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Abstract 
	  
	  
This project investigates historical changes in urban phenomena.  It questions how cities are 
made manifest through experience.  To this end the research is concerned with styles of 
appearing that have been shown by way of foot.  In questioning how cities, motility and senses 
of self intersect historically, it develops what is termed an onto-peripatetics that traces the 
genealogy of self-conscious walking - specifically forms of pedestrianism that have entered into 
writing.  It seeks to identify a deeper temporal substratum to the now routine association of 
walking and writing in romanticism and nineteenth century urban accounts.  
 
The project tracks via the Cartesian and Kantian cogitos a particular disjunction between self 
and world that has occasioned a synthesising drive exemplified by travel, observation and 
written reflection.  If in this synthesis a particular cognitive bias has prevailed over bodies, the 
research aims to think into this hiatus itself, seeking to unearth the genealogy and the 
productivity - politically, socially, philosophically – sustaining it.  The presumption pursued in 
the project has been twofold: firstly that this hiatus belongs to an enduring or rather 
reduplicating figure – Oedipus; and secondly, that both the hiatus and its namesake are 
integrally tied with Occidental urban life.  What is termed an Oedipal vector – traversing myth, 
tragedy, aesthetics, psychoanalysis, and what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari termed 
schizoanalysis – is read against an array of literary and philosophical texts addressing urban 
space.  Ranging from Plato, in whom is found a metaphysical walk, to an idiorrhythmy (Barthes 
2013) crafted by Rimbaud in his encounter with Victorian London, the project aims to account 
for a disjunctive synthesis (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000) unfolded in urban place-accounts 
historically.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Foothold, or the Onto-Peripatetic  
 
 
Would he say that there is nothing in his 
head that has not first of all been in his feet? 
Michel Serres, 1985 
 
1. The Linear Clearing 
 
This project investigates historical changes in urban phenomena.  It questions what is it that 
cities manifest - what they make apparent or cause to appear.  Equally it asks how cities are 
made manifest through experience.  To this end the research is concerned with styles of 
appearing that have been shown by way of foot.  Why this particular vantage point?  
Historically, the mobile perspective offered by walking has uniquely contributed to thinking 
through appearances.  I argue that it has also prompted broader questions of “existential 
foothold”.  This term coined by Christian Norberg-Schulz in his phenomenologically-
inflected inquiry into the nature of architecture, proposed that the built environment, in 
particular, ought to provide the basis for a “concrete” hold from which a shared “life world” 
would unfold (1980, p. 05).  Norberg-Schulz had in mind Martin Heidegger’s assertions 
concerning dwelling, in which “the primordial spatiality of being-in” involves more than 
simply being sheltered, contained or located.  Rather, at stake was a residing that involved 
putting down roots, making anywhere somewhere, organising place, and rendering it 
collectively meaningful and capable of being wholly inhabited (Heidegger 1996a, p. 99).  
However, such a Heideggerian view of being-in can be seen to be precisely what the 
excessively populous and expanding domain of cities have historically problematised.  I will 
explore the proposition that walkers observing and writing about cities have been intent on 
making salient such an existential disorientation by variously drawing near to it.  In doing so 
a reductive principle will routinely be seen to be in action: the quest for orientation rests on 
manifesting what the given obfuscates. 
Indicatively, for Norberg-Schulz a genius loci - a quality indicative of a place’s subsisting 
Stimmung or character - was too often missing in the built environment (1980, p.8).  The 
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German term Stimmung equally refers to mood and atmosphere and suggests a persisting 
background capable of being more or less attentively tuned in to.  I will argue that the 
walker, long credited with sensitivity to such Stimmung, has assumed a prophetic role in 
reading city experience, finding in it a temporal complexity that exceeds the immediately 
tangible, indeed what is representable absolutely.  Thus, the notion of “gait” referenced in 
the title of this research finds Stimmung a differential quality that is never simply manifested, 
but rather is compounded in an untimely sense and sought step-by-step.  Cities are both 
compelling and problematic precisely for this reason.  They are temporal patchworks 
holding competing fragments of built time and tracks of lived occupation in suspension, each 
variously memorialised or neglected.  To walk in such a clamourous field is to seek a 
sensible grasp or foothold amidst the disorientation of time’s touch and moving 
abandonment.  It is to form impressions amidst impressions and to seek impressions within 
the always-already-impressed.  Like the walker’s own footprint - pointedly resisted by the 
surface impersonality of cities - any vestige signals the imprint and withdrawal of a presence.  
All orientation entails accounting for such gapes in impression, just as moving forward takes 
its meaningfulness from getting back and the return journey.  Yet walking, as Michel de 
Certeau has asserted, lacks a proper place precisely because it constantly absents itself from 
the scene of its contact (1998a, p. 103).  As I will similarly argue, it is this lapse of presence 
and propriety what orientates the Occident’s quest for existential placement. 
To better think urban contemporaneity and the foothold that is its heritage, this project tracks 
a range of walking accounts sourced from European modernity.1  Observing walkers, can be 
thought to compose a series of “psychosocial types” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991) - both 
actual and fictional – who are caught up in the work of describing cities (e.g.,flâneurs, genial 
promenaders, dandies, drugged wanderers, gentleman commentators, writer-observers, city 
philanthropists, poet-drifters, bohemians, psychogeographers, voyants).  Yet, as this research 
suggests, these types populate a broader historical span that can be considered Oedipal. 
Oedipus – bridging myth, tragedy, aesthetics, psychoanalysis and what Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (2000) termed schizoanalysis – names a returning figure of pivotal cultural 
significance for the West, one that repeatedly folds the arcane into the contemporary.  Why 
though draw on Oedipus in relation to walking observers?  The hunch explored here centres 
on Michel Serres’ assertion that all cultures derive their existential specificity from the 
particular intersection they make of divergent spatial types (1982, p. 45).  For instance, “my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   This project assumes a complexity to the origins of modernity in line with Stephen Toulmin 
(1990).  Accepting broadly accepted markers of modernity – a lapses in theologically-centred 
society, the emergence of nation-states from a divided Christendom, the quest for civic agency 
over sovereign privilege, and a scientific worldview and lay-cultures arising with mass literacy and 
print technology - Toulmin questioned the historical commencement of these markers (1990, pp. 
17–21).  Standard accounts place modernity’s origins in the opening decades of the seventeenth 
century, but for Toulmin the Renaissance offers a more likely benchmark for these markers (1990, 
p. 13–16).	  
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and the Imprints of Modernity   Introduction 
 
Page 12 
body” ought not be thought of as ever “plunged into a single, specified space”; rather, it 
“works in Euclidean space [,…] sees in a projective space [,…] touches, caresses, and feels in 
a topological space [,…] suffers in another [,…] hears and communicates” in still another, 
etc. (1982, p. 44).  It is the invitation to see in bodies the condensing of multiple spatial 
varieties, and in this condensing a style indicative of a culture, which is taken up here 
specifically in relation to walking bodies.  In the case of the West, Serres thought, Oedipus 
exemplified a propensity for that culture to test its existential placedness historically against a 
backdrop of wandering and journeying, and in doing so, to define itself according to “spatial 
accidents” – in other words, an “itinerary [that] crosses spatial accidents, bifurcations, 
catastrophes, and loops” (1982, pp. 46, 48).  Journeys are eventful for they are synonymous 
with the accident, and hence for Roland Barthes, “all events are Oedipal” because they entail 
ceasing to be a “subject of the nest”, becoming with passage instead a “subject of suspense” 
(2013, p. 84).  Typically, to face an event is to confront double questions: what happened 
and what will happen next?  The “pure event”, as Deleuze has said, evacuates the present 
revolving it towards the past and the future as an incomprehensible “x” (1990, p. 63).  In 
turn, to bridge this vacancy entails a disjunctive synthesis (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000), a 
problem specifically indexed to moving forward and forgetting – something Oedipus’ name 
and ambulatory style unequivocally asserts.  Renowned for his limp, Oedipus rides a split 
gait or double footedness that fails to recognise what it portends.  What he emblematises is a 
disjunction between the visible and the sayable.  As such, the Oedipal walk is indicative of a 
flaw that is routinely inflated to a cultural generality hypostasizing a gap between origination 
and orientation. 
The “category of the between is fundamental in topology”, according to Serres (1982, p. 45), 
and offers a useful approach to exploring a disjunctive synthesis of the Oedipal kind.  It 
makes imaginable the conceptualisation of a co-presence of empirical change and figural 
continuity.  If history is routinely associated with sequential change, the recurrence of 
Oedipus calls for a topological method,2 investigating how “historical continuities” are 
conditioned by a reduplicating past (Connor, 2002).  Signally, topological methods raise the 
probability that the distant and the near, and the long past and the recent, harbour greater 
intimacy than historiography ordinarily acknowledges.  For example, Serres suggested that 
time, rather than always flowing “according to a line”, is paradoxical, flowing instead “in a 
turbulent and chaotic manner” (Serres & Latour 2013, p. 60).  Pertinently, the science of 
topology, or what its founder Leonhard Euler (1707–1783) called (after Leibniz) “the geometry 
of position”, began with a walking problem: a leisurely, if unresolved, quest by the 
eighteenth-century citizens of Königsberg to cross (only once) all seven bridges spanning the 
Pregel River in a single itinerary (Fig. 2).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Steven Connor defined topological methods as “geometry plus time, geometry given body by 
motion” (2002). 
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Figure 2. Merian-Erben, 1652. Königsberg Map. Source: Wikimedia Commons.  
 
Euler determined not only that such a walk was impossible but also that the whole question 
could be solved without direct engagement with the city, but simply through a diagram that 
reduced spatial relations to vertices and edges - what became key elements for graph theory 
(see fig. 3 and fig. 4). 
 
Figure 3. (left). Bogdan Giuşcă, 2005. “The Problem of the Seven Bridges of Königsberg”.  
Figure 4. (right). Totalt, 2012. “Graph for the Seven Bridges of Königsberg”. Source (both): Wikimedia 
Commons.  
 
What topology aimed to identify were persisting patterns in empirically varying situations, 
and in contrast to Euclidean shape rigidity, was dubbed a “‘rubber sheet’ geometry” (Rosen 
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2006, p. 4). It is on this basis, as Brian Massumi noted, that “[a]n infinite number of static 
figures may be extracted from a single topological transformation [yet the…] transformation is 
a kind of superfigure that is defined not by invariant formal properties but by continuity of 
transformation” (2002, p. 184).  That is, a particular topological structure is “transpositional” 
or vectorial, manifesting multiple determinations without itself ever being determinant (2002, 
p. 185).  
What I suggest in this project is that ‘Oedipus’, in its variant forms be seen to be the result of 
a topological vector whose transpositional valence populates the historical field with multiple 
instantiations that never exhaust it as a figure.  This situates Oedipus within a larger 
discourse, which maintains that historical linearity is itself driven by an untimely ‘vector’ 
arising specifically with the West.  In Euler’s encounter with Königsberg, two ways of 
understanding passage through the city are possible: where the locations (vertices or nodes) 
are joined by an even number of edges (bridges), a single path can be traced without 
duplication - a condition now known as “Eulerian trail” or “walk”; conversely, where the 
locations (vertices) are joined by an odd number of edges (bridges) – as was the case in 
Königsberg – no single path can be traced without duplication – a condition referred to as 
“non-Eulerian” (Lipschutz & Lipson 1997, p. 195).  Schematically, cities can be reduced, on 
one hand, to a linear trajectory simplifying urban complexity while, on the other, complexity 
itself remains in excess of its linear resolution and pulls such a transiting line back into 
complication.  In a first approximation, then, the Oedipal vector can be understood to 
function as a lever of sorts, mediating between Eulerian and non-Eulerian series as they 
manifest in urban places.  While the former can be understood to conform with what 
Certeau had referred to as an interrogative will seeking to “transform the concept of a city” 
via “a synchronic system” that accounts for all urban variation in accordance with a “profit 
system”, the latter, failing to coalesce in any singular series, suggests a wayward weave of 
“pedestrian movements” operating “below the thresholds at which visibility begins” (Certeau, 
1988a, pp. 92-97).  As such Oedipus’ broken gait can be thought to emblematise such a 
diachronic break between a Eulerian systematism and non-totalisable urban immanence. 
 
2. Peripatetic 
 
Pinpointing the urban as a founding problem for thought in the West, this research then 
proposes to pursue what it terms an “onto-peripatetic”,3 a neologism describing the nexus of 
concerns centred on a world contracted by foot.  If the term ‘onto’ registers the specifically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   Onto - “being [or] that which exists”; peripatetic – “to walk about, to walk up and down while 
teaching” OED.	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philosophical concerns of this study, the term peripatetic4 windows onto walking traditions 
in literature.5  Anne Wallace (1993), in her study of English walking and literature, 
associated peripatetic with the integrative labour described by the “literary genre called 
georgics” where walking and cultivating consolidate the ‘natural’ foundations of culture life.  
“Excusive walking”, as Wallace depicted the traversal of the countryside by leisured, 
romantic walkers, “stabilizes culture” on the basis that “walking restores the natural 
proportions of our perceptions, reconnecting us with both the physical world and the moral 
order in it” (p. 13).  Further, the “recollective perspective” ambitioned by nostalgically-
orientated,6 observing walkers “enables them to transform even sorrowful alterations […,] 
recover[ing] and preserv[ing] the good of the past” (p. 13).  Walking and writing (in 
Romantic poetry, in travelogues of observers, and in travel diaries) align perceptual labour 
with aesthetic/cultural production, in a process imagined to parallel the “material labour [of] 
farming” (pp. 11–14).  Polemically, this ‘restorative’ pedestrianism idealised pre-industrial, 
communitarian life and attributed to walking a connective potency that made it an “emblem 
of wholeness” (pp. 5-6, 13).  Along these lines, peripatetic was theorised as “a ‘timeless’ 
authorial activity” that “appears to originate text and yet be free of any origin in text”; 
remaining outside text yet generative of its narrative progression, peripatetic imparted 
authenticity and naturalism to discourse.  When “the historically specific origins of 
peripatetic theory disappears from view”, as they did with the lapse of romanticism, “walking 
becomes ideology [and…] its doctrines self-contained and unexaminable” (p. 173).  Against 
such a forgetting, this research performs a critical excavation of peripatetic, seeking to correct 
the under-investigated and under-theorised nature of walking discourses themselves by 
tracking the textual reproduction of walking.  Significantly, if peripatetic makes walking an 
emblem of ‘natural’ wholeness, it is no coincidence that it first found its authorisation in 
urban place, where it was a pivotal figure in a philosophical quests for human freedom – a 
freedom, as will be shown, that gave rise to historicity itself.        
There is another reason to question appeals to naturalism in peripatetic.  While early 
nineteenth-century romanticism and tours, maps, pamphlets and associations popularised 
walking, its championed restorative and character-building dividend was in fact a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   The etymology of the word (peri – “around” + patein – “to walk”) registers an obvious 
philosophical resonance via the Peripatetic School in Athens (335 BC – c. 269 BC) where teaching 
occurred on foot in the peripatos, or the colonnades of the Lyceum.  The labour of thought and 
dialogue threaded through the rectilinear order of the public gymnasium – previously a military 
training hall – demonstrates, in the synthesising of motility and reflection, an “impulse after unity 
of knowledge” (Ropen & Sommer cited in Wallace 1993, p. 58).  In this context where action and 
expression intend representational closure, peripatetic registers its long association with paideia, or 
education, a paidetic way or route to knowledge of the extant whole.	  
5	   An obvious contributor to this tradition is John Thelwall’s The Peripateic (1793/2009).	   	  
6	   Nostalgically-oriented in the sense that, following successive waves of rural enclosure and 
fencing commencing as early as the Tudor period (1500s), the countryside was increasingly beheld 
as a commonwealth whose communitarian basis had been alienated by private interests and, 
increasingly, techniques of agricultural industrialisation. 
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consequence of the transport revolution, which generally accelerated life (Wallace 1993, p. 
10).  In its appeal to terrain beyond cities, peripatetic follows an essentially Eulerian impulse 
emanating from, and sustained by, urban centres themselves.  The transport revolution’s 
engineering of travel emphasised an overcoming of distance.  Thus, accentuating linearity 
over local connective networks, cities aimed to transform drawn-out topography into 
topologically expedient transport conduits.  The “active negation of topography”, which 
answered, as Didier Gille argued, to “the merchant’s ideal of […] instantaneous transfer”, 
meant routing terrain with transfer “conduits” or “pipework” apposite to a “capitalist 
solution” (1986, p. 257, pp. 274–275).  Walking does not survive this solution without a 
change in its “socio-economic meaning” (Wallace 1993, p. 18): it was originally negatively 
associated with “travail”, stranger-suspicion, vagrancy, and banditry for those immured in the 
relatively closed “day’s-walk-circle” defining local rural life prior to the transport revolution 
(p. 19).  As travel became routine, walking assumed a positive valence as an exception to 
mechanised, mundane travel (pp. 18–26).  It became increasingly associated with leisure 
and the abrogation of the perceptual compromise induced by accelerated transport speed.  
Pedestrian perception came to be (and continues to be) formulaically asserted as “natural, 
slow, successive yet continuous” and therefore indicative of “superior perception, cognition, 
narration” (p. 4).  Far from simply being oppositional to mechanised travel, pedestrianism in 
the nineteenth century came to do the georgic work of “mediating between past and future, 
rural and urban, and civilizing and destructive appropriation” (p. 67).  
 
3. An Unconscious Bearing 
 
Walking-observers of countryside, riding a rationalisation of territory originating in cities, 
were party to a counter-veneration of ‘nature’ itself imaginable as a non-Eulerian reservoir 
resistive of substantial subjective purview.  Such a nature in fact was source for what 
Sigmund Freud would later call the unconscious.  As Paul Bishop (2010) has argued, Freud 
inherited a pré-romantisme built on the Sturm und Drang (“Storm and Stress”) literary 
movement.  Antithetical to Enlightenment reason, this proto-romanticism emphasised the 
primacy of individual emotion in its confrontation with a nature to which humanity was both 
“powerless to leave and powerless to enter […] deeply” (Goethe/Tobler cited in Bishop 2010, 
p. 26).  Romanticism, in search of a “reason beyond reason” (p. 28), rehearsed what can be 
understood as an alienation-possession couplet that sought to resolve the tension between 
what was taken to be a rigidly bound self and dissolved subjective states.  Ambitioned in the 
encounter with nature was a protean experience capable of yielding an elevating renewal, 
wholism or Gestalt (p. 30).  Romantic walker-writers, in part bearing a Cartesian legacy of 
corporeal alienation, and in part too Leibniz’s subsequent reformulation of that dichotomy in 
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which sensibility was understood to dissolve into ever-less conscious perception, had reason 
to seek a world beyond that of limited human vantage, to long that is for divine, infinite 
purview (p. 33).  As such, the unconscious arose first as a philosophical question regarding 
the limits and reach of consciousness.  Conversely, in Freud’s model of the unconscious 
(itself indebted to, but veering from, German romanticism and post-Kantian idealism) is 
emphasised a form of “sensory knowledge” arising with corporeality and perturbing of 
consciousness (p. 38).  Paralleling Bishop’s proposition, Jacques Rancière (2009a) similarly 
linked the Freudian unconscious to an “aesthetic unconscious” arising with German 
aesthetics and idealism.  If, as aesthetics was discovering, affect and passion were activated 
through sensibility (corporeally-centred), and not solely through cognition, it suggested that 
forms of “non-thought” persisted in “sensible materiality” and could involuntarily course 
through thought (p. 3).  For Rancière, Oedipus was himself “an exemplary hero” in this post-
Kantian context, precisely because he evidenced “a certain existential savagery of thought” 
(p. 22).  As the bearer of a “maniacal, relentless determination to know what it would be 
better not to know”, Oedipus expresses a “pathos of knowledge” in which the ‘knower’ 
“knows and does not know” and is consequently split between being both “absolutely active 
and absolutely passive” (pp. 18, 23).  On the other hand, in making Oedipus an emblem of 
psychical resolution and a benchmark against which to measure the navigation of a 
“complex” of competing desires (the reconciliation of which were key to individual and 
societal consonance), Freud set out to diffuse aspects of the aesthetic unconsciousness, 
imposing on the romantic imagination what amounted to a Eulerian will.  As Rancière put it, 
“[o]nly one thing seems to interest Freud: re-establishing the linear causality in the plot” (p. 
58).  
 
Figure 5.   Rama, 2006 (image credit). “Gradiva”, (bas-relief detail of Roman copy of 4th century 
Ancient Greek panel of Aglaurides and The Horae), Vatican Museum Chiaramonti, Rome. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons. 
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Reading Freud’s commentary, “Delusion and Dream in Jensen’s Gradiva” (1907), in which a 
fictional archaeologist (Norbert Hanold) becomes captivated by a bas-relief of a walking 
woman (Gradiva), whose gait strikes him as having a “peculiar grace” (Fig. 5), Rancière noted 
that Jensen’s fiction is remarkable for inducing a “desublimation” that released both a 
cascade of fantasies and the refutation of those fantasies by reality:  
By insisting that the fantasy is the product of his fancy and refuting his character’s 
reverie in the name of the reality principle, the novelist grants himself the capacity to 
circulate freely on both sides of the boundary between reality and fiction. (p. 59). 
By contrast, Freud rebuked Jensen for failing to decisively link the fantasy with reality (the 
coincidence between Gradiva and his companion Bertgang) and thereby activate a 
biographical and clinical valence.  The result, as Rancière put it, was that “Freud’s first 
concern is to assert a univocal story against [the…] equivocity” of fiction (p. 59).  Where 
previously Oedipus had been associated with an aesthetic unconscious and the rediscovery 
in Europe of the pathos of tragedy, Freud’s aligning of the unconscious with symptoms 
bearing “mute speech”, sought to render non-thought decipherable – in short, making the 
symptom a thing capable of speaking its own history had the effect of drawing pathos up into 
logos (pp. 61, 86).  As I will argue, this falling up of the body into truth has a long history, 
one centred by urban relations, and not coincidently, walking discourses. 
 
4. Seeing & Sounding 
 
Oedipus then has come to figure a division between representation and the un-representable 
– in psychoanalytic terms, normative desiring relations and the primal scene, or in mythical 
accounts, an excess of visibility (the limp) relative to what can be enunciated, spoken, 
thought.  Henri Lefebvre recognised precisely this disjunction in a short meditation on 
Oedipus.  Referring to old Oedipus wandering blind in the wilderness after the scandalous 
revelations at Thebes, he imagined the disgraced hero asking: 
Could I be the wanderer, the man of the eternal riddle?  Errant and erring, could my 
only truth be to wander.  Could I have punished myself for becoming fixed and for 
attempting to attain being and permanence? (1995, p.55) 
The cost of this revelation and deliverance into a wandering destiny: a thrice killing of 
“nature my mother”, losing the sight she had given all the better “that I might see […] 
wandering, mine, everyone’s” (p. 55).  Yet Lefebvre saw behind this epiphanic sight 
something more.  In his retelling of the myth, he has as a divine voice – the “voice of the 
Unseeable” – intervene: Oedipus has forgotten what is essential, that he is a fallen hero, one 
about to be risen up again at Colonus, yet his ‘prestige’ rests on violence (“murder and 
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incest”).  What he forgets in fact is that he is, all at once, “the first and the last of men”, the 
one who alienates politics from fixed territory, and in turn, makes of it a possessive and 
expansionist enterprise: 
The voice [of the Unseeable] is lost in the tumult.  A cloud of dust rises from beneath 
the feet of soldiers marching by.  They laugh at the blind old man.  They come from 
the little town [Colonus] towards which Oedipus is groping his stumbling way: Athens. 
(1995, p. 55) 
Against sovereignty arrived at via divine ordination, the democratic polis – for which Athens 
is model, and Oedipus the obscure guarantor authorising the line of leaders commencing 
with Theseus - is left instead seeking solidarity through a groping quest for consensus that 
covers over the inherent stasis or civil violence at the heart of an untethered sociality.  This 
is the problem that Oedipus bequeaths – a quest for images of solidarity capable of covering 
over a disjunction in the social (urban) body, one in fact capable of drowning out the veracity 
of authenticating speech. 
In this research, onto-peripatetic – specifically the positing of walking figures as gauge of 
urban place – is taken to be one means of suturing a lacuna between sight and voice, and 
with it, picturing political renovation.  On one hand, the walk’s tethering to narrative as a 
vehicle for revealing can be seen to participate in what Rancière considers a longstanding 
representational regime in art where the visible is subordinated to enunciation.  If in such a 
regime “speech [itself] makes visible, refers, summons the absent, reveals the hidden”, 
ambulatory action likewise dutifully goose-steps the disclosure of discourse (2009c, p. 113).  
Concomitantly, representation can be understood to effect “an ordered deployment of 
meaning” consistent with Aristotle’s overcoming of the pathos of knowledge found in tragic 
drama via the “logic of peripeteia” - a reversal leading to discovery and a belated recovery of 
knowledge (p. 115).  On the other hand, if this representational drive to coordinate poiesis 
(or making/action) and aesthesis (or perception) against the inordinate effects of pathos has its 
origins in “the world of Sophocles” and philosophy’s response to it, Rancière locates the 
collapse of representation and an emergence of the aesthetic unconscious, or what he refers 
to as the “aesthetic regime” in art, with a shift in modernity that is no less Oedipal (pp. 115-
116).  Oedipus is “the hero of this regime” precisely because he emblematises the key 
presumptions of this new domain of aesthetics – “act[ing] absolutely and suffer[ing] 
absolutely” (p. 119).  On one hand, anything becomes a subject for art (contrary to the 
codified norms of the representational regime) affording it an “absolute power” of making and 
“self-demonstration” (p. 119).  On the other, the artwork harbours an absolute passivity or 
unknowing as exemplified in the (artistic) genius who is licensed to act against every norm, 
yet is “someone who does not know what he is doing or how he does it” (p. 119).  Bearing 
the polarities of knowledge-ignorance and action-suffering, artistic phenomena condense 
both an intellectual will to bring forth ‘a work’ and its other – an interminable battle with an 
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opaque given that chaotically grounds it (p. 121).  In this context no utterance can escape 
the “inertia of the visible that comes to paralyze action and absorb meaning” (p. 121).  
Where in the representational regime speech codified the seen, rendering it actionable and 
therefore comprehensible, in the aesthetic regime speech gives way to an interminable 
description (the novelistic realism of Flaubert is exemplary for Rancière) that “deprives action 
of its powers of intelligibility” (p. 121).   
If Oedipus figures this changeover, so too is walking decisive; no longer is it a prop for 
discourse, but becomes a mechanism for plumbing a rupture between what can be said and 
what is seen.  The emergence of peripatetic - or walking made an “aesthetic practice” 
(Careri 2004) – will be shown to rest on a gestural economy of self-possession and that 
economy’s lapse.  With Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850) for instance (himself a key initiator 
of descriptive literary realism), the walking gait, as he argued in the “Theorie de la Marche”, 
is a last frontier of legitimate enquiry and has the potential to decisively tell, via a gestural 
semiotics, the tell-tale character of passing urban persons.  As Peter Brooks noted, “the 
‘Theorie’ is a demonstration of how to read the latent text in and through the manifest text” 
(2004, p. 9; emphasis in original), but it marks too a disjunction between the latent and the 
manifest, the visible and what can be said of and through it.  For Giorgio Agamben, Balzac 
announces in the ‘Theorie’ that step beyond which “the Western bourgeoisie [loses…] its 
gestures”, in other words a representable continuum between corporeal appearance and 
‘interior’ states, thereby surrendering to a “generalised catastrophe of the sphere of gestures” 
(2000, pp. 49, 51).  While the charting of interior terrain takes the route of psychologies 
ambiguously tethered to corporeality, knowledge of human motility was sought by a cluster 
of others including Gilles de la Tourette, Jean-Martin Charcot, Eadweard Muybridge, Étienne-
Jules Marey, and Frederick Winslow Taylor, etc. (2000 pp. 50-51).  As such the image of the 
walk (along with a cluster of other motile gestures) was decomposed via ever smaller 
temporal pauses or gaps introduced into the gestural and significatory coherence of 
movement.  The walker, that quotidian genius who does without knowing, in fact yields 
under these scopic technologies a plethora of indecipherable gestures so diverse, as Agamben 
noted, that it starts to look like “at some point everybody had lost control of their gestures” 
completely (pp. 52-53).  The aesthetic regime then can be thought to toy with a tension 
between the decisive gesture – an ameliorating gestalt or whole overflying what persists at the 
limits of representation – and paratactic gestures whose separating rationality court a “grand 
parataxis” – that place where, as Rancière put it, “the sentence [or any discursive 
intelligibility] sinks into the scream and meaning into the rhythm of bodily states” (2009c, p. 
45).  Between “Schizophrenia and consensus”, Oedipal, ‘aesthetic’ modernity plays out 
across a domain without “common measure” via a politics sounding for signs of binding 
commonality (p. 45).  
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As such, it is clear that technical infrastructures and practices are crucial in the aesthetic 
regime to the maintenance of social measure and that mobile technologies have come to fix 
bodies on the move into ubiquitous, electromagnetic fields and networked solidarities.  On 
the other hand, what this project undertakes is an enquiry into one particular technology that 
is prerequisite to the aesthetic regime – what Rancière (2009c) termed the “sentence-image”, 
or the constellation of ways in which image and word are intersected in the gauging of the 
soundness of the in-common founding cities.  Scopic techniques in this sense are ancestor to 
a much older visualising analytic, one traceable to a certain paratactic seeing envisaged by 
Plato that breaks up lived temporality in pursuit of atemporal, metaphysical certainties. 
Similarly, representational and aesthetic regimes can be paralleled with Aristotle’s 
demarcation between the kath’olon, or a universal totality spoken through poetry, and the 
kath’ekaston, or “little perceptions” of empirical succession drawn out by historians (Rancière 
2009c, p. 121).  In the latter, incremental steps, blind to any overarching order, and 
confronting a chaos preceding the orderly distribution of things, acquire orientation and 
common measure only laboriously.  History, both induced by metaphysics and driven by the 
loss of faith in the existential certainties it promised, pointedly arises with the confrontation of 
mythos and logos staged in tragedy – itself the originator of the sentence-image and a form of 
consciousness capable of being called Oedipal.  With it is born the characterising vacillation 
in onto-peripatetic between immanence and transcendence, between knowledge made up on 
the hoof and its other – an absolute sounding of all that is. 
 
5. Mythical Bearing 
 
Modernity then can be understood as inseparable from a pathos in knowledge requiring an 
induction into what is unknown in knowing itself.  Rediscovering Oedipus amounted to a 
reinstatement of this particular topological knot, no less than it gave rise to topology itself as a 
science (Serres 1982, p. 53).  For Serres, topology voices “the teeming multiplicity of diverse 
and original spaces”, a “barbarous topology” proper to myth and otherwise concealed by a 
Euclidean space of work (p. 53).  In pursuing an onto-peripatetic, it will thus be necessary to 
explore in some detail the mythical underpinnings of the ideal of a unitary, Euclidean space – 
a space, as Serres puts it, “of [all] possible transports [and…] always possible transfers” (p. 
52).  If European culture arising from antiquity is characterised by its scything breaks and 
ameliorative joints (for which Oedipus is figure), it is not incidental that the mythical Oedipus 
was “the last descendant of the Spartoï, [themselves figures] of disseminated spaces, of 
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catastrophic separation, of the continuous that must be recovered” (p. 47).7  Thebes’ 
founding on the soil warred over by the Spartoï made it an incongruously knitted-together 
place, one in which barbarous energies had to be forcibly synthesised.  Greek cities were 
themselves generally “dispersed, reciprocally closed insularities [or…] islands” (p. 51).  
Nevertheless, in myth they were bound into a unitary divine realm where the “gods are 
encountered as the same – here, everywhere – because in their other space they enjoy a 
single space” (p. 51).  Oedipus, it will be argued, was key amongst a range of figures 
trespassing on and transgressing this single space, and overturning what Jan Patočka has 
termed an “oikoumenē”, or cosmic “household” conjoining the “unequal community” of 
mortals and immortals (1996, p. 35).  The famous confrontation between Oedipus and the 
Sphinx at the gates of Thebes suggests the breaking of a divine monopoly over homogeneous 
space.  Logistical in nature, the conflict opened the city to an outside cleared of 
mythological impedance for which the Sphinx or “Triple-goddess” is emblematic (Graves 
1992, 105.3).  
For Jean-Joseph Goux, the scene at Thebes’ gate points to the highly “irregular form” of the 
Oedipus myth itself: the battle with divine powers is won not on the basis of a physical 
contest and an initiation into a royal investiture with “magicoreligious” ties, but through 
intellection alone.8  In ending the Sphinx’s riddling hold over the city by means other than a 
physical confrontation borrowing preternatural powers, Oedipus portends Greek humanity’s 
crossing into a post-traditional, “anthropocenter[ed]” world, where human “auto-reflection” 
and “self- consciousness” become the new measure (Goux 1993, pp. 119–120).  The 
opening of the city to rule other than through traditional, initiatory prerogative invoked the 
spectre of a secular, spatial continuity of a Eulerian type.  The myth plays out the terrible 
consequences of such hubris, reasserting a “magicoreligious” hold and non-Eulerian 
impedance to anthropocentered flight.  Nevertheless, if Protagoras’ controversial claim that 
“man is the measure of all things” parallels Oedipus’, and the substitution of intellect and 
self-government for divine mediation finds expression in a figure “standing erect amidst 
phenomena”, then Oedipus’ limping gait is a reminder, long before the story runs its course, 
that the demythologization implied by self-consciousness does not arise without a returning 
perturbation (p. 131).  The “anthropological decision that brings men out of projective 
magic”, casting them beyond “cryptophoric symbolism” generally, risked opening up a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	   The Spartoï or “Sown Men” arose from the ground where Cadmus, the wanderer from the east 
and the bearer of the Phoenician alphabet, had buried the teeth of a serpent guarding the Spring of 
Ares (see Graves 1992, 58.5 & 59.a). 
8	   In the case of Oedipus, as Goux indicated, even if Laius’ desire to pre-empt the threat of the 
newly born Oedipus by riveting his ankles together and abandoning him to the wilderness to die 
mirrors the common royal antagonism in myths towards infant rivals, everything else about the 
Oedipus myth is reversed.  Thus, he achieves royal investiture not by way of a physical contest 
with a monster – a contest typically won on condition of benevolent divine intervention through 
various initiatory steps – but through intellectual combat in a single, decisive instance that induces 
the Sphinx to enact her own suicide (1993, p. 11). 
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disenchanted world where the absence of an externally directed locus for cryptophoric 
activity delivered an existential void whose address was increasingly confronted inwardly 
(pp. 130–131).  
Oedipus became an emblematic figure of inner torment and wandering, particularly in 
Sophocles’ remaking of the myth as tragic drama.  Having inherited Thebes on seemingly 
heroic terms, he is called upon to solve the cause of the city’s consumption by plague.  
Staged at the city’s very heart - in the palace - a mytho-religious transgression is unfolded.  
Determined to resolve the calamity, Oedipus enters into a dogged investigation and adopts, 
in contravention of his station, the role of an interpretive priest seeking to uncover a polluting 
figure – an incautious speculation that culminates in his own exposure as the defiler.  At 
stake in the tragedy is the assumption of a sacrilegious position that headstrongly seeks a 
pharmakos, or scapegoat (a religious mechanism for expunging defilement9), but which 
consequently stumbles into what ought to have remained unknown (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 
pp. 233).  Sophocles’ tale warns of “the madness of knowledge”, its immoderate “desire for 
appropriation” and its “demented quest for a consciousness”, indeed the “madness of self-
consciousness” (Hölderlin cited in Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, pp. 233–234).  While tragedy 
arose as a cathartic mechanism for excising disproportionate speculation, the drama 
nevertheless drew questions of divine providence from a distant and unitary divine realm into 
the heart of urban life (p. 233).  This “drive for knowledge” corresponds with what the 
Greeks termed alētheia, an unveiling or truth-seeking whose origin lay with “magicoreligious” 
practices and oral recitation (Detienne 1996, pp. 42–43).  Yet by the fifth century BC, a 
devaluing of alētheia occurred, following an isonomia (or democratic equality) giving rise to 
secular speech, or what Marcel Detienne identified as apatē – speech tied to the temporally 
immediate, contingent events and doxa arising with the agora.  The savage drive to unveil, 
exemplified by Oedipus, corresponded with alētheia’s unmooring from its magicoreligious 
grounding and it being increasingly pegged to the vicissitudes of apatē.  Underwriting the 
everyday speech of apatē, as Deleuze and Guattari (1991) have suggested, was a 
deterritorialised societal (friendship) and mercantile (trade) immanence (inaugurated by the 
Greek poleis in contradistinction to the imperial strictures of the Mycenaean warrior 
aristocracy from which they had arisen and which they subsequently stood against when 
faced with the Achaemenid Persian Empire. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   As René Girard notes, “the pharmokon in classical Greek means both poison and the antidote 
for poison, both sickness and cure” (1979, p. 95).  As “polluted object[s]” (1979, p. 95), first 
pampered and then elevated and paraded through the polis, the pharmakoi, were deemed to carry 
the misfortunes of the populous, and their final expulsion was thought to restore the fortuity and 
solidarity of the community generally. The high-low intersection implicate in this exiling takes on 
a particular poignancy in the case of Oedipus and the problem of Athens as a “polis tyrannos” in 
the context of democratic rule.	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Concomitantly, if Socrates can be recognised as having made the everyday spaces of the polis 
an arena for intersecting alētheia and apatē,10 he provides a critical point of orientation for 
understanding the tradition of observing-walkers arising in modernity.  As the historical 
bearer of an insistent drive to know, to reflect, and to examine for truth, he spanned the 
transition from oral to written philosophical culture, as both the “representative of ancient 
divine world” and instigator of that world’s perpetuation “through new methods” (Patočka 
2002, pp. 85–87).  These new methods, centred on casual, public encounters seeking to 
unveil the inner motivations of self and others, established the everyday urban as an 
interrogative realm where societal scapegoating ceased being individually apportioned and 
became applicable to every person.  Following Socrates’ trial and sentencing to death for the 
corruption of youth and blasphemy, Plato remade him a benchmark of philosophical inquiry 
while ambitioning a polis properly fit for philosophy (p. 88).  In the Republic, this 
rehabilitation gives rise, as Chapter 1 will develop, to a metaphysical walk, a means for 
integrating pathos with logos via an “upward way” whose ideal is a “head-city” (Sallis 1996, 
1999).  This walk, spanning mythology and reason, reactively corrected Oedipus and 
Socrates’ perilous will to unveil and, as will be shown, while purporting to advance an anti-
Oedipal orientation, remains intimately tied to Oedipus.  
If philosophy originally trespassed on the domain of “clarity” apposite to the gods (“clarity 
about the whole, which is not ours”), then Oedipus can be thought of as a proto-
philosophical figure in whom “the structure of discovering” necessary to philosophy’s 
breaking with the mythical knowledge of the unequal community of mortals and immortals is 
first prefigured (Patočka 2002, p. 60).  In such a state, wandering, rather than clarity, is the 
“fundamental trait proper to man as such” (pp. 56–60).  The Oedipus of myth was an 
archetypal figure revealing a propensity for humans to stumble into “knowledge of good and 
evil” precariously (p. 49).  Hence, the “ground upon which he stands [is never…] solid, 
[and] can at any moment show itself to be the very opposite” (p. 49).  Metaphysics will be 
shown attempting to reconstruct that ground and making a place from where the good could 
be perennially reached.  Insofar as metaphysics sought to measure and moderate the 
speculative excesses of the limping wanderer, it implanted, late in the history of the Greek 
polis, a political ideal that aligned the care of the soul with a care of the community.  The 
perfectibility of the soul was seen as entirely commensurate with a perfectibility of collective 
life, thus the city founded on philosophical reflection amounted to a quest for a “city of 
justice” harmonising divine and human aspirations (p. 89).  Western Europe builds out of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   The polis becomes the site for uncovering and hunting out falsehoods, in a shift from political to 
ethical parrhēsia (truth-telling) following a crisis in Athenian democracy, as Michel Foucault has 
explored.  Foucault notes Plato’s depiction of the “bad democratic city” as that “which is all 
motely, fragmented, and dispersed between different interests, passions, and individuals who do 
not agree with each other. This bad democratic city practices parrhēsia: anyone can say anything” 
(2011, p. 10).	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model of idealised urban life, seeded by a “care of the soul” for which an invention of 
universals and an overcoming of temporal vicissitude were central (pp. 89, 222).  Yet the 
history of the West is inseparable from a wound that is integral to this ideal, and for which a 
return to wandering and temporal perturbance are chronic.  
As Chapter 2 will show, modernity is marked by a caesura between divine and human wills 
and arises as a disarticulation of metaphysical and theological ambition subsequent to the 
recognition of the impossibility (or undesirability) of a Eulerian trail between worldly and 
transcendent realms.  As Antonio Negri (2007) argued, it was René Descartes who founded a 
“metaphysics of separation”, to temper religious over-assertion and to mediate between 
sovereign power and the multitude, while forwarding mercantile interests in the form of an 
incipient bourgeoisie.  Yet in the positing of a hyperbolic consciousness, Descartes made 
Oedipus’ strategy his own and pursued it to “ontological purity” (Goux 1993, p. 159).  On 
the other hand, if Kant sought to truncate a persisting theological legacy in Descartes with his 
“critique of metaphysics”, he ironically also set the stage for a return to philosophical origins 
by German idealism - that is, a return to Oedipal pathos and the problematizing of 
consciousness.  Consistent with a disjunctive synthesis, Oedipus “appears in order to resolve 
a crisis”, “like a pharmakos” to channel or reroute perturbations (p. 9).  Post-Kantian 
philosophy rejected Kant’s foreclosure on access to absolute knowledge and was left 
contending, by means other than self-consciousness, with the question of the totality of what 
is.  Hence, if Oedipus was for Nietzsche “the last man” and, by extension, “the last 
philosopher”, the need to bypass “an exhausted self-consciousness” was at stake (Lacoue-
Labarthe 2003, p. 14).  On this basis Occidental philosophy has never been other than 
Oedipal and if it has validated consciousness over corporeality and the psyche, this study 
emphasises a downward path that channels, by way of uncertain footwork and foothold, the 
hiatus that Oedipus was brought into being to make imaginable and uncertainly suture. 
 
6. City | Time 
 
In cities, walkers not only find a compressed temporal field transported by urban fabric, their 
very apprehension of that field is defined by temporal syntheses availing perception.  Against 
a rationality and governmental homogeneity applied to such places, the urban as object field 
fluoresces with the sheer polyvocality of perspectives and phantoms it sustains.  Indeed, 
urban place is only liveable, as Certeau has suggested, on the basis of opaquely ambivalent 
oddities, “legacy objects” and ghosting memories that open variously fathomable depths in 
the present (1998b, pp. 134-135).  Exhibiting a delinquent historiography (as opposed to an 
ordered museological temporality), cites stream with dubious and “indecipherable pasts” that 
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inhabit much as “the gods of antiquity” found an increasingly disturbed pantheon in the 
emerging life of poleis (p. 116).  Such ghosting in fact testifies, as this study examines, to a 
lapse in placement of the projective magic of myth and an external cryptophoric domain.  
As the last descendant of the Spartoï, and therefore the carrier of a rupture in being, Oedipus 
emblematised an urban will seeking freedom from autochthony and the mythological 
grounding of Greek cultural life.  He is also the transmitter inwards of terrors, monsters and 
the world’s mysteries.  The “tragic universe” of the Classical Greek city states, as Jean-Pierre 
Vernant & Pierre Vidal-Naquet have defined, was a transitional place merging the old world 
of myth with a new urban sociality, that in turn made imaginable perturbed interior states 
(1990, p. 7).  In Oedipus’ case, the duality between city and mythic consciousness, between 
heroic and contemporary figures, were given corporeal expression with “discourse and 
abstraction lag[ging] behind the body which [already] knows how to act and practices what 
the mouth cannot say” (Serres 2008, pp. 258-259).  This shift from myth to an uneasy 
urbanism was depicted in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus,11 where Athens is portrayed as a 
polis tyrannos routinely over-asserting itself through imperial policy (Knox 1957, p. 61).  In a 
move that is defining for this research, when Oedipus walks onto the stage, it is the city itself 
that he plays.  As Bernard Knox has written:  
Oedipus son of Laius, a Theban mythical hero, has been transformed into an 
Athenian and contemporary figure. Not, however, a specific individual [for the…] 
resemblance [is] to Athens itself, in all its greatness, its power, its intelligence, and 
also its serious defects. The audience which watched Oedipus in the theater of 
Dionysus was watching itself (p. 77). 
This insight allows Oedipus to be read, beyond his typical association with wrought 
subjective states, as a figure integrally merged with urban phenomena.  He in fact portends 
the possibility of a psycho-historical rendering of the urban.  This innovation prompts a raft 
of considerations carrying through to modernity: 
• Imperial over-assertion equated to a troubling, centrifugal dynamic for the Greeks.  
It dangerously parried with “imperial or barbarian transcendence” at odds with a 
broader drive towards the immanence of Greek urban social life (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1998, p. 136).  Favouring democratic isonomia or equality and autarkic 
self-determination, the polis nevertheless carried the seeds of its own divagation: the 
success of fifth century urban expansion increasingly demanded “distant trading” and 
“a broadly extroverted economy” (Alliez 1996, pp. 5-6).  To the extent that the reign 
of democratic equals was vested in models of political interaction and commutative 
justice, its aim was to correct “aberrant movements that produce inequity” (p. xvi).  
Yet the city’s internal economy, modelled on the household or oikonomia, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   Variously known as Oedipus Rex or Oedipus the King, Oedipus Tyrannus is one of three 
Theban plays written by Sophocles (c. 497–406BC).	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recognised as establishing a ‘natural’ relationship with money – “the number of 
need” (p. 05) and “an instrument of equalization” (Goux 1996, p. 148) – came 
unstuck with external trading.  It brought into play what Aristotle termed 
“chrematistics”, or the art of producing wealth from circulating money.  By 
“wrench[ing] money from its mediating condition”, as Alliez recognised, it 
“withdraws exchange from the law of equivalences” (1996, p. 03).  Knowing no 
bounds, the profit motive made of the regularity/circularity of sublunary time and its 
direct correlation with need, an excessive temporality, one as Alliez emphasized, that 
“converts time [itself] into the money form”, and in the manner of compounding 
interest, rendered it infinite (1996, p. xvii).  As such, it portends an unmooring of 
time that by modernity became the precondition for market society and capitalist 
deterritorialisation. 
• The wrenching of time from eternality, itself held to be the harbourer of truth, 
paralleled a problem in truth-saying pivotal to the democratic polis.  With an 
increasing association of political parrhēsia with sophistic inflation and persuasion, 
there was call for a new ethical parrhēsia or internal sourcing of truth.  As such, 
Oedipus-Athens can be considered to be the bearer of a runaway temporality 
distressing the Apollonian edict to “know thyself”.  As embodiment of both an 
erratic temporality and despotism, Oedipus is cast “apolis” (Vernant 1990, p. 122).  
Yet the merging of Oedipus with the city in tragic drama, suggests that the urban (and 
the social solidarity it potentiates) may be read as an entity imagined to have 
wandered from itself.  Concomitantly, if the West can be thought of as Oedipal 
(Oedipus is the “name for the West”, Lacoue-Labarthe 2003, p. 8), it is so on the 
basis of having succumb to an aberrant temporality that makes urbanism itself a 
persistent problem for knowing.  
• Urban perturbation is a motor for history.  As Patočka argued, if “history is the 
domain of acting in freedom”, this acting arises specifically in the context of the 
Greek polis and its break with an existential “comportment” or orientation, defined 
by an oikoumenē where cyclic patterns prevail and where productive effort involves 
“‘living just to live’” (1996, pp. 140, 144).  The polis set in play a fundamentally 
different existential orientation, one that established a community founded in 
politics, and forced to face up to an “upheaval” or “shaking” of certainties – in short, 
it meant living “in the mode of questioning” (pp. 141–144).  Moreover, the attuning 
of the polis to “radical questioning” was instrumental in founding a European project 
animated by the “problematic nature of meaning”, and “history in the strict sense 
emerged first as western history” before “becoming universal and global” (p. 143).  
Not by necessity, but in a “history of contingencies” as Deleuze and Guattari said, 
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capitalist immanence and the decoded social body channel “universal Oedipus”, 
whose internalisation and privatisation of otherwise collectivised flows arrives last 
(2000, pp. 140-144). 
• The temporal problematic arising with Greek immanence unfolds an insistent linear 
drive to suture a hiatus in existential meaning.  In this context, urban globalization, 
or what Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) has referred to as a becoming-urban of the planet, is 
symptomatic of a mode of being whose likeness is indicative of Oedipal wandering.  
As such, “The world has lost its capacity ‘to form a world’ [and..] it seems only to 
have gained that capacity of proliferating, to the extent of its means, the ‘unworld’” 
(p. 34).  This un-worlding is indicative of a “death drive” that wants to bring the 
world’s becoming into full and final view and therefore profitable possession (pp. 42-
43). If telos and eschaton (direction and end of time) impart to existence an ethos and 
a habitus, the principle of freedom defining the West might instead be apprehended 
in the mode of a world-creation arising immanently and “without-reason” pp. 45-47). 
Maintained in the mode of fluctuating “enjoyment”, rather than in “either having or 
being”, it might unfold a world-creation released from a tragic relation to knowledge, 
itself caught between disavowed passivity and insistent action (p. 45).  Walking 
accounts, it is suggested in what follows, variously attempt such enjoyment, for 
which Oedipus’ blind sequestering to a desert wilderness (post the tragedy of Thebes 
and prior to its recuperation at Colonus), makes imaginable a going-beyond tragic 
consciousness towards a world and peopling given through “growth of/from nothing” 
(p. 52-53). 
 
7. Assaying the Walk 
 
These questions of immanence and its check by transcendence, the lapse of communal and 
gregarious foundation induced by a historicity arising with urban life, and the emergence of 
the figure of desire at the heart of urban experience frame this project.  In response, the 
project takes the form of an essay to better capture the chronically shifty, discursive traditions 
considered here.  Taking the Oedipal vector as itself a “shifter” in the sense Réda Bensmaïa 
has used the term – in other words, as an “‘operatory’ power[…] that is not homogeneous 
with any preconceived rhetorical schema” (1987, p. 99; emphasis in original) – the method of 
inquiry here roams through urban, literary and philosophical sources consistent with the 
broadly ambulatory nature of the essay form (p. 90).  Roland Barthes has contrasted what he 
called the essay’s “step-by-step method” - that utilises “slowness and dispersion” along with a 
“systematic use of digression” - with the dissertation structure that excessively closes and 
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contains (1974, pp. 12-13).  Bensmaïa, extending this approach, saw in the essay form a 
“general economy” that collapses the “rhetorical coded text” through a commitment to 
“complication” – via its “open form”, its “informal tone”, its testing (if non-exhaustive 
approach), and its “taste for mélanges” (1987, pp. 95–98).  For Barthes and Bensmaïa, 
Michel de Montaigne was the early modern essayist who best captured the “unclassifiable 
text”, fixing in one place “poetics, rhetoric, aesthetics, history, [and…] philosophy” (p. 98).  
Crafting what has been termed the “Book of the Self”, Montaigne’s essays proffer an 
encountering persona who possesses a “‘type of memory, both very archaic and very 
modern’”, and who fuses “‘the events of an individual life” with “the recollection of an entire 
culture’” (p. 98).  Oedipus similarly bears the memory of a culture in a self found to roam 
between inner and outer registers, between “subjectivation and objectification”, or between 
being known and “othered” as will be argued below by way of Tom Conley’s consideration 
of early topographic literatures (2011, p. 07).  Such a self, at once out of place and 
condensing “two sites in one” (p. 08), gains substance only through textual description, or 
what Montaigne called “the flimsy medium of words” (2003, p. 425).   
On the other hand, Cartesianism consecrates modernity with a subject tuned to its own 
immanent experience on the basis of forgetting its piecemeal, temporal assembly.  
Conversely, across a range of literary and philosophical discourses, walking will be shown to 
bring forward – even in Descartes - an exorbitant temporality on which this forgetting is 
floated.  What I term the speculative or observational walk, like the essay as a “reflective 
text”, will be shown to respond, despite a fundamental openness, to what Montaigne termed 
a “supernumerary emblem” or binding thread bringing together its “ill-fitted patchwork” 
(Montaigne quoted in Bensmaïa 1987, p. 9-11).  Contrary to Eulerian line-work, this emblem 
operates in a non-Eulerian manner, following a “logic of complicatio”, entangling, derailing, 
and going off-course (p. 13).  In explicating this emblem or “sufficient word”, Bensmaïa 
drew on Deleuze’s notion of the “dark precursor” or “differenciator” as a lever or shifter that 
couples bordering, heterogeneous series (p. 11; also see Deleuze 1994, p. 117).  Released 
by the dark precursor is everything that keeps substantive subjectivities in check: 
The system is populated by subjects, both larval subjects and passive selves: passive 
selves because they are indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and 
resonances; larval subjects because they are the supports or the patients of the 
dynamisms. In effect, a pure spatio-temporal dynamism, with its necessary 
participation in the forced movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the 
liveable […]. (Deleuze 1994, p. 118) 
Spatio-temporal dynamism in this sense points to an absence of all foothold and a fallout in 
identity.  For Bensmaïa, the body is closest to this atopic placement.  Building on 
Montaigne’s supernumerary emblem, Barthes referred to the body as a “mana word”, a word 
that can never presuppose a definitive form for “we have several bodies” each overlapping, 
mingling, condensing antitheses and contrary inscriptions (1987, p. 15).  Moreover, if “the 
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body is neither a simple origin nor a substance, but a site of atopia [then it is...] the site where 
one can change ‘postures’ and ‘perspectives’ endlessly without any of them being obliged to 
submit to a hierarchy or unified subject” (p. 16).  The walk will thus be taken as the 
supernumerary emblem colliding and shifting divergent series: the page and the city, the city 
and territory, the body and the soul/psyche, the self and its larval subjects, and, most 
significantly, surfaces and depths.  The foot as dark precursor – itself always doubling and 
dividing placement - will be found to assay not simply descriptive and given ground but also 
intensive states and phantasms indicative of what Deleuze, following Kant, called the “object 
= x” (1994, pp. 103, 317), a formula describing the undoing of every Eulerian series.  
 
8. Itinerary 
 
The project is presented in two parts – Diagramming and Spacing.  The first part sketches in 
abstract an overview of both the classical period and its interconnections with modernity.  
The second part seeks a more detailed encounter with walkers and territory spanning the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.  Together they aim to chart the origins of the 
relatively well-canvased association of walking and writing in romanticism and nineteenth 
century urban accounts – ‘texts’ that in fact anticipate a decisive crossover from 
representational to aesthetic regimes.  While mixing literary sources, empirical details, 
infrastructural givens, cultural predicates and philosophical speculation, the task undertaken 
here is primarily to produce a theoretical armature for reevaluating and deepening the grasp 
on walking discourses that have otherwise too readily bolstered appeals to naturalism, 
wholeness and non-alienated experience.  While drawing on phenomenologically inflected 
approaches, the project, in line with much poststructuralist thought, less foregrounds an 
observing consciousness than it finds in footwork and foothold a contributing genesis that 
events experience as such. 
Chapter 1 develops what is termed the Metaphysical Walk by way of Plato’s Republic.  
Building on John Sallis’ (1996) reading of the narrative structure of the dialogue unfolding in 
Athens’ port town of Piraeus, the chapter charts Plato’s indirect, but decisive, encounter with 
the Oedipus of tragedy and his parrying with a “head city” against which he enacts a 
thirdness or what I refer to as the levering action of corporeality necessary to the production 
of an upward way and a transcending good proper to the cosmological soul.  This soul, itself 
construed as a tripartite, entity, only partially human, will be shown to potentiate a 
synthesised ‘whole’ but also a series of imbalances giving rise to an array of imperfect 
societies, of which the tyrannous or Oedipal version comes to predominate in modernity.  
The chapter traces the shift from a magico-religious world centred on the palace to an urban 
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one defined by dialogue speech, and with this shift, a contest between sacred and secular 
modes of knowing typified by alētheia and apatē.  Key in this discussion will be the 
production of written monologue out of dialogic exchange, for which historical Socrates, as 
originator of Socratic questioning and a certain division in thought itself, is decisive for 
Platonism.  Divided thought and its recuperation by a teranthropic soul, it is proposed, are 
key to modernity’s ‘discovery’ of the psyche and the unconscious. 
Chapter 2 extends questions of philosophical freedom (chorismos or rupture) and its 
metaphysical management.  Where metaphysics sought stabilising orientation in 
monological speech indexed to transcendence beyond the subject, it is argued, following 
Lacoue-Labarthe (1989, 2003), that modernity sought foundation in standing figures situated 
in the here and now, figures whose type-ology were held to veil or circumscribe adequation 
and truth.  In the resulting clamour of types, Oedipus stands as an ur-figure hypostasising the 
problem of humanization and its upright installation against the erosive forces of desire, 
mimesis, image-flow and time.  In finite figures are invested a general will seeking, beyond 
Greek concerns over inordinate numbers, overwhelming expanse and truth in phenomenal 
appearance, knowledge unfettered by a theological ground.  Yet grasping towards the 
infinite to better shut out its exorbitant implications, meant a kind of mirror discovery, one in 
which an islanding off of the self to better manage a world at large uncovers an inward 
infinitude capable of undoing all standing – what Lacoue-Labarthe (1989) called the “mimetic 
lay”, Lyotard (2011) the figural, and Deleuze (1990) the “otherwise-Other” or phantasms.  
Reading between aspects of modernity and classical sources, the chapter tracks Plato’s quest 
to overcome mimesis via written self-authoring.  Following Sallis (2000) in his consideration 
of the history of the image and imagination, the chapter links walking events with double-
seeing - a strategy for stepping outside the present as image-capture in pursuit of managed 
epiphanic states (as opposed to ecstatic ones).  If for Sallis this sets up in Platonism an image 
trail ever in search of an original, the path to pure intelligibility that the search mandates, in 
fact portends a crossover into pure simulacra, a world set absolutely afloat on images broken 
free of signification.  As such the world can be imagined to vacillate between two strata 
historically contracted within the notion of the imagination itself - imaginato and phantasia.  
An exploration of this split beholding prepares for the detailed chapters of Part Two. 
Chapter 3 maps the complex commencement of modernity poised between the Renaissance 
and the early seventeenth century.  It focuses specifically on what Goux (1993) termed the 
“Oedipean or Cartesian epoch”, reading Descartes back into the Renaissance by way of 
Negri (2007) and his recognition of a “metaphysics of separation” at the heart of a “political 
ontology” founding incipient bourgeois hegemony.  Descartes’ pitching of an “intellectual 
memory” over a corporeal one will be shown to define a shift in place-encounter from the 
Renaissance topographer to the seventeenth century cartographer, one that established a new 
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relationship with knowledge and therefore truth.  What Foucault (2004) called the 
“Cartesian moment” – the threshold at which knowledge was no longer predicated on 
transformations in the knower – will be linked with Agamben’s (1993) consideration of a 
generalised problem with experience in modernity, one centred on relationships with death.  
In contrast to the metaphysical walk, for which death was no barrier to knowledge, Descartes 
can be thought to swing the ladder of classical experience-knowledge ninety degrees 
substituting a brisk and direct stroll amidst the experiences furnished by the finite world for 
the upward way.  Considering Descartes’ letter to Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac in 1631 
extolling the virtues of Amsterdam for philosophical and scientific thought, the chapter 
uncovers in Descartes’ urban depiction a psychical correlate to the political ontology of the 
emerging bourgeoisie.  Oedipus, the maker of ameliorating surfaces, will be shown to open 
up a phantasmatic relationship with city space, one playing between Thanatos and Eros, or 
surveying and fusion.  
Chapter 4 considers the question of a country-city division arising in the eighteen century 
against a will towards maternal initiation, an inauguration that is into nature.  It argues that 
an overcoming of the division between production and generation can be read through a 
variant of the metaphysical walk - what can be thought of as modernity’s promenade 
métaphysique, a rambling quest for communality arising when the agorien circle, or city-
space proper, is broken.  Considering a range of temporal factors underpinning 
philosophical and poetic discourses, particularly by way of Jean-Jacque Rousseau and 
Emmanuel Kant, the chapter thinks through with what Alliez (1996) has referred to as an 
internalization of time or subjectivation and, in turn, Deleuze’s (1990, 1994) development of 
three temporal syntheses underwriting, and in part correcting, Kant’s positing of a split 
subject.  The rediscovery of a tragic sensibility by German Idealism – specifically by way of 
Hölderlin - is used to read back into romantic accounts of walking and more generally 
Oedipus itself, a tripartite structure that counter-actualises the Platonic soul.  To the extent 
that this structure accounts for a certain undoing of temporal sequentiality – time put off its 
hinge in fact – the chapter concludes with an examination of the other of consciousness – 
‘the body’ as Klossowski (1997) found it to be.  His own schema for a tripartite soul 
composed of impulse-intensities, phantasms and simulacra-stereotypes will be shown to offer 
one way in which walking discourses way be seen to congress with non-representational life. 
Chapter 5 begins where the natal or the ideal of the national body (otherwise riven by a 
demarcation between owners of capital/property and those without) comes undone – in the 
nineteenth century, industrialising cities.  As reservoir of working populations mobilised by 
rural disenfranchisement, such cities were locales of sustained identificatory revision no less 
than economic deterritorialisation.  Exploring the invention of subjectivities, for which the 
flâneur was but one of an array of new urban physiologies, the poetic rendering of Paris by 
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Charles Baudelaire is followed via a series of commentators including Walter Benjamin 
(1999, 2002), Michel Butor (1969), Charles Taylor (2006) and Jerrold Seigel (1986).  Evident 
in Baudelaire is an onto-peripatetic pursuant of totalized, whole experience, but one 
reversing the upward drive of the metaphysical walk and the horizonal drift of an agrarian 
promenade métaphysique.  In a paean to an inorganic, crystalline world eschewing all 
Edenic reference, Baudelaire turns to the crowded streets in pursuit of a kind of split 
identification channeled by dandyism.  Eugene Holland (1993, 2006) in his adaptation of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, first proffered in Anti-Oedipus (2000), offers one way 
of reading into the densely canvased scholarship on Baudelairean poetics a specifically 
psycho-historical account, one that usefully explicates an Oedipal positioning.  Mimetic of 
market decoding, Holland saw in the shift from romantic metaphor to metonymy in 
Baudelaire’s prose poetry evidence of a “schizophrenic desire” perverting the typical course 
of sublimation or desexualisation.  The result was a certain dissolution and re-engenderment 
extracted from the urban as an initiatory mechanism productive of a narcissistic individuation 
reactively drawn from others - an orientation that can be thought of as “an-Oedipal”. 
Chapter 6 finds in Rimbaud’s poetic rendering of London an alternative to the an-Oedipal 
impasse produced by Baudelaire.  To the extent that Oedipus is a surface-maker and 
reconciler of differences, Rimbaudian poetics will be shown, less to counter the mercantile 
deployment of an horizonal plane of limitless circulation and exchange via a transcendental 
over-programming, than to flip that surface over seeking a beyond to market decoding in a 
decentred self – a self run to the limits by motility and travel.  London, harbouring a terra 
incognito at the heart of a nineteenth century imperial enterprise allowed Rimbaud a staging 
post for maximising this surface-self and in turn remaking the urban object itself.  Locating 
Rimbaud and Verlaine in London by way of Félix Régamey’s sketch of the poets in 1872, the 
chapter explicates a series of meditations on walking, observation and the confluence of the 
law and language as defined by Foucault.  In particular it plays up the difference between 
coded ways of signaling erotic intention in the context of urban promenading.  This 
difference – the homosexual difference as Lee Edelman has developed – is shown to map on 
to a tropic malfunction at the heart of Rimbaud’s eclipsing of lyric by prose poetry.  Against 
modernity’s thrust for self-overcoming and futurity, the thinking through of a counter-
temporality is explored, one pointing to the reversal of reflective consciousness and its 
confrontation with an inner unconscious.  Foucault’s (1987) “thought from the outside” 
offers one way of thinking beyond the notion that excursion leads to inner truth.  In fact it 
will be shown to recover, against all territoriality, the unconsciousness of the Occident – the 
ocean itself. 
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9. Diagramming Footsteps 
 
Anticipating what follows then, the walker may be thought to instance the juncture between 
consciousness and what is continuous with it, but ungraspable.  Greater than any 
scenography or urban portraiture walkers might picture, footfall less grounds a view than it 
falls, as Serres has imagined, into the infinite, the noise of a “numerous sea” that bears the 
peripatetic upon a “metaphysics” understood as the antithesis of what is given in and through 
phenomenology (1995, p. 13).  Following a Leibnizian inspiration, this other metaphysics 
passes through the foot as dark precursor, rather than through an ascending hierarchy for 
which soul, spirit or consciousness are pinnacle.  It rests in fact on an “infinite base” not 
explained “by lucid and rigorous rationality”, but by the foot as the contact point in an ocean 
of noise (pp. 21-22):  
The perfect, optimal, living, existent, quasi-divine form – is a foot.  It is at the bottom, 
the base, the minimum of the vortex. The vision is a sort of tornado with a low point, a 
noise hole at whose bottom is existence (p. 22).   
In this reversal, the bottom explains the top.  The immergence of rationality, the form of the 
given, and its possible manifestations all arise as “fluctuations” on this chaotic ground which 
harbours “a thousand temporalities” (pp. 24-25).  This research then addresses the walker’s 
proximity to a metaphysics of the foot arising as a “banquet of times” – or, better, a 
barbarousness of time involuntarily inaugurating the new.   
How though to capture this other metaphysics at work in the onto-peripatetic?  Much as the 
walk can be understood to track across place, being both of it and in excess of the relations 
surfacing there, the diagram – etymologically from dia meaning through and graphein 
meaning to write or mark with lines – can be thought to both over-write and abstract from the 
appearance of things a schema depicting operative or determining forces.  As Jakub Zdebik 
put it, diagrams capture the transformation of static structures and signal “flexible, elastic, 
incorporeal functions before they settle into definitive form” (2013, p. 1).  Concomitantly, it 
is the working out of an Oedipal vector that is diagrammed in both written and drawn forms 
here.  This has meant pulling from the non-representational domain of diagrammatic force, 
as Zdebik put it, “some kind of image so that it can be grasped” (p. 22).  Yet the image-
diagram with its overt spatiality less pictures determinate places or situations than a non-
place between what is visible and articulable, a non-place that structures, and in some senses 
derails, what can be thought and sensed (pp. 21-22).  Following Deleuze’s depiction of a 
diagrammatism in Foucault, Zdebik links the diagram to a topology whose particular folds 
determine “the inside and outside of thought” (p. 22).  The ‘walk’ as emblem and outline 
gesture, I aim to show, holds particular importance in the Western, one whose footwork 
explicitly tracks the seam binding the inside and outside of thought.   
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Pointedly for the Occident this seam determines a temporal relation, for history instances a 
swerve or departure from perennial time.  Thus, in the West, desire parallels the work of 
delaying equilibrium /entropy by dreaming of and seeking out, as Serres put it, the “exotic” 
through “exodic” means (2008, p. 262).  Born of a departure seen through the eyes of 
“Israel’s prophets”, history is a “cultural species”, a break with the oikoumenē or Edenic series 
peculiar to the Judeo-Christian tradition, where “imbalance” and “eccentricity” engender 
both the itinerant line of the journey and its aberrant course (1989, p. 10).  If Europe, as the 
millennia-old seat of such traversal, harboured “tribes of farmers” who did not “always 
cultivate everything”, and who left “something to be gleaned” from “desolate wilderness, 
disorder and forests” (p. 10), this project argues that a particular type of urbanism – an 
Oedipal urbanism – is respondent to a certain alienation from the nutritive earth.  A long 
practiced cultural validation of exodus has been underwritten by the lapse of fertility of the 
soil divinely imposed on Cain upon slaying Abel, his shepherd brother.  Forced into 
wandering and mere subsistence, Cain eventually founded the first city, Enoch, which 
assumed the role of sustaining mechanisms at odds with the Edenic and Asiatic ideals of the 
earth as absorbing loom.  Genesis pictures a people split from their God, an existence 
marked by disequilibrium and the disturbance of the triangular stability (what Serres in 
another context referred to as a equilateral balance) between the maternal generativity of the 
earth and the stricture of a celestial father.  Yet any triangulation in exodus suggests a 
scalene imbalance analogous to “lameness, like Hephaistos …, lame like several relatives of 
Oedipus, with sore feet, like him” (Serres 2008, p. 264).  
Oedipus - or the “Greek Cain” as Deleuze and Guattari nominated him, is figure for the 
people of the foot (1987, p.125).  Embodying both despotism and immanence, he can be 
thought to span, or rather shepherd a transition between two regimes of signs – a signifying or 
despotic semiotic and a passional or post-signifying regime.  In the former, the sovereign 
orders and organises all signs that circulate in its name – a circulation that “overcodes” and 
unifies the entire social field (Fig 6).   
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KEY 
1   Signifying centre (divine agency channelled through the sovereign) 
2   Temple/palace as inner realm of signifying centre  
3   Signs tied to other signs in accordance with a concentric signification 
4   Spiralling lines of concentric signification propagated by the centre 
5   Limit zone of signification & a-signifying flight or release – the “expiatory animal”    
6   Pharmakos, scapegoat, victimage release as carrier of “the negative line of flight” 
7   Bakhtin’s adventure time of myth and the site of epic, perennial tales. 
Augmented with Goux’s three virtues of the Hero Myth 
T    Temperance 
W   Wisdom 
CS   Corporeal strength/physical courage.  
 
Figure 6.  Author 2013. “Signifying Regime” (modified from Deleuze & Guattari 1987).  
 
In contrast to the “signifying regime”, a post-signifying or passional semiotic founds the social 
body entirely in exile and flight.  Assuming the place of the pharmakon (but given a positive 
valence rather than the negative place assigned it by the signifying regime), Cain’s people can 
be seen to swerve outward away from the despotic, circular ordering of signs indemnified by 
a monotheistic God (p. 143).  Instead, signs failing to close in on fixed meanings, themselves 
assume an itinerate course in a quest for a signified adequate to the mutual betrayal by a 
people and its God.  So too is the subject set into precarious drift, for if expulsion in the 
signifying regime amounted to a passage into certain death or what amounted to an absolute 
outside, in the post-signifying regime a step by step pursuit of foothold and orientation 
relativises death, working it into the interstices punctuating a life lived sequentially.  Hence, 
as Deleuze and Guattari argue, “Every consciousness pursues its own death, every love-
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passion its own end” (1987, p. 133).  In this sense the repetition sequence of the line of flight 
is both conditioned by death as “absolute deterritorialization” and an incremental recovery 
from this mortal trajectory of a “segmentarity” as reprieve or postponement of that end in the 
manner of the exemption awarded ‘Cain’s people’ (p. 134) (see Fig 7.).   
 
 
KEY 
 
1   Break through into subjectification (positive line of flight) 
2   Double turning away or betrayal (God and ‘his’ people)  
3   Subject of enunciation (micro despotism) 
4   Subject of the statement (as deviation in enunciation) 
5   Segmented flight and reinstitution of priestly/bureaucratic re-appropriation    
6   Beyond enunciating recuperation, decoding of market society, negative infinity 
 
A   Despotic escape, passage through water (Mosses) 
B   Corporeal split  
C   Real-life chronotrope & contemporary (urban) adventurism & zone of fluctuating reality 
D   Echoes of the old despotic signification (dotted) 
M  Inflated cognitive split 
J    Dream of New Jerusalem & break with segmentarity or the big departure 
Z   Rearward, despotic longing or the big return 
 
Figure 7.  Author 2013. “A-signifying Regime” (modified from Deleuze & Guattari 1987).  
 
Read against these propositions then, what can be thought of as the Occident’s passional turn 
amounts to the implantation of a linearity or flight that converts the negative passage of the 
scapegoat into the mundane duplication of a passional citizenry locked into fantasies of self-
legislation and a life space merging reality effects with fluctuating mental ones.  As this 
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project will elaborate, this fluctuating reality finds its ground in modernity in writing which 
“seems to be internalized, and to internalize everything” with it (1987, pp. 126-127).  Yet 
the doubling of a writer and the world written invokes a subjectification that opens a 
vacillation between a subject of enunciation and its duplication via statements.  It is the 
implications of this vacillation that this project will explore relative to walkers who write of 
cities.  In these texts will be found the steps leading to an aesthetic regime that founds 
solidarity and communality, as Rancière held, on sensation and in turn makes the city itself 
an aesthetic ‘object’ whose sensory fabric portends an always contested “being together” 
(2011, p. 56).  Reading Deleuze and Guattari’s vesting of a “people to come” in something 
like the artist’s sounding of “the ‘earth’s song’, the song of the inhuman, the song of the forces 
of chaos” (pp. 56-57), Rancière found that the aesthetic regime characteristically links politics 
with art via a will to change the given “distribution of the sensible” (p. 56).  Deleuze and 
Guattari’s a-signifying regime in fact diagrams a particular forcing from the given of a pattern 
of sensory recognition through which the people of the walk hope to weave together a 
community in Rancière’s sense.  A-signifying subjectification sets in place precisely the 
“being together apart” of the aesthetic regime that assigns art practices the solitary role of 
sounding chaotic, vitalist forces to better bring into sympathetic, affective resonance a reality-
effect of being together – or what Rancière termed a “dissensual community” divided 
between a present awaiting communitarian fulfilment and the promise of a future aesthetic 
consensus (p. 59).  If this “community structured by disconnection” makes its monuments 
both the “confident of the people” and the representative of that people’s absence (p. 57 & 
59), the observer/walker shows up as the mobile will of that same concretisation – a seeking 
anew of sensations capable of cementing people with place.  Between the rupture of Thebes 
and the call of a consensual ‘hearth’ at Colonus is a tragic consciousness and an Oedipal 
politics the beyond of which remains to be thought. 	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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Metaphysical Walk – Athens  
	  
	  
	  
To get firm ground under our feet again! Because 
what this is really about is finding in what shows 
itself to us the truly fundamental, the fixed, what 
can carry weight, and so forth 
Jan Patočka, 1974 
	  	  
1. Myth to Imbalance  
 
In their ordering of a viable life-world, all societies seek to manage the noise of decoded-
desire. As Hans Blumenberg asserted in his philosophical anthropology, societies variously 
confront “the absolutism of reality” - an “unarticulated field of data” prior to all orientation 
and conceptual grasp (1985, p. 8).  Born into dependence on others, and confronted with a 
reality where survival unaided is not viable, the human animal faces a defection of existential 
place. Unable to be fully sustained by the physical environments they are born into, humans 
are distinguished by their need to make worlds of meaning (p. 7).  Deviating from organic 
evolutionary pressures, humanity emerges into a “phantom body” defined by socio-cultural 
technologies exceeding individuals.  The anthropogenesis of this social body, and the world-
making defining it, is tied to an ancient environmental shift and a corresponding postural re-
orientation significant for this study.  Existentially decisive for Blumenberg is the shift in 
dwelling from the forest to the savannah and a consequent misfit with open terrain induced 
by bipedal mobility: 
Whatever may have been the appearance of the prehuman creature that was 
induced, by an enforced or an accidental change in the environment it 
inhabited, to avail itself of the sensory advantage of raising itself upright into a 
bipedal posture and to stabilize that advantage in spite of all its internal 
disadvantages in the functioning of organs – that creature had, in any case, left 
the protection of a more hidden form of life, and an adapted one, in order to 
expose itself to the risks of the widened horizon of its perception, which were 
also those of its perceivability […] It was a situational leap, which made the 
unoccupied distant horizon into an ongoing expectation of hitherto unknown 
things […] What is here called the absolutism of reality is the totality of what 
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goes with this situational leap, which is inconceivable without super-
accomplishment in consequence of a sudden lack of adaptation. (p. 4) 
For creatures conditioned to respond to concrete fears by flight, the anxiety induced by the 
open horizon and the long vista (making imaginable unspecified threats as opposed to 
specific ones) presented a setting where movement (fleeing) alone was insufficient to survive 
(p. 5).  If fear and flight favoured action responding to immediate threats, the predominance 
of visual distance and its associated ambiguity induced a heightened “attitude of expectation” 
for which “feeling one’s way forward [to better survey…] the whole horizon” was one 
solution (p. 5).  Akin to blind wandering, this arduous, piecemeal acquisition of experience 
and knowledge had an alternative: the construction of a shared world substituting “the 
familiar for the unfamiliar, […] explanations for the inexplicable, […] names for the 
unnameable” (p. 5).  Contrary to the dominant conception that tool use set humans apart, in 
fact humanity as a Homo pictor (a “creature who covers up the lack of reliability of his world 
by projecting images”) was the decisive factor (p. 8).  This condition established a “double-
layered relationship” characterised by persistent disjunction between “what one sees and 
what really happens – between the flat appearances in the foreground and a ‘story’ in the 
background” (p. 14). Attributable to bipedal motility then (as an upright questioning in an 
open, unarticulated perceptual field), are socio-cultural technologies pursuant of a cognitive 
hold on the unknown in excess of what can be reached by foot, or conversely, outran.  As 
such, walking – as a general signatory instance of motility – always unfolds in a double-
layered field: the walker does not simply act in the foregrounded immediacy of things, but is 
orientated by a background horizon woven by stories and orientating pictures.  
For Blumenberg, this double-layered relationship defines myth; through it “numinous 
indefiniteness” is converted into “nominal definiteness” (pp. 15, 25).  Myths, coeval with the 
“mechanism of evolution”, transmitted through oral traditions stories that acquired their 
“pregnance”, or meaning-validity, not on the basis of archetypal or perennial human 
relevance, but as the result of having endured through continuous retelling in what 
Blumenberg understood as a “Darwinism of words” (Wallace 1985, p. xxvi).  Contrary to 
Romanticism’s “aesthetic Idealism” (the valorisation of an individualist imagination in the 
recreation of the world), this collective Darwinism rested on a “Neptunism of selection” 
rather than instances of singular, creative “Vulcanism” (Blumenberg 1985, pp. 161-–162).  
Consistent with this immanence of stories, this study treats the Oedipal myth neither as a 
predefined nor a universal type, but as a ‘vector’ and ongoing deformer of culture’s phantom 
body emerging with mythological selection. The anomalous functioning of Oedipus on the 
mythological itself will, in accordance with Goux’s recognition of it as “irregular” at the level 
of the typical “structure of the heroic myths of royal investiture” (1993, p.10), be attended to 
in the context of walkers observing city spaces in modernity.  As a first step, this chapter 
considers the transition from a mythological to an essentially urban worldview, enacted in the 
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name of the philosophical logos.  It unpacks the notion of a metaphysical walk to better 
understand conventions of observing found in the walker-writers of modernity.   
Key in the transition from myth to logos is Sophocles’ Oedipus who is made an emblem for a 
pathos in knowledge (seeking to know too much) and an amorous malady (wrongly placed 
and inordinate desire).  Despite its mythological context, his travails resonate with those of 
fifth-century Athenians who were confronted with a democratic crisis, were uneasy with the 
new scientific spirit, and troubled by the city becoming the tyrannical head of a de facto 
empire (Knox 1957, p. 77).  When Oedipus Tyrannus was performed at the conclusion of 
the City Dionysia (the annual weeklong early spring festival that finished in the Amphitheatre 
of Dionysus), the audience faced not an archaic figure confined to myth but a contemporary 
character.  As Aristotle reflected in The Politics, the Oedipal risk was concomitant with an 
identification of a single individual or household with the state and perturbed the ‘natural’ 
priority of the political body over individual citizens (1992, pp. 60–61).  In terms strikingly 
reminiscent of Oedipus’ predicament, he described the impropriety of the part’s relation to 
the whole:  
Separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they will no longer be hand or foot 
except in name, as one might speak of a ‘hand’ or ‘foot’ sculptured in stone. That will 
be the condition of the spoilt hand [or limb], which no longer has the capacity and the 
function which define it. (p. 60) 
Oedipus, whose name speaks of the limb spoilt by his father at birth, but who also solves the 
Sphinx’s riddle where feet provide the clue and the measure of ‘man’, emblematises the 
individual incapable of contributing equally to the city.  If “man is by nature a political 
animal”, being out of step with the “free and equal” male citizenry amounted to being 
profoundly unequal – in other words, being “subhuman or superhuman” (pp. 59, 74).  Knox 
saw in this high-low pairing a clue to the recognition of Oedipus as a contemporary of the 
city.  In the preceding Greek archaic period (750–480 BC), the king and the pharmakos (or 
scapegoat) were integrally linked given that in times of crisis or lapsed fertility, the latter was 
made to carry the pollution of the former (as representative of the polis’ fall from wellbeing).  
As Jean-Pierre Vernant noted, in the shift from sovereign rule to democracy in the sixth 
century, the figure of the tyrannos was equated with the anachronistic and suspect place of 
the king and attracted vilification and ostracism much as the pharmakos had (1990, p. 135).  
Drawing comparison with the mythical heroes who contravened paternal lineage and 
acceded to “royalty via an indirect route”, the tyrant was seen as solely the “son of his own 
works” and therefore had a propensity to rise above men and the law in contest with the gods 
(p. 127).  Oedipus, as both exceptional king of Thebes and monstrous violator of its royal 
sanctity, was a figure exemplarily exceeding all common measure.  
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In the Poetics, Aristotle defined tragedy by peripeteia, the reversal of fate that reduces the 
tyrant/king to a pharmakos.  In post-classical Latin, peripeteia means to “turn right around” 
like a hinge and was derived from the Ancient Greek peri – “around or surroundings” and 
piptein – “to fall”.  The word’s similarity to peripatetia (“walking around”), is significant: 
peripeteia was deployed by Aristotle to characterise in tragic drama the fall beyond all “equal 
footing” (Vernant 1990, p. 135).  This etymology is consistent with the perikathaírein ritual 
that required the expelled scapegoat to circumambulate the exterior of the polis before being 
pursued over the horizon – a move that moderated the linear flight of the expelled in 
accordance with a turning or re-centring gesture that corrected erratic movement (Bremmer 
1983, p. 314).  Conversely, Oedipus errantly turns according to his double nature as hero 
and defiler infringing on all proper position.  He is (as Vernant cited Diogenes) “‘both father 
and brother to his children and husband and son to his wife’” (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 
1990, p. 138). Through his lameness, Oedipus also mixes up “the three successive ages of 
man that [should be…] only know[n] one after another” – the four legs of the crawling infant, 
the two legs of the adult, and the three legs of the old man with a stick.  In turn, he soiled 
the proper sequence and order of city space (p. 138).  Time, neither chronologically straight 
within him nor generationally cyclical, was twisted and made to turn back on itself.  If the 
poleis had their own “special gates” for expelling the pharmakos, then their sacrosanct 
deployment suggests an acute guarding, not just against erratic movement, but urban porosity 
(Bremmer 1983, pp. 313–314).  Oedipus’ conflation with Athens presented the spectre of 
cities becoming apolis – that is, succumbing to an excessive porosity and mobilisation (the 
Greek poros, meaning hole or passage, has associations such as aporia and aporetic).  At 
Thebes for instance, Oedipus breaks the Sphinx’ hold by an aporia centred on the 
unfathomable nature of the bipedal creature “man” (Vernant 1990, p. 138). 
Where ‘man’ might recognise himself in the feet affording his upright posture and forward 
gait, Oedipus’ indeterminate gait betrays this forward-facing determination.  His limp signals 
a propensity to depart from the rule and follow a deviating path – whether that path elides his 
rightful inheritance of Thebes, the death his father anticipated and planned for at his infancy, 
his humiliation and self-blinding at the conclusion of Oedipus Tyrannus, or an improbable 
rehabilitation following his death in Oedipus at Colonus (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1990, p. 
213).  Oedipus’ gait equally marks him as a figure with an exceptional destiny and a 
capacity to depart from the straight and determinate course of things. In this sense, the Greeks 
perceived lameness as an ambivalent condition, at once troubled and venerated (p. 210).  
Tragedy itself suggests a runaway speech stepping beyond the place of its utterance and 
capable of reaching into and through the given that endures and holds a public around itself 
(p. 206).  As Vernant noted in his review of Levi-Strauss’ deliberations on the issue, the 
Sphinx’s riddling question, intended to remain within the mytho-religious domain bared to 
human cognisance, was “a question isolated from its answer”, “formulated in such a way that 
	   Page 44 
it is beyond reach”.  Yet if Oedipus enters this impossible interlocutory exchange and 
renders the Sphinx, not just speechless, but without recourse to action other than inducing its 
own deathly plunge into silence, he claims for himself the interlocutory position as 
questioner, indeed a Sphinx-like reversal.     
 
2. Oikoumenē 
 
In breaking with the mythological world, the fifth century polis was locus of an exorbitant 
questioning, one that exceeded the mytho-religious domain and set in play an historical 
worldview.  For Patočka, the Greek polis and political life instigated a “public realm”, for the 
first time oriented by aspirations exceeding the cycles of labour perpetuating life survival 
(1996, p. 23).  Building on Hannah Arendt’s recognition of the distinction in the Greek polis 
between a bios politikos (a political way of life “freely chosen” and unconstrained by forms of 
necessity, compulsion, or restraint) and “private” life centred on the household and “kinship” 
relations (pp. 14, 24), Patočka proposed that entry into historic time coincides with the 
casting off of an exclusive bond with the world of work and its ties to the “household” as a 
“proto-cell or model” for collective life (p. 15).  The pre-historical mode was not without 
urban expression - the first empires were “monumental households” with “no sharp boundary 
between [them and] the world”, and while the “city’s walls may be the work of human 
hands, [they belonged…], like everything else made and done by humans, to the one house 
occupied by the unequal society of gods and humans” (p. 21).  This inequality centred on 
the question of death, and life itself was seen as a burdensome undertaking endured by 
mortals as precondition of their participation in a theocratic sociality (p. 17).  This framing 
beheld the earth itself as a “dark landscape” against which work was endlessly directed to 
achieve acceptance from divine and demonic powers and their command of a 
“nonindividuated night” (pp. 12, 22–23).  An anxiety-causing orientation to “natural, 
unproblematic man” found relief in the notion of perenniality and reception into divine 
perpetuity (p. 14).  As Patočka further argued, humanity in this form, while close to 
“nonhuman animals” in their need to “live in order to live”, nevertheless experienced a 
problematized hold on the world: mortals only had a partial view compared to divine 
purview (p. 13).  Divine and human domains ran together; leaders were mediators and 
“managers of divine households” charged with ensuring a continuous span between “empire 
and universe” (p. 34).  
In contrast, the “Greek polis” was synonymous with independence from nature and an 
“oikoumenē” (p. 35; editor’s note 7, p. 168).  It pursued a tendency already evident in the 
oikoumenē (through its growing interdependencies), to prepare for a world increasingly 
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defined by human agency, the memorialising of individual glory, and imagined forms of 
“human immortality” (p. 37).  Breaking with the “oikos” though, the polis enacted a 
“reaching forth” that displaced cyclic routines with temporal advance - “a time to” as Patočka 
said (pp. 38–39).  Eschewing the shelter of tradition and myth, the polis instead sought 
“encounter[s] with what there is, on the boundary of all that is” in a quest to account for the 
whole of existence (p. 39).  In the political and philosophical life of cities, for the first time, 
this whole – seen independently of divine ordinance - could “speak directly to humans”, 
though in the manner of a contest (pp. 39–41): 
The spirit of the polis is a spirit of unity in conflict, in battle. One cannot be a 
citizen – polites – except in community of some against others, and the conflict 
itself gives rise to the tension, the tenor of the life of the polis, the shape of the 
space of freedom that citizens both offer and deny each other […]. (p. 42) 
For Patočka the polis literally forged a culture, and citing Heraclitus, he imagined the urban 
as an incorporeal body flaring into being via a “polemos” (battle) that momentarily holds the 
parties together in an elucidated whole, just as the night-time flash of lightening brings the 
unseen into a graspable, if transient, whole (pp. 42–43).  Moreover, polemos not only 
constituted the polis, it named the “primordial insight that makes philosophy possible” setting 
in place a drive for truth or “unconcealment” (p. 43).  History is this “shakeup” and, specific 
to the West, renders Europe, and ultimately the world, the fleshing out of the “skeleton of [...] 
unconcealment” (pp. 44–45).  In place of indetermination (whether Serres’ sea of noise or 
Blumenberg’s absolutism of reality), what unconcealment motivated were finite figures or 
stopgaps (teleological absolutism or its various proxies such as theoria, theology, and the 
subject), sufficient to bridge over a precariousness exposed in reality (see Wallace 1985, p. 
xxxvii). 
 
3. “Head City” 
 
In Plato’s Timaeus, the “Demiurge” attempts such a bridging at a cosmic scale.  Confronted 
with the pre-given chora (space), a clamourous field of becoming and erratic movement, the 
Demiurge reshapes the cosmos into a working, coordinated whole by cutting and 
crisscrossing strips of the pre-existing domain into “a shape like the letter X” and then folding 
them around to form a spherical structure – the cosmic soul.  Further subdivisions and 
crossings form a complex, orbital order according to which the heavenly bodies rotate.  
Their very motion testifies to a noetic, or intelligible, design countering the impression of a 
wandering movement in the celestial bodies no less than it invokes a temporal order (Plato 
1977, p. 54).  The cosmic soul is said to induce the “birth of time”, itself idealised as an 
eternality where regular ordination unvaryingly plays out (p. 54).  Nevertheless, in John 
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Sallis’ reading of Timaeus anything but regular temporality is found: the Demiurge, as original 
maker, covers over a still earlier making in what amounts to a “palintropic” manoeuvre (from 
the Greek palin, “back”, and tropos, “turn”).  For instance, the priority Plato gave to 
“heavenly kinds of gods” did not deny the plethora of “other [mythological] gods and their 
descendants” so much as it reduced them to hearsay and forgetting as a consequence of time 
– in other words, a time before time! Not inconsistent with Patočka’s notion of changeover 
from an oikoumenē to history as unconcealment, the Demiurge displaced the mythological 
deities “of the household, of family, of descent, of lineage” (Sallis 1999, p. 86).  Opposing 
the order of generation with that of production, the Demiurge was given a fatherly role in 
Timaeus, one in which ‘an errant time before’ is quarantined to better head off generative 
“disorder [or…] monstrosity” (pp. 86–87).  Further, this contest was given a high-low 
distribution so that generation (everything apposite to maternal nature) was positioned 
beneath the agency of production (everything engendering by the Demiurge).  As Sallis put 
it, Timaeus subtracts from the earth its fertile (and perturbing) primacy, reducing the earth to a 
nursemaid set “wind[ing] around the axis that stretches throughout the universe”; the 
antecedence of the earth (as the god “with greatest seniority”; Plato 1997, Timaeus 40b-c) 
was made to secondarily corroborate with the divine artesian, who was credited with 
overcoming a waywardness in the chora itself (Sallis 1999, p. 85).  
Concomitantly, Plato held the earth to be spherical, self-sufficient, and in concert with the 
cosmic soul, needing neither “hands” nor “feet” for defence, grasping, or support (Plato 1997, 
Timaeus 33d-34).  Though in crafting the cosmos, no less than the earth, the Demiurge must 
have utilised, within the wayward time of the chora, and prior to eternality, an intervening 
labour, or what amounted to a mediating thirdness.  For Plato, it was only with three things 
that any kind of joining could be achieved: “it isn’t possible to combine two things well all by 
themselves [for…] there has to be some bond between the two that unites them” (Timaeus 
31b-c).  In advancing production over generation, it is the leveraging time of making that 
puts the heavens over and before the earth.  Moreover, this third time can be thought to 
have an ambulatory character particularly in the case of the world soul’s joining with the 
human body.  Mediating between the soul’s otherwise spherical body and the ground, limbs 
are necessary to effect, through a levering action, regular motion across the otherwise 
irregular surface of the earth (Timaeus 44d-45b).  This laborious action of levelling - in 
which walking is key – can be seen as a correction of a prior temporality associated with an 
archaic, mythological ground.  In short, a noetic grasp of the cosmos was modelled on a 
stepping up achieved via a corporeal scaffold facilitating intelligibility as such.  Yet Sallis 
suggested, in the case of Plato’s comedic depiction of the body in the Timaeus and 
elsewhere, that such an interpretation only partly registers the work of securing a logos (1999, 
p. 24).  The cosmic soul brought to ground and rendered comic in its intersection with the 
body is less a renunciation of corporeality than a necessary condition of its fall into mutable, 
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material life.  Hence in Plato’s discourse, a ‘realism’ persists consistent with a palintropic 
strategy seeking to integrate soul and material life, and points to an unwillingness to subscribe 
to the full implications of the world soul’s idealism – an idealism, as it will be argued below, 
that for Plato was implicated in a tyrannous intellectualism for which Oedipus was emblem. 
The tension between head and limbs parallels that between eternality and becoming 
organising the narrative structure of Timaeus.  Beginning the dialogue by describing a 
conversation from the previous day in which an ideal polis modelled on the cosmic soul was 
described for four guests, Socrates asks the reconvened guests to transform this imagined city 
from a “splendid”, if “motionless” “animal”, into an operational one – that is, set it on a war-
footing (Timaeus, 19b-d).  For Sallis, this opening play on versions of ‘head’ in the dialogue – 
Socrates as the head of the household, the city first beheld in the head and then recollected in 
the heads of others – sets up contrastive cities: the first is “eidetic” – a “lifeless” “head city” or 
“capital city”; the second is an “archaic city” grounded in historical political affairs (1999, p. 
28).  The former is pictured as a “technical city” where the populous is divided into 
specialist occupations for the application of techne (“τέχνη”) – agriculturalists/farmers, 
artisans, and soldiers/guardians – and where urban genesis invariably progresses from a 
compact and self-sufficient “city of artisans” to the swollen and excessively consuming “city 
of luxury”, to a third territorially expansive, militarised city orchestrated by the “guardians” 
(pp. 15, 20, and 24).  Underwriting the final militarised city-form is, the “technical control” 
of all erotic and procreative necessities on one hand, and an impetus to war and the 
expansion of territory in a contest with other cities for resources to satisfy the city of luxury on 
the other (p. 24).  Hence, Sallis saw Plato as having pictured a “city […] poised at the 
threshold of tragedy” (1999, p. 24) and pushed to the point of the imperial tyranny associated 
with Oedipus/Athens where two possibilities await: either a despotic operation must occur 
where all fertile agency is reassigned to the state and where the privacy of “hearth and home” 
is wrenched open for the common good; or, alternatively, the surrender to a city swollen with 
(non-essential) need occurs, leading to an unconstrained and warring course (1999, p. 20). 
The dilemma of tyranny associated with a “head city” in Timaeus resonates with Oedipus, not 
just in his association with Athens in its slide into imperialism, but more humorously, with the 
puns incorporated into Oedipus’ name itself: Oedi references oidi, “the swollen” as in 
oedema, and “oida”, “to know” inordinately (Knox 1957, p. 84).  Imbalanced knowing is 
lampooned as literally swollen-headed.  Furthermore, the conjunction of head/knowing with 
feet, in the second part of Oedipus’ name (invoked via pous or foot and implying a swollen 
footedness) replicates in its ground-ward association a descending trajectory akin to a comic, 
palintropy.  If in the eidetic city this downward shift involved an exposure to desirous, 
impassioned states by way of dialogue, in the Republic, a paradigmatic city is similarly 
proposed - “‘a paradigm laid up in heaven’, one that is ‘nowhere on earth’” – from which 
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Socrates also recoils on the basis that it must be technically tested against exteriority, 
materiality, sacricity and “the forces of ěρως [eros]” (Sallis 1999, p. 30).  No doubt an 
Oedipal problematic was being rehearsed in the technical city (see pp. 20, 375).  Oedipus 
most strikingly embodied incest and self-forgetfulness and, in the “scientific spirit” of fifth 
century Athens, instigated a dispassionate, if actively pursued, investigation into the source of 
Thebes‘ consumption by the plague, only to discover, on the basis of a corporeal clue before 
him all along (his maimed foot and limp), that he was the defiler. 
Socrates’ role in these discursive cities entailed - much like the palintropic absorption of 
generation by production - an appropriation and diffusing of the parallel between historical 
Socrates and Oedipus, a parallel that risked casting Plato’s own philosophical project in an 
Oedipal light.  Certainly historical Socrates and Oedipus were linked to inquiry, justice, and 
judgment.  They stood as pharmakon, both manifestly for and betrayed by the city they 
subsequently came to represent.  Both were caught up in tasks of clarification by seeing past 
the circumstantial appearance of things to find deeper faults perturbing the polis.  Both 
sought to rectify these faults by turning inward to self-truths intricately tied to the 
communities that they constituted.  Not coincidently, they were both exercised, 
problematically, by the edict of Apollo to “know thyself”, and both were accused of sacrilege 
on the basis of usurping Apollo’s prerogative over knowledge.  As exemplarily urban figures, 
they called for an oblique looking whose resulting pathos has profoundly mediated historical, 
urban understanding.  This pathos was not only linked with a transition to an a-signifying 
regime whose mix favoured the passional over the despotic; rather, the pathos coincided with 
a transition to metaphysics, whose “genesis” (far from certain, given its development in the 
pre-Socratic period by traveling “protophilosophers”) turned on a “focal problem” and the 
“uncovering” of “fundamental truth” or “aletheia” (Patočka 1989, p. 170).  Socrates 
transmitted this protophilosophical tradition as “the great questioner” and practitioner of 
“learned ignorance”, who sought freedom from “the bonds of nature, tradition, others’ 
schemata [including…] his own” (p. 180).  In seeking a space of knowing without prior 
support or ground, Socrates’ task entailed reaching for a totality only accessible through what 
is finitely given.  Hence this whole - the truth of all that is - was accessible only “in the form 
of a question” and thus imposed a necessity to think the beyond as a higher knowledge – a 
metaphysics – transcending the immediate “totality of [apparent] things” (p. 181).  As 
Patočka put it, metaphysics (as subsequently developed by Plato and others) sought to offer 
an “answer to the Socratic (or pre-Socratic) question” through logos.  Concurrently, Plato’s 
Socrates can be seen as attempting a takeover of “philosophical protoknowledge”, though 
ultimately not sufficiently to free himself entirely from its “premetaphysical soil” (p. 180). As 
will be argued below, the head city registers both the rising above and dragging along of such 
‘soil’.  
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4. Standing | Autochthony 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the persistence of this soil shows up in the notion of the 
“Autochthon”, the appeal to ancestral soil as medium of place-claims (autos, self + chthon, 
earth).  However, rather than designating an incontestable belonging, they recognised 
behind this appeal to originating terrain a “deterritorialising […] power of the earth” itself, an 
eruptive force capable of overturning stable territories (1994, p. 86).  Hence autochthonic 
agency assumes contrary forms: one sees the institution of an imperial figure mediating a 
divine order in accordance with a transcendence favouring vertical powers; the other 
concerns the arrival of a traveling outsider with no manifest lineage or place-claims.  It is 
this outsider, breaking open the prevailing oikos, who creates a free space of questioning, 
association, and via polemos (or unsheltering), a horizontal “milieu of immanence” (pp. 86–
87).  Nevertheless, transcendence, like immanence, depends on a deterritorialisation of 
existing territorial relations: transcendence being indicative of a State-form that reorders local 
places in pursuit of a higher unity; immanence being indicative of a mercantile-form that 
closes out the immediate connectedness of place in pursuit of far-flung linkages (p. 86).  
Moreover, autochthonic strangers compose two distinct “psychosocial types” (the 
despot/ruler and the artesian/traveller/trader), two forms of sociality (imperial and mercantile), 
and two forms of “reterritorialization” (the “imperial spatium of the State” and the “political 
extension of the city”) (pp. 86–87).  Transcendence and immanence find distinct loci too: 
the despot/ruler converges on “the palace”, while the artesian/traveller/trader orients towards 
the “agora and commercial networks” (p. 86). 
Partnered with mobilized artisans and merchants, wandering philosophers found in the 
developing immanence of the polis a place where philosophy was itself capable of being 
instituted (p. 87).  There the very contingency of urban place drove a metaphysical will that 
sought “a new vision of the imperishable” (Patočka 1996, pp. 64-65).  Faced with a 
declining democratic polis, the call for “definitive certainty” assumed what Patočka saw as 
two versions of invariance – metaphysics “from above and from below” (p. 65).  Pitted 
against a Platonic “metaphysics of the logos and the Idea”, Democritus’ “metaphysics of 
things” sought a constancy of the phenomenal world via geometrical atomism and 
materialism (p. 65).  While the metaphysics of things found renewal in the scientific spirit of 
the modern age, the metaphysics of the logos set in play a long tradition built on a divided 
reality or chorismos: “a separation, an abyss between the true world, accessible to the precise 
and rigorous insight of reason, and the approximate, apparent, impressionistic world defying 
a rigorous grasp which our ordinary experiences treats as the only reality” (p. 65).  Claiming 
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to bridge this chorismos, logos aimed to pull philosophical speculation away from the 
wandering proto-philosophers (a group Plato aligned with the Sophists).  Yet a paradox lies 
at the heart of this exclusion: 
On the one hand, the philosopher must be introduced into the city in order for it 
to come-to-be in deed, whereas, on the other hand, the city is precisely such as to 
exclude the philosopher. The philosopher-king is a paradox. (Sallis 1996, p. 379) 
This paradox is mirrored by historical Socrates’ fate.  Where in the Republic Socrates is 
portrayed as a speculative city-builder, in life, as Foucault had argued, he is historically 
credited with instigating a challenge to political parrhēsia (truth-speaking), characteristic of 
the polis’ democratic institutions.  In its place, he enacted an “ethical truth-speaking” that 
eschewed political forums (where “anyone can say anything” without regard for its truth) by 
taking to the agora and everyday spaces instead, inciting and enacting an examination of 
individual lives in a search for personal parrhēsia, where nothing would be concealed (2011 
p. 10).  The Platonic dialogues were one route by which Socrates – who seemingly wrote 
nothing, and who reversed the “pharmacos logic” by internalizing the ‘other’ and the curse-
cure dichotomy - was committed to text achieving a belated perenniality.  As Patočka noted, 
his enjoining with the page formed part of a project to redress the injustices of the failed 
democratic order and envision a polis “where the philosopher can live” – in other words, “a 
city […] planned out” (1996, p. 88; emphasis in original).  To create a city in outline, to 
make it the subject of sustained reflection and a thing cared for in parallel with the soul, this 
was Plato’s Socratic legacy (pp. 87-88).  Like the soul, the city had to be examined, yet to 
the extent that it is in the Republic that such a city is most acutely delineated, its narrative 
does not just unfold as a logos addressing a head city alone; rather, the Republic unfolds as a 
speculative walk enacted in concrete urban space - the space of Athens. 
Commencing the dialogue, Socrates is interrupted in his walk home, having descended to the 
port of Piraeus to attend the festival of Bendis.  Not coincidently, the chance meeting in the 
street that leads to an evening-long conversation on the nature of the just city in the nearby 
house of Polemarchus involved questions of topographical displacement.  As Sallis noted, 
the Republic describes both an ascending journey (“The Upward Way”) and a subsequent 
descent (“The Downward Way”).  In the ascending phase, three city types are traversed 
before arriving at the allegory of the cave at the core of the text (Book VII) – a revelatory 
pinnacle in which ascension into the light coincides topographically with the Acropolis (see 
Fig. 8).1  The trajectory from the port (Piraeus) to the overlooking heights (Acropolis) is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   While the allegory of the cave is often considered a metaphor for cities, the context of fifth 
century BC Athens suggests that Plato’s sketch of the paideutic path in the allegory is less than 
allegorical. Athens was a city of “violent visual contrasts”, whose key organizing axes where, on 
one hand, the vertical abruptness of the Acropolis and, on the other, the tangled networks of 
markets and residential quarters (Mumford 1961, pp. 187 & 190).  The latter composed a 
purposively complex weave, whose “formlessness” aimed to confound invading foreigners, 
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mirrored by a passage from “mythos” (with “Socrates becoming ruler over Hades”) through 
logos (via “the building of cities in logos”) to the ergon or work of crafting a “philosopher-
king” capable of ruling the fourth type of city: “the city of philosophy” (Sallis 1996, p. 401).  
Concomitantly, topographical displacement is matched by a political one, where the 
governance of the collective turns toward a transcending self-governance.  Setting aside the 
city’s political management, the allegory of the cave features “a philosophical transcending of 
the city” (p. 446).  Inside the cave is found “a political situation”, a city made up of 
prisoners; outside, ascension leads to an escaping individual’s epiphanic transformation.  In 
an obvious reference to Socrates, the return of this enlightened person, tasked with 
elucidating those left in the dark, is met violently by the political collective (p. 447). 
In fact the cave and the ascension from it is a miniature of the urban macro-journey narrated 
by the Republic overall.  Hence its pedagogical drive cannot be separated from the evening 
conversation in the port where Socrates, having descended from the city proper, is intent on 
elucidating those present, particularly Glaucon.  If an ideal city is constructed in this 
discourse, Plato’s narrative nevertheless emphasises that it is still “a city [constructed] within 
man”; a “city [constructed] within Glaucon” by Socrates, ‘fathered’ on the basis of an erotic 
midwifery that navigates modes of desire ranging from the ‘platonic’ to the carnal (p. 454).  
Concocted in the city’s lowest place (the port) therefore, the positing of a city ideal is 
inseparable from “the negativity of embodiment” and must entertain an account of its return 
(pp. 411).  As such, elucidation can be imagined as a standing balance resting on two 
supports, props or legs: the “Upward Way” and its double, the “Downward Way”.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
whereas the former was set at the centre of this “disordered” world, as a beacon of clarity for from 
its summit at “half a thousand feet” the city could not be given other than harmoniously bedded 
into its surrounding geography (p. 186).  At another level, the craggy Acropolis “represents the city 
in depth”, with its abundant supply of “primeval sources” – “the cave, the graves, the grottoes, the 
springs, no less than the later shrines, sacred enclosures [and] fountains” (pp. 188-190).  As Plato’s 
allegory obliged the seeker of enlightenment to return to the cave and its quotidian life, the 
elevated transcendence and “sustained harmonies” offered by the Acropolis could not be held apart 
from the inevitable return to the lapses of order in the Agora and its surrounds below.	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KEY 
1  Piraeus A, or the beginning of the night-long conversation 
2  Piraeus B, or the end of the conversation constructing a head-city 
3  The Acropolis or city pinnacle as scene for the “Allegory of the Cave” 
I-X Books divisions within the Republic 
 
a = myth in an arcane sense, b = Pontos/Nereus (“Old Man of the Sea”) & initiatory immersion, 
c = Socrates descent to Hades on plane of forgetting, d = the agora & mercantile and political 
immanence, e = the cave, f = journey into light & return, g = Timarchy, h = Oligarchy, I = 
Democracry , j = Tyranny, k = entry to the underworld of the soul on the plane of forgetting, l 
= the Myth of Er, m = the Meadow with four opening to upper and lower realms, n = the 
spindle of Necessity, o = Lachesis who sings of the past, p = Clotho who sings of the present, q 
= Atropos who sings of the future, r = Necessity 
Figure 8. Author (2013). “The Metaphysical Stride: an Elaboration on the ‘Structure of the Republic’ by 
John Sallis”. Modified from Sallis (1996).  
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Extrapolating from Sallis’ reading of the Republic, the following insights are evident: 
• A conjoining of walking and the city marks the instituting of philosophy. In it, 
indeterminate passage and wandering (allied with early proto-philosophers, 
including the largely apolis Sophists) is transformed into (metaphysically) determinate 
movement.  
• Urban place is divided by thought’s movement. As Figure 8 shows, such a stride 
opens a gap in place-presence (i.e. the before and after of Piraeus, or Piraeus 1 and 
Piraeus 2).  
• A metaphysical walk or stride, in spanning from the depths to the heights, synthesises 
the diversity of urban space by gathering it into a single trajectory or crossing that 
renders the polis a “choric” space or “abode” for intelligibility (Sallis 1999, p. 41).  
• This passagework binds immanence into transcendence, co-opting the troubling 
mercantile/imperialist dynamic of Athens (for which Piraeus is blatant figure) by 
forcing an idealised closure centred by thought’s vertical ranging.  
• With its feet in the sea as a “milieu of immanence” and its head aloft in a 
metaphysical acme, Plato’s narrative walk is strikingly ambiguous in its up/down 
journeying.  It courts both elucidation and peril and in this doubleness are found 
early seeds of what will become a characterising trope in narratives of “urban 
exploration” in modernity: the “male fantasy of urban descent” as a vehicle for 
testing erotic transfers and redeeming self-engenderment (Walkowitz, 1992, pp. 04–
11).  
• This schema models intelligibility as a resolution of perceptions caught “between two 
contraries”, as Plato stated (2007, 523c). Only in the face of these contraries is the 
action of thought made conscious, whereas often “perceptions […] don’t call for any 
further exercise of thought, because sensation can judge them adequately” (2007, 
523b).  In other words, a shift out of habitual sensing is required to activate dianoia 
or reasoning, and if Plato’s example in this instance is the sight of fingers whose 
apparent visual sameness presents an “indeterminate […] mixing-up”, as Sallis noted, 
it points to the necessary for reason, typified as upwardly located, to move 
downward into vision to give the later intelligibility.  The finger example, as a case 
of a “(descensional) dianoia” that settles upon the body (Sallis 1996, pp. 431–433), 
parallels the manner in which walking (as an epitome of habituation) can be a 
conduit for a doubling back of dianoia into the immediacy of the given.  To the 
extent that the distinguishing of fingers – their difference or sameness relative to size 
– depends on numeration and the distinguishing of dyads or paired differences in 
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Plato’s account, the limping gait of Oedipus (as clue of the proximity of a past with 
tragic implications) would be one instance where intelligibility fails to reach the body 
in time. Given that the Sphinx’s riddle is solved by Oedipus on the basis of counting 
feet in a paradoxical numeration that seemingly confounds typical human bipedality, 
it would similarly suggest how for Platonism vision and counting not fully guided by 
dianoia risk an unbalanced intelligibility.  This imbalance is typical, as Sallis 
described, of the warrior/ruler caught up in “the ordering, measuring, calculating of 
the visible” that Plato wants to correct with a philosophical dianoia “that turns away 
from the visible” alone (1996, pp. 433–435).  
• If the Republic inscribes a linear trajectory across the polis, it does so in the form of a 
backward and forwards dialoguing that increasing gives way to long stretches of 
monologue.  This emphasis on linearity mirrors the upward way of the soul in its 
perfecting course and as depicted  by Plato in the allegory of the divided line (Fig. 
9). Ranging through doxa (opinion), vision, dianoia (reasoning) and noesis (cognition 
or intellection), the training of the philosopher-ruler depends on similarly progressing 
from one to the other in an upward arc, such that paideia (education) is always 
portrayed as an ascending journey or passage.  Moreover, this journey is conceived 
of in metaphysical terms as a joining of the apparent world with what is occluded 
from it.  It suggests, as the analogy of the cave confirms, that the ascending walk 
into the light of the true is an achievable, if difficult task.  Walking is imagined then 
to suture via a linear continuity the spacing that metaphysics institutes; indeed this 
spacing is what orientates and drives the upward passage as if, as Sallis says in a 
different context, the journey asserts an originating encounter whose prior spacing is 
‘forgotten’ in a palintropic move.  
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KEY 
 
1  Intelligible Realm 
2  Visible Realm 
a  Domain of Forms or Ideas (noesis) 
b  Domain of Assumptions or Mathematical Reasoning (dianoia) 
c  Domain of Objects or Things 
d  Domain of Images and Shadows (doxa) 
e  Domain of disfigured Ideas resulting from infinite deferral of image-original 
structure and dianoia in decline (refer Figure 16 for detailed elaboration) 
 
Ordinarily drawn vertically, the line of ascent is rendered here transversely in accordance with 
the proposition that the movement of the soul parallels the walker’s pedagogical 
apprenticeship. 
 
Figure 9.  Author (2013). “Allegory of the Divided Line”. Modified from Plato (1997). 
	  
• With Socrates going down to Piraeus for the festival of Bendis (a newly introduced goddess 
linked to Hades, night, and female fertility (Plato 1997, 372a)), the Republic commences with 
a double link to death, for as Sallis noted, in the Odyssey, Odysseus uses a parallel phrase, 
stating to Penelope of the day when, in his words, ‘I went down to Hades’” (1996, p. 316).  
Concomitantly, “Socrates’ [allegorical] descent into Hades” (Fig. 8, c) in Book I commences 
the upward way from the place of mythos (Sallis 1996, p. 317).  Conversely, in concluding 
with the story of Er where a fallen soldier travels the underworld prior to returning to life, the 
Republic similarly ends with modified myth.  Given that it is the city in logos, or a head city, 
that is developed in the course of the narrative spanning two places in myth, the Republic can 
rightly be thought to stand on legs whose two feet are stepped and steeped (differently) in 
mythology: on one side, archaic origins; on the other, mythos absorbed and recalibrated 
according to metaphysics; in both cases, a foothold reaching into death is suggested.  
Coincidently, in its tripod-like rendering of Athen’s Long Walls (the Wall of Pireaus and the 
Wall of Phalerum), an eighteenth-century map by Jean-Denis Barble du Bocage (Fig. 10) 
suggests a bipolar city stretched bipedally across divergent dominions.  In du Bocage’s 
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fanciful reconstruction of ancient Athens, the “Street of Theseus” tracking the inside of the 
Wall of Piraeus2 may be productively construed as indicating an upward way, a route whose 
namesake is mythologically associated with both Oedipus and an ascending journeying 
through obstacles.  
 
	  
Figure 10. Jean-Denis Barble du Bocage (1785). “Athens With Piraeus”.                                  
Source: Wikipedia Commons.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   The form of the Long Walls are believed to have been parallel (see Fig. 11) and I have found no 
record of double streets (the Street of Theseus or the Street of Phalerum). 
	  
	  
	  
Figure 11. Napoleon Vier, (2007). “Ancient Athens”.  
Source: Wikipedia Commons.  
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5. Walker-Weavers & the Socratic Makeover 
 
Evident in the Republic’s metaphysical walk is a quest for vantage points, both overhead and 
underfoot, that run out beyond the actual.  The walk proselytises for a falsified ‘real‘ or 
manifest ‘world’ doubled with idealism.  Logos, routinely understood to break with 
mythological thinking, is found in the Republic’s metaphysical stride to bluntly borrow from 
mythology.  Indeed it creates an abridging line whose abiding concern is a space of 
transport that exceeds the broken terrain and patches of non-continuous space typifying the 
unequal community of the mythological world.  Serres saw Plato as the master of the “artful 
connection”, suturing the discontinuities of the chora and the incrementally tangled weave 
made by myth with a “chi” or cross.  In place of a “barbarous or feminine” logos enacted at 
the “level of the hands”, and mired both in the forces of procreation and fractured spaces, a 
male “Royal Weaver” (concomitantly imagined as a walker-weaver here) was charged with 
laying down transport between infinities – that is, between “the rational and the irrational” 
(1982, p. 49).  The metaphysical walk doubles then with the production of a “unitary 
discourse” that paces out and places “distinctions and partitions” rendering everything 
(mathematical) “fractions” of a “split whole” (p. 50).  However, this whole, indicative of “a 
single space [or…] set of operators” capable of pulling “spatial varieties” into line is 
inconceivable without that first mythological gesture of “open[ing of a…] route, way, track, 
path”, even if in the end this route is made a medium way permitting all “possible transports” 
and all “possible transfers” (Serres 1982, pp. 51–52).  
If the first of the grounding points described by the Republic rests in arcane myth (Hades, 
death and an older epic telling), the second footfall, landing in the myth of Er (8, l), reveals 
exactly this kind of transfer space, a space in fact that also coordinates and synthesises time 
(Republic 1997, 614c-d). In so far as the myth of Er reveals the mechanics of how the soul 
circulates in prior and future lives, it is made concomitant with “the whole of time” (Republic 
1997, 608c & 611a).  Moreover, found in the concluding book of the Republic (Part XI) is a 
takeover of divine claims underwriting the unequal community pictured through myth.  The 
soul’s immortality (a proposition demanding that the soul be cared for precisely because it 
endures for all time) called for a complex circulatory nexus mediating varying states in 
accordance with the “doctrine of transmigration” (editor’s note, Plato 2007, p. 361).  As 
Socrates relays the myth to Glaucon, a place called the “meadow” provides an intersecting 
point for four “chasms” that gather and disperse the souls in their various journeys through 
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upper and lower realms (respectively purifying and punishing) (8, m).  Moreover, the 
Meadow is a forum for exchange and judgment (Republic 1997, 615 a-d) from whence a 
short trip is required to reach the “spindle of Necessity” (Fig. 8, n) – described as “a straight 
column of light that stretched over the whole of heaven and earth” (616b-d).  Sat upon “the 
lap of Necessity” (Fig. 8, r), the spindle turns and its musical harmony coordinates the whole 
cosmos, which is in turn attended to by the “three daughters of Necessity” who constitute a 
secretariat of temporality, with “Lachesis” mediating the past, “Clotho” mediating the present, 
and “Atropos” mediating the future (8, o, p, q) (617a-d).  According to Plato, the souls are 
here assigned a particular “pattern” or “round of mortal life” by chance and condemned to 
live their assignments to the best of their ability before returning to the meadow for judgment 
(618a-b), a prospect - Socrates reminds Glaucon in the concluding sentences of the Republic 
- necessitating “always keep our feet on the upward way” when pursuing justice with wisdom 
(621c). 
Yet this foothold offers a qualified purchase on the whole of being, for, as Plato stated, 
commencing “another round of mortal life” – as a small portion of the thousand-year cycle – 
returning souls are required to drink from the “Forgetful River” (Fig. 8 c & k) before being 
propelled into birth, and those without wisdom to moderate their share are left oblivious to 
the living lot to which they have been assigned and the particular care of the soul such a 
destiny entails (621a-b).  As such, the metaphysics walk traverses a ground hollowed out by 
forgetting and phenomenal appearances veil the perenniality of Plato’s revised oikoumenē.  
The soul, with its upward and downward capacities, potentiates a passional drift, particularly 
in the mortal phase of its journey, mediated as it is by bodily life caught ignorantly in the 
cave of the city.  Yet for Plato determinate movement (as opposed to proto-philosophical 
wandering) is precisely the antidote to a community immobilised and rendered passive before 
images of the given.   
Usurping habit through philosophy coincides with the shift from political to ethical parrhēsia, 
or from truth-telling as it pertains to the collective (democratic) body to that of the individual. 
This care is inseparable from an active or ‘Socratic’ self-examination that gathers and brings 
forth a deeper good.  Pointedly, the task of “Socratic midwifery” is to also “assist in the birth 
of the children of the good” by implanting through interlocution an open questioning in 
others (Sallis 1996, p. 412).  Yet as Goux suggested, historical Socrates assumed this 
“autodidactic orientation”, and the question-form at its heart, from the pre-Socratic, proto-
philosophers (1993, pp. 140, 143).  Though Socrates was the proponent of an alternative 
“relation of self to self”, one that eschewed conventional, theological mediation for one 
consulted internally and idiosyncratically in the form of an internal, “demon” voice (pp. 142–
143).  Though an exemplar of Athenian wisdom, Socrates amounted to a profound anomaly, 
a seeker of wisdom who eschewed divine incipience and prudence.  Thus Socrates is 
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity  Chapter 1	  
	   Page 59 
routinely associated with Oedipus who similarly short-circuited a sharing of heteronomous 
knowledge between mortals and immortals in favour of modes of autonomous knowing (p. 
143).    
To the extent that Plato enters into this “Socratic trajectory”, as Goux wrote, it was against an 
“Oedipian radicalism”, with its “auto-initiation” and its rejection of “cryptophoric signs” and 
sacred projection (Goux 1993, pp. 143–144): 
The Oedipean risk haunts Plato’s thought like an unvoiced threat – to such an extent 
that the figure of the philosopher-king that Plato is seeking to define can be read as a 
methodical attempt to depict the true philosopher as the antithesis of the tyrant 
Oedipus. (p. 144) 
Nevertheless, the transfer from tyrant to philosopher-king didn’t occur without firstly inserting 
a modified cryptophoric background and secondly reasserting the role of an initiating process 
and paternal inculcator.  In what can be thought of as a middle way (between Oedipal 
radicalism and mythological tradition) a tripartite resolution consistent with the standard hero 
myth is evident.  Plain enough is the debt of the myth of Er to the Eleusinian mysteries - the 
cult of agrarian, female generativity (an initiation in fact refused by Socrates against Athenian 
prescription) – and consistent with Plato’s displacement of generation by production, the 
myth extends what Robert Graves has referred to as a “male usurpation of the female 
agricultural mysteries” by the Hellenic gods (1992, 24.3).  
The issue of tripartition, characteristic of the standard hero myth, and replicated everywhere 
in Plato, follows a similar trajectory.  It arises in the Eleusinian mysteries with the practice of 
“thrice-plough[ing of] field[s]” in accordance with the “mysteries of agriculture” administered 
by women.  Plato’s reference to Necessity and the three Fates (Clotho, Lachesis, and 
Atropos) in the Myth of Er effects a celestial (and upward) redirection of the chthonic energies 
of the mysteries where the Fates as moon phases stand in for the “Maiden-goddess of the 
spring”, the “Nymph-goddess of the summer”, and the “Crone-goddess of autumn” – all 
mediators of the earth and the underworld (Graves 1992, 10.1).  The alignment of temporal 
circularity and axis mundi (in the form of the Spindle of Necessity) in these cryptophoric 
machinations at once toys with the heterogeneous typologies and broken topographies of 
myth while turning them into moving parts of a unifying machinery for the circulation of 
souls.  Not coincidentally, the number of this unity is three. “One, two, three” are the 
opening words of Timaeus; they enunciate an interrupted counting (pointing ostensively to a 
missing guest from the day before) whose absence as the fourth “interrupts the continuity 
otherwise posed between yesterday and today” and therefore stands in as the number of 
illness and temporal perturbation more generally (Sallis 1999, p. 11).  The contrivance of a 
missing fourth, and therefore a curtailing of the counting at three, resonates throughout 
Timaeus and the Republic. It is tempting to see in this numeration an analogy with the walk 
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constrained and made metaphysical – the upward (1) and downward (2) ways coordinated by 
the logos of the head-city (3) at their pinnacle as a kind of ‘head-count’ synthesising a before 
and after footing generated by the bifurcated stride of the dialogue effected from the lower 
reaches of Piraeus.  It was a stride put into motion precisely in refutation of an Oedipal gait 
that famously grappled with all manner of aberrant counting.  This tricky, death-filled count 
whose seeming success in dispatching the Sphinx and opening up the city to traffic led only 
to the inflation of trouble.  
 
6. Crossing (Out) the “Common Herth” 	  
Notably, the metaphysical stride bypasses the agora - the middle or “‘common hearth’ of the 
city” through which the upward and downward ways schematically pass (Detienne, 1996, p. 
10).  This elision of the democratic heart and nexus of commercial life similarly attempts a 
bypass of the tensions associated with exchange, counting and equivalence resulting from the 
lapse in autonomy of the internal economy of the polis.  For the Greeks, this inflationary 
counting, or chrematistics, confounded the principle of isonomia (equality) founding the 
agora as a key urban institution from the eighth century BC (p. 32).  Citizenry rights in the 
polis arose as an extension of the earlier “special status” afforded the warrior class in the 
Mycenaean period, who, subsequent to the Hoplite reform, were organised on the basis of 
fraternally negotiated relations at odds with royal convening.  For Marcel Detienne, the 
warrior class was associated with a type of speech contrary to the royal command exercised 
in, and through “magicoreligious” utterance – theirs’ was the “speech of dialogue”: 
Magicoreligious speech was efficacious, atemporal, and indissociable from 
symbolic behavior and meaning; moreover, it was limited to an exceptional type 
of person. Dialogue-speech, in contrast, was secular, complimented action, 
operated within a temporal context, and possessed a unique autonomy that 
extended to one whole social group […]. (p. 89) 
The egalitarianism of the warrior class had a corresponding social/spatial form: “an assembly 
of warriors seated in a circle” (p. 91).  This form inscribed the relative equality of all 
participants by leaving open a middle space for setting down “an object of value”, a “prize”, 
or war spoil whose placement es meson (“in the middle”) and in full sight, rendered it 
collective, ‘public’ property (pp. 92–94).  Moreover, the right to speak in a public way 
depended on “mov[ing] into position at the meson” and claiming on behalf of the group an 
“impersonal sovereignty” contrary to any “‘emanation of royal power’” (pp. 95–96).  The 
agora was the inheritor of this circular ground.  As a “single spatial model”, it became a 
dominant institution organising assembly, distribution, and oratory by defining the basis of 
“publicity and community” (p. 97). Against magico-religious speech, the agora linked 
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dialogue with technological and militaristic innovation, but also facilitated an “intellectual 
mutation” emphasising rationalism over religious totalisation (pp. 103–104).  Liberated from 
the telos and predetermination of “efficacious speech”, the citizenry of poleis achieved with 
the independence of dialogue-speech a political instrument capable of “‘creat[ing] reality’” 
anew (pp. 105–106).  
Prior to their bifurcation in the late Greek Archaic period, both speech-types, as Detienne 
identified, found a common source in poetic recitation as practiced by the Mycenaean 
civilisation (p. 43).  Rhythmically sung, “laudatory speech” hymned the cosmogonies and 
theogonies that tied the king to the gods, but also recalled “the glorious deeds of heroes’” (p. 
44).  While recitation asserted the former’s hold on immortality via divine right, the later 
bestowed on the warrior caste a kind of celebratory immortality via the overcoming of Lēthē 
(forgetfulness) by Mnēmosynē (remembrance)  (pp. 45–49).  For Detienne, if alētheia 
corresponded with the bringing forth of truth into light by “magicoreligious” recitation, hymns 
to warriors similarly broached “knowledge of ‘all things’”(pp. 42-43).  It was this aspect of 
poetic speech - a claim by the citizenry at large to eternality - that Plato vested in souls.  Yet 
the vesting of truth in remembrance and memorialization risked, in the demarcation of the 
warrior from the king and the slide from warrior to citizen, the dragging of poetic recitation 
into the dialogue–speech of the agora - a descent, as Detienne noted, into falsehood or 
erroneous speech termed apatē.  If it was the Sophists particularly who were credited with 
the professionalization of “magicoreligious” recitation in pursuit of “positive apatē”, as 
Detienne writes, they no less “discovered the artificial nature of poetic speech”, inserting into 
memorization the capacity for invention and falsehoods (p. 108).  Metaphysics, with its 
attempt to grasp the past, the present, and the future in total, was precisely Plato’s counter to 
a devaluing of alētheia” (p. 109). 
Not coincidently is the myth of Er associated with Piraeus and the lower reaches in the 
Republic.  Only the “plain of Lethe” (with its “Forgetful River”) divides the souls bound for 
mortal life from “the throne of Necessity” and a full revealing of the role of wisdom and 
justice in their timeless enduring (2007, 621.a-c).  The assertion of truth-telling or alētheia on 
such a ground is further emphasised by its eschewing of the agora as a place for determining 
the essential nature and potentiality of city life in favour of a site down by the sea.  The 
immersion into this lower domain suggests an association with the sea gods Pontos and 
Nereus, who were given the appellation the “Old Man of the Sea” (8, b), a personification 
indicating “prophecy and justice” (Detienne 1996, p. 53).  The linking of alētheia to “mantic 
speech (or prophecy)” is underscored by its association with the sea, firstly on the basis that 
justice and wisdom arise out of fluid and shifting circumstances, and secondly, because 
access to such wisdom entails an immersive initiation for which the sea and rivers are 
common sites for “justice by ordeal” in “Mediterranean civilizations” (pp. 56, 58). Moreover 
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the Old Man of the Sea bestows justice and prophetic wisdom in a benevolent and paternal 
manner associated with royal sovereignty, where, in accordance with the Mycenaean and 
near eastern traditions, the “king was the ‘shepherd of men’” who prevented calamity through 
guidance (pp. 60–61).  Plato then, in siting his tutelage of Glaucon by old Socrates adjacent 
to the harbour calls on an alētheia of this type as well as a revival of sovereign initiation and 
privilege through a renovation of dialogue-speech as a slide towards pedagogical monologue 
and, as Sallis suggested, the supplanting of orality by writing.  In short, an external sourcing 
of mantic speech is shifted inward in accordance with an authoring-self. 
	  
7. A Divided Mind 	  
This inward orientation of mantic capacities set up the first instancing of a divided mind, a 
division that is between an autodidactic takeover of sacral knowledge and an unmooring of 
certainty in knowing.  Socrates’ renowned “ecstatic catalepsy” marks precisely this cognitive 
dissociation when he credits an internal, instinctual voice or demon confirming questions of 
knowing (Kofman 1998, p.105).  Usurping Apollonian claims to total knowledge, as Sarah 
Kofman furthers Nietzsche’s insight, Socrates’ demon is place-marker for what reason cannot 
reach - in other words, the demon indicates the presence of an “unconscious Dionysian” 
impulse operative in thought (p. 234).  As the first to advocate individual reason and an 
absolute for clarity in thought, Socrates is also the bearer of an “excess of wisdom” that 
radically stresses the Apollonian demeanour (pp. 224 & 227-231).  In this he mirrors the 
other “great figures of Greek tragedy, Prometheus and Oedipus”, in whom knowledge 
transmits pathos because, “whoever seeks to solve the enigmas posed by nature has no fear of 
violating natural laws” and therefore demonstrates that “monstrosity is at the origin of 
wisdom” (p. 231–232) 
This doubled burden conforms with what Søren Kierkegaard termed a “bifrontality” in 
tragedy, one that compounds the finite and the infinite, the comic and the tragic (1966, p. 
76).  Consequently in Socrates, reason is paired with the unreason of an instinctual demon, 
just as his subtly of intellect was paralleled by a physical “plebeian” crudity exemplified by 
barefooted-ness and buffoonery.  Yet it is precisely this bifrontality that Plato sought to 
smooth over by synthesising the comedic body and soul into an upward-striving third-ness 
whose moralising reason, or “faculty of ends”, robbed instinct of its virulence (Kofman 1998, 
p. 235).  So is the metaphysical walk, in its deployment of the Socratic dialogues, geared to 
an overcoming of this sort, an overcoming in fact of the Socratic gait.  If ‘historical’ Socrates 
was characterised by a “plastic personality unified by the single principle of interiority” (p. 
226), a principle coinciding with his demon - and therefore the antithesis of reason and good 
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will - the walk in logos instead binds the plasticity of personality into a single, improvable 
soul.  Moreover, bifrontality, with its imbalanced bipedality (figured in both Oedipus and 
Socrates), favours dialogue, as Kierkegaard argued, over dialectics and Platonic synthesis.  In 
Socratic thought is found, as he wrote, “an alternating (alterno pede) gait, a hobbling from 
side to side” that is contrastive with thought unified by good will (1966, p. 73).  This alterno 
pede is exemplified by a question-and-answer format rendered ironic by a will that insists on 
keeping dialogue perpetually open.  This questioning, eschewing pre-existing answers - 
eschewing in fact any answering content capable of bringing interlocution to a halt – 
circulates about an insistent emptiness (p. 87).  Hence what counts in Kierkegaard’s 
peripatetic analogy is not an intention and its crossing but a gape or break in motion itself.  
As such the walker is questioner without answer, one whose foothold must be negotiated step 
by step.  Conversely, if thought as alterno pede is grounded dialogically, it is overcome by 
monologue, and for Kierkegaard, the Republic demonstrates precisely this overturning of a 
Socratic ironist’s materialist footwork (evident in the existential and dispersive logic of Book 
1) in favour of an immaterial idealism (increasing exercised through the span of the remaining 
books) (Harrison 1994, p. 89). 
Mikhail Bakhtin similarly recognised in historical Socrates an emphasis on the dialogical, 
seeing in the philosopher who did not write a pointed proximity to “popular spoken 
language” (2000, p. 25).  Taken up in the dialogues, Socrates was made to appear as “a 
speaking and conversing man” in a “memoir-type” genre (pp. 21, 24).  As a literary mode 
centred on the contemporary present, it accorded with “scientific [Greek] thinking” by 
breaking with epic temporality vested with “gods, demigods and heroes”.  For Bakhtin, a 
“close to hand”, scientific grasp of things arises within “the field of serio-comical” where a 
bifrontal orientation collides “comic creativity” with lofty aspirations (pp. 21–23).  
Concomitantly, “Socratic degradations” and “Socratic laughter” draw from immediate reality 
“an entire system of metaphors and comparisons [indexual of…] the lower sphere of life - 
from tradespeople, from everyday life, etc.” (p. 25).  Yet against the immediate implications 
of doxa and dialogue-speech, Plato reengineered contemporaneity an epic shackled to a 
transcendent temporality, one where comic corporeality was secondary to knowledge of the 
Good.  Drawing dialogical plasticity upward into monologue, Plato set in play a long-
persisting “chronotrope” (or space-time fusing): “‘the life course of one seeking true 
knowledge’”, or what amounted to “‘the seeker’s path’” (p. 130).  If the agora was model for 
what can be thought of as a “real-life chronotope”, as Bakhtin wrote, because “In ancient 
times, the autobiographical and biographical self-consciousness of an individual and his life 
was first laid bare and shaped in the public square” (p. 131), then the “Platonic schema” is 
distinguished by a lingering mythological chronotype rich in “conversion stories”, 
sequentiality, and metamorphosis (pp. 130–131).  Moreover, “Metamorphosis or 
transformation is a mythological sheath for the idea of development – but one that unfolds 
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not so much in a straight line as spasmodically, [like] a line with ‘knots’ in it” (p. 113).  In 
grounding the Republic in a mythological before and a pseudo-mythological after (rather than 
in the agora as middle place where the individual forms contingently in the public eye), Plato 
envisioned a new mode of individuation, one whose internal unity was achieved through 
epic metamorphoses across time.  
Nevertheless, foreign to the ethos of Greek public life was the development of any form of 
“mute internal life” (Bakhtin & Holquist 2000, p. 134).  Socrates, on the other hand, 
occupying an aporetic position in public life as the “‘know-it-all’” who “‘does not wish to 
communicate anything, [who…] only questions’” (Nietzsche cited in Kofman 1998, p. 224), 
rendered imaginable a self split off from what it knows.  In his reinvention of the Socratic 
persona, Plato aimed to suture this split and the dialogic gap between question and answer 
expressing it with an anamnestic knowledge channelled through an enduring soul.  In doing 
so, he introduced into the mundanity and immanence of the urban scene the possibility of 
revelatory encounters cued from an extra-mundane dimension.  This renovation opened the 
way for a range of chronotropes that took traversal and paideia as their key spatio-temporal 
action, but which enacted them, not in foreign territory or the “abstract expanse of space” 
proper to the “adventure-time” of mythological narrative, but in the quotidian, 
contemporized present (p. 111).  On this basis, Plato is among the first to write urban place 
as a merging of “adventure-time with everyday time”.  Yet while the dialogues all occur in 
actualized places, the specificities of these places dissolve into allegory in the service of an 
epiphanic pedagogy - that is, they dissolve into an abstract non-historical domain or meta-
reality of truths.  Thus at stake in Platonism is less the immediacy of persons to place than 
the need to bring both into virtuous completion - an initiatory quest in fact.  Concomitantly, 
in the Republic, the three types of occupation in the ideal city - producers, soldiers, and 
governors – parallel a corresponding pairing of defects and virtues attributable to the soul: 
lust and temperance relative to the producers; anger and courage for the soldiers; and 
intelligence and prudence for the governors (see Fig 6; also Goux 1993, pp. 144–145).  The 
virtuous ruler – “the philosopher-king” – and the just city-state arise when virtue prevail over 
defects in a balanced synthesis.  Point of fact, the “philosophical soul” arrives at this 
equanimity through an arduous “pedagogical path” that mimics the initiatory journey of an 
earlier royal investiture similarly mobilising a tripartite framing of “endurance” (or the 
capacity for “toil”), “courage”, and “wisdom” (pp. 145–146).  As Goux put it, “Plato’s 
philosophy can thus be construed as a way of salvaging a timeless tradition on a new level 
after the disappearance of the social frameworks that had preserved that tradition” (p. 146).  
If that tradition was defined by “tests of the heroes’ integrity [and…] selfhood”, the 
protagonist was essentially a passive actor compelled to act by extramundane circumstances 
(pp. 105-106; emphasis in original).  As such, ordeals less shaped the hero anew than they 
confirmed an underlying consistency, propriety, or goodness.  For Bakhtin, “The hammer of 
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events shatters nothing and forges nothing – it merely tries the durability of an already 
finished product” (p. 107).  Renovating this tradition, the philosophical soul was held to 
similarly bear an underlying consistency, and is born out by Plato’s use of a tripartite schema 
everywhere blatantly reasserting the “trifunctional mechanism” of mythic testing in adventure 
time, but resituated within the urban ‘hero’ made a crucible for synthesising harmonising, and 
maintaining perennial virtues (Goux 1993, pp. 147–148).  
 
8. Urban Maladies 
 
Against an upstanding balance sought by the metaphysical walk is everything that perturbs 
tripartition at the level of the count, urban place and the soul. It is on the downward way of 
the Republic (Books VIII, IX & X) that Plato offered a cautionary psychology of the imbalances 
of the soul and its mirroring in the polis.  From its ideal state, a fourfold degradation of the 
soul-city is possible: first, timarchy and the greed and ambition-driven rule of the timarchic 
character; second, oligarchy and divisive, wealth-based rule as instituted by the oligarchic 
character; third, democracy and anarchic rule arising with the democratic character; and last, 
tyranny and the excessive and unrestrained rule of the tyrannical character (Fig. 8: g, h, l, j).  
In depicting these departures from an ideal balance, tyranny is not merely one amongst the 
four but, as Goux argued, it is the key precipitator of the imperfect societies and is that 
against which the diagnostic commentary of the downward way is ultimately directed (1993, 
p. 147).  The tyrant is the very antithesis of the philosopher king because in him the defects 
of lust and anger are given free range over the dictates of wisdom.  Pointedly, the tyrannical 
character is understood via a theory of dreams (p. 148) whereby the sleeper, with waking 
consciousness (or what Plato called “the rational, gentle, and ruling part”) abated, is free to 
exercise in an oneiric state “the beastly and savage part” otherwise moderated (Republic 
1997, 571c).  Yet for Goux, if Oedipus Tyrannus is the tragic telling of lust incest and anger 
unleashed, Oedipus appears to conform to tyrannical imperfection with one critical 
exception; Oedipus’ crimes were crimes of ignorance rather than ones wilfully prosecuted.  
In fact, his crimes resulted from a blindness arising with “the exaltation of the rational 
element” and thus from “philosophic excess” (Goux 1993, p. 151).  Hence the problem 
Oedipus represented for Plato was the proximity of this defect to his own valorisation of 
reason.  Oedipus carries, occluded behind the investigative reason and exemplary 
intellection shown in the face of the Sphinx’s riddling, a forgetting and an unknowingness of 
self attested to by his physical deformity and walking gait.  Against this risky synthesis of 
wisdom and forgetting, Plato’s discourse is a “compromise reaction” aiming to consolidate 
the gains of an anthropocentred world “within tradition that it rends and transcends” (p. 150). 
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Yet the price of this renovation is the transfer inward of an otherwise external, cryptophoric 
terrain apposite to magico-religious speech.  
This transposition is signalled in the concluding section on “Imperfect Societies” in the 
Republic.  There in the context of a discussion on just and injust conduct, Plato offered a 
schema for human personality in which the “outer covering” of a single, whole man sheaths a 
composite soul stitched together as a “Chimera” composed of three elements: a “multicolored 
beast with a ring of many heads that it can grow and change at wiIl”, “a lion”, and finally “a 
man” (Republic 1997, 588b-e).  The “polycephalic beast” stands in for “sensual desire”, the 
lion for courage or ferociousness, while ‘man’ is the carrier of the “wise and rational element 
of the soul” (Goux 1993, p. 151).  In fact this “teranthropic being” internalises the 
“functional tripartition” of traditional investiture, though not without approximating the 
Sphinx or “throttling” “Triple-goddess” itself (Graves 1992, 105.3).  As Goux noted, “inner 
man” bears “the image of a monster” despite an apparent outer individuality and coherence, 
and this equanimity can only be maintained on the basis of a “fierce struggle against the 
bestial elements” by “fragile reason” (Goux 1993, pp. 151, 153).  While a poor synthesis 
induces a tyrannical soul in which the visceral drives prevail, a successful synthesis – as per 
the ritual trials and ordeals that confirm a proper claim to royal investiture – incorporates and 
converts the bestial components into virtues, thereby aligning temperance, courage, and 
wisdom in a harmonious union (p. 153).  Oedipus’ fault in the synthetic task imagined for 
the Platonic soul is to enact a monopoly, not of the two animal drives, but of the rational 
element, one that refuses synthesis and forecloses on a human-centred orientation that 
rigorously expunged the others.  Oedipus’ vanquishing of the Sphinx in the adventure-time 
of myth shows ‘man’ outwitting the representative of the cryptophoric world, and in turn, 
instituting an internal, esoteric battle with the soul’s monstrosity.  In the transposition to the 
everyday space of the polis (ostensively Thebes, but in fact imperialistic Athens) as Sophocles’ 
tragedy restaged it, Oedipus, pictured as investigative ‘man’ and supreme arbiter of 
knowledge, is revealed not so much as having failed to convert the raging energies of the 
cryptic soul into virtues than having misapprehended this possibility entirely in his insistent 
pursuit of reflective reason.  
Plato’s instituting of a chimerical soul in the otherwise acutely visible contours of the citizen 
opens a psychical terrain equivalent to Bakhtin’s “abstract expanse of space” otherwise 
assigned other-world adventure-time.  The mapping of the resulting psychical topology onto 
the topography of the city - its upward and downward ways - established a protean 
psychogeography whose idealist strand subsequently found expression in the tripartite 
architecture of Freud’s psychical apparatus.  Sallis’ recognition of the institution of a head-
city in the Republic, yet ultimately Plato’s recoil from such a construct as unliveable, aligns 
with Goux’s proposition that the problem with Oedipus for Plato was an inflated rationality.  
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Only the reinstitution of a modified functional tripartition could remedy divisiveness in the 
soul and the city.  A soul handed only to reason provides no way of knowing or synthesising 
its bestial makeup and hence risked the Oedipal fault - the presumption that the fate of the 
polis rests with reflective human consideration alone (Goux 1993, p. 158).  In that direction 
lay a wilful and hubristic humanism where doxa and dialogue speech proliferate and where 
mercantile immanence and an imperialistic impulses multiply unrestrained. 
Yet the actual city, mired in shadow play with its populous prisoner to a fictive reality arising 
from orgiastic and Dionysian foundations, has its chthonic heritage transposed in the 
Republic by the cultivation of a rarefied erotic aimed, not at the city itself, but beyond to a 
whole that transcends body and image through intellection (Sallis 1996, p. 448).  The love of 
wisdom has as its backdrop Socrates as a problematic seducer - an “eroticist […] to the fullest 
extent” as Kierkegaard described him - who is charged with “corrupting the youth”, with 
“inflaming” them against the dictates of the state and the piety of the family (1966, pp. 212–
213).  Yet his was an “ironic seduction” that “awakened longings which he never satisfied” 
for he “turned the gaze of his disciples inward” rather than meeting their love, thereby 
keeping these relationships, as Kierkegaard put it, “abstract [and …] at the point of zero” – in 
other words, prior to any possession or consummation in the corporeal sense (pp. 213–214).  
Nevertheless, this siren questioning “sawed through [their…] substantive consciousness” 
exposing them to an epiphanic vantage point he neither shared in, nor enjoyed, and with 
which they were left abandoned (p. 215).  At stake for Kierkegaard was “an intellectual 
delivery [that…] severed the umbilical cord of substantiality” (p. 215).  Socrates as he was 
remade in the Platonic dialogues enacts a more substantively tethered midwifery.  Coupling 
the individual through responsibility to a singularly possessed soul that endures throughout 
time, he linked immortality to an “internal dialogue” that was required to understand eros as 
standing outside corporeality and a care of the soul inseparable from a “care for [and 
towards] death” (Patočka 1996, p. 105). 
 
9. Turn to Modernity 
The metaphysics walk then - ethereal before it is corporeal – redirects a fundamentally 
ambiguous peripatetic.  Socratic perambulation riding the drift of seducing dialogue-speech 
and an emptied out questioning, set in play a passage-work tuned to the key Greek notion of 
chorismos, or rupture, in the self-evidence of things (Patočka 1989, p. 198).  Chorismos, 
transmitting a proto-philosophical drive for freedom as uprootedness or unsheltering, 
articulates what no thirdness can bridge (p. 198).  Where Socrates enacted this freedom as 
encounter unfolded in the spirit of an “docta ignorantia” or learned ignorance, Plato 
answered the provocation induced by the chorismos with a “positive (rationalistic) 
	   Page 68 
metaphysics” claiming to bridge, by way of an “ascending dialectic” and a “descending 
dialectic”, two realms, “one sensible, the other suprasensible” (p. 195).  Metaphysics, as a 
platform for determining the paths of knowledge tracking between these realms, in fact 
undermines the freedom potentiated in chorismos by replacing an unqualified ‘whole’ given 
contingently through polemos with a ‘whole’ insistently structured all the way up and down 
(p. 196)!  Substituted was a cognitive schema capable of joining, without break, world, 
cosmos, and the soul in a decidedly Eulerian circuit.  Far from achieving an “anti-Oedipean” 
position (as Goux portrayed (1993, p. 148), Platonism set in place the framework whereby 
the depth of the world beheld through and by contest could be remade a surface fully 
answerable to cognitive toil.  Running a long historical path (passing through various 
metaphysical machinations, including “mystical or theological” reorientation), its modern 
guise shows up as an “anthropologism” seeking command of the totality of “object being” (p. 
205). Yet this “will to power”, anticipated by Plato in his anti-Oedipal suppressing of tragedy, 
remains close to philosophical logos (p. 205).  As Goux and Kofman emphasised, “Oedipus 
comes back” with Rene Descartes (Goux 1993, p. 159) because with Descartes “a radical 
separation between the soul and body, between instincts and reason” is finally posited in full 
(Kofman 1998, p. 236).  With Descartes only the “tyranny of reason can bring all tyranny to 
an end”, but in severing a place for “instincts” in knowledge, tyrannous reason cuts itself off 
“from its own depths” to pursue a course that is “pure surface, empty of all substance and all 
strength” (Kofman 1998, p. 236). 
Spanning the centuries between the demise of the polis and the Cartesian pursuit of a literal 
head-city arising in the seventeenth century, the state’s withdrawal from the world at large 
with the collapse of Roman civitas, and the turning of theological principalities towards a 
“‘true’ [other] world” indexed to divine transcendence, served to suspend a practical, living 
urban-cosmological integration (Patočka 1996, pp. 66–67).  The “Christian posture” frames a 
sense of divided being by both acknowledging an “absolute” absence of “human meaning” in 
the immediate world and by inserting a positive counterpart - “the word from an otherwise 
inaccessible ‘true’ world” beyond (p. 67).  In the place of an open freedom seeding reason, 
the scriptural substitute enacted by Christian doctrinairism imposed an unrestraint that risked 
skepticism of all truth-claims (as indeed a Socratic docta ignorantia potentiated in Platonism 
from the beginning), invoking in turn a new “daring” (p. 69).  Hence the medieval world, 
while starting out as “spatially finite” after the collapse of the Roman “universal state”, 
increasingly tended towards “spatial infinity”, which is to say it renews the European 
propensity to grasp the whole of what is, though with the backing of a seemingly indubitable, 
theological reason (p. 69 & 82).  So is the renewing, cyclical time of metaphysics given new 
finite temporal foundation in a linear tripartation defined by the “fall, salvation and 
judgment” (p. 69).  
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Integral to this linearity, as suggested above by way of Deleuze and Guattari, is a post-
signifying or “passional regime” in which flight, previously associated with victim expulsion 
and the pharmakos ritual, becomes the modus operandi of the social body (Fig. 7).  The 
seeds of this linearisation can be clearly seen in Plato’s linking of the fate of the city to the 
soul, with the later severed from cycles of initiatory, chthonic ties and set journeying 
immemorially in accordance with its “own [individual] achievement” (p. 105).  A care of the 
soul, spun out from the oikoumenē and its imperialistic overcoding of events through 
annalistics, set in play a historical trajectory that is essentially opposed to all circularity.  In 
its place, a post-signifying or “passional regime” makes imaginable “counterbod[ies]”, or 
autonomist subjectivities, neither completely engirdled by despotic signification nor 
submerged in a transient “pathos of the everyday” (Deleuze and Guattari 1996, pp. 103–104) 
with its ecstatic and orgiastic foundations (to borrow Patočka’s characterisation).  The Greek 
solution to Blumenberg’s absolutism of reality failed to settle for an unequal community of 
mortals and immortals (the first movement of life Patočka called acceptance), nor was it 
willing to rest on a transcendent imperialism belatedly authorised divinely (the second 
comportment towards life Patočka called defense).  Followed instead was a third way that 
strays from and betrays divine equanimity (the third orientation towards life Patočka called 
“unconcealment”).  A Promethean defiance of the gods is a well-rehearsed thematic in 
discourses on modernity, but if Prometheus is held as a transforming figure – with fire making 
possible, as Blumenberg said, “the workshops of the Attic potters and smiths” – his theft and 
trespass on divine providence, no less makes him a figure of irreversibility (1985, pp. 300-
301).  Thus, he shares with Hephaestus, the “smith-god”, maiming as a mark of rebellious 
encounters with Zeus.  In Hephaestus’ case, a limp is the consequence of being thrown from 
Olympus to earthly ground (Graves, 23.b & 23.2), while for Prometheus it is the dragging of 
leg chains upon release from the Caucasian Mountains (Blumenberg 1985, p. 301).  Such is 
irreversibility cast as an irregular motility in forward passage.   
Aberrant motion is a bearer of irreversibility in a second sense. Oedipus’ limp, no less than 
Hephaestus and Prometheus’, foregrounds the presence of alternative voices, commands, and 
anticipations actively present in, if problematically cognised by, the bearer.  If a gait 
amounts to the particular style of engaging motion, the synthetic gathering up of a multitude 
of contingent variables into a characterising proxy, it is an approximation that less silences 
this forming constituency than testifies to the working difference they impart to the 
individuation attributed to style.  As Deleuze proposed in a parallel context:  
Insinuated throughout the Platonic cosmos, difference resists its yoke. Heraclitus 
and the Sophists make an infernal racket. It is as though there were a strange 
double which dogs Socrates’ footsteps and haunts even Plato’s style, inserting 
itself into the repetitions and variations of that style”. (1994, p. 127)  
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The racket in question arises with the entanglement of mythos and logos.  Dialogue already 
heteroglot in Socrates’ case (as his demon makes evident), fares no better in Plato, despite his 
attempting to still the mimetic voices of an ignorant community caught up in pathos.  A 
transition from dialogue to monologue and an internalized dialectic parallels the appearance 
of an individualised soul centred on a self-determining play stretched across eternity.  Yet 
this process recalls an ambiguous vacillation between magico-religious utterance – with its 
initiatory corporeal correlate – and a head-strong anthropologism voiced by Oedipus.  The 
tempering of the tripartite soul by a synthesizing ruler was no less an overcoming of indirect 
or heteroglot discourses intersecting its individualization, though one, as Deleuze makes 
clear, that could not entirely escape this background clamor (Deleuze see 1990, pp. 256, 
1994, p. 128).  It was an exercise in, no less than an attempted amelioration of, what 
Bakhtin called the “Double-voiced” nature of all utterance (2000, pp. 324–325), or what 
Kierkegaard termed the alterno pede.  Walking and talking in the Socratic sense of attending 
to demon discourse and occluded statements in passersbys drew “the power of the false” 
from the scene of dialogue, making it possible to see multiple things and tell multiple stories 
at once in a dissimilitude close to that of the Sophists and the falsified speech of apatē 
(Deleuze 1994, p. 128).  Unlike the gods “with fixed attributes, properties and functions, 
territories and codes”, demons for the Greeks run aberrant lines of connection and flight, 
“jump[ing] across intervals, and from one interval to another” (Deleuze 1987, p. 40).  
Moreover, to the extent that this voice and name rest on the falsifying power constituting 
indirect discourse, what solidity and endurance they engender are always subject to betrayal 
and demonic flight.  Deleuze made note particularly of the line by the Chorus of Oedipus 
Tyrannus responding to Oedipus’ blinding himself: “‘Which demon has leapt the longest 
leap?’” - meaning what utterance and what voice had sequestered itself in him and driven 
him to turn his eyes from the world (1987, p. 40).  For Oedipus, prophetic enunciation arises 
into consciousness as a demon-leap, a leap bringing about a radical redistribution of space, 
or rather the dissolution of properly possessed places.  In a betrayal of the “sedentary 
structures” of the city and its representations, he is fated to play out a “nomad nomos” 
(Deleuze 1994, pp. 36-37), which sets a new urban norm that perturbs any grounding physis 
(nature).  
The enactment of an appropriative recompense for alienation can be witnessed across the 
long transition from antiquity to modernity.  At the urban level, an integration of self, polis, 
and cosmos by way of a care of the soul vested in metaphysical surety lapses.  
Consequently, in summarising these shifts, Patočka emphasised a displacement from a “care 
to be [to…] the care to have”, the latter manifesting itself specifically in a centrifugal drive to 
take possession of, and to manage, the entirety of the “external world” (1996, p. 83).  The 
“whole” of what is, no longer mediated by a spiritual relation, instead becomes a gathered-up 
domain idealised as both unlimited and infinitely deployable.  If between Socrates, who 
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walked and talked, and Plato, who walked and wrote, lay the distinction between a 
dialogical self and a monological one, then the appeal to direct discourse in the latter did not 
succeed in entirely quelling a plethora of background ghosts and demons.  Nevertheless, 
such a transition heads in the direction of a consolidated self.  As Deleuze and Guattari 
asserted, “To write is perhaps to bring this assemblage of the unconscious to the light of day, 
to select the whispering voices, to gather the tribes and secret idioms from which I extract 
something I call my Self” (1987a, p.84).  In Plato is witnessed a writing that moves 
contrarily, that contracts and internalises the utterances of the initiatory collective body and 
its magico-religious idioms, exercising them against the dispersive and falsifying movement of 
urban dialogue-speech.  At stake in the imagining of Athens as a thing traversable by logos 
was the quest for a movement in thought itself, one that could be mastered, preempted, put 
first.  Yet in accordance with a third time of mediation, a time prior to the beginning, 
thought is shown arising not only in the head (a head city), but on the page and through the 
conduct and conducting of bodies in city places.  To think the city, per chance to think 
thought, it is not enough to apprehend it as a motionless animal; an animating action is 
required.  Bipedal movement appears as the lever of logos, a logos steeped and stepped in 
myth. The playing out of mythological sheathing as a real-life, urban chronotrope, while anti-
Oedipal in intent, was nevertheless transportive of an Oedipal vector, one that served to 
unmoor the city, throwing it out, transcendentally, beyond itself.  Yet vacillating between 
upward and downward ways – pursuant of an Eulerian passage in fact - the urban 
phenomenon was more properly sent on a non-Eulerian course, sent that is into novelization.  
It is the nature of this novelization in modernity that the following chapter will explore. 
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CHAPTER 2 
	  
 
The Foot’s Rendezvous – Island Places  
	  
	  
 
 
…it all began with the feet! 
 
André Leroi-Gourhan (1964) 
 
 
	  
	  
1. Orientation |Origination 
 
	  
The previous chapter prepared the groundwork for considering walker-observers in 
modernity by outlining a metaphysical walk.  Such a walk, contrary to the forgetting of 
everyday, habitual walking, called on memory to better grasp a continuous whole beyond 
individual purview.  Western history can be thought of as cumulative attempts to grasp a 
totality posited by, but invariably beyond the grasp of, metaphysics and theology.  The term 
onto-peripatetic aims to situate walking discourses and city-observation in a broader 
discourse concerned with questions of existential orientation.  Following Patočka and, 
earlier, Serres, it has been suggested that historicity takes a particular form in the West: it 
emerges as a rupture in the cyclic temporality of the oikoumenē or cosmological binding of 
mortals and immortals in an unequal community.  If the Greek poleis set in play a city-time 
that broke with the territorial-cosmological orchestration of epic as journeying through 
distant, abstract expanse, then the metaphysical walk, with its “mythological sheathing”, 
tracked the “seeker’s path” – rich in metamorphic and transformative valence – into the city 
itself where an onto-peripatetic unfolds as a “real-life chronotrope” and for which a 
complicated compounding of actual and speculative ‘walks’ are pivotal.  One residue of 
this onto-peripatetic is that cities have been beheld as places of ‘discovery’ and overcoming, 
for which urban exploration – vacillating between an “overworld/underworld” grappling – 
delivers self-creation (Walkowitz 1992, pp. 4–11).  This dividend is inseparable from an 
autodidactic orientation driven by an Oedipal vector.  Cities, remade as sites for the playing 
out the adventure-time of epic, seemingly potentiate the recovery of an enduring quality 
concomitant with the philosophical soul.  Nevertheless, if for Bakhtin the real-life 
chronotrope is critical to the modern novel and an “anticanonical”, “antigeneric” power 
that it runs through the “literary system” (as an orchestration of canons), and if the roots of 
the real-life chronotrope run deep into archaic time, then Socrates with his “gladfly role” 
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might qualify “as the first novelist”, or at least be bearer of an impulse to “novelization” 
(Holquist 2000, pp. xxxi–xxxii).  For Michael Holquist the novel does “not permit generic 
monologue” but instances dialogue across all genres, and hence institutes an immanent 
newness as its qualifying marker (pp. xxvii & xxxi).  If Socratic degradation and laughter (per 
Bakhtin) and thought as a haltering alterno pede (per Kierkegaard) are what metaphysics 
seeks to bypass by committing dialogue to the page, setting it down, holding it in place, 
making it monological and perennial in a borrowed, epic sense, then novelisation, with its 
commitment to “the open-ended present” and an essential incompletion in things, also 
arrives with the page and risks setting the whole scriptural enterprise into aberrant motion 
(Bakhtin & Holquist 2000, pp. 7, 30). 
 
This chapter examines walking and writing in the context of an overarching novelisation 
and the problems of orientation and origination that ensue in the lapse of metaphysical and 
theological grounds for measuring an existential whole.  It argues that despite the complex 
temporal and perceptual fields harboured by cities, urban place has been presumed to 
potentiate a surrogate whole from which a sensible foothold can be drawn.  Walking 
accounts have been one way of grappling with, and labouring to overcome, the 
disorientation of time’s touch by drawing cities together into a consistent viewpoint or 
representation.  In the absence of access to, as Claire Colebrook put it, “some larger totality, 
hierarchy or order”, any ordering of the world in modernity “must be generated from man 
himself” and arises as a world represented, one generated from an individuated viewpoint 
distinct from it (2005, p. 25).  A quest for transcendent reason shifts to first-hand experience 
in modernity where a confrontation with a world beyond the subject demands an 
overcoming turning on questions of approach and vantage point (p. 27).  In observer-
walkers point of view is exemplarily figured, just as individual agency and autonomous 
vantage point find rich expression through motility.  Nevertheless, in the mobile, observing 
subject is found echoes of the old upward quest with its appeal to a plane of transcendence 
overarching troubling, composite ground.  As this chapter will explore, in modernity the 
individual subject itself assumes a transcendental role proffering its own originating ground, 
datum, or measure.  Yet the modern subject that walks, no less than an Oedipus who limps, 
is constituted precisely through uncertain self-place and self-other relations. 
 
In Robinson Crusoe (1719), Daniel Defoe offered a scenario that aptly foregrounded these 
considerations.  He staged on a desert island the task of establishing not just a survivable 
place, but an originating hold – in an existential sense – on a domain at the limits of the 
representable and the known.  As Pierre Macherey suggested, the novel was, in the context 
of literary modernism, an “advanced popularisation of the concept of origin” and 
prosletised the potency of self-fathering (2006, p. 269).  Admittedly not a city, Crusoe’s 
island-made-industrious is city-like in its refurbishing of nature as a kingdom under the 
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command of one.  Concomitantly, his narration of labour and naming pointedly relies on 
pedestrian mobility, where roaming is equated to territorialising, where encounter is 
portended by footprints, and where point of view is asserted through the foot.  Nevertheless, 
an encounter on the island’s far side with footprints that may or may not belong to 
Robinson himself precipitates an anxious replaying of recalled itineraries in hope of 
reassuringly claiming the footprints as his own (2003, p. 125).  Yet repeated recollection of 
prior walks fails to completely ease his disquiet, and eventually he is confronted with 
undeniable evidence of troubling others.  Consequent to this lapse of rendezvous with self, 
the quest for self-representation shifts as one of the interloping others, whom he names 
“Friday”, is drawn into the broader project of island-renovation.  In a blazon echo of the 
Occidental assertion of territorial foothold over colonial others, Defoe stages Crusoe’s 
belated reassertion of self and mastery in the form of the new arrival’s submission: “[Friday] 
lays his head upon the ground, close to my foot, and sets my other foot upon his head” (p. 
162–163).  In curiously circular logic, the rupture of self occasioned by the uncertain 
attribution of footprints finds resolution in the transformation of the other as the bearer and 
transmitter of the European self and its imprint.  Here the rescue of “heathen souls” bluntly 
takes the Platonic form of an upward-way, literally stepping up and over the other as a 
troubled intermediary ground.  Hoisted up is an observing consciousness whose logos casts 
out the unrepresentable, asserting a viewpoint able to survey and think the given as a 
presence for a (self-defining) subject modelling an island-consciousness.  
 
An instructive contrast to this colonising imprint, one close to Nancy’s advocacy of an 
enjoyment in world creation, is found in Gilles Deleuze’s consideration of Michel 
Tournier’s Friday, or the Limbo of the Pacific (1969).  Here, in an alternative encounter with 
a deserted island and a companion named Friday, Tournier’s Robinson, refusing a rescuing 
ship and a chance to complete a circuit home, opts instead to remain on an island named 
Speranza, thereby discovering, beyond the administrative and colonial impulse of Defoe’s 
original, that solitude makes possible an unexpected place-relation – its erotic renovation.  
With isolation comes a lapse in normative temporal and spatial coordination, as Deleuze 
noted, in which the absence of human others disorganises subject-object distinctions, and 
with it, desire.  For Deleuze, “Robinson [becomes…] the consciousness of the island, but 
the consciousness […] the island has of itself” (1990, p. 311).  With a lapse in self-Other 
desiring relations, an elemental sexuality arises in which the earth no longer retains a 
docile, “recumbent organisation” across which a “homo economicus” reigns, but rather 
rises from its supplication into a “new uprightness” that erodes Robinson’s privilege as the 
standing being and thereby draws him into a raft of strange tactile relations and erotic 
exchanges (p. 313; see also Bogue 2009).  In this account, the ground consumes the 
worker-walker rather than docilely supporting and answering to the work of organisation.  
Moreover agency is reversed and Robinson is transformed, as Tournier described, into 
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“simple dough, caught in a hand of all-powerful stone” or, in an agricultural sense, is 
remade a “bean, caught in the massive indestructible flesh of Speranza” (cited in Deleuze 
1990, p. 314).  For Deleuze, this collapse in subjective agency arising “when Others are 
missing from the structure of the world”, points to the significance of others in relativizing 
“the not-known and the non-perceived” – something others bring to “my point of view” in 
the guise of the “unseen in what I do see” (p. 306).  Similarly, others make desire object-
directed because only through others does desire find its destination and placement (p. 
306).  The immediate consequence of an absence of others is a savage mixing in which the: 
 
[…] “known and the unknown, the perceived and the unperceived confront one 
another absolutely in a battle with nuances [causing a …] harsh and black world, 
without potentialities or virtualities [and where…] the category of the possible has 
collapsed.  Instead of relatively harmonious forms surging forth from, and going 
back to, a background in accordance with an order of space and time, only 
abstract lines now exist, luminous and harmful – only a groundless abyss, 
rebellious and devouring.  Nothing but Elements. The abyss and the abstract line 
have replaced the relief and the background. (p. 306) 
 
Without figure-ground stability and the anticipated spatio-temporal patterns collectively 
anchored by interlocutors (what Deleuze called a “structure-Other” (p. 314)), revealed is 
something approaching Blumenberg’s “absolutism of reality” – a raw, elemental 
indetermination prior to cognitive-place structures, indeed place itself.  If others give the 
subject its sense of a “past world” (“I was”) and themselves constitute a possible future, 
without them normative temporal sequence fails too (pp. 310–311).  In Tournier’s account, 
days particularly lose their cumulative, sequential order:  
 
No longer do they [days] jostle on each other’s heels. Each stand separate, 
upright, proudly affirming its own worth. And since they are no longer to be 
distinguished as the stages of a plan in process of execution, they so resemble 
each other as to be superimposed in my memory, so that I seem to be ceaselessly 
reliving the same day. (Cited in Deleuze 1990, p. 311) 
 
This upright time (each moment standing erect and separate) fails to support a satisfactorily 
individuated subject and instead causes that subject to slide towards a “superhuman 
filiation” with the given (p. 315).  Yet more than simply falling into “a fundamental disorder 
of the world”, Deleuze found in Tournier’s tale of an alternate Robinson a raft of desiring 
relations behind the structure-Other that elude human-centred representation.  The 
“otherwise-Other” is a counter-structure ghosting all concrete actualisations of desired 
objects and persons, one whose elemental turbulence is more or less kept in check by the 
structure-Other:  
 
The Other is the grand leveller, and consequently the de-structuration of the 
Other is not a disorganization of the world, but an upright organization as 
opposed to the recumbent organization; it is the new uprightness, and the 
detachment of an image which is vertical at last and without thickness; it is the 
detachment of a pure element which at last is liberated. (pp. 312–313) 
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Under the sway of levelling others, the elements are “drawn into the earth, [the] earth into 
bodies, and bodies into objects”, each in turn concretising a world of actual, possible 
connections (p. 318).  Sexuality expresses this pressing down of desire into ever-more 
concrete erotic objects and modes of embodiment (p. 317).  Yet against this gravity and 
densification, an alternative upward way, a transcending passage, persists that “separate[s] 
desire from its object” and bypasses the detour of representable sexuality.  Robinson 
experiences this up-ride, though not without becoming elemental himself and joining a 
plane where depth as spatial distribution, particularly depth as separation, ceases to 
operate: resultantly he “carries the earth into the sky” (p. 317).  Deleuze gave this world of 
contracted surfaces different names – “the great Health”, the “perverse structure” – and saw 
emanating from it phantasms, ascending simulacra, and desiring perversions; in short, the 
world of the Sophists otherwise detected and pressed downward by Platonic logos (p. 315).  
Nevertheless, the great Health depicts a ‘ground’ prior to others and their organisation of 
the world and prior to the emergence of the perceptual field as a place for the playing out of 
the possible.  In this anti-Platonic reversal, what walks and what is made upright are not 
persons in pursuit of the Good, but elevated intensities causing ‘persons’ to descend into 
ecstasis – a passage that passes from objects to bodies, from bodies to earth, and from the 
earth into the elemental.  Rising up and falling down, objects and time swap figural place – 
so can modernity in its long arc be imagined and rewritten.  At stake then in these divergent 
accounts (Defoe and Tournier’s) are two holds on infinity: an infinite grasp or possession of 
the world – an autarkic accession arcing away from nature and animality – whose imprint is 
‘”humanization” and whose form is the return circle, the circumnavigation, a world 
rounded and circumscribed (Certeau 1986, pp. 144-144; Barthes & Coste 2013, pp. 27-29); 
alternatively, an anachoresis that wrenches from the social world a counter passage dis-
covering and un-burying the elemental at the cost of disfiguring any return of and to self. 
 
 
	  
2. Scriptural Economies 
	  
 
The metaphysical walk instilled anachoresis as a key city-relation: as Barthes described, “its 
foundational act is to break away, the abrupt jolt of departure” (2013, p. 25).  Further: “The 
distancing has to be symbolized in some way. Anachoresis = an action, a line, a threshold 
to be crossed” (p. 25).  Observational walking registers this break or distance in and through 
and amalgamation of traversal and writing particularly – a crossing imagined as Eulerian.  
For instance, when considering the circumnavigating adventures penned by Defoe and Jules 
Verne, Macherey recognised “a long reverie or meditation on the theme of the straight line”, 
the rectitude or formal propriety of which can only be appreciated afterwards having 
traversed “an immense reserve” of irregularity (2006, pp. 203-205).  Building on these 
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity   Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Page 77 
 
reflections, Certeau saw a broader project of “Occidental capitalization” associated with 
oceanic exploration whereby the trajectory organising encounter is cumulatively folded 
back on itself to form “a line of circles” (Fig 12.) that progressively stockpile knowledge to 
better “eliminate the losses” of observation (1986, pp. 146-147).  At stake is a quest to erase 
any unknown remainder or exteriority arising with the voyage, and progressively through 
narration and naming, to “semanticize the voids of the universe” (pp. 143, 147). 
 
 
KEY 
 
1  Voyaging circuits 
2  Progressive narrative & knowledge stockpiling  
a-a7  Imperial urban centre accumulating both knowledge & exteriority 
 
 
Figure 12. Author 2013. “Occidental Capitalization” – Narrative & Stockpiling (Modified from Certeau 
1986).  
 
For Certeau, underwriting this linear capitalization is the shift from a shared world capable 
of being read or deciphered for its pre-existing, divinely inscribed truths to a “scriptural 
economy” that must essentially construct and validate its truth values in accordance with 
writing practices.  Three salient factors define such an economy: first, the demarcation of a 
“blank space” for which the “island of the page” models a generic subject capable of 
effecting its own self-engenderment sheltered from the “ambiguities of the world”; second, 
into this clearing a text is inserted whose “itinerant, progressive and regulated practice – 
[like] a ‘walk’ - composes the artefact of another ‘world’ that is not received but rather 
made”; third, from within this scene of withdrawal where the self practices its relation to 
itself and to others but also its capacity to envisage the world as a thing remade, a strategic 
system capable of intervening in the environment beyond is devised (1988a, pp. 134–135).  
These three facets in fact make learning to write the “fundamental initiatory practice” of 
capitalism, as Certeau argued, and are exemplarily mythologised by Robinson Crusoe, 
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which pedagogically models “a universe without a father” (p. 136).  Underscoring Crusoe’s 
autarkic relation with the island is the journal in which Crusoe writes the island in 
synchrony with its outside mastering; hence the journal is a reserve space where the ‘walk’ 
of the hand/pen silos observing, walking, and acting in an external domain.  It is the page 
that gives the latter an ‘internal’ consistency in accordance with the linearity of the written 
line and a strictly sequential temporality.  Potent because it is replicable everywhere 
amongst a reading public, this model simultaneously rendered personal agency centrifugally 
efficacious (p. 136): 
 
The scriptural enterprise transforms or retains within itself what it receives from its 
outside and creates internally the instruments for an appropriation of the external 
space. It stocks up what it sifts out and gives itself the means to expand.  
Combining the power of accumulating the past and that of making the alterity of 
the universe conform to its models, it is capitalist and conquering. (p. 135; 
emphasis in original) 
 
Accounts of walking are never free of the page in a scriptural economy, not just in the 
obvious sense that they get written down, but because they model observation as that 
which can be belatedly appropriated and mastered.  Further, the walker that observes is 
always a literate walker, a scriptural self, or a subject-page who knows itself only on the 
basis of a reserve or private retraction of action and its redistribution via a self as agent of 
enunciation.  
 
Yet for Certeau, a blind spot centres the scriptural operation; orality as the “fragile way the 
body makes itself heard in the language” is what writing both purports to capture and 
unavoidably writes out of the picture (p. 131).  Bodies, rewritten as a correlate of the page, 
succumb to the “law of the named” channelling corporeal material in accordance with 
discursive norms and social codes (pp. 148–149).  Moreover, the scriptural enterprise 
assembles a world of believers around writing and who find in the page a reality whose 
veracity confirms its operations.  At the level of belief, the pairing of walkers with pages 
chronicling itineraries proselytises for the body-like space of the page itself, which is a 
space capable of enunciating a point of view and charting a Eulerian course through the 
ambiguities it confronts.  Bodies are not just put into the text; they are already inscribed 
with the effects of literacy and mirror the duplication of scriptural force everywhere.  Yet the 
body born of this instrumentality harbours a plethora of other bodily modes that speak in 
languages largely unknowable to the page and its representational stricture (raves, cries, 
rants, and howls are amongst Certeau’s examples) and which constitute an unconscious that 
spoils and reworks scriptural certainties ad nauseam (pp. 147–150).  Hence Certeau 
decentred the Freudian unconscious from the seat of the subject, locating it instead in the 
plethora of everyday practices whose knowledge is largely unknown but effected 
anonymously out of view of a reflective consciousness. “Moves, behaviours, ways of talking 
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or walking, etc.” are amongst these practices that have drawn precise knowledge 
“wholesale” over to the unconscious (p. 71).  Nevertheless, over three centuries the two 
types of knowing have vied with each other: on one hand, “a referential and unrefined 
knowledge; on the other, an “explanatory discourse that brings forth into the light an 
inverted representation of its opaque source” (p. 72). 
 
 
3. “Knowfoot” 
	  
 
Looking to the origins of the scriptural self, Defoe, as populariser of an island mentality, is 
in Walter Ong’s account of the transition from cultures founded on orality to those centred 
in literacy, the inheritor of an “internalization of consciousness and introspective habits” 
made possible by writing and pioneered long before by Sophocles (497–406 BC) and the 
other Greek tragedians (2002, p. 150).  At the threshold of alphabetic culture arising with 
ancient Greece, the myth of Oedipus made the transition to tragedy as amongst “the first 
verbal genre controlled entirely by writing” (p. 149).  Not coincidently, Oedipus’ 
genealogical line in myth runs to the union of Kadmus (Cadmus from “qadm” meaning east) 
and Harmonia; significantly the former was “a prince of the Phoenician city of Tyre” who 
travelled west to establish Thebes and impart to the Greeks the Phoenician alphabet 
(Forston 2011, p. 251; & Sacks et al. 2009, p. 73).  Further, Cadmus is linked to tragic 
drama via “twice-born” Dionysus who was the result of a union between Zeus and Semele, 
Cadmus’ daughter (Graves, 14.b-c).  Dionysus in turn was patron of the festivities held in 
early spring in Ancient Athens – known as the city Dionysia – that culminated in 
competitive drama.  Yet the link between Dionysus, theatre, and written culture is complex.  
In the fifth century BC, a proverbial refrain asked of tragedy was, as Vernant has noted, 
“What has it to do with Dionysus?” (1990, p. 181).  Despite the god giving his name to the 
Dionysia – with “dithyrambic competitions, processions of young people, blood sacrifices, 
and the parading and exhibiting of the god’s idol” – tragic form, in its doubling of “mythos” 
with “pathos” (that is, in its intersecting of legendary stories with contemporary 
circumstances) appears to have had no direct sacral-mythic linkages (pp. 181–182).  
 
In tragedy was initiated a written tradition that mandated characters with psychological 
‘depth’, motivational complexity and behavioural unpredictability (Ong  2002, p. 149).  In 
its staging of the agonistic capacities of consciousness, the written text eschewed the “flat” 
or “heavy” characters of earlier epic and mythical modes of storytelling.  In contrast to an 
oral, “noetic” grasp of the world (typical of predominately speech-directed “verbomotor 
culture” (p. 66)), writing increasingly favoured figures who were rounded psychologically 
and rendered complex by evolving time (p. 149).  While the “people-interactive” tendency 
of verbomotor life and a cultural mnemonics dependant on recitation, repetition, and 
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regularity (which for Ong was evidenced in the predominantly clichéd and stereotypical 
figures), cultures of literacy are specifically “object-orientated”, emphasising “visual input 
and the ‘objective’ world of things” (p. 66).  Similarly, Greek tragedy specifically tied the 
polis to theatre, rendering the city itself a spectacle to be observed and hence, contrary to 
an earlier “poetic genre”, tragedy entailed a thing “written to be seen as well as heard” 
(Vernant 1990, p. 185).  The emergence of “tragic consciousness” tended to emphasise the 
instability of reality, giving questionable qualities to earlier epic heroes that the audience, in 
turn, recognised as their own (p. 186).  Putting on stage other-worldly characters who “took 
on every appearance of real existence” meant that in tragedy the audience saw with its own 
eyes believable figures who “were not really there nor could be” (p. 187). Consequently, the 
present assumed a mask-like quality whose “illusionary simulations” doubled presence with 
absence, making the quotidian inseparable from the “space of the imaginary” (p. 187).  For 
Vernant, it was this in fact that tied Dionysus to tragedy, for “one of [the god’s…] major 
characteristics [was] to confuse the boundaries between illusion and reality, to conjure up 
the beyond in the here and now, to make us lose our sense of self-assurance and identity” 
(pp. 187–188).  
 
Tragedy then entailed a shift from perennial stories to ones complicated by contingency and 
contemporaneity.  Correspondingly, tragedy invoked a shift from a flat, generalised telling 
by voice to a visibly augmented telling tasked with synthesising hearing and vision.  This 
heightening of viewpoint by tragic consciousness corresponded with a broader Greek 
“anthropocentering” whereby individuals came to recognise themselves as “source and 
agent” of a world increasingly beheld “as object (rather than [solely as] a sign)” (Goux 
1993, pp. 119–121).  Goux saw in this condition a “deprojection” that eschewed initiatory 
strictures and traditions linked to divine mediation and for which the price was a 
generalised lapse in inherent belonging and meaningfulness (p. 121).  With deprojection 
pivotal to the emerging Greek science, viewpoint came to govern all aspects of cultural life 
and contrasted abruptly with Egypt where a “cryptophoric mode of symbolising 
prevail[ed]”; in other words, an initiatory incorporation into an explicitly collective system 
of sacred signs and beliefs governed imperially or despotically (p. 123).  Goux nominated 
the distinction between projection of the latter and Greek deprojection “aspective” and 
“perspective” respectively.  The former privileged figuration based on frontality and flat 
profiles with little depth of field or expressive figural exploration.  The latter favoured a 
subject-centred viewpoint whose varying observations confirmed both the relativity of 
outlook and the objectivity of the view (p. 125–126).  For example, Goux contrasted 
hieroglyphic renderings where “feet are arranged in profile along a baseline” with “Greek 
painters [who] were the first to draw a frontal view […] of a human foot” (pp. 122, 126).  
Departing from a fixed, canonical view, the foreshortened foot signalled an outlook indexed 
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to “angle of vision” and therefore one entirely time and place dependent (p. 122).  Shorn of 
its cryptophoric signification, such a foot was offered as both base and naked: base in the 
sense that it called up questions of placement and the contingency of ground-contact; 
naked in the sense of being personalised, indeed privatised in a manner contrary to 
stereotypical rendering of body types.   
 
For Goux, the “Greek rupture” with aspective was also inseparable from a confrontation 
with myth, whose cultural narratives were characterisitically “‘arrested,’ canonical, 
‘remembered’” (p. 128).  Sophocles’ remaking of Oedipus can in fact be seen to effect a 
perspectival confrontation with the ritual and initiatory mechanics of a symbolist outlook, 
replacing it instead with an inward confrontation turning on self-doubt, uncertainty, limited 
understanding, and failures in memory, for which psychological resources foreign to, and 
unimaginable in, aspective culture were necessary.  At a corporeal level, Sophocles’ 
Oedipus bears the mark of this transitional from mythic to tragic form – a pronounced limp.  
If for the Greeks, the perspectival foot was always situationally foreshortened and 
circumstantially placed, Oedipus’ misfortune was to drag an aspectively deformed or ‘fixed’ 
foot, thereby embodying a contest between providential and circumstantial models of time.  
His name, as noted earlier, denotes a double relation to knowledge signalled specifically 
through feet.  He is forwardly orientated by a will to truth, a cognitive knowing 
irredeemably forced to revisit an obscure past - in short, he condenses a dichotomy figured 
as head and hindrance.  Oedipus Tyrannus, as a “‘Knowfoot’” capable of solving “‘the 
riddle about feet’”, was also a thinker able to resolve what the usual methods of the seer 
could not (Sophocles & Gould 1970, p. 397).  Nevertheless, Oedipus no less stands as a 
precarious figure in whom a tragic consciousness demands that he cannot know his 
standing but must uncover it step-by-step.  Moreover, this uncovering is played out 
according to the internalising and deepening of a subject formed in writing.  More 
generally, in hypostasising questions of situatedness, texts about subjects who walk in cities 
are more than merely accounts of places.  Rather, these place-accounts are “instrument[s] of 
inquiry” (as Macherey said with Defoe’s island in mind) and sites for testing the autological 
as limit (2006, p. 269).  If the deserted island builds on the precedent of the urban crucible 
(or polis) as an instrument of inquiry, both together occasion the issue of figure and 
disfiguration in perception itself. 
 
 
5. “Superlinearity” 
 
	  
What the figure-disfiguration field coalescing with Oedipus suggests is the potency of a 
centrifugal orientation to life (Patočka 1998, p. 36).  For Patočka this means living in 
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horizons other than our own, in fact living beyond ourselves in a “Thou-I structure” where 
the Thou – as everywhere other to the place from which an ‘I’ centres the world - not only 
dominates but, as he credited Nietzsche with asserting, is immeasurably “older than the I” 
(p. 36).  Against a “‘human, all-to-human’” orientation making the ‘I’ the sole enduring 
measure of the field of knowledge, the Thou necessarily casts the human beyond any 
anthropocentric certainty.  Foucault, similarly surveying the limits of an anthropocentric 
centring of knowledge, anticipated the “disappearance of man” in the concluding lines of 
The Order of Things (1985).  In a decidedly Robinson-esque rendering, he forecast, “that 
man would be erased, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (pp. 386–387).  
Where for Defoe’s Robinson, at stake was a rendezvous of the self with its footprints 
necessary to overcome a “smudge” or “lapse” in self-presence (Certeau 1988a, p. 154), 
Foucault’s beyond of man as eroding facial imprint prompts the question what rendezvous 
will be, or indeed has ever been, possible between ‘man’ and his walk?   
 
‘Pre’ or ‘post’ any anthropocentric certainty, the walker is carried by an evolutionary legacy 
indicative of two spatialising factors.  For André Leroi-Gourhan, all animal life shares both a 
mobile search for nourishment and the placement of “the entire organism […] behind the 
aperture for ingesting food” (1993, p. 27).  If the first characteristic points to the significance 
of locomotion for all vertebrates, the second highlights how animate life has come to be 
organised axially according to an “anterior field” or forward-facing horizon of extended 
concern and response.  Further, this longitudinal axis is organised via bilateral symmetry in 
two areas: that “governed by actions of the head and the other by those of the forelimbs” (p. 
31).  While animal life has accorded a differing balance, species by species, between the 
“facial pole” and the “manual pole”, only in the human animal is the hand entirely relieved 
of locomotive demands (p. 34, 36).  Furthermore, free hands relieve the face of any grasping 
function, thereby allowing an evolution in cranial structure favouring vertical elongation, 
increased facial expressiveness, and the potential for greater and more nuanced 
vocalisation.  Hence, erect posture and bipedal motion were the anatomical and motor 
triggers leading first to tool use and language development and second to a cerebral 
expansion answering to new motor and emotive complexity (p. 26).  Hominoid motility is 
key in an evolving “bipolar technicity” centred on the motor functions of hand and face, 
that in turn gave rise to a parallel evolution of “technoeconomic structures” (pp. 145, 187).  
For example, growing agrarian “supersettlements” triggered the “urban mechanism” 
resulting in a specialised sociality capable of managing and accounting for surpluses, 
whether in goods, foods or religio-cultural production (p. 178).  Leroi-Gourhan makes 
imaginable a causative line running between bipedal walking and urbanisation, where 
ultimately the freeing of the hands also potentiated a freeing of time in which the 
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technician, the metallurgist, and the artesian, amongst other social actors, became possible 
(p. 169).  
 
Also born with the “furnace crafts”, coinage, stock keeping, and monetary mechanisms is 
the transformation of graphic notation into writing (p. 178).  Prior to the urban threshold in 
Leroi-Gourhan’s account, early anthropoids showed a divergent, expressive deployment of 
the hand and the face, where tool use and gestural expression (dance etc.) developed 
separately from vocal expression and phonation (speech, incantation, song):  
 
The hand has its language, with a sight-related form of expression, and the face 
has its own, which relates to hearing.  Between the two is the halo that confers a 
special character upon human thought before the invention of writing proper: The 
gesture interprets the word, and the word comments upon graphic expression. (p. 
210) 
 
On one hand, sedentarisation, with its cyclic patterns of seasonal forces, imparted to 
settlements “a cosmic image” in Leroi-Gourhan’s account where heavenly and earthly 
spheres were joined according to a radial conception of the universe (with space and time 
organised around pivotal reference points – “omphalos”).  On the other, the city’s freeing of 
time increasingly favoured processes of “rectilinear progression”, serialisation, and linear 
extension (p. 211).  Language, pushing to catch up with the technical innovations, 
submitted an earlier drawn graphism to a “stricter linearisation of symbols”, and in turn, 
sought to inscribe and code “spoken language” in phonetic temporal sequences (p. 211).  
The result was a disruption in the balanced play between aural and visual expressive 
registers, with the linguistic apparatus becoming the predominant mechanism through 
which thought was passed and through which it was preserved (p. 210).  Consequently 
writing worked to not only constrict the world of images, but served to overcome 
“multidimensional symbolic thought” in general (p. 212). 
 
In their reading of these propositions by Leroi-Gourhan, Deleuze and Guattari used the term 
“superlinearity” to describe this “overcoding” of gestural ‘languages’ by the linearity of 
language (1987, p. 62).  Moreover, the transfer of the majority of expressive traits into 
language served to reconcile the tension between a radial conception of the universe and 
urban linearization, with the despotic leader taking up the pivot point between social and 
cosmic orders and monopolising all circulated enunciation (Fig. 6) (p. 62).  In suturing the 
divide between oral and graphic systems of pre-alphabetic sociality, writing effected a 
radically different social organisation from what Deleuze and Guattari term the “primitive 
socius”.  The later had no territorially expansive mandate, for the earth was held as an 
indivisible entity maintained in immanent unity, while the former imparted to the earth a 
transcendent unity – the unity of a State capable of appropriating and dividing territory 
through decree (2000, p. 146).  The independence of graphism (the marker of filiation) and 
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voice (the bearer of alliance) in oral societies ensures that one can never predominate over 
the other and that they remain in a state of declension that declines any absolute lineage 
with the “body of the earth” (2000, p. 146).  Conversely, what Deleuze and Guattari called 
the “despotic barbarian formation”, depends on a sovereign’s “direct filiation with the deity” 
and the conversion of voice into a language capable of commanding extended territory (pp. 
192-193). Hence: 
 
[…] graphism in one and the same movement begins to depend on the voice, and 
induces a mute voice from on high or from the beyond, a voice that begins to 
depend on graphism.  It is by subordinating itself to the voice that writing 
supplants it. (p. 202) 
 
Such is the contest between the despot, the State, or head, and the urban body; the former 
took hold of the linearisation of the latter bending it around into a resonating, concentric 
order that impregnates territory with an imperial voice (p. 192).  Oedipus, “the clubfooted 
despot”, as Deleuze and Guattari nominated him, stands at the junction between “the 
despotic machine and the old primitive territorial machine” (p. 182).  On the territorial side, 
he amalgamates the three sides of the “magic triangle” or the socially initiating nexus of 
“voice-audition, graphism-body, eye-pain”, which is to say the play of alliance, filiation, 
and socially amalgamative spectacle (2000, p. 204).  On the despotic side, he rises up as a 
non-initiatory paradigm in whom: 
 
[…] the voice no longer sings but dictates, decrees; the graphy no longer dances, 
it ceases to animate bodies, but is set into writing on tablets, stones, and books; 
the eye sets itself to reading [but in accordance with…] a kind of blindness, a loss 
of vision and of the ability to appraise […]. (p. 205) 
 
On the territorial side, the Oedipus of myth represents the play of filiation and alliance that 
otherwise displaces the incestuous impulse through shifting webs of debt; on the despotic 
side, he occupies, centre stage, the “symbolically occupied [incestuous] limit” by imposing 
a direct and permanent alliance with all facets of the social, appropriating and overcoding 
them as if they were so many organs on a territorial body synonymous with the despot’s 
own (pp. 210, 267).  Societal rather than personal, incest in the despotic regime is 
inseparable from an “infinitivation” of debt owed the sovereign who enforces an “abstract 
unity” serviced through the invention of money as medium of tax (pp. 199, 221).  The 
primal Urstaat – “the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires” – is an 
idealised construction in the head/brain, a “cold monster” forming the “common horizon” 
for every concrete instance of despotic regimes historically (pp. 220–221).  
 
Bipedal walking, as progeny of an anterior field evolving a bipolar technicity centred on the 
hand and the face, having curtailed its multiplex expressive repertoire in accordance with 
the superlinearity of written language, reaches its apogee in a head city akin, as argued 
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity   Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Page 85 
 
earlier, to that of Plato’s Republic.  Yet, to the extent that the Republic offers an urban, 
authoritarian flagship in the West – indeed a philosophical template over which was traced 
anew the Urstaat – the Oedipal misadventure that was its target, far from being excised, 
may be recognised in Deleuze and Guattari’s account as native to its positing of a 
“repressing representation” and the dream of appropriating all the productive, reproductive, 
and consuming forces of a place.  Nevertheless, the ‘clubfoot’ in clubfooted-despot means 
that the ground of despotism’s own standing runs interference.  If the sovereign 
vertiginously aspires to a totalised societal body – the despot itself reconstituted as sole 
authorising ground – then no organ or operational component can fall outside its cold, 
calculative reach.  However, the inscribing in the scriptural enterprise of an “eminent 
voice” standing outside the text as an “object on high” depended on an expulsion of 
privation, the unsightly or everything in the body that did not accord with its higher ideals.  
As Dominique Laporte parodies a despotic averting of its gaze from the lowly: “surely, the 
State is the Sewer. Not just because it spews divine law from its ravenous mouth, but 
because it reigns as the law of cleanliness above its sewers” (2000, p. 56).  The totalitarian 
will in this account exhibits a sanctifying ambition synonymous with sanitariness: 
civilisation stands against the “barbarous”, and as conqueror, “emblazons his trials with a 
primordial prohibition: ‘no shitting allowed’” (p. 57).  In the History of Shit (2000), Laporte 
recognises in the 1539 edicts by François King of France applied to Paris the conjunction of 
two seemingly disparate demands: on the one hand, the King insisted that all civil and 
notarised documents be “written with a clarity that will remove all ambiguities or 
uncertainties” (p. 3); on the other, that all household, putrid wastes were to be retained 
inside until the hours of darkness when they could then be disposed in private (pp. 4–5).  At 
stake in this less than accidental intersection is an “individuation of waste” requiring the 
“removing [of] excrement from sight” (pp. 62, 68) and the “purify[ing] of the commerce of 
words” (p. 13).  Furthermore, “purified, language” and gold, as its correlate, were made 
synonymous with an elevation above “dirty commerce” and a communing with all that is 
base (p. 18).  
 
While the State, as bearer of pure language and clean money, was held to command the 
public domain, ‘privacy’ amounted to everything that was diametrically opposed to its 
height, and in fact, came to be literally conflated with the privé (p. 46).  Parodying the 
psychoanalytic ascendency of psychical integration in which the phallic stage postdates the 
anal, the anus provides the psyche with a means of recognising in corporeal expulsion, 
objects/‘gifts’.  Conversely, it can be thought to also model the transcendent voice and its 
detachment from living bodies.  Yet the anus was also the first of the organs to slip from the 
despotic grasp with its abjection of the earth and its lowly ‘fruits’.  Thus the despotic socius, 
upon which a total account of flows was paramount, ascends on the basis of a forgetting of 
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those flows that sully its image ideal, even as they sustain it.  If Victorian modernity 
instituted a pervasive hygienism across multiple societal and urban scales, its principal goal 
was unimpeded and unmixed circulation, and though exercised in the name of public 
health, in fact it sought to reconcile and moderate what in the economy it could both not 
face and yet ignored only at its peril – runaway commercial interests.  To the extent, as 
Dider Gille argued, that territorial-economic governance all came down to a question of 
pipework – itself an Eulerian, topological problem – an on going direct alliance with the 
prince or sovereign, and the servicing of the infinite debt that entailed, was what, in the 
end, the orchestration of flows could not stomach. 
	  
	  
	  
5. Fall into Latency 
 
	  
Where does the Urstaat fall?  It falls into its own everyday built-in machinations – 
resentment and vengeance.  Deleuze and Guattari called these machinations latencies 
(2000, p. 213).  Paranoiac in origin, latencies are ingrained in the expropriating, credit-
wroughting operations of the State and gave rise to a deathly, mimetic desire (the death 
instinct) that permitted no play of desire other than the “desire of the despot’s desire” (p. 
213).  Yet latencies tend to disturb rather than consolidate the overcoding of the Urstaat, for 
“they submerge the tyrant, but they also cause him to return in unexpected forms; they 
democratize him, oligarchize him, segmentalize him, monarchize him, and always 
internalize and spiritualize him” (pp. 222–223).  Assailed by latency, the State is forced to 
manage an array of decoded flows at, or close to, the limits of its appropriating mechanism  
– “the privatisation of property”, “formation of great fortunes”, “commodity production”, the 
“extension of markets”, and the “expropriation and proletarization” of producers (p. 223).  
Yet to the extent that capitalism is born of this volatile mix of decoded flows, it arrives 
slowly and diachronically.  By comparison, the State “comes like lightening” as a fully 
functioning, despotic machine enacted synchronically (p. 223).  Nevertheless, something 
more than contingent decoding is necessary to capitalism’s inception.  While the 
merchants, traders, and producers had always operated in the pores of the despotic fabric 
(Fig 13) (p. 223), “the State looks elsewhere” and is “disinclined to dirty itself” or face the 
“rotten reverse of the golden coin” (Laporte 2002, p. 58).  Instead, capitalism with no such 
foibles or elevated desires, garnered its strength erratically, establishing itself as a “strange 
menagerie” building out of a “schizoid time” other than that synchronised by the State (p. 
223).  What then launches capitalism proper Deleuze and Guattari ask?: essentially, a 
supersession of the delimiting territorial body of the despot.  Building on historian Fernand 
Braudel’s reference to Europe as a “narrow Cape of Asia” compelling exploratory and 
mercantile adventures “outside its own front door”, the West launched itself into a “new 
massive deterritorialization” for which the State was ultimately reduced to sponsor rather 
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than monopolisitc motor (p. 224).  Concomitantly, capital, previously yoked in an 
interminable alliance with the State, became, in the context of a general decoding of flows 
and circulation, “filiative”, meaning, as Deleuze and Guattari cited Marx, that it is 
“endowed with a motion of its own” and is governed only by the pursuit of surpluses and 
the generation of further capital (pp. 224, 227).  Critically, when the mobility of capital – its 
begetting of profits – becomes a sovereign value in its own right, the despotic body ceases 
to be the “quasi cause […] appropriat[ing] all the productive forces”, leaving capital itself to 
“become the [sole] full body” p. 227). 
 
A socius of this order given as and through extreme mobility builds on another factor: the 
particular historical route the Urstaat takes in the West.  The synchronic nature of the 
Urstaat means that wherever it appears, it is made thoroughly immanent to the sociality it 
appropriates, and like “a cerebral ideality”, it posits itself an origin prior to the beginnings of 
the social-territorial arrangements it overcodes and orders (p. 219).  Yet in the European 
context this ideality is doubly zeroing, for with the demise of an actual urban substrate over 
many centuries following the fall of Rome and Constantinople, what emerges “when the 
Christians took possession” of the imperial remainder was a “spiritual empire” (p. 222).  The 
Urstaat in the West is indexed from the start to anachoresis and a deterritorialising bypass: 
“a fresh start in the wilderness” in pursuant of “a new alliance” predicated on a passage 
through an outside/other domain whose sense of uprootedness or unsheltering is invariably 
carried over into urban settlements (2000, p. 222).  Such is the Oedipal becoming of the 
Urstaat in the West, an upsurge of passional signification torn between identification with 
the expelled and an overcoming of the bifurcation with divinely authorised sources.  This 
disjunctive relation in which the calculative, cold-headedness of the despot proper is 
transposed into “the hearts of his subjects” effected both an internalisation of the despotic 
mandate (a “paranoiac machine” within) and spiritualisation (a “celibate machine” pursuing 
self-engenderment and authoring) (p. 222).  If the Urstaat operates generally to impose a 
single incestuous overcoding, sexualising social relations everywhere via a direct alliance 
with divine sources monopolistically channelled through the despot, Oedipus, as the West’s 
club-footed tyrant, leaves open a remainder, a beginning at odds with the origin the despot 
claims in ‘his’ assertion of divine franchise (p. 219).  The rejection by emerging 
philosophical thought in Classical Greece of a “‘monarchial’ vocabulary” (Vernant 1982, p. 
114) rested, as has been indicated above, on a “palintropic” manoeuvre whose arche 
ambitioned an “elementary principle” prior to myth but capable of asserting a metaphysical 
Urstaat free of the tension between origins and beginnings. If Oedipus drags a mythic, 
apsective foot, his despotism trucks a residual filiative desiring machine irreducible to the 
paideia of metaphysical passagework.  As the visible mark of what went unacknowledged, 
his limp signals a privation, a privy (as both adjective and noun), bordering on personal 
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contingency (tragic consciousness as deepened individuation) – in fact a mode of 
subjectification abject to both territorial and despotic representations (Fig. 7).  
Consequently, under his name, capitalism ushers in “private persons” (rather than 
overcoded ones) to populate the body of deterritorialised capital: 
 
Oedipus-the-despot will have to be replaced by Oedipuses-as-subjects, 
Oedipuses-as-subjugated, Oedipuses-as-fathers, and Oedipuses-as-sons. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2000, p. 217) 
 
The latencies haunting the despotic socius are no less internalised than the infinite debt 
called up in the name of the sovereign.  The public-privé/private, seen-unseen, pure-abject 
dichotomies find a new tyrannical arena in the psyche where the (Freudian) unconscious 
was imagined to entertain, and the social body is taught to anticipate-renounce, incest 
between actual persons (p. 217). 
 
KEY 
 
1   Persisting despotic signifying centre  
2   Mercantile trajectories in communication with alternative signifying centres  
3              Signs tied to mercantile semiotic create a counter-signifying 
 bureaucracy 
4   Persisting victimage release or zone of shame independent of mercantile passage 
5   Breakaway latencies arising with mercantile lines of flights   
6   Adventure time of mercantile immanence and zone of legal exceptionality. 
 
Figure 13. Author 2013. “Signifying Regime with Mercantile & Private Latencies” (modified from 
Henri Pirenne 1974 & Deleuze & Guattari 1987). 
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Concomitantly, internalisation makes a carapace of individuation, much as the 
superlinearity of writing recalls an authorising and “eminent voice” in the chain of signifiers 
that hovers clear of the chain of exchange itself.  As a mute voice or presence making every 
statement an ordering enunciation and enunciated order (from on high), private persons 
under capitalism constitute an adjunct, a prepared place reserved within its flows.  Yet, as 
places go, the private persona is less substantive than attenuated: subjects in modernity arise 
as “images of images”, as simulacra (p. 264).   
 
Certeau’s recognition of a scriptural economy in which learning to write is a “fundamental 
initiatory practice” for capitalism is striking precisely for its proliferation of images of self 
and for modelling a framework that stabilises the play of such images.  But here a shift in 
the role of the old despotic Scriptural enterprise is revealed; the world given as The Word, 
as a text transcribed by, or on behalf of, a transcendent Other – to borrow Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s characterisation – was what written language and the self that came to pass 
through it could not testify to (2011, p.4).  For Jacques Ranciere too, if “in the beginning 
was the Word”, the general thrust of an interpretative vocation tracking an “infinite number 
of signs” in their becoming incarnate, becoming flesh, tends to problematise any closure of 
world back to The Word, or amounts to the same thing, a beginning rounded back into the 
end (2004, p. 1).  The outward excursion of words into the world in pursuit of an adequate 
enclosing volume gets interrupted and spaced-out by an overabundance of worldly truths 
whose mimicry and seductive incarnation “overwhelm the fragile truth of the book” (pp. 2–
4).  Certainly capitalism has no truck with The Word and its vicissitudes, or rather, to the 
extent that writing persists and labours within its flows, it “typically plays the role of an 
archaism” (Deleuze & Guattari 2000, p. 240).  Contrary to the despotism of linguistic 
signifying chains, capitalism makes apparent a different semiotic operating in the shadow of 
the play of signifiers, one that turns on the contingent formation of figures engendered by 
the intersection of “flow-breaks or schizzes” (p. 241).  Citing Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari 
noted the way “the signifier is overtaken towards the outside by figurative images”, or what 
Lyotard referred to as the object “of which [discourse…] speaks” (Lyotard 2011, p. 7) – but 
also on the inside “by the pure figures [letters and words] that compose it” (p. 243).  Broken 
from the inside, letters potentiate a field of a-signifying ruptures – or “shattered partial 
objects” (p. 243). “The figural” operates as portals for admitting into the significatory rigor of 
discourse a libidinal overflow whose expressive domain is always in excess of content and 
always elusive of identity (Lyotard 2000, pp. 242–243).  Moreover, as Lyotard argued, the 
figure (a term he ascribed to the visible or the seen in the phenomenological sense of a 
world experienced in and as depth by way of corporeal movement that reveals the fullness 
of objects by unfolding their concealed roundness through sensorial engagement) constantly 
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induces in language a tearing apart of its systematicity.  Discourse “does not merely signify, 
but expresses”, meaning that its “double exteriority” expels the object of designation per se 
while unravels its “inexhaustible thickness” (Lyotard 2011, pp. 8–9).  Thus, the signified 
rests behind the signifiers as a thing both concealed (in its fullness) and contingently 
brought forth through a figural engagement heterogeneous to signification proper.  In the 
context of the capitalist socius’ amplification of desiring forces that favour the “rule of 
immanent commutativity” and value equivalence (p. 24), the work of effecting figures 
capable of standing upright amidst the plasticity of decoded flows assumes particular 
importance.  As the following section will examine, Oedipus as figure provides the bridge 
between the metaphysical walk and an alternate gait in modernity in which the alternation 
of antistrophe and strophe by the tragic chorus is mirrored in the vacillating forces of 
“production and antiproduction”, social and private persons, and work and desire (Deleuze 
& Guattari 2000, p. 265).  At stake in this play of desire is a tension between the literate 
subject as a self-authoring figure and one seduced by the figural and its imitative 
dissipation, a tension in fact traceable to the metaphysical walk proffered by the Republic.   
	  
	  
	  
6. Desire – Working Mimesis 
 
	  
For Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, across two millennia the West has recognised itself in two 
seemingly contrasting figures or types – the figures of work and the figure of desire.  The 
figure of the work, an older type, emblematises humanity on the basis that mobilising 
technology and orientating stories (as a Homo pictor) is key in making a life world.   
Conversely, the subject of desire has negotiated the difficult terrain of excess in its various 
forms, with Oedipus in particular, signalling both desire’s malfunction in myth and its 
redeployment by psychoanalysis as spectre and antidote to triangulated familial passions 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 2003, p. 7).  Ostensively these figures move in a direction antithetical to 
Lyotard’s characterisation of the figural; they stand for something as opposed to dissipating 
all standing.  For Lacoue-Labarthe a “Gestalt, figure or type” distinguishes itself from a 
ground (or background) and the term gestalt is cognate to a range of German words that 
share the root stell – to place, put, or stand.  The eliciting of standing figures, as Lacoue-
Labarthe noted, is inseparable from an ontological labour he called an “onto-typo-logy”, 
whereby metaphysics finds continuance in modernity via the positing of representative 
types (1989, p. 52).1  In contrast to transcendence (a climbing or springing into a beyond as 
its etymology suggests), gestalt figures perpetuate metaphysics through “rescendence” – the 
eschewing of a meta-domain in favour of a grounded ascendance in which finite, essential 
                                       
1	  Such figures include Nietzsche’s wandering Zarathustra, Ernst Jünger’s (1895–1998) Worker, 
Rainer Maria Rilke’s (1875–1926) Angel, Freud’s Oedipus, and Karl Marx’s Proletarian (Lacoue-
Labarthe 1989, p. 52 & Note 8).	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types stand in for the infinite.  Tracking Heidegger’s objection to an “eidetic ontology” 
grounding the Platonic idea where essence and appearance are condensed (where 
something can only appear if doubled with a non-appearance as essential truth), Lacoue-
Labarthe recognised how recendence (without recourse to a world of essences structuring 
the visible) nevertheless belatedly borrows an optic of essences through figural or finite form 
(pp. 54–55).  A transcendental vacancy does not prevent a facsimile of truth arising with the 
installation of “the stele” (placement, standing, “erection”, etc.), and this installation of 
standing truths presupposes a metaphysics centred, not on the soul, but subjectivity and 
representation (p. 81).  
 
Pivotal to this onto-typo-logy in modernity is “the figure of man” as an exemplary tupos for 
existential meaning – indeed a ‘statuesque’ one (Sparks 2005, pp. xx–xxi).  In turn, the 
walker (orthopedically erect and autonomously ranging in its bipedality) stands out as an 
agent of meaning-bestowal.  For Lacoue-Labarthe, Oedipus can be understood, not just as 
figure of desire, but a figure in whom work converges too, precisely because, as a key locus 
of (Greek) science and philosophy, he obliged an orthopaedic correcting of the tragic taint 
in knowing (its pathos) by initiating a laborious unveiling or alētheia.  Moreover, this 
revealing is inseparable from a quest for figures of thought that eschew the figural in thought 
tout court (or what amounts to image work and the imagination), despite “figuration” having 
long inflected philosophical discourse and having programmed it “from the most distant 
sources of metaphysics” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, pp. 52–53).  The ideal of a pure thinking 
uncompromised by mediation is a fiction no less because metaphysics is fundamentally a 
philosophy of mimesis installing “static determination[s] of Being” (pp. 69, 79). This 
mimetic continuity makes it possible to recognise that from Parmenides to Nietzsche 
metaphysics amounts to a single project or “one same history” seeking to unveil a “radical 
heterogeneity of Being”, one in fact consistent with the pre-Socratic world where alētheia 
was essentially a negative term corresponding to an always contingent unconcealing or 
unhiding of phusis or natural being.  Rather than speaking its truth, this version of alētheia 
was what disfigured all truth claims much as proto-philosophy found its motive freedom in 
the perpetuated imbalance of chorismos.  What the “curious limp” of Oedipus suggests is 
that the “Western gait” is never free of a de-figuration or a de-installation in metaphysical 
certitude – which is to say, a fall into sophistic mimesis and fictioning (Lacoue-Labarthe 
2003, p. 17).  
 
Certainly Oedipus is the one in whom (self) witnessing leads to ruin. Constitutionally – 
congenitally – mimetic, Oedipus is defined by a limp transmitted through gods, titans and 
forefathers, an imitative son, lover, father, a priest, a pharmakos, a god, a criminal, and a 
concrete solver of problems and riddles who also “interprets too infinitely” as Friedrich 
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Hölderlin suggested (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, p. 233).  Against the stele or standing 
forth of installed truth, his was an alētheia proper to the mimos.  For the pharmakos, like the 
mimic, always “offer[s] themselves as (something they are not)” (p. 116; emphasis in 
original).  His limp signals not the standing (forth) of the Idea but the ever-present potential 
for the proper to trip into impiety.  Reading between Heidegger and Plato in the Republic, 
Lacoue-Labarthe emphasised how mimesis (as mode of making or poiesis) is presumed to 
“deinstall[…] the ideal”, reducing it to recumbency: “Mimesis is the decline of aletheia, the 
‘lying down’ or ‘stretching out’ of the stele: Mimesis is the ‘easy lay’” (p. 86).  At stake is a 
larger politic, the distinction between “‘good’ and ‘bad’ poiesis, between demiurgy and 
mimesis [as its other]” (p. 86), which is to say (given the Republic as context), at stake is the 
place of desire relative to the soul and the State.  Given that Oedipus foregrounds the 
problem of mimetic desire – desiring what another desires (with all the questions of societal 
foundation and dissolution that Girard diagnosed) – the tragic temperament according to 
Platonic psychology leads to tyranny on the basis of not knowing oneself, of not bringing 
the circumference of soul/self full-circle, of keeping its constituent energies in-check, and of 
balancing its internal economy.  For the polis, specifically as the Republic pictures it, the 
problem for the corporeal city (as opposed to the city in logos) is precisely a problem of 
mimesis.  If the task of revising the polis can be imagined as a “political orthopedics” 
designed to put the polity back on its feet having fallen into the “catastrophic economy” 
spun by the mimetic lay, such an orthopaedics per Plato’s definition is pedagogical in 
nature and specifically concerns the education of the guardians (pp. 124–125).  Moreover, 
if this pedagogical task centred on a certain care of the soul, then the subject’s relation to 
language is pivotal (pp. 124–125). 
 
Specifically in the Republic, the care of the soul commences with a raising up of the “in-
fans” out of mimetic passivity (p. 127).  The mother tongue, as an inevitable, initial 
succumbing to the feminine voice, moulds the infant’s soul as if a blank awaiting 
impression (pp. 126–127).  The infant’s consciousness was made an imitative ground 
susceptible to children’s tales or fables mistakenly taken as the whole truth – a mimesis 
Platonic pedagogy intends to subsequently correct (p. 126).  Concomitantly, the drive for an 
independent stance free of imitative engenderment, as Lacoue-Labarthe suggested, invoked 
an anti-mimetic resentment spanning the Western speculative cannon.2  This perennial 
anxiety over knowing what voices speak in and through consciousness prompted a 
philosophical quest for “absolute (in)sight by a subject theorizing its own conception and 
engendering itself in seeing itself do so” (p. 127).  “Typo-graphy” is inseparable from 
“paideia (of forming or of Bildung [self-education])”, which as a pedagogical “second birth”, 
                                       
2	  From Plato to Lacan, mimesis brings on “a kind of virile stiffening and anxious clenching as well 
as a resentment against the original maternal domination and original feminine education” (1989, 
p. 127).	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aims to overcome the fictive, false, and impress-able first-start via a “metrical identity” of 
informing figures whose terminal ambition is always a subject free of mimetic trace (pp. 
127–129).  For Lacoue-Labarthe, “Parricide and castration” centres this Western, anti-
mimetic bias (p. 130).  In a different context, Goux spoke of the prolongation of 
feminisation (in a mythic sense) that Oedipus presents as a consequence of the failure to 
traverse the tripartite initiatory tests (or rather the short-circuiting of that passage by 
intellect).  However, in accordance with Lacoue-Labarthe’s gloss on Platonic pedagogy, the 
tragic failure is shown to centre on a failure of will exercised over the mimetic lie and the 
equivocality of language in general.  Conversely, tragedy remains problematically on the 
side of dramatisation where uncertain voices and motivations act through characters.  Like 
mythopoetic speech, it projects an appearance of truth without a corresponding speaker to 
verify or authorise it.  Plain speaking – what Plato called “haple diegesis” or clear narrative– 
is the remedy the Republic purports to exercise over dramatisation (p. 133).  The Republic’s 
metaphysical walk stages a pedagogical traversal in which speaking subjects stand forth 
from, and prior to, textual production (Plato 1997, Republic 378e–379).  The rule of haple 
diegesis means that the text enunciated must be the philosopher’s exclusively.  But the 
Platonic dialogues are anything but a haple diegesis, as Lacoue-Labarthe noted, for the 
Republic and the other dialogues, mobilises Socrates as Plato’s mouthpiece (p. 135).  Not 
coincidentally is Socrates chosen as ‘speaker’ in Plato’s quest to deliver the polis from 
tragedy, for Socrates was a “voluntary pharmakos” as opposed to one selected by rite and 
hence assumes a mimetic mantle only in a quest to cast out the old ways.  Plato’s choice of 
Socrates as a (dead) speaking figure served to presence an enunciative will behind the 
textual scene, thereby “miming mimesis” to better fix “its disconcerting mobility” (p. 135).  
The philosopher, in making himself a figure on the page, crafted a fiction for reading-
through to a pure or undivided speaker behind.  Hence, as Lacoue-Labarthe asserted, a 
“thaumatic” or miraculating machine is at work in the Republic that, while renouncing 
imitative practices (“controlling rigorously the procedure of enunciation”), sets up internal 
to the text itself a reflective mechanism trying to capture and capitalise on the mimetic 
machinery while standing clear of it (Fig. 14) (p. 134).  
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KEY 
 
1  Passage through Visible Realm  
2  Path to Intelligible Realm 
 
i  Mise-en-abyme entangling phantastic & Eikastic imitation 
ii  Phantastic imitation or semblances 
iii  Eikastic imitation or epiphantic vision 
iv Double-Seeing as bypass – the Divided Line given synthetic continuity  
 
Figure 14.    Author 2013. “The Divided Line & Mise-en-abyme”.  
	  
 
Read against the polemic against imitation in the Republic (Book III that aims to purge 
speech of mimetic content and Book X where mimetic speech is compared with the 
production of likenesses by painters), at stake in writing was a trapping of mimesis to better 
sight its operation.  Moreover, writing at least potentiates the expression of a substantive 
person conceived to be genuinely ‘outside’ or behind the text and in that sense can be 
conceived of as a master of similitude and imitation (Martis 2005, p.32).  Against “tragic 
consciousness” and its transmission of a Dionysian masking in which the present was 
inseparable from a duplication in imagination, the confounding of boundaries between 
illusion and the true was what the thaumaturgic operation set in play to better overcome it.  
Platonic thaumatism, drawing on pre-scientific mechanisms (modified myth), borrows the 
victimage mechanism to leverage or propel a soul/subject clear of the mise-en-abyme 
untouched.  In its reach for a metaphysical original, and therefore an end to the play of 
images, the soul/subject given in the thaumatic operation is both quasi-Oedipal (in the 
sense of an intellection that eschews corporeality) and anti-tragic (in that it aspires to ascend 
beyond passive knowing into active wisdom).  In contrast to Oedipus, a figure thoroughly 
written over, and in turn, telegraphing Apollo’s prophecy no less than the lapses of his 
forefathers, the dialogues labour to install a temporally constant author anterior to the act of 
inscription.  Like a mise-en-abyme, which reflects to infinity what it captures in its visual 
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field, the Republic displays a progressive displacement of image-figures, each claiming to 
better approximate the Ideas while never actually arriving at the original itself.  As Sallis 
noted of the upward way of the Republic, “except for the terminal point, everything on the 
way up the line and out of the cave thus takes on the character of an image”, themselves 
pursuing originals, that in turn are found to be images (Sallis 2000, p. 80).  Ultimately, no 
original is finally offered, save for the image of the sun in Book VII – a fathering that 
nevertheless remains incontestably an image (p.81)! 
	  
	  
	  
7. Exorbitant Imagining  
	  
	  
How does this perpetual fathering of images emerge in modernity? Tracking Plato’s critique 
of imitation to Book X of the Republic is suggestive.  There in the context of the downward 
way and a return to corporeality, the question of imitation turns on a problem to do with 
measure and proportion.  Images fall into two types: on one hand appearances, with their 
sensuous capacity, amount to phantoms or semblances that appeal to “the soul’s foolish 
part” on the basis that they induce pleasure; on the other, likenesses reveal something truer, 
they are capable of representing paradigms - particularly through their proportioning and 
ratios (Sallis 2000, pp. 47, 52).  Not withstanding this distinction, semblances and true 
copies together are generally disparaged in the Republic.  However, Sallis found that this 
two-fold capacity of images was specifically teased apart at the ascending centre of the 
Republic with the staging of the allegory of the cave. There the word εἰκασία is used to 
signify a revelatory capacity in images specifically (p. 48). This epiphanic dimension is 
achieved in the ascent from the cave into light and corresponds in Plato’s allegory of the 
divided line (Fig. 9) with a crossing from the visible into the intelligible realm.  As Sallis 
described this transition, “the movement is one of liberation in which the soul, initially in 
bondage to images, ascends toward the free vision of the original” (p. 48). Yet in the context 
of the servitude of the cave, and prior to this revelatory crossing, a break is necessary for the 
given to be recognised as itself an erroneous reality – in other words, it is necessary for 
images to be seen “precisely as images” (pp. 48–49, emphasis in original).  The liberation of 
vision from within vision itself is what Socrates called εἰκασία”, and Sallis called a “double 
seeing” that inaugurates ascension, and in turn, a synthesising traversal by the soul (p. 49).  
Significantly, the corporeal gesture corresponding with double-seeing is a sideways stepping 
that breaks the front-back visual captivation defining imprisoned image-life (see Plato 1997, 
515c) – that is a stepping sideways to view the visual field askance (in both senses of the 
word), much like the mise-en-abyme Lacoue-Labarthe described.  Concomitantly, double-
seeing implies a break in the temporal continuity of the (illusionary) passing present; it 
implies something like a time-out-of-time reserved for and as reflection.  Additionally, as a 
subject position defined by delay, double-seeing establishes by necessity an imperative to 
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recoup or gather into new synthesis a consequently fractured and divided experiential 
domain (Fig. 14, iv). 
 
An ascent towards the intelligible commences when an absenting from what passes is 
converted into a present beheld self-consciously.  Yet this conversion implies a spacing or 
individuation that deepens experience much as tragic drama set in play a reflective 
complexity associated with an individuated point of view.  While Sophocles’ Oedipus 
exemplarily exploited such a perspectival richness and a newly synthesised world, he 
equally pictured an abyssal potentiality beyond all recuperation (see Figure 15).	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
KEY 
 
1   Passage through Visible Realm  
2   Path to Intelligible Realm 
 
i   Mise-en-abyme entangling phantastic & eikastic imitation 
ii   Phantastic imitation or semblances 
iii  Eikastic imitation or epiphantic vision 
iv  Aristotelian peripeteia or reversal through realisation 
v  Blind wandering 
vi Oedipus at Colonus/tragic catharsis & pseudo-synthesis with the 
intelligible 
 
Figure 15. Author 2013. “Oedipus as Posthumously Anticipated Interruption of the Divided 
Line”.  
	  
 
Double-seeing, like a broken gait, mirrors a general split in Platonic vision where absence 
and presence compound in accordance with “the eikastic and the phantastic” - or epiphany 
and semblance (Sallis 2000, p. 53).  In tracking the mutation of double-seeing historically, 
Sallis found an evolving weave of revelatory and corrupting powers attributed to 
appearances that eventually coalesced around the contemporary notion of the imagination 
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(pp. 55–71).  In the general shift across this history towards a focus on the inward 
determination of appearance as impression, the variously validated imaginato and phantasia 
reach modernity, particularly Romanticism, still with Platonic echoes of ascendance (as in 
an alpine-inspired Coleridge for whom it is “Imagination that stimulates to the attainment of 
real excellence”) and descent (with phantasia linked to fancy and frivolous sensory 
pleasures and distractions) (cited in Sallis 2000, p. 57; emphasis in original).  Transmitted 
with imagination is the old prompt to movement (the soul/subject as an entity capable of 
being ‘moved’) towards completion of an epiphanic promise registered with seeing. Yet 
epiphany offers no closure for images are involved all the way up in the Platonic cosmos, 
with likenesses chasing originals in a repetitious “image-original structure” that is unable to 
bring off “the pure original” (pp. 80–81).  Plato’s Socratic dialogues, remarkable for their 
greedy solicitation of interrogative images, suggest that “the [inadvertent] effect of 
philosophy on the city” is to render it a place precisely for the “inflation of image” and, in a 
sense, a site inevitably destined to overturn the Platonic quest for the original.  Moreover, 
the Platonic image-original structure in fact programmes precisely this infinite deferral and 
the final reversal or descent of Platonism into simulacra (Fig 9., e) (p. 84).  
 
Urban modernity, as inheritor of “this dis-figuring inflation” of the image unanchored from 
origination, nevertheless remains motivated by an impetus to unveil or defuse the potency 
of images (p. 80).  Channelled all the more extensively via a technologos and its tele-
graphic support:  
 
[…] everything [now…] depend[s] on the appropriate engagement with images, 
on forming, cultivating, and maintaining the proper image [to the extent that…] 
an effacement of the difference one would have posited between oneself and the 
flow of images [expires]. (p. 81) 
 
The observer-walker finds itself a figure mandated to enter into the image repertoire of cities 
seeking to unveil or subtract an observational fidelity from them.  Or rather, the observer-
walker seeks the city’s nature in the absence of a manifest nature or truth lost with 
metaphysics (itself claiming to speak on behalf of the nature of all things lying beyond the 
natural) (p. 149).  
 
If, as Sallis noted (citing Schelling), “‘the whole of modern European philosophy since its 
beginning (with Descartes) has this common defect, that nature does not exist for it and that 
it lacks a living ground’”, Oedipus, as a figure exiled from the polis but also as a figure of 
the urban itself exiled from place-proper, is the progenitor of a general “alienating of the 
nature of nature” – a fate in fact figured by Cain (p. 150).  On one hand, the Greek 
philosopher is an agent capable of thinking freely beyond any “pregiven content”: as Sallis 
referenced Hegel, Oedipus is the epitome of the solitary voyager of knowledge who insists 
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on withdrawing from that version of nature given as sacred through myth (p. 148).  
Correspondingly, Oedipus’ self-blinding and subsequent wandering apolis, paradoxically 
prefigures more than just a solitary voyager in the manner of an older Odyssean philosopher 
coursing the oceans freely (p. 148); rather, his was a precautionary tale foregrounding the 
abyssal state arising with a denatured nature, which philosophy subsequently sought to 
correct via an eidetic climb and a re-envisioned nature tethered to Ideas (pp. 148–149).  
The tragic violation of a sacral orientation (for which Oedipus’ blinding is a recoil unable as 
he was to stand the disparity between appearances and truth) anticipates another 
constituent element in modernity – a coming to terms with the horizonal spacing inherent 
in phenomena – the sense that things themselves, as opposed to the appearances by which 
they are apprehended, depend on lines of approach and viewpoint.  Following Sallis’ 
proposition that “sensible monstration” (i.e. that things have the power to hold in “reserve, 
unseen, in [their…] display” an infinity of views (pp. 110 & 123)) is the double of the 
monstrous grafting implicated in tragedy (given its trade in semblances), the exploration of 
the former in modernity (particularly in phenomenology (p. 139)) inadvertently circles back 
to the originary (Oedipal) rupture underwriting philosophical freedom.  Yet this return, like 
nature displaced and refigured via the eidetic quest, re-enacts a similar reactive 
abridgement: imagination, having been glimpsed as constitutive of the soul itself, is likewise 
appropriated internally by the subject.  This internalisation is one consequence of Oedipus’ 
blind wandering: the willing of a world given without horizonal seeing or sensible 
monstration; in other words, a world freed from a treacherous and eventful time propagating 
misleading semblances or prophetic interference.  This existence, mediated only by 
immediate, tactile measures, entails a truncated life-world predominantly constructed via an 
imagination closed off from the monstration of sight – in other words, imagined as if an 
essentially self-engendered construct reached internally through third sightedness.  Against 
what Blumenberg referred to as an absolutism of reality that the work of myth labours to fill, 
blindness stands for a break mandating the displacement of horizons inward and hence a 
zeroing in which metaphysics attempts to manage all temporal occurrences. 
 
	  
	  
8. From Extension to Time-Intensity  
	  
 
The continuance of metaphysics into modernity then is undertaken on the basis of 
managing time’s exorbitancy.  Challenging was the discovery of temporal processes and 
spatial expansion in excess of human purview or imaginable reference everywhere – the 
infinite mutability of time (geologically, geographically, evolutionary, historically, culturally, 
and economically) and an aweing centrifugation of horizons (seen in astrology, mapping 
techniques, travel technologies, and perspective techniques).  In the face of an infinitely 
distributed, yet indefinitely located sources of, divine providence, the prerogative of 
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knowledge passed to the human domain.  Yet Deleuze argued that initially this prerogative 
was understood as a subset or sub-cognition of an infinite knowing, and “Classical modern 
philosophy” (Descartes, Leibnitz, and an array of post-Cartesian positions) proceed from “an 
innocent way of thinking starting from infinity” (1980b).  As such, human cognition, despite 
claiming autonomous access to truths via methodological discovery, conceived that access 
to be in accord with “a pre-established [divinely authorised] harmony” (Hughes 2012, p. 
29).  In the case of Descartes, whose philosophy in the first person (the ‘I think’) opened the 
way for the invention of modern subjectivity (itself an intensification of Oedipal 
anthropocentering), the cogito, despite aspiring to loosen the theological tethers, ultimately 
leans on the good will of God in its divining of knowledge free of doubt (Deleuze, 1980b).  
Pivotal to Cartesianism, as Deleuze claimed, is an ethos of truth-creation, one paralleling 
the creation of new territories along with a subject and a political class to traverse them.  
Nevertheless, modernity’s prolonged engagement with the question of the infinite caused it 
to re-centre on “the problem of founding or of foundation” (Deleuze 1980b).  The 
philosopher instead became a “founding hero […] the one who founds within an existing 
world, not the one who creates the world” (1980b).  This founding, turning its back on 
metaphysics in any extended sense, instead underwent a kind of standing journey, one that 
sought what is “bottomless”, indeed the “center of the earth”, where for Deleuze, the earth 
itself became a figure for the maximally undetermined (1980b).  
 
Contrastive with the metaphysical walk and its upward quest, modernity in pursuit of more 
proximate certainties increasingly looked both inward and downward.  Broadly, an 
intensive search was substituted for an extensive one in a dubitative passage seeking 
foundations for the disparity between consciousness and the horizons of beholding.  
Replacing the outward concern of the Platonic philosophy of image, the Cartesian 
viewpoint built on the Stoic notion of the image as “imprint or impression”, an outward 
imposition requiring internal mediation and modification (Sallis 2000, p. 85).  An 
impression-forming model of sensation neatly mapped with the new printing and pressing 
technologies pivotal to a scriptural economy – but also an emerging physics understood as 
force impression.  Against an illusionary sensory potential in outward things (and outwardly 
imposed opinion), Descartes insisted instead on a verifying inner vision capable of 
mediating and managing the imprint of sensation (p. 85).  As Sallis found, early modern 
philosophy ranging up to Locke and Berkeley was marked by this increasing 
disenfranchisement of the image of things from things themselves and a vesting of 
knowledge about things in the ideas of things beheld internally (2000, pp. 85–88).  Lyotard, 
borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, similarly recognised in Descartes particularly a “vividness 
granted the motif of sight”, but on the basis that sight be ‘abstracted’ as something like the 
“thought of seeing” rather than its sensorial experience (2011, p. 178).  Nevertheless, 
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Descartes’ methodological pursuit of a non-illusionary sight insistently sought, as Lyotard 
argued, an a priori heterogeneity or duplicity in the visual field against which to exercise its 
geometrism: “‘Accurate’ sight is never unmediated, but reclaimed from blurred vision. The 
mind’s inquiry has a childhood, which is the murky and the phantasmagorical” (2001, pp. 
178–179). 
 
The extraction of optically corrected figures drives inquiry, even if the Cartesian 
methodological polemic appears only to favour the corrected figure itself.  Pointedly, in 
metaphors of city reform optical figures and the erosive figural find mutual intersection with 
the quest for a viewpoint capable of capturing “the whole city [in…] a sight free of 
prejudice”, though one that cannot avoid grappling with “the anamorphosis of what is not 
located at the point of proper sight” (2011, p. 179).  This is the human difference 
differentiating a human gauging from a divine one.  What the latter maintains perennially, 
the former can acquire only in an infinitely delayed, step-by-step acquisition of knowledge 
gained through temporal labour (p. 177).  Geometricism and mathematism are presumed to 
speak the same discourse as god and provide pedagogical correction of the sensory, itself 
taken as child’s speech (p. 181).  Hence with Descartes representation must undergo a 
“principle of derivation” establishing “an autonomous order of the signifier” in place of 
lapsed access to divine signification (pp. 181–182).  
 
In this Lyotard saw Descartes philosophically extending a “critique of representation” that 
sought to divorce text from figure – something already well underway since the Renaissance 
(p. 182).  From a medieval situation in which figures and script together signified according 
to monopolistic scriptural codes binding the “thickness or difference” of the figural into 
textual relations, the Renaissance reflected the freeing of discursive form from “sacred 
discourse” and at “the plastic level” – the production of an autonomous visible domain 
released from the demand of symbolising theological narrative (p. 175 & note to Figure 3, p. 
482).  Ceasing to signify as such, imagery was permitted to move towards freer designation 
leaving the world of words, not to be read, but to be observed – an orientation invoking 
division and a straining for abridgement. As such: 
 
The position of the image changes completely: no longer discourse’s lining, it 
becomes a theatre or mirror, carving out behind its glass pane a deep stage where 
the phantasmatic becomes hallucinatory. (p. 192)  
 
Hence, the double problematic of modernity: a centrifugal will to confront difference – 
what Certeau (1986) called the heterology of the Other; and, a centripetal relation where 
the figural, perturbing the structure-Other, prompts exposure to the otherwise-Other or what 
Lyotard referred to as the wilderness of the unsignified (p. 193 & Note to Figure 3, p. 482). 
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With philosophical idealism and Emmanuel Kant’s establishing of a noumenal-phenomenal 
split, it was less an image-object rapprochement that was sought but a theatrics of the island 
in which the perceptual domain “is essentially a within, an interiority” predicated on an 
outside it can never reach (Sallis 2000, pp. 89–90).  For Michèle Le Doeuff too, the 
“emblem of the island” is central to Kant’s critical project, which imagines an island 
foothold for a humanly cogent metaphysics (see 1998, B295, A236) 3 and implores learning 
to stay put rather than pursue a tempestuous and uncertain knowing resting on older 
metaphysical oceans (Le Doeuff 2002, p. 8).  Contrasting with Defoe’s tropical island, 
Kant’s island of certain foundation transported a castrative valence in its valuing of 
verifiable place (the “island of understanding”) over an “uninhabitable world” beyond – or 
as she parodies Kant: “One avoids the discomfort of the icy fogs but at the cost of 
renouncing the dream of discovery, the call of new lands, and hope” (p. 12).  What this 
island-image aimed to counter was the tractive and exorbitant capacity of the imagination 
to draw the self beyond the self and in this “abandonment of the right to dream”, the “island 
of the Analytic” provides a compensatory knowledge and hold on the world, though not 
without testing within the subject itself the pathways of thought bringing the world into 
beholding (Le Doeuff 2002, pp. 15–17).  Moreover, if for Le Doeuff, perceptual knowledge 
framed this way rests on a vague fantasy of bodily integrity, Sallis saw in Kant too “a vague 
analogy with a bodily schema of inner and outer”, one wrought with difficulties, not least in 
the arena of touch where the whole corporeal event would preclude any clear alignment of 
perceptual spacing and inner space (2000, p. 91).  This misalignment, which will be 
explored in subsequent chapters, finds progressive erasure and overcoming in the discourse 
of walkers where the figural, cast out of discourse, makes its return in a quest for a beyond 
to the island of human certitude.  Tournier conjured this beyond out of Defoe’s Robinson-
esque, and Sallis himself credits an elemental force in imagination born out, not as a 
temporality defining inner sense or consciousness otherwise withdrawn from the “sensible 
manifold” beyond, but as a “polytopical time” (2000, pp. 186, 192) that draws the multiple 
horizons of things and elements in and through the subject itself (Fig. 16). 
	  
                                       
3	  For	  Kant’s	  depiction	  of	  the	  northern	  isle,	  see	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  (1998,	  B295,	  A236).	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KEY 
 
1   Limit of the epiphanic promise imagined by Plato 
a   Displacement of Forms or Ideas (noesis) by standing figures 
e Domain of disfigured Ideas resulting from infinite deferral of image-
original structure 
 
i   capsular impulse or island consciousness 
ii  lines of tractive force of imagination drawing consciousness beyond 
itself 
iii  Unconscious core variously plumbed for content or evacuated of 
meaning 
 
Figure 16. Author 2013. “Island/Figure as modern terminus of the Divided Line”.  
	  
 
This recourse to islands – and as Le Doeuff has explored, philosophy’s eschewing of 
imagery from the mechanics of thought (despite drawing on figures insistently) - is axiomatic 
with a reversal of the Christian curtailment of the figural in scripture, no less than Plato’s 
double-seeing.  The positing of pictorial depth rotates the figure out of text, much as the 
distanced object of discourse does in scientific thought. The “pane of representation” 
suturing the viewer/perceiver from the world beyond is construed as a sealed surface.  
Consequently, the world is given as lost, and as Lyotard put it, “the West must now re-
present: represent what is absent to it (reality), but was once present to it, and what is not 
signifiable in discourse” (2011, p. 194).  The appeal to antiquity in the Renaissance finds 
what the Christian deviation had repressed.  Not incidentally, classical “sculpture in the 
round” amounted to nothing less than “the total unmooring of the plastic signifier”, for its 
transposition from legend and emplacement in sacred compounds and sites figures a lapse 
in “the temple’s speech” and the resulting message at the dawn of European modernity: 
“Now we can move around the god” (p. 193; emphasis added).  Moreover, the “statue’s 
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complete three dimensionality will be measure of how far the god has retreated”, an 
absence marked not by “a document, a testament” but by what eludes all speech, an 
“autonomous object” availing itself to sight only (p. 193).  Thrown into circulation without 
orientation about such vacated figures, humanity itself could not be other than observers 
moved to observe themselves.  For Lyotard, the problematic “representation of the divine in 
statuary” cannot but be implicated in “the development of the city”, hence: 
 
When the political sphere opens up, the dimension of the sacred shifts: the political 
and philosophical word is uttered by human beings and no longer received by them 
as emanating from an Other; and both the linguistic and plastic signifier desert the 
temple and move to “the middle,” ε ̈ζ µέσον. The opacity now belongs to the naked 
man, standing on his pedestal in the middle of the Agora. (2011, p. 193) 
 
Contrary to the metaphysical walk and its detour of the agora in pursuit of an upward way, 
an onto-peripatetic in modernity finds its foothold exactly in the mercantile-ground that 
orients the middle place of the polis.  If in the agora the Greeks balanced the tension 
between the commercial expansion of cities and the resulting hubristic wealth with a 
communal consciousness centred on isonomia or lawful societal equality (see Vernant 
1982, p. 74), then modernity ushers in precisely its antithesis, a dysnomia (or lawlessness) in 
which the agora, no longer circumscribed by the circle of equals, is made an every-place 
without circumference – or as Deleuze and Guattari had it, a deterritorialisng socius.  In the 
face of an exorbitant urban centrifugation, the middle place of agreement falls to the human 
figure itself as marker of the finitely equal, though not without setting in play a quest to rid it 
of vacancy, calling out the figural and opaque in it (Lyotard 1991, p. 4).  Hence, for Lyotard 
“the name of the human” is inseparable from a pedagogical arc in which the child swings 
from “native indetermination” into “adult community”.  This arc sets up a fundamental 
vacillation in placement of “the inhuman” (Lyotard 1988, p. 4).  As such, modernity is a 
problem of where to situate the inhuman and to what effect, for is the native 
indetermination of the infant what defines the human essence or some other differentiation 
determined by and understood as (adult) development” (p. 6)?  If the metaphysical walk 
provided a mediating course (between myth and logos), it nevertheless culminates in eidetic 
finality (such as the Good or the Idea).  Conversely, in modernity, a “metaphysics of 
development” reigns instead and “no finality […] no end” could ever satisfy its 
machinations (p. 7).  If there is a double-seeing apposite to this metaphysics, it entails a 
side-lined witnessing of the inhuman complication of plasticity and development where the 
limits of the former and the end point of the latter offer no more concrete an end than the 
“explosion of this star” (p. 7).  In this context, the meaning of Oedipus changes; Oedipus is 
no longer the high-low, king-pharmakos, dichotomy against which the human medium of 
an urban populous is measured – or the sophrosyne citizenry of a proto-bourgeois Greece 
(guided by “moderation, proportion, fair limits, the golden mean” (Vernant 1982, p. 84)).  
Instead, the inhuman in modernity is tracked inwardly.  Hence, Oedipus is that which is 
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completed and resolved by the every-person, as the medium or mediation whose 
achievement is to gloss over the dysnomia of psychical and societal bodies alike.  It is this 
spacing opened up by dysnomia within the median, the sophrosyne, that the following 
chapters explore. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A Pathos in Modernity – Amsterdam  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Modern Western history essentially begins with 
differentiation between the present and the past. 
 
Michel de Certeau, 1975 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
1.  Pathos 
	  
	  
In Part One I sought to locate walking-observers in an onto-peripatetic whose serial 
unfolding in the West is inseparable from urban relations conditioned by a rupture with 
cyclic temporality indexed, firstly to an oikoumenē, and secondly, a despotic order 
purporting to channel theological certainty.  What Bakhtin called the “real-life chronotrope” 
depicting everyday urban spaces – mirroring epic journeys through abstract (mythological) 
space but in the immediacy of the now – has long twinned place accounts with the “seeker’s 
path”, a quest aiming to plumb a manifestly opaque contemporaneity.  Cities appear as a 
temporal conundrum broadly indexed to questions of existential orientation.  If the task of 
metaphysics was to conceive a topos free of disequilibrium and therefore fit for philosophy, 
the philosophical soul nevertheless reached modernity profoundly altered: in Patočka’s 
sense a care of the soul as a “care to be” was remade as a “care to have” that strove to take 
hold of the world not in spiritual relation but proprietorially.  Writing is an initiatory practice 
pivotal to such having, given its calling into standing of an en fan otherwise fated to speak 
only in mimetic terms.  Capitalising on experience by putting things onto the island of the 
page no less effected a capsulized self, which, having writ the world in small, renders it 
surveyable and graspable.  Nevertheless, the page presupposes an askance distance; 
following Sallis and Lacoue-Labarthe, it can be recognised as a site for double-seeing, a 
place of bypass and temporal audit (pursuing a single synthesis of time) but also a place of 
ir-reality.  Conversely the image-original structure inherited from Platonism leaves open at 
the level of sense impression a split vacillating between imaginato and phantasia, for which 
imagination is made a coverall retracted inwardly and proprietorially by the subject. 
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Similarly, the rupture initiated by metaphysics with nature is deepened in this retraction; the 
West’s passional regime, itself founded on expulsion and exile consequent to a divinely 
mandated poverty in nature (the curse of Cain), reaches modernity exhausted of doctrinal 
certainty.  If the Oedipus of tragedy was always double – a defiling figure at Thebes and a 
sacred, redeemed one at Colonus, one knocked from its feet and subsequently raised again 
by the Gods – at stake was a toying with, if not a complete overstepping of, sacred 
prerogative (Goux 1993, pp. 183-186, 188).  At Colonus Oedipus is given a burial and with 
“death he finds a site [,…] a center”, as Goux said, though this receiving ground is pointedly 
in a foreign place (other than his Theban homeland) and is one that is destined to be kept 
secret.  The result is an irregular resolve with the Gods, meaning he is denied the most 
sacrosanct altar, the hearth or centre apportioned to goddess Hestia/Vesta that always visibly 
centres home and polis as Goux noted (p. 191-192).  In fact this deviated burial enacts the 
“founding moment” specific to Western urbanity: Oedipus’ heir as Sophocles tells it is 
Theseus, the founder king of Athens, and the city receives the Oedipal gift of perpetual 
safety and peace on condition that Oedipus’ dying secret be passed to every succeeding heir 
only at the death of their predecessor.  While Sophocles leaves that secret undisclosed in the 
tragedy, Goux offers an interpretation: the Oedipal aftereffect passed to the urban lineage 
that takes the democratic polis as its source is a newly minted, “third figure of subjectivity” 
(p. 195).  If Oedipus reaches Colonus having shaken off both the aspective posture of 
mytho-religious thought and an excessive “perspectivist self-consciousness”, glimpsed anew 
is a “transpective” posture – an orientation that “presupposes the successful constitution of 
the egocentered subject” but also registers “the dimension of aspective, which has been 
internalised and situated as the ‘unconscious’” (p. 195).  That this transposition entailed a 
displacement of fearful exterior sources (the Sphinx specifically but projective magic and 
cryptophoric symbolism more generally) inward, commenced in parallel is “the rationalist 
era of anguish” where doubt and uncertainty track interior contours shorn of relieving, 
collective projection (pp. 194-195).  Moreover, the transpective resolution portends a 
bypassing of any explicate appeal to pathos - with “its extreme devices (madness, 
perversion, and all the derivations of tragedy)” - in sacred communion (p. 197).  Replacing 
theological transcendence is “that other modern form of transcendency: the internal and 
internalized rift that is the unconscious” (p. 197).  Hence in modernity, “Anguish is the 
pathos of a culture without pathos”, precisely because it renders suffering centripetal (p. 
195).  Oedipus’ synthesis of both autological reason and revelatory insight at his death, 
amounts to a shifting inward of divine sources and it is there that the caesura in knowing 
associated with the externalised, unequal community gets renegotiated.  The 
unconsciousness then is the inevitable outcome of an Oedipean trajectory of individuation, 
which led not, as Freud thought he had discovered, to desire figured Oedipally, but to the 
instancing of a subject erected across a vacancy in knowing tout court (p. 199).  If Platonism 
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more generally instituted a “care for [and towards] death” in the service of a travelling soul 
that endures, Oedipus at Colonus, proffers death, not as an occurrence harmonised with 
divine forces, but contracted about its own finality.  The urban transpective legacy builds on 
a precarious continuity without a commonly shared, perennial knowing and effected via an 
individualist, revelatory initiation.  Collectively centred nowhere (in other words, without 
sacral hearth), but cast into serial transmission, the urban floats an everyday commonality 
across a certain unknowing.  As this chapter will explore, modernity as a post-traditional 
communality, finds its solidarity in a heterological knowing that accumulates disjunctively, a 
disjunction that cuts through the ontic and into the ontological.  If Hestia centred all sacred 
placement, Oedipus’ transpective posture, consistent with an a-signifying semiotic, is that 
centre’s loss and a longing for it directed towards ameliorating abridgement.  
 
This chapter starts by exploring the complex commencement of modernity as it pertains to 
what Goux termed the “Oedipean or Cartesian epoch” – that period orientated by 
autodidactic knowing and preparatory of a third positioning of subjectivity (p. 196).  In 
particular it attends to what can be understood as a bi-origination in modernity, one 
decisively orientating the experiencing subject relative to knowledge and death.  The subject 
emerging with modernity bears both a residual, humanist optimism and marks of division 
and radical upheaval.  As Certeau has written, in a scriptural economy the blank page 
similarly intensifies a “labor of division” exercised against the world and lived time; like 
double seeing, it entails the production of a position askance to temporal continuity (1988b, 
p. 14).  Standing outside such continuity is commensurate with standing differently, for the 
page invariably condenses “the decision to become different or no longer to be such as one 
had been up to that time (p. 4).  Instead, interpretation is made to fill an interrupted present, 
assigning to it a power of oversight and renewal over the past, though not, as Certeau 
asserted, without selecting against what does not fit its model of intelligibility, and not 
without being plagued, to varying degrees, by the return of what selection cuts out ( p. 4).  
Moreover, historiography is uniquely conditioning by one return in particular: in so far as 
the West establishes its collectives, no less than individuals, via an exclusionary logic 
(marking itself off from the other that it measures), it is death that is both its aversive motor 
and its modus operandi: 
 
Death obsesses the West. In this respect, the discourse of the human sciences is 
pathological: a discourse of pathos – misfortune and passionate action – in a 
confrontation with this death that our society can no longer conceive of as a way of 
living one’s life.” (p. 5; emphasis in original) 
 
Built into a writing/reading subject is both an awareness of personal finitude and that 
finitude’s extension via the page.  Yet one writes by withdrawing from the world in a “labor 
of death and a labor against death” (p. 5).  Organising “both absence and production” 
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simultaneously, historiography crosses over into modernity by mobilising writing itself as “a 
conquering will” (pp. 6-7).  Like the newly emboldened sixteenth century princes released 
from an earlier “providential time” and free to “‘make history’” in their own name, the 
wielders of written discourse – the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as a growing army of literates - 
were not without their own political ambition (1988, pp. 5–10).  
	  
	  
	  
2.  Knowing Death 
	  
	  
As suggested previously, it was in images and the figural more generally that European 
modernity invested a certain errant knowing freed from providential time and a medieval 
binding of script and image.  If the page was one way of writing the self as self-agency, a 
parallel concern with the when and where of existence in the early modern period (sixteenth 
century) is indicative, as Tom Conley has identified, with a burgeoning production of 
cartographic literatures.  Defining this literature was an unprecedented “theatricalization of 
the self” that intersected personal autonomy and locality-awareness via “both textual and 
gridded representations of reality” – i.e. in maps, topographical views, and printed 
discourses (1996, p. 2).  In this context, measuring and representing territory (whether 
graphically or through language) was inseparable from self-engenderment because 
encounters with uncharted place presupposed subjects capable of ordering a world through 
individual purview: as Conley put it, the “self is visible only when it achieves the effect of 
totality of having engineered a world through it’s own labours” (pp. 5–6).  Accordingly, the 
self effects a “signature” of agency for which it is paradoxically both “cause and effect” (p. 
6).  The aligning of geography and discourse at the rise of print culture in early modernity 
was indicative for Conley of incipient, national subjects in whom history and 
“psychogenesis” (or subject formation) was imbricated around a “narcissistic illusion” 
aligning the making of worlds with self-development (pp. 6–7).  
 
Typical in these literatures was a “topographer” – someone who, in attending to locality and 
the contingent facets composing it, was able to draw from them what can be understood as 
a broader cognitive orientation (Conley 2007, pp. 8–9).  Hence, a topographer is someone 
“‘who tries to link the contradictions found in a particular place […] to a greater ‘geography’ 
or a world map’”, indeed the cartographer asks how, as an individual witness, “‘local items 
of the present and the here-and-now can be made to express and to designate the absent, 
unrepresentable totality’” (2007, pp. 19 & 218, note 33).  This “dyad of a local-and-global 
consciousness”, as Conley termed it, continues a cartographic tradition, which, at its 
wellspring, aimed to “tie humans at a local level to a cosmographic picture” (p. 218, note 
33).  As such, charted in early modernity were a series of “unlinked islands” composing a 
veritable archipelago of “image-facts” floating more or less amicably amidst an expanse of 
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uncertainty.  What were called “isolario” or “island-book[s]” in the sixteenth century 
coincided “with a moment when, in the development of oceanic travel, the expansion of the 
borders of the world led cartographers to compose atlases in which new information could 
‘float’ aside inherited knowledge” (pp. 8–9, note 12, p. 216).  Similarly, in early cartographic 
practices, the realm beyond knowledge was textually nominated as a “terrae incognitae”, 
and in the very act of naming, as Conley asserted, the menacing unknown finds a de facto 
orientation.  
 
These cognitive practices testify to a still essentially centred world.  For Conley this type of 
relation with the unknown is inseparable from a more or less certain tie to origination, for 
which the human navel is a corporeally localised marker (1996, p. 9).  Hence the navel is a 
kind of covered “blind alley”, “a one-eyed hole”, and an “anti-abyss”, as well as a mound-
hollow pinpointing maternal loss, and, allegorically, a site showing where roots were lifted 
and from where “mother earth” has slipped away (p. 9).  Conley similarly noted the navel’s 
decisive role in providing subjects with “a sense of time and place”, precisely because the 
navel organises the unknown by pinpointing origination and a time-before-knowing (p. 10).  
As a mark decisively determining temporal whereabouts – all that is before and after – the 
navel induces a cardinalization for the subject that holds open, at least at the level of 
fantasy, a return to, or recovery of, the womb.  Like the “reassuring rectitude of the map”, as 
Conley said, the navel portends mastery and a “revery of totalization” […] idealization and 
conquest” (p. 10).  Such reverie aligns a cartographic impulse with the engenderment of the 
subject for whom the unknown furnished a site for appropriating, in the labour of 
topographic orientation, a generative maternal prerogative: hence, “the subject desires to 
give birth to himself or herself without the intermediary of the parents […]” (pp. 10–11).  
This celibate action takes the unknown as a fertile, engendering field that “defies fixed 
meaning”, and like the unconscious, can be diagrammed as a “great circle” as Conley 
proposed, the celibate action of the topographer, in turn, can be imagined as “a smaller 
circle” within that operates as an interceding agent seeking, through its mobility and 
cunning, to manage the larger circumference (p. 11).  Still short of complete deprojection 
typifying a transpective orientation, in the sixteenth century the ‘unknown’ was a fusion of 
monsters, cryptophoric occurrences, indeterminate territory, no less than fear and anxiety, 
and as Conley emphasised, terrae incognitae is a category readily fusing fluidity of meaning 
with mental perturbation, particularly in the context of cartography.  At the limits of 
certainty, maps routinely relied on a richly illustrated field of “cannibalism, vivisection, and 
death”, and if death particularly was a key motif in Renaissance narratives, character-
building retained an initiatory vestige that entailed self-completion by means of a passage 
“into the realm of death and back again” (p. 11).  As a venue for testing, and rebirth, death 
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in Renaissance iconography was “averred to be an erotic or a mystical event”, one that 
potentiated the merging of knowledge and experience (p. 11). 
 
Giorgio Agamben’s consideration of what he called the “destruction of experience” in 
modernity offers a useful explication of this complex entanglement of knowledge, 
experience, and death.  In contradistinction to a pathos in modernity where knowledge and 
experience where thought capable of converging this side of death, in the Renaissance such 
continuity was deemed possible only via a paideutic passage that crossed into, and was 
therefore entailed being marked by, a transcendence beyond.  As Agamben argued, since 
antiquity “the subject of experience” (the experiencer of everyday life) had been the bearer 
of a routinely shared “common sense”, while “the subject of science” (the person in whom a 
higher knowledge avails itself) drew on an intelligence or nōus otherwise veiled from routine 
experience (1993, p. 18).  Consistent with traditional initiatory stricture, the human path to 
knowledge was characterised as a “páthei máthos”, something acquired or “learned only 
through and after suffering”, and which precluded the foresight or certainty of predictive 
knowledge (p. 19).  For example, at the threshold with modernity, Renaissance writer 
Michel de Montaigne in “On Practice”, could still recommend “breaking ourselves in for 
death [by…] making an assay of it” (2003, p. 417) precisely because “‘to philosophize is to 
learn to die’” (and cited in Conley 2011, p. 6).  Writing as a technique for miming death’s 
approach in fact has origin in late classical traditions where philosophers ranging from Pliny 
to the Stoic Epictetus routinely sought out knowledge at the very limits of mortality: 
Epictetus, for example, longed for “death [to] take [him] while […] thinking, writing and 
reading” (cited in Foucault 2005, p. 359).  Standing at the juncture between science of 
antiquity and its remaking in modernity, Agamben recognised in Montaigne a will to run 
experience all the way up to death in pursuit of a vantage point on definitive knowledge; as 
such, wisdom arrives by traversing the path of ageing and through the cost of a certain 
suffering and humility (1993, pp. 18-19).  
 
On the other hand, the new sciences tolerated no such deferment of knowledge, seeking a 
direct correlation between experience and knowing by funnelling experience into 
experimental method and validating it as the sole pathway to, and measure of, knowledge 
(p. 19).  For both Francis Bacon and Descartes experience joins with knowledge on the basis 
of a serial accumulation as indicated by the inordinate use of metaphors centred on paths 
and journeying.  Yet these appeals to passage are of a restricted type, for as Agamben 
paraphrased Bacon, “mere experience” – associated with chance and wandering (whether 
“groping” or being lost in the “forest” or the “maze”) – must be corrected by the “right road”, 
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the direct line, the expedient, and true course.1  In short, experience is valued only to the 
extent that it could be subjected to “scientific verification” with its “sensory impressions” 
converted to “qualitative determinations” and rendered amenable to methods of prediction 
and consistency (p. 17).  Experience, as the locus of inquiry, finds itself cast both “as far as 
possible outside the individual” and into the domain of “instruments and numbers” (pp. 17–
19).  If passage and pathways are nevertheless invoked in these early discourses on scientific 
method, any appeal to experience, rich in contact effects and local proximities is eschewed.  
The route to truth is idealised as a direct journey whose complexity could be reduced to a 
“step by step” achievement of modest certainty that progressively builds “a continuous and 
uninterrupted movement of thought” (Descartes, 2007a, pp. 15–20).  Replacing the 
humanist quest for an encounter with truth at the threshold of life, knowledge is summonsed 
back from behind the veil of death to become something tangibly possessed and purged of 
mystical associations.  At stake in this shift is a political differentiation from a societal order 
that constructed truth as a measure of the cosmos, to one seeking an instrumental 
knowledge apposite to a world shorn of theological certainty and readied for mercantile 
hegemony.  
 
	  
	  
4. “Classical Self” |“Modern Subject” 
	  
 
Foucault named this shift in knowing the “Cartesian moment”: 
 
[…] the history of truth begins when knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives 
access to the truth. That is to say, it is when the philosopher (or the scientist, or simply 
someone who seeks the truth) can recognise the truth and have access to it in himself 
and solely through his activity of knowing, without anything being demanded of him 
and without him having to change or alter his being as subject. (2005, p. 17) 
 
Defined by an ego-centred perspectival, such a subject differs from its pre-modern 
counterpart by virtue of its release from an initiatory precondition to truth.  Eschewing the 
old Christian pastoral practices of self-renunciation, asceticism, and the care of souls guided 
by ecclesiastical institutions, the Cartesian subject seemingly claiming complete autonomy, 
in fact mirrored a pioneering independence tested by breakaway religious groups in the late 
Middle Ages and early Renaissance.  By asserting the right of individuals to chart their own 
path to salvation, Foucault recognised in such groups a reassertion of classical self-relations, 
particularly a Stoic self-relation (1997, pp. 277–279).  The result was a new type of figure 
arising with Renaissance statecraft, one whose concern with an “aesthetics of existence” 
produced, as Foucault described, a “hero [who is…] his own work of art” (p. 278).  
Consistent with what the Greek’s called epimeleia heautou – a concern and care of the self – 
                                       
1	  Descartes offered an extension of Bacon’s analogy with darkened paths, way-finding, and rules for 
deducing knowledge. See 2007a, p. 16.	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the new aesthetics of existent meant “making one’s life into an object for a sort of 
knowledge”, not in the Christian sense of a betterment in preparation for an afterlife, but as 
culminating fulfilment in this one (pp. 269–271).  If for Foucault this attendance to the self 
reappears in the Renaissance, it in fact anticipates the dandyism practiced in nineteenth 
century urban locales (p. 271).  No less, walking also demonstrates divergences between 
classical and Christian-pastoral enactments of the self.  For instance, he compared the 
walking exercises of Stoic philosopher Epictetus (55–135 AD) with a seventeenth century 
Christian seminarist: in Epictetus’ case observing and questioning sights in the street 
occasion opportunities to master responses and practice sovereignty over everything that 
might come the walker’s way; alternatively for the seminarist, the walk reveals a diminution 
in the face of all things and an overarching “dependence vis-à-vis God”  (pp. 276–277).  On 
one side a self-governance presumes self-malleability, and on the other, an uncertainty 
about the nature of one’s inner constituency, fear of ungodliness and an emphasis on self-
purity and corporeal integrity prevail (p. 270 & 274).  For the classical self “practices of 
knowledge” accord with the edict, “no access to truth without ascesis” (pp. 278–279).  
Conversely, the modern subject arises through “subjectivation” that calls for ceaseless self-
knowledge, precisely because an indeterminate core defines its constitution.  For Descartes, 
“any subject” can “accede to truth” on an obvious, evidential basis (p. 279).  The resulting 
“nonascetic subject of knowledge”, divested of ethical strictures and the requirement to 
navigate and overcome worldly experience to arrive at ‘truth’, undertakes a radical 
reduction of the world in a quest for a resilient, constant subjective core resistant to ascetic 
becoming precisely because the knowing self can never completely extricate itself from 
uncertainty or doubt (p. 279).  For instance, in Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes 
described undertaking, at the levels of cognition and experience, a “demoli[tion of] 
everything completely and start[ing] again right from the foundations”, advising those 
willing to follow him, “to withdraw their minds from the senses as well as from all 
prejudices” (1991, p. 12 & 8).  Nevertheless, Foucault recognised in this conscious 
retraction a meditative legacy consistent with those of earlier techniques of the self.  
However, in Descartes case, a disengagement with shared social and perceptual worlds 
demanded a plumbing of the veracity of the self’s cognitive core.2  At stake in the 
diminution of any sensory contribution to knowledge was a reduction solely to the 
“intellectual foundations of certainty” (Foucault, 1998, p. 394).   
 
Agamben recognised a similar reduction - the “quasi-mystical reduction of all psychic 
content except the pure act of thought” (1993, p. 22).  For him, the cogito, or “thinking 
substance” was a reaction to the remaking in the Renaissance of earlier spiritual beliefs 
                                       
2	  “So today I have expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged for myself a clear stretch of free 
time. I am here quite alone, and at last, I will devote myself sincerely and without reservation to the 
general demolition of my opinions” (Descartes 2007b, Meditations on First Philosophy,18).	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arising with Neoplatonic Hermeticism and mysticism of late antiquity.  The Renaissance’s 
own scientific renovation had sought an overcoming of the classical antipathy between 
experience and knowledge by adapting earlier mystic traditions for which astrology and 
alchemy (each able to unite heavenly and earthly, divine and individual agency) were key 
(p. 20).  If in classical thought the intersection of poiema (act), páthēma (suffering), and 
máthēma (knowledge) delivered pure intelligence only beyond death, in the Neoplatonic 
mystercism of late Antiquity, the transmutation of substances and communication between 
divided realms delivered an “emanationist system in which a continuous hierarchy of 
intelligences, angels, demons and souls […] communicated in a ‘Great Chain’ which begins 
and ends with the One” (p. 20).  This conception made imaginable a graded crossover in 
knowledge overriding the Aristotelian division between noūs [pure cosmic intellect] and 
psychē [of distinct living entities], just as it suggested a way of reconciling the Platonic 
distinction between the One and the many (p. 20).  To the extent that this emanationist 
system called on spirits as a universal mediating agent, an agent lying somewhere between 
the corporeal and the incorporeal as Agamben noted, the new sciences saw in the notion of 
‘rarefied thought’ a version of absolute knowledge available to human purview (p. 21).  Yet 
to overcome the “rationalism/irrationalism opposition” inherent in mysticism and with it a 
fusing of experience and knowledge as an unutterable or inexpressible ecstasy, máthēma 
had to be released from páthēma and rendered unexceptionally expressible (p. 22).  
Knowledge was presumed to subsist everywhere but as prescient to the thought that would 
come to grasp it (p. 22).  In this grasping did the otherwise ethereal thinking subject reveal 
itself as a substance, a “new metaphysical subject” drawn from “the soul of Christian 
psychology” and “the noūs of Greek metaphysics”, as Agamben described (p. 23). 
 
What counts as experience then for the rarified, substance-self?  For Agamben, what 
experience gives the classical self is an anticipation of death as that totality that rounds off a 
life in its passage to wisdom (p. 23).  Foucault offered a similar summation: “old age means 
wisdom […] acquired experience”, and as Seneca showed, striving towards old age makes a 
“dynamic unity” of life, in which death, as its culminating moment, ought to be realized as a 
“perfect satiety of ourselves” (2005, pp. 108–111).  Unlike the Christian remaking of 
“salvation” as an “event” “effectuat[ing] a crossing over [from…] mortality to immortality”, 
the classical understanding retains salvation on the side of life as the complete realization 
and perfecting of the self (pp. 181–185).  In Stoic philosophy particularly, the practice of 
self-memorialization gives a “cross-section view” revealing the belated truth of the life lived 
(p. 480).  Moreover, for both Seneca and Epictetus “life must be recognized, thought, lived, 
and practiced as a constant test” (p. 437).  Even adversity and suffering can be reconceived 
as a good with alchemical potential.  Moreover this “test attitude” runs the full span of 
classical culture from the “great […] myths” (where Prometheus was pivotal) to tragedy with 
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Foucault referencing “Oedipus the King and Oedipus at Colonus” as examples (p. 444).  
Both tragedies by Sophocles together can be thought to play out the idea of a summative 
memorialisation, or rethinking of the whole, capable of seeing past, or giving perspective to, 
life as a cumulative domain of suffering. Taken on its own, Oedipus Tyrannus is, as Deleuze 
(1978) noted, an atypical tragedy in which the fallen hero is not awarded death, but is rather 
cast out, wandering and forsaken, into an existence without alleviation and without end.  
Conversely, Oedipus at Colonus provides exactly this missing punctuation and a summation 
to the ordeals of life as Foucault similarly noted (2004, p. 444).  This co-optation sets in play 
an ethical, as opposed to a political, parrhēsia that also seeds a potential disenfranchisement 
of the self from the polis.  In the classical period, this rupture is ameliorated in a care of the 
self inseparable from a cultivation of the polis, which is recalibrated in late antiquity as a 
self-care indexed to personal salvation and a relation towards death rather than the city per 
se – something anticipated and programmed by the metaphysical walk.  On the other hand, 
modernity sees a return to the city and the experience it might potentiate, a return motivated 
by the will to close experience with knowledge.  Yet contrary to wisdom arrived at in death, 
the subject of modernity knows no maturity and no conclusion in knowing as Agamben said 
(1993, p. 23).  Instead, experience as knowing is undergone in the absence of any 
culminating closure (aged wisdom) with the result that knowledge, rendered infinite, can 
only be possessed in the form of a perpetual and infantile seeking (p.23).  A possessive will 
to know swamps the self-city-world.  The cutting off of death as a perquisite to the 
completion of knowledge corresponds with what Certeau recognized as a labour against 
death, just as a closing off of the classical self was a labour of death enacted in the name of 
a post-traditional epistemology.  The transposition from self-care to a subjectivation in 
which the self embarks on an interminable quest for self-knowledge opens towards the 
pathos of aspective.  For Goux it is the Oedipus of Thebes (and not the Oedipus of Colonus 
enacted in antiquity and to some extent revived in the Renaissance) that finds its first full 
revival historically in Descartes (1993, p. 159).  
	  
	  
	  
5. Adventures in Knowing 
	  
	  
Nevertheless, this pursuit is not short of compensatory uses for the new scientific 
knowledge:    
 
Through this philosophy we could […] make ourselves, as it were, the lords and 
masters of nature.  This is desirable not only for the invention of innumerable devices 
which would facilitate our enjoyment of the fruits of the earth and all goods we find 
there, but also, and most importantly, for the maintenance of health, which is 
undoubtedly the chef good and the foundation of all the other goods in this life” 
(Descartes 2007a, Discourse on the Method, 62). 
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Portended here is a shift from an ethical to a managerial mentality attuned to the longevity 
and productivity of populations.  An increasingly instrumental use of knowledge signals a 
changeover from forms of sovereign rule decreeing life’s end to a regulative form of 
governance mandating life in accordance with a “gradual disqualification of death” as a site 
answerable to power (Foucault, 2003, p. 247).  Increasingly “hidden away”, death becomes 
“the most private thing”, the point at which the “individual escapes all power” and is marker 
of the transition from sovereign power to bourgeois mediation (p. 248).  If Descartes is 
critical to this transition, it is because, as Antonio Negri has argued, he is the bearer of a 
philosophy apposite to a broader seventeenth century political transformation, one resting 
on a “class self-identification” that was broadly mercantile and entrepreneurial and which 
borrowed from the “cosmopolitan humanism” arising with the Italian city states (2007, p. 
95).  As Negri argued, despite Descartes’ outright rejection of a conceptual framework 
inherited from Renaissance humanism, his texts overtly rely on humanist metaphors, centred 
on the long rehearsed themes of “‘path’, ‘house’ and ‘machine’” (p.33), but also themes 
covertly borrowed from Renaissance utopian reworking of urban space.3  For Negri, this is in 
fact the reason for the persistence of humanist metaphors in Descartes; they signal the 
presence of a proto-bourgeois imagination (aligned politically if not epistemologically with 
humanism) which saw itself capable, on one hand, of mediating between the rising 
Absolutist monarchical power consequent to the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), and in the 
other, a resulting disenfranchised and dispossessed multitude left to circulate outside the 
older vertical feudal ties of caste and land.  In this context of a societal crisis, with the new 
entrepreneurial class ‘threatened’ top and bottom, Descartes’ positing of scientific Reason 
aligns historically with a quest to establish a “reasonable political order”, one capable of 
compromising both with State power while recruiting to its ranks, an artisan and labouring 
multitude.  
 
Two factors identified by Negri are particularly significant: one centring on the role of 
memory, the other on the significance of solitariness.  To the extent that humanism still 
sought a model for reason capable of being harmonised with the cosmic order, by the 
seventeenth century no such optimism prevailed, and as Negri wrote, in a seemingly 
shattered world, “Universal discontinuity” reigned and truth, rather than being 
cosmologically verifiable, had become a matter of power, “divine power” (p. 107).  Faced 
with the need to ground knowledge otherwise alienated between defunct ideals and the 
vicissitudes of political power, Descartes framed the problem as a correction of “a great 
imbalance between memory and spirit” (cited in Negri 2007, p. 104).  On one hand, 
                                       
3	  As Descartes wrote: “Again ancient cities which have gradually grown from mere villages into large 
towns are usually ill-proportioned, compared with those orderly towns which planners lay out as they 
fancy on level ground [and in the case of the former…] you would say it is chance, rather than the will 
of men using reason, that placed them so” (2007a, Discourse on the Method, 11-13).	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memory of the Renaissance is associated with, as Negri said, “the habit of a lived 
experience, the bodily sign of participation in the humanist adventure”, something Descartes 
called a “corporeal memory”; on the other, an “intellectual memory”, dependent only on the 
soul and free of any attachment to “local memory” makes “separation” its defining gesture: 
 
In separating itself, the bona mens [the good mind] demands a global elucidation of 
its own separation.  Wisdom can no longer be founded on a secure possession of the 
world, on an immediate relation to the world.  Only the demand to abducere mentem 
a sensibus (‘withdraw their minds from their senses’) makes possible the new 
philosophical proposal of a path towards wisdom. (p. 105) 
 
This “critique of memory”, consistent with the positing of spirit or pure thought, viewed the 
world through what Negri called a “metaphysics of separation” and in renouncing the 
world’s continuity through a collectively grounded memory, an ameliorating synthesis was 
sought via the cognitive labours of a solitary consciousness called on to laboriously re-join it 
piece by piece (p. 106).  Against tradition, the Cartesian metaphysics of separation truncates 
any possible experience of a living continuity with the past precisely because, as Certeau 
characterised modernity’s pathos, “it has become impossible to believe in this presence of 
the dead” (1988b, p. 5).  The modern subject, invested only in what can be rendered legibly 
certain, nevertheless cohabitates with what cannot be assimilated, but can be managed, 
partitioned, and displaced.  Hence “two ‘heterologies’ (discourses on the other)” are 
instrumental in a metaphysics of separation –  “the body of knowledge that utters a 
discourse and the mute body that nourishes it” (p. 3). 
 
Moreover, the heterological relation finds a particular poignancy in the demarcation 
Agamben makes between “the quest” and “the adventure”.  As he wrote, in the medieval 
Christian world, the quest is a journey or undertaking to extract from the experience of fallen 
existence and its travails an abstract knowledge of the good.  Knowable only “per scientiam” 
– that is, by way of an external authoritative promise (such as scripture) – the quest 
“expresses the impossibility of uniting science and experience in a single subject” (Agamben 
1993, p. 28).  As such the life journey always amounts to a journey without certain route or 
achievable end.  In other words, the life journey is “an aporia, literally […] the absence of a 
road (a-poria)” (p. 29).  On the other hand, given that “scientific experiment is […] the 
construction of a sure road (of a methodos, a path) to knowledge” that deputises exclusively 
for determinate ends and efficacious routes, a scientific outlook manifestly renounces the 
logic of the quest (pp. 28–29).  That the subject of science, the cogito, undergoes experience 
of knowledge neither by ultimately possessing it in finality nor by being transformed by it, 
means that the quest - as a journey predicated precisely on a continual self-testing according 
to the vicissitudes of life’s twists and turns - loses its relevancy in modernity.  Where the 
quest might promise to ultimately suture an essential rupture in human knowing, a knowing 
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that would at its end be “exotic and extraordinary” in itself, in the context of modernity’s 
penchant for direct passage, “the adventure”, as Agamben said, comes to take its place, 
providing the “final refuge of experience”, but one whose “road goes [immediately] by way 
of the extraordinary and the exotic” in the here and now (p. 29).  Reading between 
Agamben and Certeau then, the adventure, by brushing up against the extraordinary and the 
exotic, in fact precisely embodies the heterological mechanism.  Concomitantly, the 
Cartesian sure road mirrors such an adventure where a “methodos” in discourse draws its 
certainty from the mute, astonishing body of the Other –  “the Indian, the past, the people, 
the mad, the child, the Third World”, as well as the body, the woman, and the city, as 
Certeau said (1988b, p. 3).  Undoubtedly, this other provides a residual domain for 
assigning, transmitting, and excising what in the realm of experience the cogito cannot 
assimilate or circumscribe for fear of compromising its psychical unity and its claim of an 
immediately intellectual foundation in certainty. 
	  
	  
	  
6. Looking Down on Pavements 
	  
	  
Observing walkers in modernity then can be thought to partake of an ‘adventure’ in 
knowledge caught in a heterological bind that summons experiences from which a fullness 
of contact and maturation (in Agamben’s sense) is denied.  In the subject of experience 
emerging with Cartesianism – a position equating to an undergoing without having – can be 
found a caesura of significance for modernity, one that drives a bipolar affective landscape 
balanced between melancholic loss and an exclusionary violence.  A prodigious history is at 
stake.  This history seeks to manage a bipolarity whose underlying drive is a recovery of 
unitary ‘experience’ – albeit in different guises and to different ends.  In this context, walking 
offers an ameliorating measure to the vicissitudes of the climb found on any ladder to 
knowledge.  As Foucault noted, “the view of the world from above” – the overview – 
preoccupies “spiritual experience [as it is] found in Western culture” (2005, p. 283).  For to 
behold the totality of what is at “the summit of the world” (a view commensurate with “the 
soul on the threshold with life”) is to achieve a “consortium dei”, the partnering of a self 
with absolute knowledge (pp. 283–284).  Conversely, if in Descartes the subject’s 
transcendental relationship with knowledge entailed a pre-emptive capitalisation on an 
experiential wisdom otherwise consummated with death, the universal applicability of 
method did what the point view of the summit might otherwise achieve; it imparted to the 
deceptive and testing mobility of sensate experience a perennial orientation but one 
applicable in the context of the motile body in its here and now adventuring.  Hence 
Descartes can be thought to swing the ladder of classical experience-knowledge ninety 
degrees; contrary to the metaphysical walk, wisdom was to be found spread out in 
extension.  In its metaphoric depiction at least, a brisk and direct stroll amidst the 
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experiences furnished by the world was enough to occasion the conditions necessary for its 
revelation.  
 
Nevertheless, the Cartesian cogito was not without its own appeal to elevation from which 
to survey the progress or the passage of things from a remove somewhat above the contact 
fray, as Hubert Damisch has shown.  Examining Descartes’ deployment of the “stove-heated 
room” as an arena for contemplation in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Damisch 
recognised precisely this type of urban proximity predicated on a modestly elevated remove.  
As private ‘refuges’ for philosophically rehearsing a “methodical doubt” necessary to the 
new science – a method seeking certainty and regularity from the world’s sensory multiplex 
– they were also imagined as simple, cellular rooms whose confines condensed the 
thinking-self as singularly removed from the confounding effects of collective, political life 
and accumulated thought; in short they prophesized for a time apart.  In these solitary 
locales for thought, Damisch saw Descartes renovating an earlier humanist concern with a 
human vantage point (perspectivally centred in urban public place – on the street or in the 
squares) in favour of the Enlightenment predilection for the bird’s-eye view.  Certainly, the 
sparsely appointed environ Descartes deemed necessary to thought in its untutored state was 
in fact strikingly centrifugal, offering a seemingly essential vantage point for deliberating 
over and planning a remaking of the world in what Negri saw as an early modern 
“Prometheanism” inherited from a preceding humanism.  If for the humanists it was enough 
to ‘encounter’ and thereby reframe the world in human terms, for the Modern Age 
knowledge ambitioned a means, a fulcrum, for “possessing” it in total (Negri, 2007, p. 37).  
 
Certainly in staging the famous wax argument Descartes makes an elevated room a pivot 
point between introspection and doubt; in the play of wax handled in proximity to the 
stove’s heat, he is compelled to imagine walking to a window and seeing below what he 
might presume to be “men crossing the square” but which he conjectured, might really be 
nothing more than “hats and coats [that…] conceal automatons” (2007b, Meditations on 
First Philosophy, 32).  A parallel between the shifting sensory states of the wax and the 
deceptive appearance of street-walkers underscores a capacity to see through the 
conventional assumptions and sensory habituations imbedded in visual appearance.  At 
stake in such scrutiny is a distancing mastery that was given exemplary configuration in “a 
plunging perspective view of something like a ‘street’” (Damisch, 2001, p. 5).  This 
“downward view from above” (otherwise enacted corporeally as a “backward and upward” 
move into an interior) reframes the street – itself “synonymous with the city” and metonymic 
of a multitudinous populous  – as a domain capable of cognitive remaking (p. 5–12).  In 
what can be thought of as a proto-bourgeois interior, a pivot capable of both dividing the 
world and joining it anew was imagined – the private individual fronting the multitude, 
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cognitive agency probing mechanical corporeal repetition, the domicile overseeing the city, 
thinking things (res cogitans) pressed into extended ones (res extensa).  Indeed as a 
mediating machine ‘the interior’ in fact mitigates between two types of mind, no less than 
“two types of cities” as Damisch reiterated – the crooked and the reasonable (p. 7).  The 
enclosed, elevated view, with its plunging perspective, didn’t merely orientate an outlook 
and a distanced domain of scrutiny, it made imaginable a substantive, private self capable of 
raising above a cognitive wandering indicative of the multitude.  Much as Lyotard argued, 
its heterological outlook finds in urban others (in fact the urban tout court as the 
embodiment of the figural) an uncertainty that can never quite be dispelled but whose 
contact gives rise to renewed cognitive agency.  
 
Following Deleuze and Guattari, Damisch recognized in Descartes’ city-sighting and self-
scrutiny, a territorial-situational foundation for philosophy.  Yet as Deleuze and Guattari 
further argued, philosophical concepts are not just defined by a territoriality giving rise to 
them.  Rather, concepts answer to “conceptual personae” populating these territories.  
Pointedly, Descartes’ cogito is shadowed by an antecedent figure Deleuze and Guattari term 
“the idiot”, an obscure, “private thinker” who thinks “with innate forces that everyone 
possesses on their own account by right” (1994, p. 62).  If the ‘idiot’ is antithetical to the 
“public teacher” (the purveyor of conventional concepts and the insider of public 
knowledge), the proto-bourgeois interior was a site conceived precisely as a conditioning 
milieu that tapped into and transformed according to the deductive strictures of reason, what 
seemed ‘native’ and innate to the ‘street’.  In short it models  a place, because ‘private’, of 
privileged idiocy, an idiocy domesticated, and tempered according to a broader politic of 
bourgeois mediation partitioned from the multitude below and absolutive, aristocratic power 
above.  Nevertheless, the bourgeois project ultimately does not settle its accounts in the 
domicile alone; rather, it feeds back into and renovates the world.  Likely interior solitude is 
a ruse in the Cartesian enterprise for the isolation it extols was but a preparatory step for a 
broader, centrifugal, political possession of urban, national, and global space.  Hence 
twinned with this depiction of the transitory interiors in Discourse on the Method and 
Meditations on First Philosophy is the advice to “not wander”, to “walk as straight as” 
possible “in one direction”, to not turn from “the right path”, to “arrive somewhere at the 
end”, to not languish “in the middle”, to not “roam hither and thither”, and to seek “good 
ground” on which to travel. In other words, the text advises its reader “to cast aside the 
loose earth and sand so as to come upon rock or clay” – in short, to consider propositions 
and overcome problems by “suppos[ing] them to hold between lines”, simple lines of 
geometric traversal whose “unravelling” adeptly lead to truth in, and of, this world (2007a, 
Discourse on the Method, 20–30).  
	  
	  
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity   Chapter 3 
 Page 121 
	  
7. Monday 5 May, 1631 
	  
	  
	  
 
Figure 17. Joan Blaeu (1649). “Map of Amsterdam”. Source: Atlas van Loon, Wikipedia Commons.  
 
	  
Descartes, a wanderer par excellent, was not short of provisional abodes from which to 
anticipate a bourgeois world-making.  In a letter dated 5 May 1631, he wrote to Jean-Louis 
Guez de Balzac (1597-1654) from Amsterdam extoling the virtues of the then quasi-
independent city-state within the Dutch Republic: 
 
In this large town where I live […] everyone but myself is engaged in trade, and hence 
is so attentive to his own profit that I could live here all my life without ever being 
noticed by a soul.  I take a walk each day amid the bustle of the crowd with as much 
freedom and repose as you could obtain in your leafy grooves, and I pay no more 
attention to the people I meet than I would to the trees in your woods or the animals 
that browse there.  The bustle of the city no more disturbs my daydreams than would 
the rippling of a stream. Whenever I reflect upon the doings of passersby I get the 
same sort of pleasure as you get when you watch the peasants tilling your fields, for I 
can see that all their work serves to enhance the beauty of the place I live in, and to 
supply all my needs. (2007c, 203-204) 
 
The irony of imagining a solitary, bucolic reverie in a rapidly growing city precariously 
sustained by the dyking, damming and piling of marshy land is matched here by invoking 
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aristocratic niceties4 in what was amongst the most intense seventeenth century capitals of 
commercial and informational exchange (Smith 1984, pp. 985, 1004).  While Descartes 
credited to this exemplary Baroque-capitalist city his “becoming so philosophical”, the 
linking of anonymous walking with daydreaming would seem to elide the real material and 
societal conditions sustained in such a place.  Nevertheless, the invocation of solitude here 
no less proselyized for an anachronistic ‘retreat’ from seventeenth century urban life than 
did the stove-heated room; rather, as Negri argued, Descartes can be thought to intricately 
gauge his social world, crafting in response a metaphysics apposite to the situation he found 
himself in: “every metaphysics is in some way a political ontology” (2007, p. 317).  Yet what 
might a political ontology of the daydreaming walker amount to?  Certainly the mercantile 
Dutch Republic offered Descartes a very particular type of liberty: it was both a locale for 
channelling “nostalgia for the world of freedom and revolution of the Renaissance”, but also 
for renouncing that humanist world-view (p. 100).  Significantly, as Negri cited Descartes, 
the Low Countries gave opportunity for a “solitary existence, ‘dans le desert’”, (p. 103).  The 
letter to Balzac rehearses in fact the play of an intellectual memory over a corporeality 
bound to the immediacy of place.  The free time it envisages is an expelling of time in the 
form of situated memory.  Occasioning an indifference to urban others, its city-ness is 
affirmed on condition that its communality is renounced.  Similarly, if Descartes imagines he 
is “dans le desert” (a term redolent with Oedipal implication) while city-bound, in fact the 
city is rendering a wilderness, an urban place apart from itself.  In short, the walk casts the 
dreamer into solitariness while bestowing on him the power to occupy multiple placing. 
 
In fact the asserting of a dream-state (“my daydreams”) in the letter anticipates (by 
approximately seven years) the dream state that Descartes utilised to test the limits of 
methodological doubt in the “First Meditation” of Meditations on First Philosophy.  If, as 
Foucault had written, the deliberation on dreams verses waking perception modelled an 
askesis - a rehearsal of thoughts designed to displace the relation of the subject to itself, 
eliciting detached order out of wayward passions (1998 p. 406) - the daydream invoked in 
the letter to Balzac clearly suggests, in advance of a solitary space devoted to free time, a 
comparable meditative scenario.  In this earlier version though the walk itself crafts free time 
(“everyone but myself is engaged in trade”).  Edward McGushin, in his reading of Foucault’s 
consideration of the “First Meditation” has noted that the choice of dreaming as a test for 
doubt (as opposed to madness) was made on the basis that it exampled a ready and 
convincing instance of the deceptive capacity of perception, one that enabled a freeing 
                                       
4	  If Descartes’ reverie can be considered aristocratic, it is so in the sense of the landed gentry whose 
estates emphasised a town-provincial axis closer to the Renaissance urban-world continuum than a 
Medieval/feudal world of division. This classical vision ultimately draws on models from ancient 
Greece and Rome, where, as Fernand Braudel noted, “the town was open to its countryside and on 
terms of equality with it” (1974, p. 402).	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from, and discrediting of, actuality: “The doubt must allow the subject to disclose itself in a 
new way, as something whose very mode of self-disclosure is distinct from the “system” of 
its “actual” being-in-the-world” (2007, p. 189).  The daydream that Descartes floats across 
the “bustle of the city” is precisely of this order; it pictures a way of being-in, but at the same 
time, uninitiated into, or touched by, the actual.  Moreover, its distancing makes possible an 
objectifying grasp denied those natively habituated to the city’s rhythms.  The true irony 
concerning the dream in the “First Meditation” was, as Foucault noted, that its deployment 
of a meditative schema - a schema long associated with transformations of the self by 
knowledge - served to bring into being “a non-ascetic subject of knowledge”, a subject 
divided from, and capable of mastering through this division, the object of knowledge 
(Foucault cited in McGushin, 2007, p. 192).  In the letter to Balzac, a Cartesian relation 
between walking ‘subject’ and the urban ‘object’ is similarly rehearsed.  Yet even walking 
must be freed of its corporeal memory, as Descartes makes clear in an elaboration of his 
famous “Cogito ergo sum” - “I am thinking, therefore I exist” – in the Principles of 
Philosophy (1644): 
 
Hence, thinking is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willing, and 
imaging, but also with sensory awareness.  For if I say ‘I am seeing, or I am walking, 
therefore I exist’, and take this as applying to vision or walking as bodily activities, 
then the conclusion is not absolutely certain.  This is because, as often happens 
during sleep, it is possible for me to think I am seeing or walking, though my eyes are 
closed and I am not moving about; such thoughts might even be possible if I had no 
body at all.  But if I take ‘seeing’ or ‘walking’ to apply to the actual sense or 
awareness of seeing or walking, then the conclusion is quite certain, since it relates to 
the mind, which alone has the sensation or thought that it is seeing and walking. 
(2007a, 7, p. 195) 
 
A ‘moment in time’, an arrest in the temporal flow, a meditation on the structure of actuality 
and its impressing of a particular mode of being-in-the-world - these are the components of 
the doubting cogito in its quest for certainty.  Striking in Descartes’ recommendation on the 
suitability of Amsterdam’s indifferent urbanity to thought is that it puts a moving meditation 
(walking) before a static one (a stove-heated room).  If in the interior, this meditative 
moment can be recognised, as Renaud Barbaras has said, as “the first attempt at 
phenomenological reduction”, a reduction involving “an undoing of our immediate link 
with what appears [indeed…] a conversion negating the existence of the world”, ‘the walk’ 
as free repose and ‘retreat’ within the “bustle of the city” in fact underscores the extent to 
which movement nevertheless subtends thought.  As Gilles Deleuze has said: 
 
From Plato to the post-Kantians, philosophy has defined the movement of thought as 
a certain kind of passage from the hypothetical to the apodictic.  Even the Cartesian 
movement from doubt to certainty is a variant of the passage. (1994, p. 196) 
 
Where Descartes would have this apodiciticity signal that only intellection is capable, as 
Barbaras said in response to Descartes’ wax argument, of “grasp[ing] the power of infinite 
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variation that is a body”, he cloaked perception in an idealist garb that presumes its objects 
proffer “a reality that transcends its mode of appearing” (2006, p. 06).  As Barbaras argued, 
in countering a purely empiricist apprehension that takes object/bodies to arise out of an 
excessive motion constituted by a “pure sensory multiplicity”, Descartes surrenders or gives 
up “incarnation” in preference for the “positing of a pure object”, one reliant on an “excess 
of unity” (2006, p. 06).  Deleuze drew attention to a similar process at the level of cogito 
itself.  The “Cogito ergo sum” - I think therefore I am - implies “two logical values”, a 
determined existence (I think) and an undetermined one (I am) (1994, p. 85).  At stake is the 
reduction of the multiplex variables of lived experience to the pure object of the thinking 
self.  As Deleuze argued, “Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by 
reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation 
carried out by God” (1994, p. 86).  The cogito, as an excess of unity, “has no other 
guarantee than the unity of God himself”, and for Deleuze this meant that “the point of view 
of the ‘I’” is less radical than ordinarily supposed, precisely because “God survives as long 
as the I enjoys a subsistence, a simplicity and an identity which express the entirety of its 
resemblance to the divine” (1994, p. 86). 
 
Around this question of temporality then, the ‘phenomenological reduction’ that Descartes 
exercises over the proto-bourgeois city can be read this way: the wayward movements of the 
city (everyone following their own self-interest) is visualised aristocratically as a unity of 
purpose (“the pleasure […] of peasants tilling”); similarly, the expanse of the city, an 
extended body that exceeds individual purview, is made graspable through the observance 
parts indicative of an estate or landed totality held proprietorially.  In this sense, the choice 
of Amsterdam was particularly apt, for it was a city - more so than any up to that time – that 
imposed a planned, unitary image onto an otherwise cumulative coming into being.  
Founded, as Lewis Mumford noted, on a mechanistic order, both technically (in terms of its 
ability to sustain itself against the sea) and geometrically (in terms of the clarity of its layout - 
a layout, consistent with a Baroque ordering that sought to freeze, in key ways, experiential 
variety), Amsterdam was, by seventeenth century standards, a city seemingly designed from 
the foundations up (1984, p. 505), precisely as Descartes called for in the Discourse on the 
Method.  Nor can it be coincidence that it was in the mercantile Dutch Republic, that he 
sought refuge both from monarchical and ecclesiastical censorship, but also the historical 
turmoil of his age. In summary then: 
 
1. The colliding of early bourgeois urban life with Renaissance reverie concretises the 
problem of experience in early modernity pulling knowledge back from the 
(classical) brink of death and allowing it to float as an angel intelligence across the 
surface of the given.  Yet a metaphysics of separation necessary to sustaining this 
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ethereal grasp in fact ghosts, as Negri found, an early bourgeois, humanist 
revolution, both “individualist and rationalist”, but corporeally tied to a 
cosmopolitanism modelled by the “Italian city states” (2007, pp. 94, 207).  
Humanist Prometheanism, displaced into the heart of subsequent Baroque tensions, 
is left to extract idealised images of city space but delivered over to a newly unified 
social class – the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the price of this reversal of hegemony 
was an ‘I’ recognized ontologically and politically only according to separation (p. 
208).  
 
2. The solitariness and atomisation Descartes attributes to Amsterdam (in fact implied 
by Cartesianism) is compensated for by an omnipotent spanning of distance and 
time.  An “I-world relation” validated via an “I-God relation” (as the guarantor of 
thought’s self-certainty) meant, as Negri put it, that “God is therefore in me and not 
in the world” (2007, p. 221, 222).  Replacing a prior horizon of faith in which a 
union of experience and truth would prevail outwardly, the metaphysics of 
separation establishes a new “vertical” orientation – “starting from the I it reaches 
God” as Negri said (p. 222).  Divinity, as the new “horizon of man [and] not of the 
world” makes the latter “a terrain on which to prove the truth of the I”, precisely 
because truth is not a thing out there, but is what is tested and risked through the 
perspective of the experiencer (p. 223).  Given the tension between humanity as the 
“possessor of the truth of the I” and the absence of the truth in the world, truth-
testing becomes a profitable adventure seeking to possess a world otherwise 
abdicated by God (p. 223).   
 
3. As Blumenberg noted, against the old Platonic notion that truth naturally and 
benevolently reveals itself, “Method”, as a means of getting at knowledge, suggests 
the antithesis; truth must be coerced into view via an application of cognitive light: 
“Phenomena no longer stand in the light; rather, they are subjected to the lights of 
an examination from a particular perspective”, for seeing is made conditional on 
perspective – specifically “the angle from which light falls on the object and the 
angle from which it is seen” (1993, p. 53).  Countering the Jansenists belief that God 
has abdicated the world as a consequence of humanity’s fall into pride and hubris 
and in turn left only a darkened, “vertiginous void” anticipating the end of time, 
Descartes, himself having “climbed up to God”, as Negri put it, makes of this 
abeyance, not the world’s crossing out, but a criss-crossing of the void by a 
continuous labour of connection pursuant of “a new world – a separate world, as 
new as one wishes” (Negri, 2007, p. 263 & 266).  For Blumenberg this criss-crossing 
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rests on a kind of “light-supplying therapy” in which “technological figures” make 
“world-realization” visibly imaginable (1993, p. 53). 
 
4. Explicate in Descartes’ urban depiction is the foregrounding of bodies, one that 
accents their non-synchronous ‘reality’.  Cartesianism in its preparation for such a 
reality exercises, as Patočka says, “a dominating knowledge”, one aimed as 
rendering “reality [itself a…] construct” […] responsive to “mathematical or 
generally formal schemata” (1989, p. 286).  Contra the Renaissance, it favours 
formalism and conceptualization over the variability of content, universal postulates 
over local or immediate contexts, and timeless implications over timely intervention 
– factors that overvalue intellectualism (see Toulmin 1990, pp. 30-36).  Hence the 
world is beheld autodidactically, rather than through the transmission of prior 
knowledge and posits a knowing subject “with no master but himself”, a “thinker 
without master as master thinker” (Goux 1993, p. 160).  What does this thinker 
encounter?  Bodies, everywhere a proliferation of bodies extended on the basis of a 
partes extra partes – a state where every position in space is exterior to every other 
and a thing can only wholly exist in one place at a time.  It idealizes orderly and 
masterable placement.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty recognized in this “Operational” or 
“‘technicized’ thought” a loss of experiential depth and embodied understanding - 
what he called “thought in contact”.  Space reduced to its geometrical qualities and 
populated only with distinct objects (each “outside one another”) serves to suppress 
an inherent latency and opacity proper to space in favour of an “absolute positivity 
of Being” (2007, pp. 363, 366).  
 
5. For Nancy, “partes extra partes” founds Cartesianism, replacing a world integral 
with the cosmos – “a world of distributed places given by, and to, the gods” (2008. 
p. 109).  The result is a world beheld without inherent latency.  Yet counter-
intuitively, such a world answers to a logic of touch.5  For Descartes thought is a 
contact event where sense is synonymous with sensing (p. 131).  On this basis, as 
Nancy provoked, res cogitans in fact must be bodily - something he credits 
Descartes with suspecting and increasingly seeking to reconcile by understanding 
the soul’s union with the body (p. 131).  Hence in Descartes an echo of the 
topographer’s will to encounter is evident, but one that achieves syntheses through 
cuts and discontinuities.  As Nancy wrote of the forced interfacing of divided cogito 
                                       
5	  Descartes’ The World (posthumously published in 1664/1677), offers explicate refutation of an 
existential void or discontinuity in matter on the basis of a world-plenum, a world of continuous 
contact achieved by a multitude of discrete bodies maximally compacted, even when in motion 
(2007a, 19, p. 86).  Touch, being “the least deceptive and most certain”, according to Descartes, 
makes imaginable a world-totality where all motion is indicative of an infinite circulation for which no 
“prime mover” (in Aristotle’s sense) is necessary (p. 82 & 85).	  
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity   Chapter 3 
 Page 127 
and body: “I ob-ject my body against myself, as something foreign, something 
strange, the exteriority to my enunciation (“ego”) from this enunciation it-self” (p. 
29; emphasis in original).  Hence in the partes extra partes what is key is less the 
“part” per se but the “extra” as a relation inducing exteriority (p. 29).  Renunciation 
of a humanist, corporeal memory leaves only a relation of otherness between 
bodies.  Moreover, Cartesian dualism is not merely what makes up the subject, “it is 
the ‘Subject’”, the ‘I’ being that which bridges and touches (p. 131: emphasis in 
original).  Hence, as he says, the psyche, though extended, “doesn’t know itself as 
extended” but experiences this “nonknowledge of the self” by the mind being 
moved (2008, p. 144).  The self can’t be other than an amalgam of the motility that 
engages and engenders it: “if I walk it is a walking soul; if I sleep, a sleeping soul 
[…] And if I die, the soul becomes death itself” (p. 144).  Yet in Descartes’ depiction 
of walking in Amsterdam it is a soul capable of sensing the body in multiple places 
that is appealed to.  Having slipped beyond the propriety of the partes extra partes, 
the soul rests in pure extra, positioned outside placement in the strict sense.  
Isolation in the mercantile/bourgeois city permits something inadmissible – a 
humanist world-in-union otherwise rejected in the new science.  A metaphorical 
deployment of “walking”, “wandering”, “passage” and “the right path”, etc. 
provides a figurative door for propagating thought as equanimous or smoothing 
contact.   
 
6. Nevertheless, for Merleau-Ponty the “Cartesian equilibrium” means sustaining the 
self-as-thought against both a mixing with the body implied by vision and the need 
to plumb the terra incognita implied by God’s being.  While not eliminating the 
“enigma of vision” (with its here-there discrepancies and latencies in depth), 
Descartes seconded it in pursuit of a metaphysics that truncates metaphysics itself.  
The risk otherwise is an image of thought that has no proper place or premises and 
hence is not capable of finite delimitation; in other words, thinking would be driven 
by “a mystery of passivity” at its centre (p. 365).  Discredited in the Cartesian 
philosophical and political project for pure understanding was a Renaissance 
mixture of soul and body.  Spared the abyss of transcendent reasons, the bourgeois 
ordering of space as secular and reasonable, occasioned in the “Cogito ergo sum” a 
determined existence (I think) contrary to a passive, undetermined one (I am).  Yet 
as Deleuze argues, “the death of God does not leave the identity of the [pure] I 
intact, but installs and interiorises within it an essential dissimilarity” between it and 
the undetermined ‘I am’.  The result is the persistence of an inconsistent, “passive 
self” solely determined by time at the heart of the cogito (1994, pp. 86-87).  It is this 
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doubling within the cogito that Descartes uncovers, it is precisely this that his 
equilibrium aims to moderate or cover over. 
 
	  
	  
8. Oedipus or Machines 
	  
 
Evidenced in Cartesianism then is a bi-origination in modernity, one in which a humanist 
step is countered (if not eclipsed) by a baroque one that in turns trips into a metaphysics of 
separation.  Leonard Lawler captured this doubling inherent in modernity when he depicted 
the “upright human body” as always both a thing studied (as body) and an embodied entity 
that dissolves with contact experience.  Hence the walker resides in “the between of survey 
and fusion, the mi-lieu, the mi-chemin between essence and fact” (2006, p. 86).  While 
Occidental capitalization (see Fig. 12) stockpiles narratively and epistemologically, 
seemingly immune to the effects of heterological contact, as Certeau insisted, the colonial-
imperial project is in no sense free of transference and fusion: 
 
From there and nowhere else comes the native, that other introduced into the 
fellowship of the explorers.  Through the native, the reality of the elsewhere causes 
the voyage to drift, it diverts it, anchoring it in a dreamland. (1986, p. 148) 
 
Stalled, capitalization brushes up against what Conley characterised as a mystical 
“dedifferentiation of the world and the body”, a dissolve that concomitantly brings the 
supernatural and knowledge dividend into reach (1996, p. 12).  Closed off from a learned 
dividend in death, modernity directs its quest for wisdom and knowledge towards others in 
the here and now.  Contrastive with the mystic union of the sixteenth century that shows up, 
not as experience exactly, but rather as an “itinerary through space and literature” 
maintaining a “half-named sense of the unknown”, modernity foregrounds the adventure of 
experience as constitutive of “a clearly articulated relation with the unknown” resolved in 
an exchangeable form transmissible within a burgeoning print capitalism (p. 3).  Where 
mythical congress delivers a marked or initiatory testament – “usually a scar left on the body 
of the figure narrating the event” - modernity less marks bodies than it testifies to the 
strictures of circulating with, and as, commodities (p. 12).  Modernity restructures the 
alchemical transformation of the unknown into knowledge according to a double logic: it 
drives towards “dedifferentiated from the other” to better grasp what fascinates because 
incomprehensible; yet it also discredits such dedifferentiation by casting it as text geared 
towards gain (p. 12).  At stake in this double logic is, as Conley saw, a substitution of the 
topographer by the geographer, for in the sixteenth century the eye “wanders about and 
literally touches a world of unforeseen expanse” in an “errant” looking consistent with a 
“precolonial moment of the gaze” – a gaze that still marvels at, and is enmeshed with, the 
unknown (2011, p. 2).  Borrowing Francesco Colonna’s image of the snail as exemplifying a 
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type of groping engagement without recourse to any anticipatory overview, Conley credits 
to the topographer a “haptic eye” tracing the edges and outline of things. Contrastingly the 
geographer of early modernity marshals a plethora of names, boundaries and destinations in 
a manner prejudicial to an incomplete wandering or surrender to wonder.  Nevertheless, to 
the extent that modernity builds cumulatively on these two types or moments in the quest 
for a bourgeois civil domain and basis for hegemony in knowledge, mystic dedifferentiation 
of world and body can be thought to not only precede, but be a prerequisite for, an 
observing consciousness or substantive ‘I’.  
 
In thinking this genesis of the self, Conley reviewed Montaigne’s depiction of a recovery 
from unconsciousness resulting from a fall from a horse – a recovery likened to a re-birth or 
return from death – in the essay “On Practice”.  The essay is notable for its consideration of 
a kind of anatomy of the soul returning to itself having roamed close to death (Conley 2011, 
p. 6-8; Montaigne 2003, p. 424).  Typical of a topographer’s descriptive agenda, the account 
vacillates between “subjectivation and ojectification”, between a self that is known and 
othered (Conley 2011, p. 07).  Necessarily “sortir en place” (out of place), the result is a 
portrait condensing “two sites in one” precisely because it calls on interior states and the 
capturing of those states in words garnered for public reception (p. 8).  In Montaigne’s 
depiction unconsciousness (as a facsimile of death) unveils what normative consciousness 
obscures, a body dissembled from its soul and issuing “passive movements” and responses 
“without [cognisant…] leave” (2003, p. 422).  Indeed, Montaigne writes the return to 
consciousness as a detaching of the ego from its dissolve in habitual actions and 
grammatical consistencies belonging to a “multilocal” self broken up within temporality 
itself (Conley 2011, p. 8).  Conversely, Descartes has no need of an event miming death to 
assert the partition of a thinking substance from a corporeal one.  Cartesian self-observation 
accentuates, if not death, then a truncation of time, a rarefaction and sparsity apposite to 
angle intelligences.  Yet an echo of the topographer’s cunning lingers in the Cartesian 
enterprise, particularly in Descartes himself who, as Patočka asserted, is less Cartesian than 
he is routinely credited with being (1989, p. 36).  The step-by-step method typifying 
mechanicist philosophy borrows the anatomist’s commitment to an incremental 
reconstruction aiming to capture a lived whole.   
 
For Dennis Des Chene, Descartes undertakes an exemplary unpacking of pre-existent, 
divine machinery by an array of explanatory mechanisms given through diagrams and texts 
(2001, p. 72).  Deductive in nature, this task entailed the production of workings 
explanations capable of seducing readers.  Hence, Descartes can be recognised as 
belonging in part to a tradition of travelling “purveyor[s] of marvels” who exhibited their 
inventions to sceptical audiences, cajoling them into belief through amazement and wonder 
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via a seeming simplicity (p. 73).  Like the supplanting of crocked and wandering routes with 
straight ones giving direct destination, the task was to render explanatory mechanisms self-
evident animations of inevitable truth (p. 75).  The reinstituting of an operational continuity 
carrying the eye within and across diagrammatic delineations aimed to bind the separation 
of extended and thinking things.  The problematic nature of the body/soul union is decisive 
in this regard.  Contrary to an Aristotelian view that makes the conjoining of matter and 
form, or body and soul, the precondition for “complete substances”, in Descartes, as Des 
Chene put it, “no mode of thought is a mode of extension”.  Hence, the automatism of 
extended things has no reliance on the soul for its engenderment, animation or cessation 
(2001, p. 140).  The body bears life’s vital functions as so many incremental machine parts 
operating outside of any “hierarchy of being” and leaves the corporeal machinery 
functioning on its own non-consciously (Deleule 1992, p. 212).  Bestowed a living 
machinery, the unruly, desirous capacities of bodies were overruled in favour of a model 
recognising only efficacious function and productive yield: in other words, the body was 
made “an imaginary object” capable of being opened up and capitalised on as known (p. 
204).  Nevertheless, the joining of bodies and souls in Descartes’ world appeared as a divine 
caprice otherwise “opaque to human understanding” (Des Chene 2001, p. 141).  Death 
truncates even this provisionality, setting the res extensa apart from the res cogitans.  Given 
the plethora of organic parts making up bodies and, more problematically, the continual 
change evident in bodies over time, only when bodies are joined with a soul is a 
harmonious union induced.  In other words, the soul engineers a miraculous 
“transubstantiation”, not of the res extensa per se, but of the relational union bringing “bits 
of bodies” into a concert that counters the “Hydra” or monstrous accumulation of parts 
otherwise potentiated in organic life (pp. 144–145 & p. 151).  If the latter potentiates a 
dysfunction ultimately leading to death, as Des Chene said, “God imitates, it would seem, a 
normal healthy human body, not a monster or a body wracked by disease” (p. 157).  This 
presumption of a ‘healthy’ norm as a reasonable operational precondition holding together 
what otherwise moves and changes without any inevitable commitment to union, 
nevertheless sets the intellect against the body and casts it into the role of mediator, 
manager, and symptomatologist of the irregular domain of bodies and their disease field.  In 
the wake of Cartesianism, cities no less than bodies answer to the stricture of the 
harmonious norm operating metonymically as an image standing in for a complex whole 
beyond purview (Deleule 1992, p. 208).  The ‘urban organism’, as the nineteenth-century 
hygienists thought the city, holds close to Descartes’ proselytising of an overarching and 
single consciousness capable of straitening out the crooked streets and speeding up the 
purposeful passages they facilitate - an Eulerian reform indeed.  
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9. Death | Surface 
	  
 
A pathos in modernity, as that which puts death at a distance only to invoke it at every term, 
opens up questions of depth – in other words, spatial and temporal indeterminacy given in 
and by bodies conceivable as flesh and not as machines.  If for Merleau-Ponty the partes 
extra partes equates to a field “without hiding place” (2007, p. 363), the human point of 
view suggests the contrary, for it ‘stands before’, vertically and frontally, facing up to a lapse 
in the capacity to survey totally (Lawlor 2006, p. 86).  In this sense the human body, caught 
between survey and fusion, is a “figure standing out from the ground of the visible” and is 
therefore capable of being itself surveyed.  Hence the upright body is also a seeing thing that 
“resembles the ground of the visible” by calling its field into being and being of that field too 
(p. 86).  Consequently, to the extent that vision, body and thought are never other than 
found in states of mixture, they testify, not to a consolidated union, but to a blind field lived 
according to a here-there structure that splits and divides the experiencer as seen and 
seeing, as felt and feeling.  Similarly, if this between survey and fusion defines an inherent 
doubling in ‘man’ (“‘l’homme et ses doubles’” as Lawlor cited Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p. 86), 
it is a doubling that mirrors the psychical division between fusion and truncation or what 
Freud, seeking the drives associated with life and death, called Eros and Thanatos.6  
 
A homology runs between the social and the psychical.  For Deleuze, Oedipus is bourgeois 
precisely because the complex bearing his name models an ameliorating sexuality, that 
covers over preceding destructive, libidinal drives instituting a mending, desexualised 
phallus.  Far from being an aggressor as Freud characterised Oedipal motivations, he is the 
“pacifying hero”, the familial “peace-maker” (1990, p. 201 & 205).  Paralleling Descartes’ 
proto-bourgeois project, is a psycho-genesis, as Deleuze modified Freud, one aiming to 
quell “the infernal powers of the depths and the celestial powers of heights”, substituting for 
this volatile terrain “a third empire”, the domain dedicated entirely to surfaces (p. 201).  For 
an infant traversing the “Oedipal phallic stage”, the surface-effect amounts to a self-image 
gathering up the erogenous zones and the prior part-objects into a synthetic whole (1990, p. 
208).  Referencing Melanie Klein’s recognition of a volatile, pre-Oedipal sexuality that 
battles for influence and satisfactions prior to a reconciled genital organisation, Deleuze 
recognised in the Oedipal stage a replacement of destructive drives with pacifying ones (p. 
200).  The mother, as the locus of incursive desires and suffocating affect is constituted anew 
as a surface capable of being managed and worked amicably:  
 
                                       
6	  Normam O. Brown gives this characterisation: “Eros is the instinct that makes for union, or 
unification, and Thanatos, the death instinct, is the instinct that makes for separation, or division” 
(1985, p. 80).	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The phallus should not penetrate, but rather, like a plowshare applied to the thin 
fertile layer of the earth, it should trace a line at the surface.  This line, emanating 
from the genital zone, is the line which ties together all the erogenous zones […] 
bringing all the partial surfaces together into one and the same surface on the body of 
the child [while…] re-establish[ing] a surface on the body of the mother herself and 
bring[ing] about the return of the withdrawn father. (p. 201) 
 
Cartesian Reason, similarly warding off “the monsters of the depth” – sacrerdotal, initiatory 
knowledge but also the mystical underpinning to scientific thought itself – institutes a realm 
of reasonableness no less reconciled with the “powers on high”, both sovereign and divine 
(p. 205).  The world remade by modernity is “Herculean” in much the same way Deleuze 
aligned Hercules and Oedipus who both moderated a capricious maternal figure and a 
withdrawn father - Juno and Zeus in Hercules’ case (p. 205).  No less with Oedipus it is a 
matter of forming “a kingdom of surfaces and [an…] earth to fit his size” (p. 205) through 
communicational inscription, infrastructural incision, and a cartographical flattening.  On 
the other hand, it is insufficient to say that modernity culminates solely in surface 
sublimation and desexualisation of an Oedipal type.  If the price of renouncing psychical 
depth-relations is, as Freud postulated, a neurotic deflection of sexual instincts (1999, p. 
1957), for Deleuze making the neurotic the singular standard-bearer of a civilising 
compromise with libidinal impulses via an ego over-identified with the superego, 
misrepresents the Oedipal adventure (an adventure in fact that carries all the significance 
Agamben set against the quest).  Gravitating toward neither the neurotic pole nor the 
psychotic one, Deleuze envisaged a way out of the stark familial polarities and the reality-
irreality division emphasised in Freud’s diagnostic.  The pervert, a trickster amphibiously 
occupying the reality principle and the excesses of the id, opens in the smoothed, restorative 
Oedipal surface a break or rupture.  As Faulkner described Deleuze’s cracked or splintered 
ego:  
 
[…] half of the pervert’s ego generates an ideal plane of thought, which disavows 
castration; simultaneously, the other half recognises the reality of castration; the 
disavowed half generates a metaphysical surface of thought, and the other half 
constitutes the actions and passions of the body. (2006, pp. 52-53; emphasis in 
original) 
 
For Deleuze the ‘pervert’ indicates the interplay of two planes: a “physical surface” of willed 
actions and a “metaphysical surface” where action appears to be “produced and not willed” 
as if from a time inconsistent with chronological succession (1990, pp. 207-208).  The 
metaphysical plane or screen, sitting otherwise to reality and its castrating demands, 
establishes counter-realities, realities indicative of the “mother-image” and “a narcissistic 
ideal of omnipotence” otherwise commanding “an internal world [composed] from the id’s 
archetypes” (Faulkner 2006, p. 53).  Thus framed, the superego ceases to bar the desiring 
action of the infantile id, facilitating instead an opening up of the ego-surface to release 
what Deleuze referred to as a plethora of phantasms or “impersonal, and pre-individual 
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singularites” (1990, p. 213).  In short, the Oedipal position, mediating between maternal 
fusion and the surveying/surveillance of the superego, does not achieve its equanimity 
without also potentiating a certain phantasmatic orientation. 
	  
	  
	  
10. A Phantasmatic Walk 
	  
	  
Descartes offers a glimpse of this phantasmatic bearing in his depiction of walking in 
Amsterdam, where corporeal and the incorporeal (or imaginary) planes are doubled.  The ‘I 
think’ as a unifying agent relayed via the page is tasked with eliding their division.  Yet the 
Amsterdam walk proffers less a unified writer than one in whom divergent viewpoints are 
pointedly cultivated: the walker of busy urban streets and the walker of bucolic, rural 
estates; the fractured or refused attendance of citizens in the former inducing the sensory 
murmur of bubbling brooks and the hum of contented, estate-working peasants of the later.  
Indifferent streets incongruously yield to a communitarian beatitude and narcissistic unity or 
ideality.  No less doubled in this city is Thanatos (an exclusionary and temporally agitated 
drive linked to deep, infernal powers) and Eros (a celestial, timeless fusing of place and 
pleasure indicative of contemplative heights).  What cogito could span such extremes?  On 
one hand, Descartes proffers an Oedipal type, an ameliorating surface builder and purveyor 
of a cartographic conscious binding heterologies into a matrix of managed experience.  On 
the other hand he anticipates a phantasmic cogito, a dreamer (an “I-dreamer”), not of the 
nocturnal type, but of reverie where oneiric activity, as Gaston Bachelard has said, permits a 
slide towards an ir-reality beyond the “reality function”, a place where the “non-I” and the 
self fuse as “my non-I” (1969, p. 13).  As such he pulls off the pervert’s trick of holding to 
and eliding reality, of being both corporeally and incorporeally apparent.  Approaching 
what Deleuze called the “dissolving ego”, the walker is depicted as the carrier of 
incompossible, monadic worlds.  If every monad constitutes a compossible world, they 
equally presuppose “incompossible” ones as so many “variants of the same story”, for which 
Oedipus and the metaphysical walk are source in this case (Deleuze 1990, p. 114).  Hence 
modernity’s homo clausus, as bearer of a determined world, is ghosted by a plethora of 
indefinite ones.  As Deleuze exampled, Adam as the prototype of human wandering, and 
the “first man […] to live in a garden, to give birth to a woman from himself”) equally carries 
an “objectively indeterminate Adam”: “There is thus a ‘vague Adam’ that is, a vagabond, a 
nomad, an Adam = x” that bridges divergent worlds, living each differently (p. 114).  Hence, 
the formula the “object = x” stands in for object/persons as classes or types who carry 
divergent viewpoints (p. 115).7  
                                       
7	  Deleuze adopts and adapts the “object = x” from Kant for whom an “object of representation” is but 
one sensory manifestation of an object “outside the power of representation” (1998, A103-106).  In 
other words, every experienced object takes its recognisable properties from a transcendental aspect 
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity   Chapter 3 
 Page 134 
 
Descartes for his part intersects the incompossible worlds of the urban and the Arcadian.  
They share a common walker, but in the form of the walker = x, a shifter who spans 
between divergent space-times, in this case literally aligning the hum of productive 
enterprise with the murmur of an industrious nature.  What emerges is something neither 
true to the walker’s actual perception, nor proper to his actual past, but a “non-existent […] 
phantasm” (Faulkner 2006, p. 82).  This phantasm amounts to a quasi-urban emanation of 
an urbanism-outside-itself.  It portends what Nancy, referring to a proliferation that gave rise 
to globalisation, a “bad infinity” disguising deprivation under the guise of a planetary 
civility.  It is as if, as Nancy put it, “the world affected and permeated itself with a death 
drive that soon would have nothing else to destroy than the world itself” (2007, p. 34).  No 
longer “in front of me” as a “unity of the objective or external order”, the world gives itself 
up to globalisation on the basis of falling “outside representation”, which is to say, it 
becomes a “world without an outside” (2007, pp. 43-44).  Descartes’ Amsterdam, a global 
entity in advance of globalisation, is pictured as an anomalous city, a city, in its perfunctory, 
self-centred commercial drive, outside all the others. Not coincidently did Descartes pen 
The World from this ‘capital’ of a quasi-state or republic founded on the monopolisation of 
world commercial circulation and circumnavigation by the Dutch East India Company.  
Perverse is the parallel of this amphibian ‘place’, buoyed by a worldwide, water-born 
commercial imperative yet achieved by the most tenuous floatation by way of dykes and 
cannels, and the bubbling brooks of the country estate and the landed gentry. A bourgeois 
marriage of convenience between the mercantile and the aristocratic effected by way of 
reverie, calls up in advance of the fact, the spectre of a world city in a world unable to 
orientate itself as a world (Nancy 2007, p. 34).  What prevails is a within-ness (for there is 
nowhere else to be) that interminably turns in on itself as something like a “glomus”, or ball 
of interminably wound thread (p. 34).  Where the urban uncoils as so many Eulerian ways, 
at the level of the globe, agglomeration imparts a decidedly non- Eulerian setting. 
 
How does the Oedipal walker meet this becoming-unworldly?  Descartes’ walking self, in 
soliciting divergent viewpoints in a single consciousness effects a fractured orientation (the 
object = x) that calls for a harmonious synthesis.  The aim is a convergence of 
heterogeneous series in a resonance whose reassertion of a compossible whole consolidates 
and consoles the cogito (I think).  In sympathy with the metaphysical walk, but without 
recourse to an enduring soul or a cyclic temporality anchoring its self-sameness return, a 
                                                                                                                 
that exceeds the sensory given. As a “formula of recognition”, it describes the capacity of object and 
understanding to synthesise recognition into a consistent reality (Faulkner 2006, p. 19).  Deleuze was 
concerned to shift this transcendental operation from consciousness to pre-conscious syntheses 
associated with habit and memory as divergent series producing, not recognition and unity, but errant 
and problematic couplings out of which thought is engendered (1994, p. 103), as the next chapter will 
develop.  
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divergent foothold given in a metaphysics of separation ambitions a surface resolution 
apposite to Eros in its here and now converging.  But the object = x risks a contrary 
trajectory: rather than resonance, convergence and the instituting of a compossible world, its 
composing series may diverge into incomposible worlds.  Where a metaphysics of 
separation finds its highest ambition in the pleasure of binding parts, the conjoining of ever-
larger units prompted by an urban-commercial proliferation increasingly substitutes 
dissonance for resonance.  The walker = x, troublingly caught between a deviating reality 
and phantasies of unification, is increasingly lead to confront, contrary to the syntheses of 
Eros, a thanatic, urban body resistive of any unification.  Which is to say, the walker less 
encompasses a world that they centre or enjoin around them, than they embody a divided 
gait, a walk giving body to an irreconcilable division between corporeal depths and 
incorporeal surfaces.  As Faulker summarises: 
 
Two movements emerge: Eros (love) idealizes and unifies by organizing convergent 
series and by determining the object = x; the death instinct (anger) actualizes and 
divides; it counter-actualizes the object = x and places the order of events into 
question. (2006, p. 83) 
 
Thrown out of order, habit and memory no longer induce a substantive consciousness but a 
broken or dissipating one.  Perspective in turn gives way to aspective – a surface fault giving 
vantage onto a phantasmatic, psychical flipside.  Deleuze offered a three part 
characterisation to this psychical break: the psychotic, in so far as he/she is a “thinker of the 
[bodily] depths”, pursues a bachelor’s mandate – a solitary return to, or invocation of, 
intensities at the border of sense; the neurotic or “depressive thinker dreams of lost 
betrothals”, of the restoration of loves, of longed for returns; while the pervert, as the 
purveyor of phantasies and the “thinker of surfaces”, is caught up in the “ ‘problem’ of the 
couple” or a “sort of coupling of thought” (1990, p. 219).  If the former two entail something 
like a return to ‘origins’ in an amelioration of wounds (the first as a reassertion of the id over 
phallic organisation, and the second in pursuit of a maintenance of phallic surface integrity 
in the form of the ego), the ‘conjugation’ of the later is indexed to the future as a rehashing 
of all the series of memory and habit in forms irreducible to either.  For Deleuze this 
conjugation is the very basis of thought and in a perversion of the Cartesian ‘I think’, this 
counter-cogito arises in a forced movement responding to the repetitions of a runaway time 
that neither consolidates or grounds the ego but that evidences everywhere a “dissolved self 
[and…] a fractured I” (1994, p. 145).  
 
Long before, Socrates no less invoked the walker = x - a single identity walking in 
innumerable universes of sense.  Like Descartes’ own refiguring of the walker = x, he offered 
an illusionary consistency that masked, in Deleuze’s words, an “interiorised […] 
dissimilitude” whose “divergence of points of view [show…] several things or tell several 
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stories at once” (p. 128).  In Descartes’ case, he no more successfully asserted an outside of, 
or an elevated purview over, the city (even if the landed-estate offers a modest rise over its 
marshy double).  Only on the page does the walk achieve a double step binding two places.  
Testified to in such duplication is what Deleuze calls the “powers of the false”, that version 
of anti-Platonism even Plato didn’t fail to recognise.  The walkers of modernity, where they 
rise above forgotten habitual tracks, do so by entering into symbolisation – that is, by 
entering onto the page – where they no doubt sought to reconcile through descriptive tracts, 
a trafficking of simulacra of city and self, to better ‘think’ the disconcerting coupling of Eros 
and Thanatos.  Walking metamorphosed as textual tract can be thought to rise over the 
general experiential forgetting of urban place, just as it elevates corporeal passage to an 
incorporeal event – the thought of walking.  Facing repetitions of ever perplexing sort, it 
gave rise to a clinician’s practice forced to read in the pathos in modernity a beyond of the 
pleasure principle, as the following chapter will elaborate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Impressions of Free Time – Rambling  
	  
	  
	  
 
Out of this tragic union of the infinite-new and the 
finite old, there develops then a new individual in 
that the infinite-new individualises itself in its own 
appearance by acquiring the appearance of the 
finite-old. 
 
Hölderlin, 1794-1800 
 
 
It’s the time of Oedipus. 
 
Gilles Deleuze, 1978 
 
 
	  
	  
 
1. Initiation  
 
 
In the previous chapter was tracked the fortunes of a subject of experience arising with the 
page and facing – one way or another - death.  The unitary mechanism of the page, it was said, 
stood both for and against the city, removed from, but integral to, an observing, ameliorating 
persona who found place on the basis of a wounding separation and its reparation, albeit a 
problematized one.  It was suggested that such a restoration of agency could be thought of as 
phantasmatic, which is to say it counter-actualised trauma by mingling the real with a more or 
less cognizant ideal.  Between acts of walking and their inscription on pages the walk – 
habitually unconsidered – avails itself to phantasies that counter-actualise the ‘real’.  The 
positing by Descartes of a divided walker in Amsterdam was said to fit the formula ‘the walker 
= x’ - an adaptation of the object = x formulated by Deleuze.  Contravening the partes extra 
partes, and echoing the metaphysical walk, such a walker straddled divergent worlds.  Masking 
urban lack (immediate societal contact and recognition), an alternate world of images was 
drawn down in a phantasmatic coupling.  The real moment of the walk, to the extent that it can 
be situated at all amidst written relays, is truly “atopan [or] without place”, as Deleuze says of 
Plato’s depiction of the “instant” (1990, p. 166).  Unlike Plato however, it is not a matter of 
expunging phantasms or sophisms from the urban scene; for Descartes it was a matter of 
embracing doubles and compounding variations of the same.  
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With Goux it was suggested that Descartes’ cognitive overflying of corporeal memory returns 
Oedipus decisively (the “Cartesian turn” as return to the tragic dramatics of hubristic 
knowledge without corporeal cost).  If Freud saw in Oedipus’ patricide and subsequent 
incestuous marriage a universal desire, one that is necessarily overcome and corrected by the 
threat of castration, he repeats, as Goux said, the anthropocentrising mistake of Oedipus 
himself by putting a human face to the castration threat, much as Plato wrapped up a 
chimerical soul in human form (1993, p. 36).  Avoided in both cases in fact is “face-to-face 
confrontation with [what Lacan called] the Thing”; in other words an encounter with, and a 
transformation by, what is “prehuman, superhuman, inhuman” (p. 36).  The Oedipal myth, as 
irregular variant of the heroic monomyth, is the consecrator of the division between the human 
and the non-human, though equally that between artifice and nature, the city and the country, 
the subject and the object, the body and the soul.  Moreover, at a culture level – since long 
before Oedipus was a psychical mechanism it was a narrative depicting royal investiture and 
social cohesion – the myth idealises nuptial union and the future generative prosperity of a 
community based on a sacrificial overcoming of a misplaced maternal attachment, itself 
“deadly” as Goux said, to a procreative, “nonmaternal feminine” (p. 27).  If in the monomyth it 
takes symbolic matricide to achieve romantic union, under Oedipus the spectre of patricide 
runs desiring relations towards incest (p. 27).  Yet in the Freudian rendering of the Oedipal 
causal sequence what restrains the tragedy is a sublimating of desire achieved by an 
identification with paternal authority at the level of the superego.  For Goux this amounts to a 
misrecognition of the primary obstacle to the fulfilment of desire.  What looked like a universal 
template for the channelling of desire in fact was a historically contingent formation, one that 
distorted “masculine desire” relative to mythic peoples.  Further, if the avoidance of castration 
equates to a shunning of initiation, beneath this impulse there is, in Goux’s words: 
 
[…] a still more fundamental desire to be initiated, to accept the task imposed, to 
confront severance (death, the trial of the cutting blade that kills the monster-
mother but also, painfully, frees the hero from her) in order to be reborn. (p. 28) 
 
The complex ways in which this impulse is renounced points to a troubled maternal relation, 
an “involuted and atrophied sensitivity to the feminine” as Goux put it, that persistently sets a 
“monocentred self-consciousness” against phantasmatic versions of the monster-mother (pp. 
38-39).  A pathos in modernity can be thought of as the call of an initiatory impulse derailed.  
What walker-observers enact in the wake of Cartesianism, it will be argued in this chapter, is 
the press of a monocentred consciousness against an authoritative, obfuscating real, behind 
which there are deeper initiatory desires raised by the seductively compound body that is the 
city.  If in Descartes’ urban retreat – pursuant of a reasonable civility spared interfering street 
(mob) contact and (French) monarchical stricture – was paired with idyllic ‘nature’ as a 
maternal ideal, the metaphysics of separation in Cartesianism radically amplified the long 
registered bifurcation between generation and production in the founding of urban place.  With 
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the nature of such places lost both to ‘nature’ (as remaindered by an eidetic climb aiming to 
speak on behalf of existential nature tout court), and metaphysical/theological certainties, the 
quest to suture that division saw walkers implicated in a project to recoup or reinvent nature 
from out of a seemingly abyssal societal state.  For this it was necessary to mobilise a liberal 
citizen/subject, one in whom an initiatory communal joining was both promised and ultimately 
problematized. Nature itself was valorized as a mediating surface or plane of universal contact.   
	  
This can be given a psychical correlate.  Deleuze in his reworking of the Freudian Oedipal 
misadventure notes how the castration threat translates into surface affects.  The Oedipal 
solution to conflicting desires entails a negotiated resolution that papers over the paternal 
contest.  Nevertheless this ameliorating graft - what can be thought of more broadly as a 
surface politic - is a stopgap measure that doesn’t finalise troublous libidinal terrain.  What 
Deleuze referred to as the “metaphysical surface of thought” is the result of the persistence of 
separation and imparts to things generally a questioning atmosphere for which surveying (in all 
its senses) is response (1990, p. 222).  If sublimation accords with the first phase of the Oedipal 
resolution and amounts to desexualisation that sets libidinal energy off in other directions, a 
second phase looks for a compensatory coupling or resexualisation that overcomes a lost erotic 
fusing.  For Deleuze, there is no normative conclusion to Oedipus; it is a mechanism that 
launches a plethora of phantasms haunting the actualisations of life, setting in play actions, 
events and ideals as contingent suturing of surface wounds (Williams 2008, p. 191-192).  In an 
amelioration of the surface, it is the management of time that proves to be decisive, as this 
chapter will show.  
 
 
 
2. une promenade métaphysique 
 
 
 
Walking strikingly emblematises the paradigmatic tension embodied by the liberal subject, a 
tension that saw liberty defined, in one direction, as a freedom from external impediment and 
constraint – what Colebrook calls the “free exchange of self-determining individuals” - and in 
another, the demand for subjects to demonstrate their own autonomous legislation or “self-
representation”, a representation inherently troubled by democracy’s open or ill-defined 
societal definition (2005, p. 5).  The most obvious consequence of this hiatus between, as 
Celeste Langan put it, “freedom as sheer mobilization”, and an individual entity required to 
represent its own autonomy, is that the subject is rendered both “abstract” and “without 
[inherent] properties” (1995, pp. 7, 13).  Analogous with the outcast, the cast away, and as 
Celeste Langan argued, the “vagabond”, the person who moves unimpeded by attachment to, 
or ties emanating from property, was instead compelled to be ‘his’ own property (1995, p. 33).  
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Freed from the “feudal form of covenant”, a “new ‘contract’” takes its place, one whose 
“covenant” is with the self itself (1995, p. 36).  
  
With unimpeded mobility a precondition for the consolidation of the bourgeoisie, as Paul 
Virilio highlighted, at stake was a public order vested in the total management of all mercantile 
and social motion: 
 
No more revolts, no more seizures, no more tumults” […] “Public order will reign if 
we are careful to distribute our human time and space between the city and the 
country by a severe regulation of transit; if we are attentive to schedules as well as 
to alignments and signal systems; if by environmental standardisation the entire city 
is made transparent, that is, familiar to the policeman’s eye. (1986, p. 18) 
 
Under such conditions, walking, and all else besides, fell within a politics of acutely managed 
motion: to impede or not satisfactorily submit to this circulatory edict was to render oneself 
suspect.  As Virilio noted, if for Montaigne the dream of liberty amounted to a “freedom to 
come and go”, what the bourgeois revolution delivered in fact was an “obligation to mobility” 
(p. 30).  Similarly for Virilio the nature of the urban shifts across the span of modernity from 
being “the ‘great immobile machine’” centred on the sovereign, to becoming “integral to, and 
integrated with”, a territorial State apparatus that redistributed country-wide the siege strategies 
of old while implementing a new “logistical management of all motion”; in short, “the once-so-
coveted city is already no longer in the city” (p. 24; emphasis added).  At stake was a “fortress 
motor” variously redefining the urban matrix consistent with an administrative continuum 
running between “the polis, the police [and…] highway surveillance” (pp. 14-15).  The “society 
of the course”, as the inventor of the straight line vector”, readies territory as a surface capable 
of capitialising on all motion (Virilio 2005, pp. 42 & 44).  
 
If modernity is synonymous with motion, it is also a ‘return’ to democracy.  What makes its 
return modern, as Nancy asserted, is that it is “without any effective principle in civic religion”, 
and therefore without a grounding “transcendent principle” (2012, pp. 66 & 72).  Breaking with 
all earlier closing limits (“kinship and totemic figures or myths”), democratic sociality contends 
with an insistent centrifugation: 
 
To cross from the rural community into the polis or into the modern megacity is 
already a step from interiority to exteriority. Exteriority was the problem, or 
problematic […] that democracy was called upon to resolve. (p. 67) 
 
Without inherent ground its political operation vacillates between two poles: vested on one 
hand in governance, security, and the management of social risk; and on the other, it sought 
validity in a transcending reason – “divine right or reason of State, national or international 
myth” etc. (p. 62).  Yet the idealism of the later – barely able to cover over the “absence of 
foundations – increasingly faced the “insurrectional moment” with its ambition for a 
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“revolutionary State” (pp. 63-64).  At stake is “liberty of the whole human being within the 
equality of all human beings”, a principle defining not just a free and unimpeded citizenry, but 
as Nancy puts it, the very ontological conditionality of “the human being” itself.  Exampling 
Rousseau’s social contract, Nancy emphasised that it was not simply a matter of new forms of 
“body politic”; at stake was a defining of the very community of the human itself, “the 
humanity of mankind” (p. 60).   
 
Politics in this democratic managing of exteriority is no less “self-surpassing” than the 
“logocracy” of the polis (pp. 60-61).  If there is a “métaphysique” implicate in democratic 
modernity Nancy claimed, it lies with the “whole anthropology silently conjured up the 
moment one mentions ‘society’ or sociality, or sociability, or association” (p. 68).  Yet the 
communality permitted in the absence of substantive partisan bonds admits no interiority of 
association, but rather something as minimally substantive as a “mutuality of feeling […] tensed 
[and…] set in tension, amongst us” (pp. 68-72).  This métaphysique, finds its meaning in the 
sense of an “in-common”, or rather the promise of a communality as end or goal, though not 
without realising the very intangibility of the common: “Communality is the regime of the 
world, of the circulation of meaning” and permits no ultimate unity or finality, promising 
instead an infinite realisation, a “numberless [array of…] unfinalizable forms” (p. 72).  This 
métaphysique shares with its predecessor of old a quest for the measure of existence, a total 
accounting seeking the “form of all forms” (p. 72), and yet this measure runs, not to the 
consolidated and relatively circumscribed footprint of the polis, but to poleis themselves set 
apolis.  Unlike the metaphysical walk – Plato’s anti-Oedipal sociality that sought to 
restoratively bind (through image-text) the divided ground on which the polis arose – what 
might be termed modernity’s promenade métaphysique (to extend Nancy’s “Gallic” inflection 
(p. 68 & 72)) characterises the blind testing for forms of the in-common when the agorien circle 
is broken - when the gathering into a visual circumference (as the etymology of the agora 
suggests) is plagued with the unseen, the unforeseen, the beyond-seeing, and the invisible - in 
short an apatē let loose from any restraining logocracy.  Carried over in the political will to 
power of democracy, as Nancy said, is affirmation of its ancient exteriority but its distortion too 
towards alternative ends: 
 
Our drive for unity or synthesis knows itself, when it knows itself aright, as a drive 
for expansion and unfurling, not contraction into an end point. The gravitational 
pull of the end point and the unique meaning distorts the understanding of politics. 
(p. 73) 
 
The figure of ‘man’, less able to centre the communality of the agora, sought an alternative 
standpoint – an initiation in and by nature. 
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3. Upright Contra Motion 
 
 
Rousseau, renouncing a sociality of cities, sought instead a countering “‘civil religion’” beyond 
“the mere rationality of governance”, one vested in the higher ideal of an originary, if forgotten, 
human being subsisting prior to corrupting social dependence and connection (1984, p. 4). 
Reaching “backwards in time”, as he wrote in A Discourse on Inequality (1755), ‘man’s’ 
essence was best imagined in the state nature bestowed on ‘him’ prior to a fall into historicity 
and the discontent of his age.  In a purportedly self-evident fiction that located human origins 
benignly “under the Oak”, the languid body of the “savage” was said to be without need of 
movement, constructed reach or social connection on the basis that natural benevolence made 
everything immediately ready to hand.1  In such a state, neither alone nor integrally tied to 
others, a profoundly “unsocial sociability” reigns (Nancy 2012, p.67).  Yet despite this self-
sufficiency, the no less innate human “faculty of self-improvement” initiated a general longing 
and desire, in turn activating a time-consciousness that dragged humanity, bit by bit, out of a 
“primitive state” and into an overdeveloped “outward extent” (1984, p. 88 & 139).  As Bernard 
Stiegler noted, at stake is an account of human origins pictured as a deviation or journey out of 
equilibrium, a departure from harmony with nature and animals into civilisation as historical 
illness (1998, pp. 116-117). Yet this is no simple itinerary: “There is the origin, then the fall, 
forgetting, and loss”, but then it is difficult, as Stiegler said, to know “what is at the origin of the 
fall” (p. 101).  Worse, the scene Rousseau envisaged may be nothing but a fiction, “a state 
which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed” as Rousseau himself put it (1984, p. 68).  
Rather, two origins are at work simultaneously: firstly, man’s freedom from dependence while 
in nature; and secondly, a difference within man – what Rousseau called “his capacity as a free 
agent” to deviate from the rules of “brute nature” itself (Rousseau 1984, p. 87; see also Stiegler 
1998, p. 119).  
 
Like Plato’s palintropic manoeuvre in the Timaeus, an origin is posited that stands in for prior 
beginnings pointedly lost (Stiegler 1998, p. 119). Conversely:  
 
The more natural it is, the deeper it is hidden in the “appallingly ancient”: in order 
to remember, to recover the evidence prior to the fall, reason must be forgotten. 
Earlier than I think, I am because I feel, I suffer […] The nature of man is neither 
                                       
1	  As Rousseau wrote: “I see him satisfying his hunger under an Oak, quenching his thirst at the first 
stream, finding his bed under the same tree which provides his meal; and, behold, his needs are 
furnished” (1984, p. 81). Bernard  Stiegler, in his own commentary on this scene, noted the 
“practically immobile” nature of originary man and a contradiction inherent in Rousseau’s claim 
that such a man “always walked on two legs [and] made use of his hands as we do” (Rousseau 
1984, p. 81 & Stiegler 1998, pp. 112-113). If not being “moved excessively” is the marker of this 
primitive being, walking and the use of the hands, as Stiegler argued, are physiological indicators of 
the very opposite: motility and reach, a reach extended into and through things (p. 113).   
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reason nor sociability.  Originary man is neither a reasonable or speaking animal, 
nor a political or social one. (p. 110)  
 
Echoing Plato’s anti-Oedipal motivation, Rousseau configured his return to primordiality as a 
reversal of the progressive ethos indexed to intellectual and social perfectibility; contra reason, 
an overt emphasis on physicality sought to balance the passions according to need and not 
excess (Rousseau 1984, p. 88).  Time amounted to the wrecking of natural equilibrium and a 
collective deterioration into intemperance and wars, while the individual, fallen out of 
perenniality and into time, became a “tyrant over himself and nature” (pp. 88, 147-151). 
 
In hypothesising the possibility that forgotten origins could be argued through imagination (if 
not essentially returned to), Rousseau was, as Stiegler noted, “the father of the question, what is 
man?”- a question that both launched and renounced “ethnocentrism”, for the study of man 
required seeing past or through the fact of human difference - such differences being markers of 
division and fall (Stiegler 1998, pp. 104, 108, 110).  At stake was the isolating of a “human 
invariant” that would serve as anchor against the flux of difference and time (p. 105).  As such, 
Rousseau’s fiction of origin rides “a mythical turn”, for like the metaphysical stride, modernity’s 
promenade métaphysique found footfall in two places: originary man in a static stance, and 
that man’s fall into step and the agitation of historical humanity.  Correspondingly in A 
Discourse on Equality, standing to “walk on two feet [‘natural man’…] cast[s] his gaze over the 
whole of nature and measure[es] with his eyes the vast expanse of the horizon” (1984, p. 81).  
Conversely, the “step towards inequality” as a fall into movement (requiring reach and 
therefore desire or longing) in the Discourse was refigured in Reveries of the Solitary Walker 
(1782) as a perambulation offering a reverse-track to the horizon of nature from out of the 
dissolute spaces of cities.2 Standing still and apart, the mythos of natural man was carried over 
into the “Sixth Walk” of the Reveries of the Solitary Walker as a demand to be socially invisible 
and unimpeded (2004, p. 101).  Further, as Rousseau proposed, pedestrianism extended into 
writing  “doubles the space of my existence”, firstly by transporting the walker from an 
extraneous and agitated present into a solitarily, autonomous state apposite to self-examination 
and mastery belonging to perennial nature (pp. 34-35), and secondly by collating, at the level 
of feelings, elucidation and thought, what the infinite reverie opened up by rambling causes to 
be forgotten (pp. 32 & 107). Nevertheless, ‘the walk’, despite its capacity for speculative drift, 
was taken by Rousseau as a figure of immediacy - “what was within [his…] reach” – one that 
occasioned an interval of self-reasoning resolute in its eschewing of the “subtle sophistries of 
metaphysics” (2004, p. 59).   
 
                                       
2	  See for instance the “Eight Walk” depicted as an excursion away from city-space (Paris) and the 
interference of “a thousand things” that “evil-doers” impose upon him. Conversely, as he stated, “as 
soon as I am under the trees and surrounded by greenery, I feel as if I were in the earthly paradise 
and experience an inward pleasure as intense as if I were the happiest of men” (2004, p. 133).	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Irrespective, recognisable in Rousseau’s coupling of walking with writing is what Renauld 
Barbaras called a “metaphysical attitude” (2000, p. 78). By Rousseau’s account, achieved in 
the walker-writer is what the walk alone prompts but fails to secure: namely the retention and 
consolidation of itinerant flights of consciousness.  It mirrors in fact the double-seeing Sallis 
identified in the broken temporality of the Allegory of the Cave.  If walking in its solitary guise 
facilitated for Rousseau attendance on the “daily fluctuations of the soul”, the writing self 
provided agency over those vacillations (2004, p.32). T his is what the pathic descent of 
consciousness into the body (or what Stiegler referred to as an “‘I feel’” prior to the “‘I think’”) 
pursued - a foothold transcending the fluctuation of time, a point-before capable of anchoring 
and rectifying perceptual appearances.  For Barbaras what drives the metaphysical attitude is 
the sense that “Becoming [is…] inferior to Being” precisely because it cannot master an abyssal 
absence (2000, p. 79).  Fearing that the world’s genesis is inadequately trusted to duration 
alone, metaphysics reactively posits instead “the plenitude, the positivity of essence, to 
surmount the threat of nothingness” (p. 79).  As such, metaphysics can be characterised by 
three gestures: firstly, the coupling of consciousness with an otherworldly, “transcendental 
life”; secondly, the defining of Being through enduring essences; and, thirdly, “‘withdrawal to 
the bottom of nothingness’” in a quest to better expunge it (Merleau-Ponty cited in Barbaras 
2000, p. 80).  Like the downward way in Plato, Rousseau’s summonsing of originary man in 
nature sought to counter nothingness by finding grounding limits in a fiction – precisely an 
immediate existential plenitude free of the deleterious effects of temporality.  Natural man - if a 
profoundly regressive entity – nevertheless recalibrated everything according to a single 
silhouette of Being against nothingness – to adjust a phrase by Barbaras (2000, p. 87).  This 
silhouette - somewhere between repose and standing, but always short of prolonged and 
reaching action – marked the merging of metaphysics with “philosophical anthropology” 
(Stiegler 1998, p. 101).  
 
At stake on this anthropology was a figure of finitude capable of countering both the infinite 
variation composing the hominid and an earlier philosophical appeal in Rationalism to belated 
divine harmonisation (Hughes 2012, p. 29).  If it was Descartes who put into play a philosophy 
of the first person (the ‘I think’), and with it a revival of Oedipal anthropocentering, the 
speculative ambition of metaphysics by the late eighteenth century was made to run a narrower 
passage still: all existential ambition was required to pass through the human subject tout 
court. In a renovation of Augustine’s inward moral source, Rousseau posited what Robert 
Solomon termed a “transcendental pretence”, a “spectacularly self-centred image of the moral 
world”, one in which transcending certitude was made to pass from divine to human will 
(1988, p. 20-21). By putting such a source potentially not just within reach, but within as a 
sensate or felt rightness, he instituted a radical shift in self-relation whereby goodness 
amounted to a universal orientation for humanity at large.  Counter to a manifest human visual 
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variation, intuition as a non-visual, sensory referent can be thought to have mirrored 
Augustine’s “lux interior” with its mediating of the eye and ear and its conditioning of outlook 
by an inner and backwardly sourced authoritative grace, but given in its revised guise as a 
precondition of the moral self. Further, for Solomon, Rousseau’s transcendental pretense gave 
home to Kant’s noumenal self (1988, p. 40) – one of at least three constituent parts (including 
the empirical and transcendental selves) necessary to a “‘unity of consciousness’” in the subject 
(Kant cited in Seigel 2005, pp. 306-309).  As Solomon put it, this subject/self not only creates 
“the world”, it knows itself no less than it “knows all selves, and the structure of any and every 
possible self” because “everyone, everywhere, is the same” (1988, p. 6).  
 
Yet this self-sameness was not a substance as it was for Descartes, but a finite form that gives 
the given as such. Expanding on Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 & 1787), 
Deleuze put it this way: “The finite ego founds the world and knowledge of the world because 
the finite ego is itself the constitutive founding of what appears.  In other words, it is finitude 
that is the founding of the world” (1980b).  As Kant himself asserted, the task of metaphysics 
was not to conform knowledge to objects but to recognise how “objects must conform to our 
cognition”, for “experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule 
I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori” (2000 Bxvi-vii. 
See also Hughes 2012, p. 29).  For Deleuze this shift in legislative understanding by the finite 
ego (or what amounted to the “I think”) meant that the self was no longer held to be a limited 
quantum of infinity as it had been for Descartes; the finite in the form of the arbitrating ego 
opened not onto the infinite as pre-given by an ordained source, but the indefinite as a world 
orchestrated from a perceptual centre capable of synthesising, step-by-step the given (1980a).  
For Kant the coherency of this perceptual grasp was dependent on an active orchestration of 
cognitive faculties (Intuition, Imagination and Understanding) into a unity of consciousness 
characterised by temporal continuity.  Yet this unity amounts in Kant’s account to a self-
consciousness or reflective unity, in other words a representation of the self as thought and not 
intuited.  In other words a world synthesising recognition via the object = x.  Between the 
thought self and the inner sensing of self a gulf opens, one Deleuze referred to as the “fractured 
I” (1994, p.87).  Hence there is in the finite ego an indefiniteness that causes it “to surpass and 
go beyond itself” in a “self-overcoming” or “infinite becoming” that ultimately subordinates the 
finite itself (Deleuze 1980b). Distinctive then in une promenade métaphysique is a double 
standing spanning the finite and the infinite – in fact a ramble between what is originary and 
what is derived in temporality. To better grasp this, a further historical excursion is necessary. 
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4. The Accident of Time 
 
 
Kant courts what in time classical philosophy (both Ancient and early modern) eschewed – 
temporal rupture.  In the Greek context, to be apolis was to be atopis (placeless) and atopos 
(improper).  Set adrift not just from the ‘natural’ place of the city (its propriety, like all “places” 
for Aristotle, being dependant on “a vessel that cannot be moved around”; 1996, 212a14-
212a15), meant being cast into an indeterminate time beyond enduring placement (Casey 
1998, p. 5).  Striking for Casey is Aristotle’s “dispos[ing] of infinity” in Book 4 of Physics, a task 
aiming to exercise erratic movement and its contesting of the containment by place (p. 67).  
Used to mediate between the determinacy of place and the relative indeterminacy of time, 
Aristotle invoked the notion of the void. As Casey observed: “Void, then, exists between place 
and time: as if to say that to get out of place is to get into the void and to get into time is to get 
out of the void” (p. 67).  As a measureless place, the void cannot adequately explain motion, 
change or the medium within which movement takes place, for it implies a domain that 
“admits no difference” - whether up or down, in motion or stillness, or whether departing or 
arriving (Aristotle 1996, 214a26-214b34). 
 
Time too appears as something like an infinite void, given that in one direction there stretches 
what no longer exists (the interminable past), and in another, what is yet to exist (the 
perpetually arriving future).  For Aristotle, the only substantive place where time could be 
grasped was the present moment (218a11-218a21).  Yet troubling in the present is the inability 
to know whether each ‘now’ itself differed, or whether it remained one and the same (219b13-
219b34). Recognising that time and movement were bound together, Aristotle equated the 
‘now’ with a person in motion, who while traversing innumerable instances of before and after, 
endures  (219b13-219b34).  The present, as that which carries along, can be valued as a 
substantive thing, while movement as change cannot. For Dorothea Olkowski, Aristotle in fact 
rejects any aspect of time that moves thereby rendering the before and the after a “nontime” 
(1998, p. 21).  The differentiation evident in the succession of ‘nows’ “is no more than 
differences within identity”, and in turn, the contingencies time brings forward are “only 
accidental (they are not-being)” and do not qualify as “ difference in itself” (pp. 18 & 22).  For 
Alliez, Aristotle less discovers the essential substratum of time in the ‘now’ than he envisages a 
portal continually inviting in the accidental that is “foreign to the essence of the thing” (1996, 
p. 23).  To say the now is like a moving body is to risk the Sophist’s proposition that identity 
varies with place (as Aristotle exampled: “Coriscus’ being in the Lyceum is different Coriscus’ 
being in the market-place”; 1996, 219b13-219b34).  
 
Nevertheless, mastering time via the present meant, as Alliez wrote, reconstituting a “‘field of 
presence,’ a place of temporality through which time is in a sense onto-logical within the ‘now’ 
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of a presence” (1996, p. 24; emphasis in original).  Such is the chronic quest in the West for the 
place of immediacy to be tied with eternality. “‘Cosmodicy’” or cyclic cosmic motion was one 
way human life could be tied to eternality and ordered motion (p. 24).  The soul, as that which 
endures in identity, historically becomes “but an avatar of the question of the ‘now’” (p. 23).  
For Plato then, time was synonymous with the motion of the soul in its travels across varying 
states of life.  Yet as Alliez credits Plotinus with recognising, the equating of time with a 
travelling soul meant tying it to extensive movement.  Instead Plotinus shifted time into the 
interior of the soul itself where, as Alliez put it, “a new form of movement, which is intensive 
and no longer extensive, ordinal and no longer cardinal” was established (p. 28).  This 
movement made “‘each of us […] an intelligible world’” as Plotinus put it, one that “‘reflect[s] 
the entire diversity of ontological totality’”- if imperfectly (cited in Alliez 1996, p. 34).  In an 
urban metaphor, Plotinus likened the world soul, or “all-soul”, to a single city that nevertheless 
containing a multitude of diverse souls each akin to the other much as species are related to a 
single genus (p. 45-46).  Yet this is a city whose ideal state is pure intelligibility, and if it 
resembles Plato’s head city, it is so on the basis that individual souls are no longer moving parts 
of a working cosmos; the cosmos is internally and intensively circumscribed by the all-soul. 
Conversely this “One Soul” decomposes downward losing intelligible potential as it folds into 
matter.  Descending into extension, “geometrical figures tend to predominate over figures of 
light”, and “intrinsic differences turn into extrinsic distinctions” instituting “real divisions, local 
separations, and subjective oppositions” (p. 47).  From universal being to individual beings, 
subjective distinction (or “extensive subjectivization”) amplifies divergent passions, further 
calling the souls from contemplation into actual movement and serial temporality (p. 47). 
Breaking with the world soul, human souls depart an urban/cosmic “circle of the same”, 
unrolling time itself and decanting the ego along a “straight-line labyrinth of time” (p. 49).  
Hence the “phenomenal subject” hollows out an interiority inherently torn between worldly 
engagement and an inert “eternal model” (p. 49).  This “will to heteronomy” anticipates, in one 
direction, Saint Augustine who will make the soul a synthesising entity bridging between 
“originary and derived time” – for which a resumption of the city of God on earth is figure - 
and Kant, who as Alliez wrote, asserts a secular, urban time freed entirely from any notion of 
an “intensive motion of the soul” (pp. 34-35).  Along the way, psychological time sets up in the 
soul displacing an earlier “cosmic image”, while modernity, contrary to cosmology, discovers 
the possibility of plumbing the interiorizing implications of a “time image” free of, or prior to, 
the measure of movement (p. 51).	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5. Time Moves – or Subjectivation 
	  
 
Against Plato’s double-seeing and its quest for a temporal aside aiming to re-join the proper 
order and movement of the Intelligible (its Apollonian orientation), Plotinus effects a decidedly 
Dionysian turn in which the soul is imagined as a thing capable of being beheld and therefore 
possessed rather than merely cared for.  For Alliez, in making a psychical space imaginable, 
Plotinus configures a non-corporeal descent that falls into narcissism – not the “material 
narcissism” imagined by Ovid in the myth of Narcissus (where fixation on (self) image is 
destined for dissolution and death) – but into a specular, scattered play of images confounding 
self-observation (1996, p. 53).  If individual souls cannot but be simulacra or diminished copies 
of the world-soul, any pursuit of an integral picture of self must pursue an “upward path” that 
counters descent as Plotinus said; 2013, 1.6.7) – in other words, it must break through a 
spectral, scattered play of images confounding self-observation (Alliez 1996, p. 53).  
Upwardness is thus possessive, claiming the “dignity of Being” on the basis of “the alienated 
soul’s fascination with owning” (1996, p. 55).  An incorporeal narcissism becomes the “new 
insanity” geared to subjectivism and self-validation relayed according to an “inner infinity” – an 
infinity imagined to be capable of both being beheld and held contemplatively (pp. 51-53, 58). 
(pp. 51-53).  
 
For Alliez, this amounted to a transition to a world given form through the engendering action 
of inner ‘vision’ for which the face (rather than the body) was the mobilising portal (1996, pp. 
56-59).  Intelligibility is thus cast outward according to an inner lighting that fuses the viewer 
with the viewed (p. 56).  So while the metaphysical walk in Plato is conceived of as walking in 
the light of truth - an “action image” of sorts – the psychologised soul effects a “contemplation 
image” seeking to transform the seen through a kind of sublime beholding (p. 56).  Lost is any 
depth of field where objects and subjects are distinguishable through extrinsic lighting; the seen 
instead must get sorted out within the soul’s intensive folds.  This shift, as Alliez noted, shows 
up in Byzantine art which radically altered the anthropocentric perspective and Hellenistic 
notions of plastic beauty, reasserting instead the flat plane and iconic representation once tied 
to aspective, but retooled for an inner psychical landscape.  The result was a “negative 
perspective” and “optical reversal” in which pictorial distance and decisive viewing position 
were overturned in favour of confronting proximity where impressions were asserted in the 
place they are encountered (p. 62). Thus, “Absorbed in an ungraspable Stimmung, the viewer 
forgets his or her own situation”, or distance from “the contemplated object, because “there is 
no single point where one can determine one’s own limits so as to be able to say: up to this 
point, that’s me” (p. 62). Thus subject and seeing fuse in a convoluted synthesis. 
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Alliez sees in this contemplation image what Deleuze, termed a “passive synthesis” – a 
‘background’ operation preceding individual egos.  Single souls are thus split between their 
own temporal grasp of the world and a prior spiritual World Ego.  Contemplation, tinctured by 
a desire for universality, thus bestows a narcissistic countenance taken over from the divinity.  
At the individual soul’s centre is seeded a “first purity”, a thought of the whole, that ultimately 
means the “I will be another” (p. 67).  The distinction between action and contemplation 
images effected a mechanism capable of “tip[ping] Platonism toward subjectivity” and set the 
West on a passional, rambling line countermanding its despotic orbit.  The result: “all life is 
thought” and “all things are like a life that stretches forth as a straight line” (p. 67).  The 
synthesising of passive and active egos corresponds with what Deleuze and Guattari 
nominated as the post-signifying or passion regime of signs (see Figure 7) and it is clearly this 
that Alliez had in mind when characterising “Neoplatonic subjectivation”.  Yet ridding a split 
in time – chronos, or the sequential-intentional domain of the present as action image, and 
aion, the future-past of the contemplation image - this self, increasingly unable to synthesise 
these divergent series, gave rise to what Deleuze and Guattari, in a differing context, called a 
subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement (1987, p. 129).  
 
In Rousseau enunciation and statement similarly align with contemplation and action images, 
the first according with originary, natural man relieved of all temporal passing, and the second 
with that man’s fall into action and chronology.  Yet across the centuries a division occurs, one 
that cuts off the Neoplatonic, narcissistic circle of self-divination and natural synthesis to the 
extent that originary time can only be construed as a fiction that no future image of action can 
suture.  Instead, a confessional impulse derived from Saint Augustine prevails.3  Like 
Augustine’s instigation of a Christian philosophy in which creator and creation remain at a 
distance, for Rousseau the world of man no longer cohabits authentically with nature and 
following the fall into self-improvement it can envisage such a union only as a thing gathered 
with any certainty by the mind (hence the fiction of origin in Rousseau).  A line then running 
from Augustine through Descartes, Rousseau and Kant grapples with this existential impasse.  
For Alliez, this is the “West’s dominate dynamic” – a “Christian logic of alterity” pitched 
against Neoplatonism’s subject-in-disjunctive-union (1996, pp. 82-83).  In turn, Oedipus is 
signal to this Christian philosophy: cast out by an “inaccessible God”, a religion of “mediation 
and reconciliation” results (pp. 92-93); in turn an autological orientation takes consciousness as 
its principal object and hubristically interprets divine will; a scission between divine and 
human economies gives rise to double cities – the city of God and its other, with the former 
“dwell[ing] as if abroad” - while an urban impulse to betterment must sojourn in the heads of 
believers “till the time of its reign arrives” (1996 pp. 84, 266 – note 27; Augustine 1999, p. 
                                       
3 For instance, Augustine’s Confessions (397-398) finds mirror in Rousseau’s The 
Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1782). 
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479/XV, 1).  For Alliez the “Augustinian cogito” anticipates a Cartesian version on the basis that 
both share the notion of “non-objective eternality” (or relation to infinity) while in turn 
maintaining consciousness as objecthood.  The “certitude of thought” is what validates God’s 
being evident, but on condition of a disjunctive relation: hence at stake “is an ‘abstract God 
who forbids religion in the etymological sense of a living link with God’” (p. 93). 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari the Cartesian cogito is post-signifying precisely because, turning from 
extended things and a God otherwise conceived of as distanced, it breaks with an absolute 
coding of the socius.  Put to work synthesising, this cogito sets in play three movements: firstly 
“doubt – which is typically a type of paranoiac machine; [secondly] the non-deceiving God 
[as…] a miraculating machine, and [thirdly] the ‘I think’ [as…] a celibate machine” (Deleuze 
2001, p. 95).  Spanning from doubt to self-certainty, despotic signification is replaced by a 
“legislator-subject” who belatedly borrows - while ostensively shunning - a divine 
(miraculating) mechanism (1987, p. 130).  Duplicated at the level of the subject is a “subject of 
enunciation” on one hand (the I think as determination) and a “subject of the statement” (an I 
am as undetermined or variously determined) on the other (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 128 & 
Deleuze 2001, p. 93).  As Deleuze and Guattari asserted, “When Descartes says, I can infer ‘I 
think therefore I am’ but not ‘I walk therefore I am,’ he is initiating the distinction between the 
two subjects” (1987, p. 128), meaning a subject of enunciation standing outside or 
independently of any “union of the soul and the body, or feeling” typical of the subject of the 
statement.  The distinction between enunciation and statement centres on the division between 
a purely thinking entity and one that acts - describing, depicting, speaking its situated being.  
Yet an “echolalia” is at work in which thought seemingly prevails over situations but situations 
constitutive of subjects necessarily providing the material for thought, that in turn is assumed to 
prevail over situations (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 129).  As they say, “this recoiling […] is 
also that of mental reality into the dominant reality”; in other words, reality requires no external 
referent, no despotic visage, or even paranoid-interpretive mechanism to anchor it.  The cogito 
instead engenders (as a celibate or bachelor producer) a reality it alone thinks and adjudicates 
over in accordance with a seemingly sovereign ‘reason’ and reasonableness (1987, p. 130). 
 
In providing an ontology apposite to an emerging bourgeoisie, it is the time of the merchant, 
the mercantile (and mercenary) traveller, that Cartesianism founds.  Time distinguished this 
way attains its meaning from the Augustinian cogito.  For Alliez, the Cartesian cogito completes 
what for Augustine would be unthinkable: the compacting of the transcendental dynamic 
singularly into a “psychological ego”, one where time is naturally and unproblematically 
present (1996, p. 121).  In the stove-heated room for instance, thought acting across time 
overcomes the apparent sensory divergence of wax in different states, compacting them into a 
single, enduring substance.  Similarly, the very exercise of thought is predicated on an 
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excavating out of the temporal quotidian a time of contemplation - time that is in fact made 
space, for a subject brought into the fullness of presence via thought.  If a phenomenological 
reduction is achieved in such a setting, as Barbaras argued, it was in Augustine that Alliez 
recognised a pre-emptor to the West’s “phenomenological enterprise” (p. 121).  While for 
Augustine time absolutely belonged to God its creator, the fall from grace represented by “the 
twin sins of Adam and Cain” instigated a worldly time deviating “from immutable and 
universal good” (pp. 99-100).  Wilfully bending aion to its own ends, humanity embarked on a 
“temporialization” or particularisation of time, a process Augustine called distentio - distortion 
(pp. 100 & 107).  What renders this model of temporality phenomenological is the proposition 
that an eternity integral to time is recoverable from the distentio natural to the fall via a process 
of intentio or intentional seeking out of a higher orientation (extensio ad superior) (1996, p. 
107, 121).  With distentio there is only serialisation and unequal exchange - in other words, a 
time apposite to the merchant and Chrematistics: “With the fall, time became that distentio of 
the soul dispersed into the multiple and into the cares of the saeculum [age] dominated by 
money” (p. 106).  The soul’s quest for an inner, spiritual refuge from mercantile hegemony is 
precisely what consecrates the split ego and a drive for “an authentic time below the ontic time 
of the concrete ego” (p. 121).  For Augustine time as a series of present moments advancing 
from the past towards the future is displaced by a temporal continuum streaming from the 
future backwards, and only contingently experienced as a “field of presence” (1996, p. 123). If 
the “past and the future also exist” it is because they harbour the limits of what in originary 
time can be experienced and made cognizable by the soul/subject: “the present comes to be 
out of the future [where…] it proceeds from something hidden, and into something hidden it 
returns” (Augustine 11.17.22). 
 
Kant, exploring the foundations of perception, was unwilling to invest the field of presence 
solely with the Cartesian psychological ego.  As Deleuze read the difference between the 
Cartesian and the Kantian cogito, in the former, the “thinking substance” can only assert its 
hegemony on the basis of an “expelling [of] time” and substituting “the point of view of the I 
for the point of view of God”, whereas Kant refigured the cogito according to the operation of a 
differential time always short of divine purview (1994, p. 86).  As he explained, to the 
determinable element – the “I think” – an undetermined component – the “I am” - must exist 
without knowing its determination ahead of the action of time (p. 86).  In this temporally 
fractured cogito, what Deleuze defines as the passivity of the undetermined, Kant describes as 
a capacity for receptivity, a capacity controlled by the rule of synthesis that ensures that the 
empirical constituents are bound into a consistent identity (p. 87).  Playing, as James Williams 
has noted, on Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a “Copernican revolution”, Deleuze sought 
an even more radical de-centring of subjectivity, dispensing with all vestiges of identity as a 
stabilising axis (Deleuze 1994, p. 86; Williams 2011, p. 82).  Drawing the question of time 
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beyond the machinations of the human soul and the purview of consciousness, Deleuze aimed 
to excavate the foundations of a transpective orientation – the domain of unconsciousness 
syntheses that precede subject-positions.  If in the traditions considered above, the issue has 
been how to represent the action of time, transpective opens a domain inaccessible to the ‘I 
think’ and problematizes agency over an inner, temporally-defined terrain understood to 
ground learning, reason and illumination.  In the step towards an aesthetic unconscious, for 
which the peripatetic observer was key, Oedipus shows up as decisively erosive of the thinking 
subject. Similarly, if the metaphysical walk sought to stabilise and cognize time according to a 
“moving image of eternity”, une promenade métaphysique tracks a demented motion in time 
itself, a time ceasing a circular, celestial modality and uncoiling instead as an urban, 
wandering line  (Plato 1997, Timaeus 37d; Voss 2013, p. 195). 
 
 
 
6. Divergent Syntheses  
 
 
At stake in Deleuze’s decentring of Kant’s theory of synthesis is recognition of a passive 
synthesis or time consciousness prior to human experience or cognizance.  Indeed the event of 
human consciousness rests on three temporal syntheses at work across a pre-subjective 
domain. Firstly time can be understood to accumulate in accordance with a gathering of 
diverse sensory matter forming a passive self defined through habit - what Deleuze called the 
domain of “Habitus” and Eros (or the faculty of imagination).  Life, any kind of living 
actualisation, is inseparable, as he says, from Eros, or the operation of a pleasure principle that 
mobilises a “certain quantity of libido (Eros-energy)” in a repetitious binding or joining (1991, 
p. 116).  Secondly, contemplative attendance on past accumulations of the first synthesis tie 
sensation into what Deleuze called a “past in general”, or what he called Mnemosyne (or the 
faculty of memory) (1994, pp. 79-80).  Thirdly, between habitus and a past in general, an 
active synthesis becomes possible, one that thinks what remains incomprehensible in the 
earlier two (p. 80).  For Joe Hughes, Deleuze in fact merges notions from both Merleau-Ponty 
and Bergson with the third synthesis: with the former asserting that the “sensible datum […] 
sets a kind of muddled problem for my body to solve” (habitus), while the later rendered 
perception inseparable from a choice in motor response for which memory was critical (2008, 
pp. 112-113).  As James Williams applied the tripartite syntheses to Deleuze’s commentary on 
the non-endogeny of an infantile drive to motility, “Any walk is habitual”, but it also 
circumscribes the “living present” within a broader synthesis of “past events and future 
possibilities” for which an active determination embroils the gestural capacities and limitations 
of the body in problems of orientation, sense and recognition that builds on memory and the 
contracted material of earlier syntheses (2011, p. 105).  Hence, each synthesis presents a 
cavalcade of problems: the persistent divergence of the passive or larval selves of the first 
synthesis - given its contingent, narcissistic consolidation of pleasures, tensions and discharges 
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- produces an overwhelmingly indeterminate world without orientation or sustaining direction 
(Deleuze 1994, p. 85); the second synthesis attempts to overcome this volatility in favour of a 
better consolidated self/ego, but as the domain of the past in general, it presents its own 
problems as a ground for stabilising an enduring self, not least because it composes a too 
impersonal a resource, one shot through with a plethora of incomprehensible traces and 
repetitions (forgetting, failed representations, erroneous recollections and “involuntary 
memory”; p. 74); in turn, the third synthesis intervenes in the irresolvable contest of the earlier 
two, with the faculty of thought (the “I think”) as a reflection or self-contemplation (1994, p. 
110; Hughes 2009, pp. 120-121).  Yet this final synthesis is not achieved without the former 
syntheses themselves appearing as other to the self per se, precisely because the faculties of 
imagination and memory are each embroiled in their own “involuntary adventures”, their own 
co-opting and utilisation of repetitions and the differences that arise there (1994, p. 145).   
 
The price of these temporal operations, as Deleuze made clear, is the implantation at the core 
of the self of a constitutive fracturing that is never completely overcome. Hence: 
 
[…] it is by interiorising the difference between the two lines [Eros & Mnemosyne] 
and by experiencing itself as perpetually displaced in the one, perpetually disguised 
in the other, that the libido returns or flows back into the ego and the passive ego 
becomes entirely narcissistic.  The narcissistic ego is inseparable not only from a 
constitutive wound [the disjuncture between syntheses] but from the disguises and 
displacements which are woven from one side to the other, and constitute its 
modification.  The ego [or “I] is a mask for other masks, a disguise under other 
disguises.  Indistinguishable from its own clowns, it walks with a limp on one green 
and one red leg. (p. 110) 
 
In this striking analogy the ego is figured as a stitched together entity, with one leg sourced 
from the faculty of imagination and the other from that of memory (Hughes 2009, p. 121).  Yet 
these contributions are not balanced as Deleuze’s appeal to the limp suggests, but in continual 
dissonance and while he doesn’t expand on their particular colouring, it can be surmised that 
the green one corresponds with the unceasing, runaway displacements of the first passive 
synthesis (imagination/present), while the red one accords with the recuperative and arresting 
tendencies of the second synthesis (memory/past).  The result is a narcissistic ego fronting an 
array of incipient selves - themselves composed of so many disguises and masks – and in turn, 
a wounding distance that must be bridged or overcome.  Yet the resulting limp references an 
irremediably fractured subject in whom a caesura between the past and the present testifies to 
a temporality that is “no longer ‘rhymed’”, a time that does not accumulate in a before and 
after continuity (Deleuze 1994, p. 89). 
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7. Oedipus & the Linear Labyrinth 
 
 
 
In Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) Deleuze found a commentary that developed the unrealised 
consequences of the introduction of a new, pure form of time into thought by Kant – a 
continuance linked with “the death of God and the fractured I”, but also Oedipus specifically: 
 
Hölderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of 
Oedipus, as though these were complimentary figures of the same death instinct. Is 
it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus? (p. 87) 
 
As Hölderlin recognised in “Remarks on Oedipus”, it was Sophocles who anticipated in tragic 
drama a dilemma pivotal to modernity: time, retaining the internal impetus established by 
Augustine, nevertheless wanders from its divine referent and in turn isolates and hollows out 
the subject. 
 
For Deleuze, Hölderlin identifies the specifically irregular form of Oedipal tragedy.  In Greek 
drama generally - for which the plays of Aeschylus were indicative - a tripartite structure is 
evident: a defining state of limitation (or what Deleuze calls a “just order”); a transgression of 
limitations; and, a reconciliation or atonement of that transgression which restores the earlier 
state of justice and order.  In this context ‘man’ transgresses the limits defined by a 
cosmological order and in the course of things is returned to ‘his’ place.  With Sophocles’ 
Oedipus it is no longer the case of transgressing limitations, suffering the consequences, or 
making an ameliorating return to course; with Oedipus it is the limit itself that has become 
elusive and indiscernible, for he is the man who is guilty without knowing his crime and who 
transgresses despite inordinate efforts to avoid the breaching of providential propriety (Deleuze 
1978).  The limit, when it appears in the Oedipal tragedy, takes the form of a sudden rupture or 
caesura whose breach commits the transgressor to a transformative itinerary without return or 
redemption.  Cast into a solitary orbit without centering reference, humanity, as represented by 
Oedipus, is left to chart its own course: 
 
In Oedipus time has become a straight line which will be the line on which 
Oedipus wanders. The long wandering of Oedipus. There will no longer be any 
atonement, even if only in the form of a brutal death.  Oedipus is in perpetual 
suspension, he will travel his straight line of time.  In other words, he is traversed by 
a straight line which drags him along.  Towards what?  Nothing. (Deleuze 1978) 
 
In Oedipus Tyrannus there is no retribution or even death; his fait is a death delayed, a death 
transposed into the long hiatus of a walk, guided not by sight or the unfolding stricture of 
divinity and fate, but one surrendered to the intensities of uncertain extension.  Even death at 
Colonus fails to turn the emptied line of time towards closure with the aftereffect of burial 
being an urban subjectivity orientated by transpective. 
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Like Sophocles’ courting of a departure of the gods of Antiquity in the Oedipus drama, 
modernity similarly shares a sense of divine abdication, or more accurately, as Hölderlin 
identified, a double turning from each other of God and the faithful.  As he wrote of the 
moment of realization at the tragedy’s pivotal point of realisation: 
 
Inside it [the caesura], man forgets himself because he exists entirely for the 
moment, the god [forgets himself] because he is nothing but time; and either one is 
unfaithful, time because it is reversed categorically at such a moment, no longer 
fitting beginning and end; man, because at this moment of categorical reversal he 
has to follow and thus can no longer resemble the beginning in what follows. 
(Hölderlin 1988, p. 108) 
 
Corresponding with what Blumenberg saw as a theological contest between Gnosticism and 
Augustinianism arising in the Middle Ages, this double turning away finds historical ground in 
the evolving doctrine of “divine absolutism” – the belief in a God with absolute freedom to 
determine the course of the universe irrespective of human need (1999, pp. 135-137).  For 
Blumenberg modernity in turn was ushered in, not on the basis of religious renunciation 
leading to secularisation, but as the consequence of an understanding of self and world pushed 
off-centre by an abdication of providence within religiosity, a de-centring that called for a new 
“self-assertion” and reconstruction of the world according to principles of human reason in the 
absence of reliable divine providence (p. 138).   
 
From within this double infidelity - that of God towards ‘his’ people and humanity toward its 
God – arose an interregnum or vacancy intuited in the very meaning of space and time.  In 
effect, as Deleuze said, a kind of “degree zero” or datum of absolute detachment prevails 
(1978).  It is this zeroing consequence that Hölderlin’s caesura grasps – the trace of an 
absconding God leaving ‘free time’ in his wake.  As a result, Sophocles’ Oedipus, like the 
subject of modernity, is rendered “atheos” – “separated from God”, as Deleuze says – rather 
than atheistic (1978).  At the level of human motility, and walking particularly, a striking divide 
arises between Kant and Hölderlin, one centered on Oedipus and his transport of a tragic 
sensibility.  For Kant what the Enlightenment promised was “free movement” liberated from the 
“walking cart” of ignorance and dogma (2013, p. 3). Yet “walking confidently […] towards 
majority”, as Kant recommended for the public use of reason, could hardly be further from the 
image of blinded Oedipus, “the gods’ most hated man” set apolis and wandering with the aid 
of minors (daughters Antigone and Ismene).  Yet Deleuze credits Hölderlin’s subtraction of God 
with going further than Kant by radicalizing the question, and the call to self-assertion that 
reason was called on to answer.  Where Enlightenment philosophy ambitioned the foundations 
of science - sciences belatedly dependent on nature whose divinely instituted reality is broadly 
indifferent to humanity – self-assertion (Kant’s walking confidently unaided) is shunned in 
favour of a fall into aesthetic phenomena (Blumenberg 1999, pp. 141-142). 
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8. Conjoining Oedipus & Hamlet 
 
 
 
Deleuze further developed his commentary on Hölderlin and Oedipus in reference to 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, particularly around Hamlet’s statement to Horatio in Act 1, Scene V - 
"The time is out of joint; O cursed spite!/That ever I was born to set it right!" (189-190; 
emphasis added), and subsequently to Laertes in Act 5, Scene 1 – “For though I am not 
splenitive and rash, /Yet have I in me something dangerous” (271-272).  In the former lines 
Deleuze found a “First Formula” for summarising Kantian philosophy, while the later ones 
suggested a second formula he attributed to Arthur Rimbaud who had famously written to Paul 
Demeny in 1871 – “Car Je est un auture” (I am an other, or as Deleuze’s version is translated, 
“I is another”; p. viii) (Rimbaud 2005, p. 375).  This other, as passive or receptive self, is what 
constantly arises within the consistency of the ‘I’ and imparts, as Deleuze said, a “giddiness, an 
oscillation” by virtue of time which “splits us in two” (1994, p. ix).  This diversion, as Hamlet 
recognised, presents a particular problem for thought for it raises the question of who the 
“spontaneity of thinking” can be attributed to, or rather, that there is “in thought something 
impossible to think” (Deleuze, 1978).  For Deleuze this estrangement precisely signals the 
Kantian subject’s relation to knowledge, where like the tragic hero who “repeats precisely 
because he is separated from an essential, infinite knowledge”, there is something in excess of 
phenomenal experience and which “acts like something hidden, like a blocked representation 
(1994, p. 15). 
 
In key ways, tragic repetition falls back on generalities and habitual responses to cover this 
blockage, thereby missing the metamorphosing impetus in tragedy.  As Deleuze noted, 
referencing Marx, there is a historical tendency for tragedy to fall back into farce - for tragic 
repetitions in fact to yield to a kind of comedy (pp. 91-92).  In Oedipus Tyrannus the comic-
tragic cycle is exemplified in the hero’s limp, which confronts without giving up its secret.  At 
stake is a meaning “too big” for Oedipus to grasp prior to the caesura that forces him to 
confront his guilt.  In fact the tragedy can be thought to offer a “three-stage structure of 
repetition”: the comic limp before, the tragic caesura itself, and wayward wandering after” (p. 
92).  As Ronald Bogue summarised: “The tragic moment is a caesura in the rhyme of man’s life, 
a break that makes past and future incommensurable from that instant on.  Continuity is 
broken; beginning and end no longer rhyme; the beginning cannot equal what follows” (2001, 
p. 18).  The result is the emergence of a version of the self that exceeds its circumstantial 
constituents or its passive assemblage via Eros and Mnemosyne.  Hence the caesura or 
circumstantial crisis firstly relates to a situation in which the “past or the before” brings to light 
some unknown aspect of the self that overwhelms the present.  Secondly, the resulting break 
calls for a response capable of measuring up to the event – a “becoming-equal” to the 
disjuncture in normative time - and for which a “metamorphosis” is instigated doubling the 
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lesser self of the caesura with an overcoming ideal.  Thirdly, in the confrontation caused by the 
caesura between a passive self and an active “I” or ideal, a quantum of difference is produced 
that causes the future to deviate. Spanning the beginning, the caesura, and the afterwards an 
image of the totality of time is asserted, a time that is not circular but which in its interruption, 
affirms a returning difference (Deleuze 1994, p. 89).  Oedipus in this account occasions a shift 
from an autological subject to one that is auto-affecting.  The caesura constitutive of the third 
synthesis, when pushed to its full metamorphosing potential, overcomes comic-tragic repetition 
and affirms a becoming that excises all fixed identity. Hence: 
 
[…] what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself.  In this manner, the I 
which is fractured according to the temporal series correspond and find a common 
descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without 
self or I, the ‘plebeian’ guardian of a secret [a…] secret coherence which 
establishes itself only by excluding my own coherence, my own identity, the 
identity of the self, the world and God. (1994, p. 90) 
 
Implicate to this other within identity then is a tripartite assemblage countermanding the 
Platonic soul and the mythic hero’s royal investiture: “repetition-binding, […] repetition-stain, 
[and…] repetition-eraser” as Deleuze described (1994, p.114); what Hughes called the “three 
unequal faculties” - imagination, memory and thought (2009, p. 124); or in Bogue’s 
description, the “condition, actor and actor-obliterating action” (2010, p. 43).  Hence, from the 
urban footwork of Socratic parrhesia runs a strain of thought splitting the soul/subject in 
accordance with “the tragic transport” turning man into “nothing but time”, a time “fitting 
[neither] beginning [nor…] end” (Voss 2013, p. 211; see also Hölderlin 1998, p. 100).   
 
 
 
9. The Aesthetic Walk 
 
 
 
The caesura, in dividing the subject, also imports into the time of production (schedules, 
projects and tasks) a vacancy or excess.  Beyond the total servitude demanded by the despotic 
socius, the production of ‘private’ persons ostensively puts time into individual hands.  Yet a 
demand arises with this other temporality: 
 
The ‘excessive time’ is not fully free, and therefore it poses an imperative, a drive to 
exceed.  The opening of time, which is excessive, empty, or infinite […] drives the 
subject to probe his or her infinity and to exceed him or herself, to leave oneself 
behind. (Magun 2004, p. 1155) 
 
Tragic consciousness, as Artemy Magun reads Hölderlin, sets up an “infinite internal struggle” 
for which ‘free time’ is pivotal, not least because of the West’s long exercised “reification of 
individual self-control” in which, as Elias put it, a sustained “severance” is maintained between 
“individual affective impulses” and the “motor apparatus” (2000, p. 481).  The 
complexification of social relations runs in parallel with a monopolisation of violence by the 
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state and a regularisation, stabilisation and redirection of impulse and drives, with the 
“lengthening of the chains of social action and interdependence” invoking an “extension of 
mental spaces beyond the moment into the past and future” where thinking habituates itself to 
“chains of cause and effect” and self-distancing (Elias 1991, pp. 97-101 & 2000, p. 370).  
Hölderlin’s delineation of a tragic caesura no doubt reflects on and amplifies these contesting 
components defining a division between the self and its world.  With the prolongation of 
thought ever deeper into temporal dimensions constituting the past and the future - with its 
surveying habits based on distancing, including self-observation and self-distancing, and with 
the positing of an even more complex and unfathomed “inner landscape” - psychical 
development is made to appear remote or alienated from societal forms.  The caesura, at once 
the result of this seemingly foundational partition between psycho-genesis and socio-genesis, 
no less stands as a longed for abdication and escape into free time, into a space-time that short-
circuits ever denser obligations by the ‘civilising’ webs of association and chains of causality.  
Bodies themselves, everywhere managed into docility and/or competitive competency fall, in 
one sense, into a kind of silence, while in another, they are made to repetitiously mime 
economies of generality.   
 
Walking observers are integral to this economy, even as they claim a space outside it. 
Ostensively they mirror the bifurcation in modernity between the Euclidean space of work and 
the time of leisure.  In contrast, as Magum says, to “the momentus capture of capital” and its 
insistent productive mandate, leisure seems to bestow a disposable time, notable for its 
“‘inachievement’ and ‘inertia’” (2004, p. 1162).  Not that leisure was, or remains, outside the 
economy of production – cessation of labour being necessary to the restoration of productivity 
while “surplus labour” offers an exploitative capacity in Marx’s sense – but it nevertheless 
potentiates a troubling excess, a domain of free time from which spontaneous and overturning 
action might erupt (Magus 2004, pp. 1153-1154).  Modernity takes motion as its motif 
precisely because pathos is its negative motor (p. 1152).  In Rousseau recuperation and/or 
mourning (relative to originary man) motivates accounts and encounters; in Kant a “labour of 
development” (in Enlightenment man) drives a progressive impetus (p. 1152).  Yet for 
Hölderlin, the caesura suggests a motive agency in time itself that delivers no extensive 
movement.  So does leisure ride inactivity and parallels what Deleuze attributed to time out of 
joint: even when “nothing moves” there is something that continues to act, something in excess 
of the movement of temporal succession.  Emphasised in Hölderlin’s radicalization of Kant was 
the prospect that the slackening of temporal obligation was not only the basis for progressing 
human freedom, but that leisure as a void within work was also a void in the continuity of 
time, one whose immanent motion was capable of undoing all projects, including the 
projection of identity.  It is in this context that an aesthetic unconscious emerges, just as it is 
within the domain of leisure that aesthetics is principally pursued, and it is also there that 
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peripatetic literatures arise (2004, p. 1156). 
 
Rancière has similarly charted questions of temporality in literary sources exploring what he 
called “another kind of leisure – that of aesthetes who enjoy the forms, the lights, and shades of 
nature, of philosophers who spend their time exchanging metaphysical hypotheses in the a 
country inn, and of apostles who set out to communicate their faith to the chance companions 
they meet along the road” (2007, p. 279).  Staged in rustic beatitude, the fusing of strolling with 
spectatorship and contemplation defined romantic sensibility (p. 279).  Marked by a certain 
passive individualism, such roaming stood in contradistinction to toiling, obligated bodies, and 
yet it was the confluence of aesthetes and displacement that made, as Rancière put it, 
“Republican politics” a politics of walkers (2004a, p. 17).  Paralleling an obligation to mobility 
in the society of the course, the post-revolutionary ideal to come and go freely meant, as 
Rancière said, stepping beyond the old arbitrations over “good or evil”, or the search for 
scattered signs of some greater, occluded truth.  More simply, it was “a matter of walking and 
looking” in a natural community merging politics and sensibility in a synthesising vision piloted 
by the poets (p. 17).  Contrastive with the “asocial subject” envisaged by Rousseau, 
romanticism is remarkable, as Langan has said, for “restor[ing] that subject to a social setting” 
(1995, p. 15).  With William Wordsworth specifically, a “lyric subjectivity” was shaped around 
the possibility of a “natural association” of people and things.  Walking, as a vector capable of 
traversing “the topos of the community” and eliciting a completely symmetrical, indeed 
reversible bond between words and things, and between the imaginary and the real, was 
pivotal (pp. 18 & 21).  Yet this aligning of poetic and political utopias, as Rancière wrote, 
quickly came apart in the souring post-revolutionary atmosphere for the word ‘liberty’, like the 
deed itself, failed to live up to the bucolic modesty “of the wandering walker” (p. 21).  The 
fateful aligning of genial strollers with dispossessed masses on the move – set in motion by 
Enclosure and a general economic disenfranchisement of people from place - provided a 
decisive misrecognition of mutuality, from which a bifurcation sprung, one in which the poet, 
no longer able to direct an ameliorating, pastoral sensibility towards the future, was forced to 
backtrack, consolidating on earlier, seemingly better-tested trajectories.  Reverting to the 
ephemeral and the distant over place and political immediacy: 
 
Poetry asserts itself as the ability of a sensory community to grasp anyone and 
anything in poetic wandering, by going back over the route of the inaugural walk, 
by dissociating the rhythm of its walk from that of the citizen armies, the clouds of a 
summer sky from political storms. (p. 20; emphasis in original)  
 
In Wordsworth, as Rancière found, the solitary observer was reified as a figure closer to the 
original course of liberty (p. 22).  If from its inception lyric sensibility, in aligning with ‘the 
people’, had aimed for a new social homogeneity and communitarian consistency, 
misrecognition of its aims in the politicised mass induced its own caesura - “a crack in lyric 
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simplicity” itself (p. 22).  Like a recuperative strategy in tragedy aiming to equal the time of 
crisis, a quest for absolute value in old ideals was sought, one resulting, as Rancière put it, in a 
“simulacra of the epic journey” (p. 22). Staged as a geographic and temporal quest to recover 
protean liberty in its old origin - Ancient Greece - the “lyric ‘I’”, otherwise centred by 
immediate places (in Wordsworth’s case, “the England of the lakes”), sought freedom in the 
originary “ocean of the poem” - in short “the ancient Mediterranean” where words at their 
origin could still be imagined to harbour an unsullied identity with things (pp. 22-24).  The 
identification of the self with the page - an identification that found simple ratification in the 
correlation between the movement of the pen/mind and the movement of a corresponding 
responsive body in traversed space – called on far-flung bodies and memories, gestures and 
affects through a kind of trickery calling echoes and snatches of borrowed experience into text 
(p. 23). Rancière depicts the caesura of place/self this way:  
 
The “new epic” that returns to the primal land of the truth of words also reopens the 
distance between the subject/poet and the subject of the poem.  The journey 
toward the native land must be entrusted to a fictitious character, but also a false 
character. (p. 25) 
 
Recalibrating and renewing the correspondence between words and things denied to the 
present meant calling up a defect in the subject’s presence.  As Rancière said, this retrospective 
operation came to “dominate modern thinking about poetics” with the notion of the return 
journey as archetypically figured in the travels of Odysseus (Ulysses) becoming the “very 
metaphor” for all “poetic transfer of meaning”, given the underlying presumption of a straying 
or wandering of words from “original roots” (p. 22).  The return journey was one way of stilling 
time and grasping at what endures. The alternative was the crushing surge of the new and the 
news that killed off the daily present incessantly, sullying and cheapening the saying power of 
words (p. 25).  Yet gone from these writers was the easy marriage of divergent places in a single 
consciousness, as Descartes had penned from Amsterdam.  If the Cartesian walker = x could, 
ironically, garner sufficient humanist residual to imagine a joined up world via the 
topographer’s sensibility of a continuous, tactile plenum (even if rendered disjunctively as a 
partes extra partes rather than fused), the new “lyric-epic speaker” (Rancière is thinking of 
Bryon and Shelley particularly), abdicating a lyric self tied to the gestural immediacy of simple 
walks in the country, called up temporarily complex excursions set on recovering, resurrecting 
and reviving.  
 
Pointedly, the tying of modern lyricism to excursion in pursuit of an undivided poet-writer, was 
one way of bypassing the divided self of tragedy and its divisive, ‘ignorant’ community of 
spectators.  Travel sought to cover over political turbulence by calling up an ideal ‘we’ and an 
“unambiguous ‘I’” via an “un-signifying poetry” (or one minimally mimetic) that in its simple 
observations and correspondences between people and things bypassed an actual, troubled 
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collective commensurate with the (disquieting) “tone of the city” (p. 11).  The return to Greek 
epic and an idealised nature in part truncated an attendance on what Bakhtin referred to as 
real-life chronotrope, favouring, much as Plato had before, mythological sheathing and its 
transformative valance.  Yet contrary to the metaphysical walk, modernity’s promenade 
métaphysique sought foundation in the “displacement of a body onto a landscape” where 
territorialisation and sense impression would be married integrally with the page (p. 13). 
Overall, the task was to impart to the wanderer (or the subject of the statement) the 
“subjectivity of the traveller”, the one who travels, reckoning and recording and returning back, 
with echoes and utterances synthesised sufficiently to fuse with the ‘I’ of departure (or the 
subject of enunciation) (p. 12).  Yet the introduction of an epic modality no doubt troubled, 
much as Plato’s double-seeing, by stepping out of the passing present and entered into an 
ambiguous temporality.  In both instances, “words” could not maintain a mimetic immunity, 
and transportive of what Lacoue-Labarthe termed a mise-en-abyme, ultimately are shown up to 
be “only words”, a medium apposite to the seducer’s lies for which Don Juan offers an 
exemplary figure of travel and untruth.  Hence, with the rise of the duped chronicle, appears 
“Ulysses the liar”, the tragic antihero (p. 25).  The defective aspect Rancière saw in the “lyric- 
epic” character mirrors the Oedipal bifurcation between cognitive and corporeal knowing, and 
with it, the caesura’s radicalising of thought. Firstly, Romanticism’s “simple walk” can be 
thought to correspond with the first or passive synthesis of immediate succession (Eros - as the 
simple concatenation of steps and a floating gaze4).  Secondly, the imagined walks of the epic 
and the longed-for return of a lost unity can be thought to correspond with the second synthesis 
as the domain of a past in general (Mnemosyne – as a backward loop recovering time5).  
Thirdly, the caesura induced by the amalgamation of these two types of ‘walk’ potentiates a 
subject-rupture and the world thought anew (metamorphosis – as the fusing with the self’s non-
self).  With this third synthesis is found a raft of anti-heroes, heroes who recover the wandering-
form - much as Oedipus’ limp invites a perpetual tracking from the straight or direct path – but 
in an epiphanic guise.   
 
	  
	  
10. Lying Consciousness & Other Semiotics 
 
 
 
Conversely, the Oedipus of psychoanalysis misconstrues the third temporal synthesis, and 
names a particular stalled relation in which a corporeal-cognitive schema is made to 
repeatedly paper over the caesura and the difference at its heart.  As such, there is no 
surpassing but only various modes of falling apart or falling short (in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
                                       
4 See Wordsworth’s, I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud: “They stretched in never-ending line […] I 
gazed--and—gazed, but little thought” (Wordsworth W.1888/1999).  
5 See Shelley’s Hellas: The Last Chorus: “The world’s great age beings anew, | The golden years 
return, |The earth doth like a snake renew” (in Wordsworth 2005, p. 406).  
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words, the “‘pre-oedipal’, ‘para-oedipal’, ‘quasi-oedipal’” (2000, p. 55).  Oedipus in this 
configuration is the standard-bearer of a universal subjectivity, one dependant on the 
accomplishment of a pre-given psychical configuration, and the key player in an unconscious 
remade a “classical theatre” (p. 55).  Mirroring the Romantic backward quest for an “idealist 
turning point”, the traces of Greek soil Freud thought he found in analysis in fact where traces 
of his own “Goethian classical culture” (p. 55).  If the Freudian, Oedipal triangulation 
(“mommy, daddy, me”) can be shorthanded to a “3+1” formula for Deleuze and Guattari - that 
is, a tripartite assembly of the one (mimetic of the tripartite, Platonic soul) - in fact beyond the 
representational shackling of the psyche to an underlying logos, the unconscious answers to a 
pathos whose formulation better reads as “3+n” (pp. 52, 96, 178): 
 
There is no Oedipal triangle: Oedipus is always open in an open social field.  
Oedipus opens to the four winds, to the four corners of the social field [it is a…] 
poorly closed triangle, a porous or seeping triangle, an exploded triangle from 
which the flows of desire escape in the directions of other territories. (p. 96) 
 
Blowing apart the stereotypical flag bearer of psychoanalysis, this other Oedipus ghosting 
universal subjectivity is instead a relaying point spanning the societal machinery and the 
intensive landscape subsisting with bodies.  Pointedly, bodies make representational 
appearance through exceptionality.  Would Oedipus’ body be remarkable at all without a 
limp? In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze pits affectations and intensities against the general 
and commonly representative.  Ironic and comic repetitions are said to perturb moral and 
natural law, with irony working to “overturn the law” by ascending in a kind of parody of 
principles, while the comic, in contrast, operates according to the “art of consequences and 
descents, of suspensions and falls” (1994, p. 5).  The notion of the fall makes a corporeal 
appeal indicative of a downward course for which in Anti-Oedipus the disjunctive synthesis is 
key with its variously organised “bodies” or “recording surfaces” (2000, pp. 11-12).  Further, in 
Cinema 2: The Time Image, Deleuze’s invokes the body as a power capable of a 
“philosophical reversal”, one that frames the corporeal not as an “obstacle that separates 
thought from itself”, but which thought must instead be “plunged into […] in order to reach the 
unthought, that is life” (1989, p. 189).  As he says, it is not the body that thinks, “but, obstinate 
and stubborn, it forces us to think” (p. 189).  Prior to thought, bodily life arises fundamentally 
with what Deleuze defined as the first and second syntheses - that is with habitus and memory 
– and it becomes a problem that thought is subsequently called on to grapple with (1989, p. 
189). 
 
Habitus and memory - forces in excess of the Cogito - are what the thinking self finds, much as 
Oedipus’ limp carries with it the past as a distant and forgotten ground that adheres with each 
step and whose eventual arrival into conscious awareness instigates the caesura.  As Deleuze 
put it: “Oedipus receives a sign once from too far away, once from too close, and between the 
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two a terrible repetition of the crime is woven” (1989, p. 23).  Speaking through codes alien to 
speech and thought itself, the body runs both ahead and lags behind; it speaks in fact for what 
is incommunicable to consciousness.  If the repetitious comic-tragic cycle is indicative of an 
impasse in which metamorphosis fails, it is also the impasse of philosophy in the modern 
period in its contest with bodies that otherwise outstrip and elude it.  As Nietzsche claimed in 
The Gay Science (1882/1887), “For the longest time, conscious thought was considered 
thought itself. Only now does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our spirit’s 
activity remains unconscious and unfelt” (1972, p. 262).  Instead, as he says, thinking exhausts 
itself on a “battlefield” beneath which, not a conciliatory, but a pathic knowing reigns.  Pierre 
Klossowski in turn noted how “consciousness is the result of an operation of generalisation, 
[and…] falsification” (1997, pp. 98-99).  Beyond what can be thought through language, what 
is essential is inexpressible because it “lies in our pathos” (p. 100).  Nietzsche in turn sought an 
individuality that was neither the average or the general, but lay with what Klossowski called a 
“corporealizing thought”, far below the head-high falsities of consciousness (p. 30): 
 
The body wants to make itself understood through the intermediary of a language of 
signs that is fallaciously deciphered by consciousness.  Consciousness itself 
constitutes this code of signs that inverts, falsifies and filters what is expressed 
through the body [hence,…] everything leads to the ‘head’ (the upright position), 
the message is deciphered in a way that will maintain this ‘vertical’ position; there 
would be no message as such if this position were not habitual and specific.  
Meaning is formed in the upright position, and in accordance with its own criteria: 
high, low, before, after. (p. 26; emphasis in original) 
 
Underpinning this schema is a multitude of “vague impulses” (p.33).  In the attempt to stabilise 
these intensities and excitations consciousness imposes a fallacious organisation, one made all 
the more possible, as Klossowski extends Nietzsche’s argument, by the opacity and muteness 
of corporeal impulses themselves.  If “cerebral activity” for Nietzsche arises, in evolutionary 
terms, with the most recently developed corporeal organ – the brain - it is also the body’s most 
fragile activity, and one, ascribed to the summit of the corporeal posture, that makes the 
greatest defensive demands of ‘the body’ generally.  In fact ‘the body’ as rightful and upright 
property of the self and as the seat of thought only advents as such on the basis that the vast 
majority of corporeal impulses are forgotten (p. 27).  By these terms, any diminishment in 
cerebral activity sees the cloak of personage recede to expose what Nietzsche, and Klossowski 
with him, take to be the body (im)proper in all its dissociating potency, a body irreducible to 
“the codes of everyday signs” or “institutional language” (pp. 30 & 37). 
	  
What Deleuze called the “Cogito of a dissolved self” (1994, p. xxi), Klossowski termed a 
”consciousness without an agent” (1997, p.32).  In the context of Nietzsche’s physiognomic 
thinking, if the agent endures only as the belated effect of a prolongation of selected impulses 
and excitation, in the context of the broader economy of signs of the body it cannot be 
otherwise than a falsification.  In this Nietzsche might be thought to pre-empt the Freudian 
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unconscious, and while both draw on an aesthetic unconsciousness, in Nietzsche it was the 
path of pathos, not logos, that was followed.  In contrast to a cognitive unconscious seemingly 
accessible to “the code of everyday signs” eventually, the body as other to conscious resists 
even this ruse.  Against Apollonian consciousness as the seat of wellbeing, for Nietzsche health 
lay with a Dionysian unconscious capable of overcoming an overly vigilant, insomniac 
consciousness.  At stake is “the erroneous perspective of a parte ad totum – which is why all 
philosophers are instinctively trying to imagine a total consciousness, a consciousness involved 
in all life and will. In all that occurs, a ‘spirit,’ ‘God’” (1968, p. 376).  The chaos of drives 
underwrites life, not the “pictorialness” of consciousness and is as such unexchangeable 
(Klossowski 1997, p. 125).  
 
To the extent, as Nietzsche held, that all movement at the level of impulse and drive constitutes 
a “gesture [and therefore] a kind of language” (cited in Klossowski 1997, p. 43) there can only 
be interpretation and a perspectivism spanning all the way “from the lowest level up to its 
extreme spiritualisation” (Klossowski 1997, p. 47).  The reversal of thought that Nietzsche 
sought - its corporealisation - involves, in Klossowski’s phrasing, “retranslating the ‘conscious’ 
semiotic into the semiotic of the impulses”, and in this way overturning an automatism 
remaining “ignorant of the perpetual combat of forces” on which semiosis rests (p. 125; 
emphasis in original). 
 
In fact the ego is but the tip of what Klossowski defined as a multi-faceted psychical apparatus 
akin to the soul of the medieval mystics, for whom an unplumbable depth supplants any 
certain grasp of God’s transcendence (p. 9).  At this soul’s lowest levels are a plethora of 
unnameable impulses and excitations out of which are assembled phantasms or what 
Klossowski called “obsessional images (cited in Smith 2005, p. 13).  Consequently, any sense 
of self rests on a “phantasm”, a fragile “suppôt” or substrate/substance that, as Smith says, stills 
“the moving chaos of the impulses” by “bestow[ing] a psychic and organic unity” upon them 
(p. 12).  Unlike Freud, for whom fantasies operate according to a substitutive logic centred on 
symptomatological equivalence, Klossowski’s phantasms are contingent loci within the 
“invisible agitation of the soul” that far from determining the self’s truth, are agents for what 
Deleuze called the “powers of the false” (Deleuze 1989; Smith 1997, p. xi).  The phantasm’s 
essential unintelligibility is what drives an impetus to explicate content from them.  From this 
repetitious locus of unknowing arise a further element of the Klossowskian soul - the invention 
of “simulacra” or willed representational figures that translate what is “incommunicable and 
nonrepresentable” into a language rendered through stereotypes and the normative 
conventions of everyday signs (Smith 2005, p. 16).  Hence via a rarefying of impulses, arise first 
phantasms, followed by simulacra and then stereotypes in a trajectory that turns intensity into 
intention.  Deleuze offers a characterisation of “the cliché” that mirrors the Klossowskian 
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stereotype.  As he said, “A cliché is a sensory-motor image of the thing” - in other words it is 
what is immediately passed over, or by, on the basis that it is already too well known to 
perception (1989, p. 20).  Citing Bergson, he refers to the cliché as that which we “perceive 
less of” on the basis of the minimal conscious engagement it demands.  On the other hand, as 
Deleuze added, “if our sensory-motor schemata jam or break, then a different type of image 
can appear”, an image he goes on to describe, in the context of modern cinema, as the “time 
image” (p. 20).  The phantasm is that mechanism which injects back into the cognitive 
immobility of the stereotype an aberrant mobility calling on thought.  It is what perturbingly 
doubles with gregarious signs dissimulating their claim to equivalence or sameness (Smith 
2005, p. 17). 
 
Reading the Oedipal scenario into Klossowski’s counter-tripartite soul (composed of impulses-
intensities, phantasms, and simulacra-stereotypes) the limping protagonist carries at his core a 
phantasm repetition that both defines and beguiles identity.  He starts off “on the right foot” as 
Deleuze said, “gay and innocent”, believing “that he had warded off the monsters of the depth 
and allied himself with the powers from on high” (1990, p. 205).  He is a “peace-maker”, 
placating contesting forces, wishing in the process to better “form a kingdom of surfaces and of 
the earth to fit his size” (p. 205).  Yet the supposed right path carries within it a depth-intensity 
incommensurate with the surface of things.  The resulting tragic caesura calls for a 
commensurate simulacra – a blinding that reproduces, in the endless wandering that follows, a 
walker perpetually thrown off-course as measure of a limp that potentiates in every course 
passage tangential to intentionality.  In this too the simulacra releases what in the proper name 
of Oedipus had been silenced, initiating a reverse passage from a semiotic of consciousness 
(swollen headed) to a “semiotic of the impulses” (swollen footed) and with it an unfolding of 
the solecism binding bodily sense to language.  In another sense the apolis wanderer 
anticipates the Antique placement of an iconoclastic regime that cast the gods beyond the city 
limits.  Christian monotheism, with its mistrust of imitations and icons, exhibited a fear of the 
return of a polytheism and yet, with the turning of this monotheistic God away from humanity, 
it is a polytheism of sorts that returns, a polytheism of affects, “a kind of polytheistic inversion 
of Augustine’s monotheistic City of God” (Smith 2005, p. 11).  Yet the search for new affects 
conditional on alternative gods was pursued outside according to a city impulse itself given 
over to the perpetual transport of roads.  Seeking such impulse/gods beyond the grinding 
“heterorhythmy” of industrialising cities - perceived as resolutely godless - walkers sought what 
Barthes called idiorrhythmy – “a medium, utopian, Edenic, idyllic form” (2013, p. 9).  If what 
lyric-romantic idiorrhythmy sought was a rural, reconciled communality, what modernity’s 
promenade métaphysique crafted was a world-spanning (as opposed to the cosmos-spanning 
metaphysical walk), surface affair not without its pit falls in time.  
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11. Death-Drive 
 
 
In the following chapter it is with a return to city place proper that lyric will be found to 
exhaust itself.  There, walkers placed the experience of alienation and shock at the centre of 
their perambulations.  Yet what would experience itself entail, having become inseparable 
from “the surging emergence of the concept of the unconscious”, and therefore a thing beheld 
by neither a thinking self (the Cartesian cogito) nor an autonomously synthesising 
transcendental agent (the Kantian cogito) (Agamben 1993, pp. 40-41)?  For Agamben, between 
Montaigne and Rousseau the meaning of experience fundamentally changes: while for 
Montaigne, regaining consciousness subsequent to a fall while out riding was an extreme 
experience akin to death, for the Rousseau, a comparable limit is courted, when while on a 
country walk, he was struck down by a runaway Great Dane dog, the recovery from which was 
characterised as a kind of new birth ((pp. 38-41).  From death and infancy as models of 
defining limits in experience, the subject itself will appear as an entity compounded with an 
anonymising self in the “third person”, one complexly stretched between death and pleasure 
principles (p. 41).  Against a pastoral probing of cities (Wordsworth’s sonnet “Composed Upon 
Westminster Bridge” (1802) say), it was a de facto return to a repetitious, vertical sounding of 
urban terrain in the form of depth-intensity that characterised accounts of experience. 
	  
If psychoanalysis strikingly invested its energies in charting infantile terrain, Freud himself did 
not resist delving into the beyond of the self, indeed the beyond of life itself.  Yet contrary to 
the speculative, Freudian death drive and its quest for a return to inanimate matter, in 
Deleuze’s account, Thanatos turns the question of immobility towards temporal stasis.  To the 
extent that Eros repetitiously binds the libido to better facilitate a discharge in pleasure, 
repetition equally “holds together the instant”, and with it, a repetition of “what was before the 
instant” (1991, p. 114; emphasis in original).  Hence, the passing of time causes everything 
immemorially persisting or to come (Aion) to double with Chronos.  So on one hand, Eros 
binds excitation into momentary pleasure; on the other, temporality arises as that which 
repeatedly unbinds the present, siphoning of pleasure, excitation, and pulling experience back 
into the depths or what amounts to the pure, empty form of time (p. 114). 
	  
Green footed Eros and red footed Mnemosyne (itself the ultimate bearer of Thanatos, as 
testified to by the body without organs) risk swopping place.  For Nancy, if globalisation, with 
its proliferating agglomeration, is indicative of a “death drive”, the criss-crossed orb or glomus 
is indicative of a repetition-binding to excess.  This repetition though is of a technological 
order, an epic, circumlocutory overcoming of distance, but it is also a decent into an “excess – 
beyond representation” (Nancy 2007, p. 47).  This excess can be said to vitiate the course of 
Eros with its economy of pleasure and discharge of tension.  As Deleuze recognised, an 
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alternate rhythm may emerge where “Pleasure [becomes…] a form of behaviour related 
[solely] to repetition” itself (1991, p. 120).  In this sense pleasure and repetition “exchange[…] 
roles”, and in doing so, invoke a kind of “perverse mysticism” whereby “pleasure ceases to 
motivate the will and is adjured, disavowed, ‘renounced,’ the better to be recovered as a 
reward or consequence, and as a law” (p. 120).  He had in mind the particular desiring 
structures of masochism and sadism, whereby the surface resolutions of Oedipus fall back on 
various hyperbolised facets indexed to the before and after of the castration threat and that 
manifest, not as a pursuit of pleasure exactly, but as pleasure derived from the very act of 
backward, stalled repetitions.  Reversed this way “Eros is desexualised and humiliated for the 
sake of a resexualised Thanatos”, giving rise, as Deleuze put it, to the characterising 
atmospheres of “coldness and comfort (the coldness of desexualisation, on one hand, and the 
comfort of resexualisation, on the other)” (p. 120).  The coldness/comfort dichotomy associated 
with the masochist modality (as female authoritative ideal wrestled off a paternal administration 
of the socio-symbolic) will be shown in the following chapter to be of considerable 
significance for walker-observers – specifically Baudelaire and the flâneur – who made the 
troubled intersection of the maternal and the non-maternal, the desexualised and the 
resexualised, key initiatory levers for ‘knowing’ the city. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“An-Oedipal” Walking – Paris  
	  
	  
 
 
By man of the world’, I mean a man of the whole 
world, a man who understands the world and the 
mysterious and legitimate reasons behind all its 
customs […]. 
 
Charles Baudelaire 
	  
	  
	  
	  
1. The Natal 
	  
	  
What arises when a liberal citizenry, having surrendered a poeticised correspondence 
between national terrain and communal freedoms, confronts the repetition to excess of 
nineteenth century urban industrial life?   To the extent that national political economies in 
Europe pitted liberal democracy against monarchical absolutism, as suggested previously, 
the beneficiary was the bourgeoisie, who found in such economies, an institutional form 
apposite to its mercantile goals (Sassen 2006).  To “the raw power of capital” was added the 
mandate to confer rights and privileges to the owners of capital (p. 100).  Yet, to the extent 
that the resulting political economy depended on a new national identification or 
consciousness, it was enacted in accordance with the production of rights-bearing subjects 
themselves profoundly split between propertied classes and disenfranchised others, or what 
Sassen termed “distinct economic subjects/actors” (p. 105 & 110).  While the route taken by 
each European State varied, as Sassen argued, bourgeois hegemony rested on a caesura in 
the national body, one that showed up in cities particularly.  Masking the institutionalising 
of disadvantage, the citizen/subject was otherwise held up as its own self-sufficient property 
bearing the very “dignity of individual man” as Langan put it (1995, p. 14).  Yet ironically, 
such self-possession could not escape the propensity in modernity for the “transformation of 
[all] property into circulating capital”, a mobility that not only reduced fixed distinctions 
increasingly to “unit[s] of account” but no less cast persons into circulation in accordance 
with a generalised “obligation to mobility” (p. 38 & 101).  Grounding what Deleuze and 
Guattari termed a “global Subjectivity” – or “naked and free labor” disenfranchised from 
land – is the nation-state (“the ‘natal’”), itself an abstract means of instituting an 
identificatory consistency (1987, p. 456) - or “imagined community” as Benedict Anderson 
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(1991) had it - amidst the productive forces otherwise decoding prior local values, 
communities and place-based solidarities.  
 
Contrastive with the despotic state that enslaves its populace as component parts of an 
empiric “megamachine”, the nation-State subjects citizens to a social apparatus reproducing 
itself in “passional […] living forms” – meaning contingent identificatory fields or totalities 
built on a “certain deterritorialization of territories (community land, imperial provinces, 
seigneurial domains etc.)” and an invented ‘people’ brought about by “a decoding of the 
population” (pp. 456).  In systems of national “social subjection”, as Deleuze and Guattari 
argued, all subjects are workers of some sort labouring on the social body of capital itself: 
 
In effect, capital acts as the point of subjectification that constitutes all human 
beings as subjects; but some, the “capitalists,” are subjects of enunciation that 
form the private subjectivity of capital, while the others, the “proletarians,” are 
subjects of the statement, subjected to the technical machines [industrial 
apparatuses] in which constant capital is effectuated”. (p. 457) 
 
Hence post-signifying subject positions, vacillating between enunciation and statement, 
between a national self and minoritarian (or “nationalitarian”) vestiges, constitute so many 
axioms or instances of consolidation otherwise coursed by capitalism’s circulatory matrix 
(p. 457).  Deleuze and Guattari call these points of consolidation “axiomatization” (p. 461), 
a process of “forced reterritorialization” conditioning, diverting and reconfiguring the 
prevailing deterritorialization (Holland 1998, p. 67).  To the extent that axiomatization 
installs “antiproduction within production itself”, it does so on the basis of reconfiguring 
prevailing modes of production to induce ever further productivity.  The whole enterprise 
works, as Eugene Holland has suggested, by “free[ing] people from determinate conditions 
of existence and codes of meaning […] only to force them by necessity to accept new and 
increasingly exploitative conditions” (1998, p. 67).  This doubling is not without a degree of 
deadening cynicism, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, and the positing of ever-new 
‘living’ scenarios on the basis of an interminable process geared to “extort surplus value” 
carried with it a sense of fluctuating reality driven by mundane passional attachments at 
once attracting and yet far from believable (2000, p. 238).  Such was, and remains, the 
comforts and coldness of the full body of capital.  
 
This chapter charts encounters with the nineteenth century, urban capitalist socius and the 
shock effects characterising it.  Stripped of the ‘natural’ idealism vested in the natal, market 
decoding shows its raw, fanged countenance, and with it, a problem for experience.  
Previously Agamben was shown emphasising a general malfunction in the experiencing 
subject, one arising with the Cartesian and Kantian cogitos.  At stake was a rising awareness 
of the unconscious and the role of unknowing in acts of knowing.  Consistent with a 
changeover that saw death displaced by infancy as the locale where the limit experience of 
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knowledge was tested, the urban itself was taken to be a sick body, the convalescence from 
which would rise up, in terms the hygienist movement anticipated, a reinvigorated, reborn 
organism.  Charles Baudelaire, building on Edgar Allan Poe’s gauging of the 
incomprehensible mysteries of urban life via a convalescing wanderer (in “The Man of the 
Crowd”, 1840), vests exemplary urban comprehension in a child’s-eye view – something 
equally credited to adults returning to health from convalescence (2010, pp. 10-11).  This 
observing acuity Baudelaire credited to a new persona – the “‘man of the world’” – who, as 
a kind of specialist artist “tied to his palette like a serf to the soil”, wants to know and 
understand all that “the surface of the spheroid” has to offer (2010, p. 9).1  Yet, as Agamben 
noted, this chronicling of modern life in total was required to pass through the shock effects 
of the urban.  Place-estrangement was the royal road to a “’lieu common’” or “common 
place” given by epiphanous knowing (1993, pp. 41-42).  The cost, as this chapter aims to 
show, is a psychical splitting and that division’s management. 
	  
	  
 
2. Vagrancy & Bohemia  
 
	  
Baudelaire’s “man of the world” is one response to capitalist decoding when a definitive 
image or enduring unity of the social body is stalled.  Unlike the “transcendental unity” 
maintained by the despotic socius, axiomatization, as the nation-State’s mode of contingent 
unification, is compelled to play catch up with the “superior deterritorialization of capital” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1987, pp. 455-458).  Axiomatization induces, no less than it seeks to 
manage, incessant shifts in subjective repertoire.  Certainly the nineteenth century European 
capitals facilitated an adventurism of subject-types that stressed the limits and tolerance of 
bourgeois sensibility.  Paris, caught in successive waves of revolution and Empire, was one 
such locale where, as Jerrold Seigel described, “Bourgeois progress”, in its project to 
overturn old vestiges of a sovereign/despotic power (Ancien Régime), increasingly sought - 
in pursuit of what Hegel had diagnosed as a troubling “free subjectivity” - “the dissolution 
of traditional restrictions on personal development” (1986, p. 10).  Yet for Seigel, the 
Bohemianism of the 1830s and 40s was not alien to the bourgeois project; in fact it 
represented something like the shock troops of a progressive quest for bourgeois hegemony 
and self-development (p. 05 & 11).  Moreover Bohemianism was particularly identified with 
“artistism” whose inventive theatrics challenged prevailing identities and presumed 
destinies while purporting to challenge the commercialism of the age (pp. 11 & 17).  Yet 
consistent with Seigel’s intuition of a continuity in the bourgeois-Bohemian identificatory 
field, the anti-commercial polemic of Bohemianism no doubt unwittingly paralleled a 
market drive to dissolve determinant conditions and fixed points of subjectification, while 
                                       
1	  This “painter of modern life” was the artist Constantin Guys (1802-1892) (2010, p. 7).	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‘inventing’ new passional points on which to capitalise. As Félix Pyat, who coined the term 
artisism, worried: “One is an artist the way one used to be a property owner, it’s the 
distinguishing mark of those people who don’t have any” (cited in Seigel 1986, p. 17).  
Certainly the descriptor Bohemian - itself drawing on the French word for gypsy (bohémien) 
as Seigel noted - signalled a positive revaluing of ‘flight’ and postsignifying 
deterritorialization, particularly in its emphasis on an older “romantic fascination with the 
exotic, the uncivilised, and the unclassifiable” ascribed to vagabondage and the wandering 
of travelling peoples, themselves thought to transport a noble legacy contesting narrow 
Enlightenment rationality (p. 24).  On the other hand, imperialism, colonial trade and the 
circulation of foreign nationals in nineteenth century urban settings exposed even the most 
insulated of lives to an alien newness.  As Seigel credited an anonymous writer of the time, 
“‘the gypsies of the old civilisation will have become the messengers of the new’”, thereby 
casting “fantasy” into “society’s center”– having otherwise been “squeeze[ed…] into the 
corners and margins of existence” (p. 25).  Indeed the vagabond in these contexts was more 
than simply the messenger of the new; as Langan has argued, vagabondage was that state 
mostly closely approaching “the abstracted unit of citizenship” arising with a post-
revolutionary confluence of romanticism and liberalism and remains the “hallucinatory 
double of capital” whose “sole logic is expansion” (1995, pp. 12 & 224).  In its destination-
free lassitude, vagrancy is capable of being misread (on the basis of a means-ends 
substitution) as the very indicator of an economic freedom from productive labour (p. 14), 
and in its urbanised guise (as the stroll or promenade), as the indicator of a certain skewing 
of leisure practices originating with aristocratic and cosmopolitan elites, but widely adopted 
by the middle classes (Amato 2004).  Bohemianism, as catchall for a raft of identificatory 
positions, and as recipient of residual threads of romanticism, no doubt conflated freedom 
of mobility with economic freedom, though not without substituting the visceral, and often 
poverty-stricken, bodies for its cultivated, genial double. 
	  
Attendances like this on states of bodily comportment and social types were indicative, as 
Seigel noted, of a will to visualise and raise to the level of public consciousness - via a 
burgeoning print medium particularly - the proliferating subjectivities spawned by urban-
industrial life (1986, p. 28).  Specifically, “popular pamphlets called physiologies” - which 
“described Parisian social types” including the flâneur - were widely circulated in the 1840s 
and 50s (pp. 28-29). Sought were recognisable characters amidst the crowd - figures in 
whom a certain inherency lay - yet the flâneur, as one such type in fact offered a master 
figure for roving detection.  As Walter Benjamin put it: “Performed in the figure of the 
flâneur is that of the detective”, a performance that while covered over by indolence, “in 
reality, hides the riveted attention of an observer who will not let the unsuspecting 
malefactor out of his sight” (2002, p. 442).  How distant is the Cartesian man of the crowd 
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from this “spectator prince” cultivating his own anonymity while capitalising on the 
exposure of others (p. 443).  As Benjamin cited Baudelaire:  
 
“For the perfect flâneur,… it is an immense joy to set up home in the heart of the 
multitude, amid the ebb and flow… To be away from home, yet to feel oneself 
everywhere at home; to see the world, to be at the center of the world, yet to 
remain hidden from the world […]”. (p. 443)  
 
Moreover, if the flâneur is the observer-spy of the marketplace as Benjamin asserted, he is 
no less the bearer of an idleness that strains against “the division of labour” (p. 427).  In 
flâneurie particularly is found, as Seigel put it, “the tension between work and indulgence, 
travail and jouissance” (p. 125).  Against the specialisation and the sedentariness of work, 
public service and the professions, jouissance, or immoderate enjoyment, was the antidote 
to work stricture and its forced inertia.  Baudelaire’s own transgressing of the bourgeois 
work ethic found an ideal in the “dandy” – an arcane “champion[…] of human pride”, 
fastidious in appearance and yet the conduit for a “spirituality and stoicism” exercised with 
monastic despotism (2010, pp. 38-39).  Moreover, this version of the stoical transported an 
aristocratism linked, as Charles Taylor has shown, to heroism, bravery and corporeal risk – 
in other words, an ethos apposite to the “warrior-aristocrat” (1989, p. 436; Baudelaire 2010, 
p. 36).  Underwriting Baudelaire’s writings, as Taylor saw it, was an epiphanic project 
whose heroism sought to draw from a degraded market urbanism a spiritual dividend, a 
yield no longer convincingly attributable to the natural idealism of Romanticism.  Yet key 
for Baudelaire was a remaking of dandyism and its blasé indifference. As he compared the 
dandy to Constantin Guys (“M.G.”): 
 
[…] the dandy aspires to cold detachment, and it is in this way that M.G., who is 
dominated, if ever anyone was, by an insatiable passion, that of seeing and 
feeling, parts company trenchantly with dandyism. Amabam amare, said St 
Augustine. ‘I love passion, passionately,’ M.G. might willingly echo. (2010, p. 12)   
 
This reformed dandyism nevertheless entailed a descent into crowding movement to find in 
its “ebb and flow, the bustle, the fleeting and the infinite” (p. 13).  Drunkenly given over to 
the mass in person, an alchemistic remaking of the urban everyday was sought (1989, pp. 
436-437).  
 
	  
3. Market Descent  
 
 
 
For Taylor, Baudelaire’s paean to drunkenness (“Time to get drunk” - whether on wine, 
poetry or virtue) entailed a derangement aiming to slip free from work time’s “horrible 
burden” (Baudelaire 1970, p. 74 & Taylor 1989, p. 437).  Actively sought in this counter-
temporality was what Taylor called an awareness of existential “wholeness”, a recovery 
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afforded to aesthetic practices, particularly poetry and literature.  If art in the nineteenth 
century came to replace ‘nature’ as an inherent source of existential meaning, for Taylor it 
was because while the latter increasingly came to be thought “too inert, disordered, 
opaque, [and] banal”, art itself offered instead the possibility of “build[ing] a realm entirely 
apart” – solely responsive that is to human action and reform (p. 439).  City space offered a 
source of revising poetic richness, and signalled a broader shift away from lapsed Edenic 
values towards the urban inorganic as itself a domain of perfectibility.  For Taylor, this 
appeal to an active, crystalline exactness over passive organic chaos matched a shift from 
an Erasmian Christian orientation to a Jansenist one that insisted on tying human 
motivations to original sin, and a quest for the soul’s purity by way of a passage through 
depravity and fallen life (1989, pp. 249, 356, 439).  These two Christian orientations 
complexly double for Taylor with Aristotelian and Platonic traditions where, through a 
complex series of crossovers, an Aristotelian overcoming of inner division associated with 
the organic gave way to a darkening Platonism (1989, pp. 439-440).  Hence a quest for 
wholeness, once upwardly directed in the metaphysical walk, is made to pass through the 
debased motivations of market society. 
	  
For Holland, Baudelaire’s evolving poetic output complexly inhabits what Taylor termed the 
“post-romantic” visionary posture.  Baudelaire was not only an exemplary poet of “shock-
defence” who called for a “high-anxiety hyperconsciousness”, but he also ushered in a 
“psychic splitting” – or what amounts to a breakdown of subjective consistency and 
foundation (1993, p. 04).2  Hence, if in Baudelaire’s transition from romanticism to 
modernism there is a parallel shift from lyric to prose (or “anti-lyric”) poetry, as Holland 
argued, equally at stake is a transition from a defensively maintained psychical whole, to a 
split psychical condition giving rise, on one hand, to a plethora of shifting identifications, 
and on the other, to an aggressive drive to totalise or close off a ‘self’ resistant to its 
perturbing setting (p. 03 & 07).  Moreover, this poetic “psychodynamics” was integrally tied 
to the intensified societal decoding defining the market economy.  The “‘cash nexus’ of the 
market” exclusively privileged exchange-value over use-value in a reification that alienated 
and commoditised phenomena, severing them from concrete attachments (p. 12).  What 
interested Holland though was a parallel between this rationalisation/reification and 
decoding/recoding, where, as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, decoding works by 
demystifying, devaluing and subordinating qualities, while recoding involves bestowing 
                                       
2	  Holland drew the notion of psychical splitting from Melanie Klein who had documented the 
“near-total disorganization of the psyche at the earliest, pre-Oedipal stages” (1993, p. 24), or what 
Klein herself called “paranoid and schizoid anxieties and mechanisms” that “drive the ego to 
develop specific defence-mechanism” (1975, p. 02).  Splitting for Klein centred on a “dispersal of 
the destructive impulse which is felt as the source of danger”, one that attaches itself to varying 
‘external objects’ via “projection” (1975, 04-05).  From this arise a complex series of splitting and 
absorptions of good and bad objects that variously lead to the consolidation of the ego and/or 
schizoid psychical positions.	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new qualities replacing those stripped from original experience, albeit one amenable to 
further decoding and calculative valuation (p. 13).  While recognising capitalism’s 
essentially “a-semiotic” characteristic, Holland was interested in the tendency for 
axiomatization to be “imbricated on both sides [decoding and recording] with sign-
systems”, and as a consequence, to be “detectable in the psyche and in literary texts as well 
as in social institutions” (p. 15).  Importantly, modernity as that liberalisation apposite to the 
capitalist socius and its overturning of a despotic or imperial signifying regime, in fact was 
what emerging art practices of modernism – as a relatively autonomous domain staked out 
in contradistinction to the bourgeois market society – aimed to repudiate through 
accelerated experiments in decoding (p. 15).  Nineteenth century urban bohemia was one 
such incubator for radicalising art and subject types, no less than societal coherence.  Key 
in Baudelaire’s ushering in of modernist practices was a revision of romanticism’s 
deployment of metaphor in favour of metonymy (Holland 1993, p. 11).  For Holland, this 
meant an unmooring of tropic equivalence, and identity in favour of associational fluidity 
and ambiguous signifcation.	  	  Reworking what Lacan called a “metonymy of desire”, 
Holland described how “infinite semiosis” (1993, 5) is released when the symbolic 
structure, ordinarily guaranteed by an anchoring significatory centre is lost: 
	  
In cases where the law of signification fails, particularly when the “nom/non-du-
père” is denied (or “foresclosed”), the result according to Lacan is 
“schizophrenia,” a purely metonymic form of desire not governed by the 
metaphoric grammar, syntax, and lexicon of the symbolic order, linguistically 
conceived. (2006 p. 18) 
	  
For Holland though, it is not the name of the father per se that defines the Symbolic order, 
but rather a “certain figure-of-the-despot” which is used to maintain “coherent rule over 
social relations, behaviour and cognition” (p. 19).  “Schizophrenic desire” and an excessive 
semiosis accompanying it, far from being a pathologic exception, is the operational norm 
induced by capitalist market relations.  Eschewing “infantile determinism” and familial 
extrapolation as the foundation of psychic life, Holland asserted with Deleuze and Guattari 
that it is this “socio-historical context [that…] ultimately determines psychic life” (p. 19).      
	  
In previous chapters Oedipus was recognised as fulfilling an ameliorating role, binding 
contraries into surface continuities, the traversal of which required a unified speaking 
subject.  In the standard psychoanalytic depiction, the possibility of “speaking as [an] ‘I’” 
depends on “‘whole’ social beings modelled on one of its parents”, themselves situated 
within a differential system sanctioned by paternal privilege (p. 197).  Such a resolution is 
understood to entail the refiguring of maternal attachment according to a socio-symbolic 
apprenticeship that internalises paternal authority in the form of the super-ego (p. 187).	  	  For 
Holland this meant the abandonment of an “Ideal ego” – as omnipotent fusing prior to 
maternal separation (or what Freud called “primary narcissism”) – in favour of an “Ego-ideal 
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that condenses cultural norms by way of social role modelling (p 193).	  	  Conversely, a 
pathos in modernity paralleling the intensification of market relations necessarily renders 
socio-symbolic apprenticeship unstable precisely because its repetition mechanisms 
(decoding/recoding cycles) trouble the maintenance of ego-ideals and the sublimation or 
desexualisation of Eros.  As suggested previously, disenfranchised Eros opens the way to 
Thanatos and sheer repetition as a mechanism maintaining pleasure in its own right.  For 
Holland the shock-effects of modern urban life charted by Baudelaire are both indicative of 
the latter and prompted exploration of a mode of desexualisation centred on self-dissolution 
and re-engenderment – in short, a deployment of the urban as an initiatory mechanism 
productive of individuation.	  	  Consciousness thrown into constant, defensive vigilance, in 
fact models a Christian ethos of suffering and self-attendance, something already key in 
romanticism.  Consistent with the lapse of revolutionary promise, as canvased previously, 
romanticism had long validated “personal suffering” as a mode of resistance to, and 
compensation for, the resulting vacillation between decoding and excessive recoding (p. 
186).  If in that context suffering served to secondarily bind social solidarity, Baudelaire 
presided over a transformation of this tradition, seeking instead a psychic intensity resulting 
from identification with transgressive societal stricture (p. 187).  Flaunting the demands of 
the socio-symbolic in pursuit of “guilt-ridden” intensity amounted to an “existential 
masochism” answering to a sadistically perceived socio-symbolic despotism (pp.187-188).  
	  
Hence the aristocratic dandy, in whom is found both a warrior’s sacrifice and suffering 
asceticism, plied a strange course between social elevation and descending immersion into 
a depraved urban substratum.  Concomitantly, Baudelaire’s post-Romantic sensibility, with 
its increasing reliance on prose poetry over lyric (specifically the “Tableaux parisiens” and 
Petits Poèmes en prose), tended towards more “‘realistic’ poems” shorn of the “exotic 
fantasy”, as Leo Bersani noted (1977, p. 106).  These depictions of external spectacle were 
coincident with an appeal to urban others as a source of appropriation: 
 
That is, the bits and pieces of observed life in a big city provide the poet with an 
opportunity to put bits and pieces together, to reconstitute a coherent life from an 
isolated image. And he reconstitutes those lives for himself: it is as if the poet 
could become whole only by fabricating a wholeness outside himself. (1977, p. 
108; emphasis in original) 
 
For this a mobile observance was necessary and it is in this context that walking is made a 
key mode of encounter.  For instance in “Les Sept Vieillards” (“The Seven Old Men”) of the 
“Tableaux parisiens” section, a strolling narrator is accosted by mysteries and living ghosts 
travelling Paris’ “giant colossus’ conduits” (1998, p. 177).  Specifically confronting is the 
appearance of an “evil” eyed “old man” whose posture defied bipedal propriety: 
 
You would not call him bent, but cut in two - 
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His spine made a right angle with his legs 
So neatly that his cane, the final touch, 
Gave him the figure and the clumsy step (1998, p. 179) 
 
Yet once sighted, such men multiply: not one, not two, but “seven times”, sinister, ancient 
men “indifferent to life”, are depicted tramping off “towards their unknown goal” (p. 179).  
Rushing home, the observer is left to reassemble a semblance of self from his “soul [sent] 
danc[ing] in circles like a hull Dismantled, on a monstrous shoreless sea” (p. 181).  
Balanced between shattered integrity and narcissistic recovery, the urban multiplying of one 
type, whole and self-sufficient - if monstrously so – sets in play a vicious condemnation of 
urban place as hell-like and a datum from which an integrated self must be risen from - for 
which the high-low, sky-street, right-angled body offer repeated tropes.  Bersani said of this 
poem, it is as if, despite seeming not to recognise himself in these others, they nevertheless 
theatricalize a “separation of the self from itself” (1977, p. 122) and if, in Baudelaire’s 
words, they are indicative of a familial perturbation or “Trick Phoenix” giving rise to the son 
[as…] father of himself” (1998, p. 181), in fact the narrator performs precisely this tricky 
self-engenderment by repeatedly recalling and reordering the spectacle.  For Holland too 
“Les Sept Vieillards” demonstrates a drive to arrest urban shock but through “extreme 
metaphor”, where poetic correspondences aim at an “infinite repetition of the absolutely 
identical same” and therefore a cessation in the serial motion of metonymic desire (2006, p. 
162).  Against “These monsters [that] smacked of all eternity” (Baudelaire 1998, p. 179), the 
Phoenix trick of the living walker turns on a sheer mobility capable of encounter and 
surviving withdrawal. 
	  
	  
4. Love-Hate Amidst the Crowds  
	  
	  
Pointedly, this encounter with inscruitable old man is redolent of Poe’s “The Man of the 
Crowd”, where encounter and fevered pursuit of an elderly character though London city 
streets similarly leads to a recoiling realisation that incomprehensible desires and monstrous 
motivations are revealed when singular entities of the moving urban mass are drawn into 
observed scrutiny.  Like the roamer in “Les Sept Vieillards”, Poe’s narrator, having pursued 
this incompressible other night and day, has no option but to retreat, to re-narrate, and 
assert his own peripatetic logic in opposition to that which he has observed.	  	  However, 
Poe’s importance for Baudelaire goes beyond particular instances of poetic mimesis; for 
Holland what Poe provided, given his own political and economic circumstances, was an 
“ego-ideal” showing how “martyrdom to market society” and the suffering it engenders 
might also potentiate poetic greatness (2006, p. 209).  Building on a claim by Michel Butor, 
Holland similarly recognised Poe as one of three “poetic Others” or “intercessors” 
corresponding with phases in Baudelaire’s poetic trajectory: in his romantic phase - “long-
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time mistress Jeanne Duval”; in the revolutionary phase - “the people of Paris in 1848”; and 
subsequent to the installation of Napoleon III in the 1851 coup - Poe himself (2006, p. 23). 	  
In the latter the “modern aristocrat” or tragic ‘breed’ emerged, much as Poe had, as a figure 
both antithetical to market society yet tethered inextricably with it.  This trajectory defines: 
firstly, Baudelaire’ turning from romanticism and the harmonious ideal towards city space as 
libertarian counter-model to the militarism of Napoleon (1769-1821); secondly, a rising 
sense of compromise, particularly given the installation of the Bourgeois Monarchy of Louis-
Philippe in 1830 and a restoration of commercially-driven market relations seen to 
prostitute societal and artistic values; and thirdly, despair and cynicism at the collapse of 
democratic idealism with the arrival of the Second Empire (pp. 14-15). Baudelairean poetics 
then, born of this cynicism, sought to bridge and re-programme a crisis in artistic, creative 
values indicative across the entirety of the social body  (p. 6).	  
	  
In line with a psychical-historical convergence Deleuze and Guattari called schizoanalysis 
and Holland deployed in his consideration of Baudelaire, both psyche and socio-historical 
entities can be understood, at different levels, to synthesis “a global sense of duration”, one 
that holds together the divergent temporalities of prior psychical part identifications and 
objects, no less than competing societal aspirations and interests were given global 
coordination in a bourgeois hegemony (Faulkner 2006, p. 36).  The socio-symbolic itself 
can be considered phallic to the extent that a ‘global’ engirdling and subordinating of rival 
instincts and interests linked to Eros and Mnemosyne are accomplished (p. 37; Deleuze 
1994, pp. 102-103).  What Lacan called the phallus, Deleuze interrogates as a symbolic 
organ covering over the “virtual or partial objects” it borrows and builds on.  Such a 
genealogy taints the phallus with absence making it a thing “displaced in relation to itself”, 
a thing “found only as lost”, and “possessed of an always fragmentary identity which loses 
its identity in the double” (1994, p. 103).  In psychoanalytic terms, the phallic orientation 
spells the end of the “auto-erotic drives” (anal, oral & urethral stages), supplanting them 
with concretely real, desired objects, but not without positing these prior stages as both lost 
and paradisiacal – in other words, contributive of a retrospective illusion of unity otherwise 
set in a pure past preceding phallic division (Faulkner 2006, p. 38).  Deleuze offered an 
explicitly philosophical characterisation of lost psychical loves: pre-Socratic philosophy, in 
its splintered allegiances and contested assertions of existential certainty, was pointedly 
schizophrenic in orientation; Platonism, in its attempt to reconcile and iron out such 
multifarious claims, was essentially depressive – depressive in the sense that its revised love 
of wisdom entailed a distribution of love and hate based on the whole of truth at once 
asserted and withdrawn (1990, p. 191). In Plationism as Deleuze said: 
 
[…] the Good is reached only as the object of a reminiscence, uncovered as 
essentially veiled; the One gives only what it does not have, since it is superior to 
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what it gives, withdrawn into its height; and as Plato said of the Idea, “it flees or it 
perishes”. (pp. 191-192) 
  
Concomitantly, the metaphysical walk, no less than modernity’s promenade métaphysique, 
undertake a depressive quest for a good that is prior and always perishing.  Further, an 
Occidental onto-peripatetic, to the extent that it mirrors an Oedipal vector, is phallic in 
orientation precisely because it strains to bind symbolically “always displaced fragment[s]” 
themselves “standing for a past which was never present” (Deleuze 1994, p. 103). 
Seemingly reconciled in a “narcissistic illusion”, the maternal “ideal ego” (given through 
Eros) and the paternal “ego-ideal” (given through Thanatos) are what the phallus gathers 
and attempts to reconcile, though not without enduring the spectre of a split or castrative 
division (p. 39).  Sublimation is the Freudian answer to this disjuncture where, in a 
narcissistic illusion (Oedipus as peace-maker and surface-builder), the wounded ideal ego 
and the departed ego-ideal (heterogeneous series associated with maternal and paternal 
figures, but also corporeal depths and a transcendent voice on high) are drawn together 
inwardly consolidating as the Id and the super-ego (p. 48).  In what Deleuze saw as a 
particular configuration of the disjunctive synthesis, sublimation aims to draw together 
through recognition and identification, the hybrid underpinnings of the psyche, thereby 
channelling prohibition towards social utility and cohesiveness (pp. 48- 50).  
Desexualisation (or the reassigning of libidinal energy towards non-erotic ends) is the price 
of this reconciliation, but also promises a healing of the split that brings the ego into being – 
though not without the expending of considerable energy to overcome pre-phallic psychical 
patterns.  Much as Goux found in the Oedipal vector a hyper-validation of the intellect and 
self-mastery, Freud too associates sublimation with an intellectual world committed to 
bypassing instinctual frustrations and to constructing a reality in which phantasies are 
remade “‘into truths of a new kind’” (Freud cited in Faulkner 2006, p. 49).  This elevating 
drive, indicative of a Platonic upward quest, is rich with instabilities as Keith Fauklner has 
explored, for “the superego’s structure issues from, and prolongs, the perversions of the pre-
genital series”, and more, it is “a foundation of vice” that seeds a culture’s virtues.  Perverse 
impulses differ from sublimation, as Faulkner said, only by virtue of “the social usefulness of 
the outcome” (pp. 50-51).  If the upward path out of the pre-phallic libido offers one route 
for desexualisation, Deleuze recognises another, one, as suggested previously, that bypasses 
sublimation in favour of a perverse resolution embracing both the irreality potentiated by 
the id and the strictures of the reality principle (1991, p. 117). It is this course, a downward 
journey in fact, that Baudelaire found necessary in his traversal of urban space.  
 
A phallic orientation, in its quest for unified wholes, equates to a psychical “object = x” 
(Deleuze 1994, p. 103).  In contrast to a psychotic orientation, the Oedipal problem of 
restoring failed loves is a neurotic project effected by a “depressive thinker dream[ing] of 
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lost betrothals”, as Deleuze said, but one carried out instead as a problem of forced 
couplings of divided states (1990, p. 219). In the case of the walker = x (the walker who 
seeks that which is transcendent to the perceptual given), it was a matter of condensing the 
“bad infinity” (Nancy) of a mercantile proliferation made global, with the bad infinitive of 
pleasure anchored singularly in repetition for its own sake (a pathos in modernity).  In 
Baudelaire the walker = x is made to span dual infinites – hell and heaven – that themselves 
double the before and after, the past (lost, corrupted) with the future (forsaken – “Each day 
we’re one step further into Hell” as he advises the reader at the commencement of Les 
Fleurs du Mal (1998, p. 05)).  Each infinty confronts the incomprehensibility of the present 
or “now-time” in Baudelaire, as Francoise Meltzer has said (2011, p. 243).  “Spleen and the 
Ideal”, as the opening section is titled, pits the melancholy and inordinate demotivation 
(“Nothing is longer than the limping days” Baudelaire 1970, p. 147) against the paragons of 
love and art, gauging the yawning gap between the real and its elevation as ideal. 
	  
The real, defined by a bourgeois advancing of linear time apposite to the progressive 
advancing of mercantilism, is no less the bearer of excess sensory stimuli that challenges the 
very constitution of the experiencer.  Benjamin for his part charted in Baudelaire a 
transformation of the “structure of […] experience” in which individual existence ceases to 
find a correlate in “the collective past” with its rituals, ceremonies, and festivals (1999, p. 
153).  It is this lapse of correlation that exposes experience to the corrosive action of clock 
time, or, as Baudelaire put it in L’ Horloge (“The Clock”), subjection to “The Clock! [as] a 
sinister, impassive god” that “eats”, minute by minute, a ‘man’s’ “earthly season” (1998, p. 
161).  Abyssal, featureless time, bereft of substantive shared markers, precludes the 
integration of experience with memory and recollection and institutes in the nineteenth 
century the hyper-awareness of temporality Baudelaire called spleen time (p. 163; see also 
Holland 2006, p. 112).  Consciousness, as Benjamin made clear with reference to Freud, is 
the psychical mechanism that manages stimuli without recourse to memory traces, but in an 
environment like the nineteenth century city where “shock experience has become the 
norm”, a “constantly [engaged] consciousness” no longer has the mediating capacity of the 
past to mitigate the influx of impressions (1999, pp. 157-158).  Deprived of a synthesising 
continuum, incidents are sustained as recollections, Benjamin thinks in the case of 
Baudelaire, only on the basis of their exceptionality within the uniform calendar of market 
existence (p. 159).  A kind of halting patchwork makes up a simulacra of experience itself 
always in a duelling contest with the shock-medium that is the city and which wrenches 
from Baudelaire himself a “‘jerky gait’” as he searches out “rhyme-booty” (p. 160).  As 
“precise point in time”, complete in themselves and cut off from spleen time, the congealed 
islands of consciousness stand apart as ideals countering the sense of life as something past 
experiencing (p. 180), and provide the only means available, as Holland put it, “to salvage 
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some form of experience from the ravages of modernity” (2006, p. 114).  Benjamin finds in 
the poem “Correspondances” what he calls a “crisis-proof form” mobilised by Baudelaire 
against the mundanity of spleen time, whereby a concurrence between things can be found 
by tracking backward in time in a quest for an original datum or “unity” in “nature” (1999, 
p. 178 & Baudelaire 1998, p. 19). “Man walks within these groves of symbols” Baudelaire 
said, “which regard him as a kindred thing” (1998, p. 19), and in this sense deterritorialises 
in the name of beauty what was once initiated into the realm of ritual.  Statuesque – in fact 
phallic – such symbols invoke a kind of unified “prehistory” and experienced in another 
time or by other lives (Benjamin 1999, p. 178).  Here symbols, unmoored from their 
signifying context, assume an a-signifying capacity standing as so many proximate things 
both bared and apart – together and apart that is, as the mass of the crowd maintains itself.	  	  
	  
 
 
5. From Impression-Gathering to Programming  
	  
	  
A quest for a correspondence between mundane and ideal time was already palpable in 
Descartes’ Amsterdam walks, but demonstrates there the relatively easy correlation, despite 
a developing metaphysics of separation.  In Baudelaire, as Benjamin identified, the arrested 
idéal cannot but battle uncertainly with spleen time which “musters the multitude of the 
seconds against it” (p. 180).  Yet as Holland argued, spleen time, in its brutal repetition, 
effected a “death-threat” that ultimately undoes any appeal to prolonged or recovered 
instances of perception (2006, p. 137 & 161).  The “poetics of correspondence”, or what 
Holland takes to be a metaphoric project enacted against a metonymy of desire, reveals 
itself to be far from crisis-proof (p. 162).  Consequently, between the “Spleen et idéal” and 
the “Tableaux Parisiens” sections of Les Fleurs du Mal, Holland recognised a transition.  
Contrastive with the linear march of spleen time, the “Tableaux Parisiens” section - starting 
with “Paysage” (“Landscape”) and “Le Soleil” (“The Sun”) – turned to cyclical modes of 
temporality (p. 137).  As such, there is an emphasis on “first person future indicatives” over 
“history and the nature”3 and a pointed exercising of the “Poetic will” over the dissolution 
of self in spleen time (p. 138).  Further, a shift is evident in the “Tableaux Parisiens” towards 
“contextual reference” or place description and with it, an emphasising of space over time 
(p. 128).  This attendance on “real reference” centres less on the recovery of memory traces 
than on the production of novelty through observational encounter - in other words a 
supplanting of memory by imagination. 	  
	  
                                       
3 For instance, “Paysage” proclaims itself an “eclogue”, though not without overturning its pastoral 
association with a parodic, urban one (see note 167, Baudelaire 1998 p. 369), and rendering the 
waging of riots an incidental, outside concern to be shut out like the winter (1998, p. 167).	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Significantly, it is with the urban-flâneur that Baudelaire’s late art criticism is worked out in 
conjunction with the validation of a poetic will and place-reference in his later poetry (pp. 
140-141).  Indeed the whole impression-observation-depiction assemblage is dependent on 
a “built-in observer- flâneur” fixated on “city life” as Holland said (p. 147).  Pointedly, the 
transition from memory to imagination was understood to launch a modernist aesthetic 
Baudelaire called “mnemonic art”, and which appealed to practices capable of capturing 
amidst the impressions of sense experience “the culminating features or highlights of an 
object” in what amounted to an outlining (literally a delineation) of the ‘big picture’ and the 
contributing “effect as a whole” (Baudelaire 2010, p. 21).  Yet this mnemonic art, as 
Holland puts it, “is in a sense undecidable: neither a simple reproduction of the object-
world, nor a pure product of artistic will or style, but something in between” (2006, p. 147).  
At once passive and active, the artist is both the involuntary receiver of impressions and the 
shaper of novel visions.  At stake in other words is an implantation of the warrior-like and 
shock-resistant dandy-flâneur with the excessively “sensitive artist” caught up in a 
perceptual infantilism induced by an “involuntarily” reception to inchoate impressions.  On 
this basis does Baudelaire’s “man-child” take up the “whole world” as its domain of interest 
and measure (2010, p. 09 & 12): 
 
[…] the lover of universal life moves into the crowd as though into an enormous 
reservoir of electricity.  He, the lover of life, may also be compared to a mirror as 
vast as this crowd; to a kaleidoscope endowed with consciousness, which with 
every one of its movements presents a pattern of life, in all its multiplicity, and the 
flowing grace of all the elements that go to compose life.  It is an ego athirst for 
the non-ego, and refreshing it at every moment in energies more vivid than life 
itself, always inconstant and fleeting. (2010, p. 13; emphasis added) 
 
To read this depiction through Lacan’s subsequent notion of the mirror stage is to recognise 
a megalomaniacal distortion of the “I function”.  What “imago” or body gestalt might be 
drawn from this crowd given its insistent otherness and distance from any ideal?  If the 
mirror draws the infant “or little man” - as Lacan called ‘him’ – towards an “ideal-I” capable 
of rising above the turbulence of a “motor style” or motility yet to be mastered (what Freud 
called a “trotte-bebe” or “a sort of walker”, as Lacan noted), the securing of stature and the 
unified ‘I’ as enduring “statue”, even if a phantasmatic achievement (2006, p. 76), can 
hardly be what Baudelaire’s dandy-flâneur-genius-artist-infant achieves in a crowd that 
involuntarily moves him (both physically and emotively)!  If Lacan’s “I formation” answers 
to an “internal pressure” triggered by a “spatial lure” that shifts fragmentary senses of self 
into an “‘orthopaedic’ form of its totality” (p. 78), the ego achieves unity at the expense of 
diverse drives and maintained in and through others on the basis of identification and 
merger of “aggressive rivalry” (Holland 2006, p. 198).  For Lacan the latter shows up in 
defensive, neurotic structures (in dreams, as he says, symbolised as “a fortified camp, or 
even a stadium”), while the former tends towards a capture by “situation” of the psychotic 
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kind (2006, pp. 79-80).  The socio-symbolic is that which mediates the excesses either way, 
and as Lacan said, tasks psychoanalysis with “calculate[ing] the angle of […] threat to entire 
communities” - in other words, provides “an amortization rate for the passions of the city” 
(p. 80).  Yet in Baudelaire’s modernity it is a non-amortization economics that prevails in 
that the principal debt owed a super-ego capable of carrying the symbolic order is forgone.  
As Holland put it, “In the decoding process of the market, the law of hierarchy and the 
hierarchy of the law itself are thoroughly subverted” (2006, p. 243).  Certainly in Baudelaire 
it is less a neurotic rivalry of egos that motivates the “lover of universal life”.  Instead, 
unable to stabilise the contingent and the fleeting, a compact of a pre-Oedipal type was 
sought to merge the ego with the non-ego, yet it was done so on the basis of an 
aggrandisement or narcissistic elevation beyond life.	  	  	  
	  
All this points to the problem of coupling in the emerging market society – a coupling that 
is, between unmoored citizen-consumers and capitalist socius.  As Rancière put it, the 
nineteenth century was “haunted” precisely by the “Platonic paradigm of the democratic 
dissolution of the social body” – exampled earlier in the split between political and ethical 
parrhēsia – but troublingly reconfigured in the European setting as a “fanciful correlation 
between democracy/individualism/Protestantism/revolution/the disintegration of the social 
bond” (2009, p. 57).  If the Platonic problematic centred on the necessity of conjoining a 
care of the soul with that of the community – for which the Oedipal scenario (tyranny) was 
negative motivation – and the modern Oedipal orientation centred on a depressive position 
impelled to desexualise via ameliorating surface continuities (sublimation), an alternative 
coupling availed itself, one, as considered previously, that coupled the strictures of reality 
with irreality in what amounts to the ‘perverts’ road.  Holland recognises in Baudelaire 
exactly such a route in his negotiation of market society.  From romantic pre-Oedipal 
fusing, to a revolutionary impulse conceived of as the “mother and son’s anti-authoritarian 
utopia” directed against the ‘bourgeois monarchy’ of Louis-Phillippe, called up was what 
Holland termed “historical masochism” (2006, pp. 194-195).  In psychoanalytic terms, 
masochism repudiates the father as bearer of the authoritative socio-symbolic and invests 
relational authority in a female figure instead in a parodic reversal and subversion of the 
Oedipal prohibition.  Yet this borrowing of the female as newly invested bearer of 
dominance institutes an “an-Oedipal” relation, one centred, not on genital ‘satisfaction’, but 
a “desexualised” and sentimentalised possession (pp. 192-193).  This results in a “split” at 
the level of the masochist’s super-ego where, as Holland argued, “the Oedipal ‘ego ideal’ 
[the father] is rejected in favour of the pre-Oedipal ‘ideal ego’” (p. 193).  The latter, 
preceding the consolidation of the super-ego, stands as a locus of “omnipotence and 
connectedness”, not simply in a maternal, familial sense, but as a “distinctly public and 
even mythical figure” (p. 193).  If in this idealised world the symbolic is kept at bay, it in 
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fact invites a further disintegration of the ideal in which (as Leopold von Sacher-Masoch – 
whose proper name underwrites the condition - describes in Venus in Furs), the contract 
governing a reversed dominance itself ceases to be mutually contractual and the maternal 
figure, while feigning a pre-Oedipal beatitude, increasingly adopts a post-Oedipal 
assertiveness commensurate with a “phallic male lover/husband”, but because foreclosed in 
the symbolic, returns in the more troubling register of the “real” (1993, p. 194).  The 
collapse of this ideal ego, in the context of a split super-ego results in what Holland calls a 
“borderline narcissism”, and a conversion of the disillusioned masochist into a “vitriolic and 
sometimes violent cynic” (1993, p. 194). 
 
Linking this psychodynamic to the historical circumstances in which Baudelaire was 
embedded, Holland suggests that when the social idealism potentiated in the Second 
Republic abruptly gave way with the election of Louis Napoleon and the positing of the 
Second Empire, something like a disorientating eruption of the real – a real akin to the “too 
big” moment Deleuze attributed to the caesura of the Oedipal repetition – occurred.  
Baudelaire, and in turn the modernity he was pivotal in shaping, was thrown into a 
confrontation with a bourgeois socio-symbolic mired in the market relations of industrial 
capitalism.  Paris, the “gigantic whore” as Baudelaire called it, succumb, not just to a lapse 
of contractual obligation vis-a-vis nurturing, socialist ideals, but was betrothed to a new 
authoritarian usurper who disciplined the runaway, excessive city by way of Georges-
Eugène Haussmann’s planning reforms.  If Paris achieved its appellation "La Ville-Lumière" 
(city of light), partly on the basis of the early adoption of street illumination at this time, but 
also in response to the cutting of open boulevards through the labyrinthine vestiges of its 
medieval street pattern, it did so precisely in terms of a very old urban polarization typified 
by the pairing of ‘Babylon the whore’ and ‘New Jerusalem’.  Baudelaire’s tracing out of the 
disjunction between two infinities (hell and heaven) no doubt testifies, if not to the 
dissolution of such eschatological polarities, then to the impossibility of the city’s 
transfiguration to the latter and the familial resolution it calls on (“And I […] saw the holy 
city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for 
her husband”, Revelations 21:2). Against any final pastoral laying-bare of the city in a 
consummative sense – what in fact in the Judaeo-Christian tradition amounts to a return to 
an original pastoral naked beginning – the revelatory arc Baudelaire called up nevertheless 
entailed a facing-up-to in a psychodynamic sense.  Where as an “ontotheological ordering”4 
of face and city centres on denudation - and as Jean Delumeau has argued, it was the 
apostle Paul who exemplarily clarifies this claim: “Now we see, he says, ‘as if in a mirror 
dimly’; then [at the revelation] we will see ‘face to face’” (p. 50) - in Baudelaire the would-
                                       
4 Kristin Ross refers to an “ontotheological” ordering in Baudelaire in which objects, otherwise 
unrelated, are assigned a teleology they otherwise don’t have (1989, p. 126). This notion is adapted 
here in light of Delumeau’s emphasis on facing. 
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be city-bride, first shorn of its authoritarian suitor and then its idealised, nurturing guise (or 
what Buck-Morss calls a “matriarchal utopia”), assumes a final seducing personae - the take 
up of all and any suitor.  Not surprisingly, given the characterological proximity of 
prostitution and flâneurie (as has been widely noted in Walkowitz and Buck-Morss 1986), 
the boulevards and soliciting came to share the common reference “Les grandes 
horizontals” (Buck-Morss 1986, p. 119).  
	  
	  
6. City Recumbency  
	  
	  
Engineered for rapidly moving traffic, the boulevard was the veritable emblem of its age. 
The bearer of coursing  carriages, Baudelaire could not help but associate such transport, 
like the city itself having succumb to the market economy, with indolent pleasure: “the 
carriage follows an alley streaked with light and shade, at a brisk trot, carrying along a bevy 
of beauties, cradled as in the gondola of a balloon, lolling on the cushions, lending an 
inattentive ear to compliments, and lazily enjoying the caress of the breeze” (2010, p. 54).  
As Butor recognised: “When he describes the carriages that Constantin Guys dashes off on 
paper, Baudelaire will make veritable beds out of them […] This carriage is in a sense the 
great brothel that has come to meet him” (pp. 24-25).  It abolishes with its “rapid succession 
through space” the “dreadful solitude” the man of the crowd had cultivated in his pursuit of 
the city’s mysteries (p. 25).  Haussmanization no less forced a new intimacy between the 
bourgeois domical and the renovated public staging post that was the boulevards.  There 
the bourgeoisie, edging the long thoroughfares cut into the city’s old twisted fabric, could 
not but oversee at their leisure the city’s succumbing to a trafficking in commerce.  
Consistent with this forced recumbency, residences on the Parisian boulevards were 
coupled to continuous balconies mandated under regulations controlling new Second 
Empire façade construction.  The intention was to forge a cohesive, horizontal synthesis 
along the wide boulevards that countered individual variations building by building.  As 
Andrew Ayers describes the Second Empire apartment construction in Paris (2004, p. 399): 
 
Rather than volumetric masses in the cityscape, such apartment buildings, with 
their flat, standardised facades, were conceived to be viewed purely as 
backdrops, decorative curtains lining the everyday theatre of life that was the 
street. (p. 399) 
 
One such backdrop is highlighted by Jonathan Crary (2001) in his consideration of Edouard 
Manet’s painting The Balcony (1868), an image portraying a bourgeois family calmly taking 
in the urban spectacle from a balcony suspended above one of Haussmann’s boulevards.  
For Crary the reduction of the background interior to a featureless, black space is indicative 
of a reversal of romanticism’s eschewing of externality in favour of heightened interior states 
(2001, p. 83).  Manet’s balcony viewers, having stepped through the plane of the facade, 
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maintain a strictly horizontal gaze, as if the street had itself risen up around them.  The 
balcony as Manet isolates it is not merely a building element amongst others but a street-
element first, indeed one component of an elevated walk paralleling the boulevard’s length, 
much as the apartments backing them were likewise constructed as serial spaces (or 
enfilades).  As Ayers confirmed, the Second Empire apartment typology specifically departed 
from the medieval proportioning of the preceding maison bourgeoise which was organised 
vertically across a number of floors on narrow, deep plots that ran from the street frontage to 
courtyards in the rear.  Restoration and Louis-Phillipe-period apartments instead were 
assigned wide plots allowing suites of rooms on single floors fronting either, more 
prestigiously, the street or, secondarily, rear courtyards in the fashion of the aristocratic 
château or hôtel particulier, both of which “lined up [their] best rooms along the garden 
front” (2004, pp. 398-399).  In this sense the walking-rhythms of domestic life were 
consciously made to parallel and absorb the rhythms of the street below.  As Emile Zola put 
it: 
It was the ripe and prodigious fruit off an epoch.  The street invaded the 
apartment with its rumbling of carriages, its jostling of strangers, its license of 
language. (cited in Vidler 1991, p. 97) 
 
Anthony Vidler likewise noted the “rapacious” “invasion” of the “home” by the new street 
culture which induced an unprecedented mixing in the Second Empire of social types 
spanning “the brash and newly rich, the self-made man, the bricklayer turned contractor, 
[in turn] rubbing shoulders with their partners of necessity, the older middle class and a 
failing aristocracy” (1991, p. 97).  
 
This architecture/urbanism of the upwardly mobile, private citizen, as Benjamin noted, 
upheld less the values of democratic citizenship than the edict that each “private individual 
manag[e] his [own] affairs” (cited in Cohen 1995, p. 214).  Moreover the acceleration of 
circulatory conditions was critical to the bourgeois hegemony and its “business affairs”, 
amongst which the construction of railways were key.  Haussmann, charged with enacting 
a rationalisation of the arterial routes of Paris had a larger circulatory body in mind.  
Running all the way to rail termini, the boulevards were in turn strategically linked to the 
conveyance of communications, goods, persons and the military to the country’s distant 
frontiers and beyond.  Since their introduction in 1842, rail services were required by law to 
converge on Paris, as Colin Chant and David Goodman noted, but the ease with which the 
capital’s old narrow streets could be barricaded and closed at times of political disruption 
(in fact they had been no less than nine times between 1825-52) lent weight to 
Haussmann’s argument that the city constituted a critical weakness in the circulatory 
unification of the national body (2000, p. 107).  Backing this corporeal analogy was the 
discovery by William Harvey and Claude Galien in the seventeenth century of the 
circulatory unification of the human body (Mattelart, 1996, p. 16).  A more immediate 
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progenitor was Claude Henri de Saint-Simon who had espoused a “social physiology” that 
similarly relied on the notion of a circulatory differentiation and health and that contributed 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century to what Armand Mattelart described as the “Cult 
of the Network”.  For Saint Simon the social body, like the organic one it paralleled, if left 
to its own accumulation of habits, was susceptible to disorder and degenerative states, 
while a healthy, progressive society, like the robust organic body, required internal 
coordination and regulation ensuring uninterrupted communication between its parts (p. 
87).  Systems of communication no less than networks of physical transportation acquired a 
redemptive, almost spiritual validation for they guaranteed the conduits of exchange upon 
which vigorous industrialisation depended.  In the post-revolutionary context they were 
what stood against the stagnation and concentrations of wealth typifying the ancien regime 
(pp. 89-90; Vidler 1991, p. 59).  If this strain of thought can be recognised as binding a 
managerial conception of society to “modern space-annihilating devices”, of which 
Mumford (1984) had counted the cannon as first and certainly not least significant amongst 
the means of expression at a distance, the boulevards offered a communicative valence, no 
less than a militaristic one, consistent with the quest for perpetual motion underwriting the 
nineteenth century marriage of markets and politics.  If that century’s progressive ideal was 
inseparable from a “diffusionist perspective in which influence always spreads out from a 
tutelary centre that imposes its worldview on diverse peripheries”, as Mattelart noted (2003, 
p. 31), spatial and societal ‘chaos’ in the capital represented great risk – a risk demanding 
its’ laying bare.  
	  
Charting the new velocities and altered rhythms of market society, what Baudelaire found in 
the local coupling of the city with vast centrifugal networks was – in Benjamin’s 
characterisation - an “unfolding of the temporality of hell” (2002, pp. 65-66).  For such a 
temporality, which “does not recognize death”, was everywhere embodied, as Benjamin 
held, in circulating forms whose limited duration – “fashion [,…] the acceleration of traffic 
and the tempo of news reporting” etc. - mocks death, though not without enacting it on 
small through a cyclic propagation and truncation of ‘trends’, ‘news’, ‘events’ pointedly 
aiming at “eliminating all discontinuities and sudden ends” themselves (p. 66).  In this 
sense, even if as Benjamin said, “death as caesura belongs together with all the straight lines 
of divine temporality” (p. 66), the lapse of convergence in the alpha and the omega doesn’t 
close off a belief in straight lines, as Regis Debray noted, for they are the very stuff of a 
“Saint-Simonian utopia” (2004, p.58).  With New Jerusalem impossibly remote, modernity 
is nevertheless the age of “go-betweens” built on “numerous channels of communication”, 
as Debray held, like so many secular substitutes for angels and their triadic enacting of 
mediation, hierarchy and passage (pp. 32-33).  The nineteenth century, Parisian street made 
interior, and the interior proper reduced to a resonating chamber for the city’s 
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machinations, together assert, again in Debray’s characterisation, the centrality of the 
“vestibule” or “hallway” as an existential spatial figure, indeed a conduit singularly apposite 
to the play of communicatory ‘angels’ who provide the remaining “grimace of an absent 
God [as…] small change of a disappearing act” (p. 43).  Baudelaire for his part assigned to 
the angel figure in “Réversibilité” (“Reversibility”) a plethora of negative inversions 
channelling the lofty into runaway conditions ‘on the ground’ (1998, p. 91).  There, 
enveloped in dark over-coats and not wings, the ‘everyman’ is caught between the fleeting 
course of time that fashion is testament to and some deeper “discontinuity in time” marked 
by modernity itself (Foucault 1997, p. 310).  For “the modern hero”, as Baudelaire, coined 
this new messaging species, dark clothing, as it entered the canvas of Constantin Guys for 
instance, unveils the more profound commitment of the age, an enduring pathos or relation 
to death: 
 
The dress-coat and the frock-coat not only posses their political beauty, which is 
an expression of the public soul – an immense cortege of undertaker’s mutes 
(mutes in love, political mutes, bourgeois mutes…). We are each of us celebrating 
some funeral. (Baudelaire 1965, pp. 17-18) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Constantin Guys, 1895. Untitled. Source: The Yellow Book (v).  
 
 
 
7. Mercantile-Communicational Gravity  
 
 
This insistent laying down and contracting of everyday life into variously dissolute and rapid 
circulatory lines can be thought to have produced a dance of acquiescence and resistance 
vacillating between a rising up and falling down within a mercantile-communicational 
‘gravity’ whose right-angle transposition shows up as a horizontal vortices courting and 
contorting death.  The repetition compulsion driving capitalist decoding and axiomatisation 
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can be thought to have called for an alternate notion of life, as Baudelaire’s The Painter of 
Modern Life hypothesised.  Foucault, in the essay “What is Enlightenment?”, has explored 
such an alternative, and in the process, found an improbable alignment between Kant and 
Baudelaire around the issue of modernity’s unique depiction of the present.  Neither limited 
to a notion of the present as belonging to a distinct world era, nor a sign heralding 
impending events, nor a culminating moment about to usher in a new world, Kant 
understood the present to essentially potentiate a deviation, “an ‘exit,’ or a ‘way out’” 
(1997, pp. 304-305).  As Foucault noted, Kant is not:  
 
[…] seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future 
achievement. He is looking for a difference: What difference does today introduce 
with respect to yesterday. (p. 305) 
 
At stake in this difference-making or way out, as Kant accounted for it in his own essay 
titled “Answer the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’”, was the issue of exceeding a certain 
human immaturity understood as an acceptance of “someone else’s authority” (p. 305).  In a 
peripatetic analogy canvased earlier, Kant figured the public use of reason as something like 
“walking confidently […] towards majority”.  Further, immaturity and maturity, like hobbled 
motility and independent “free movement”, align with the distinction between private and 
public uses of reason.  As Foucault noted, private reasoning is that which submits to 
prevailing societal roles and obligations (being a civil servant, a soldier etc.) – in short, 
being “‘a cog in the machine’” (p. 307).  Standing upright against the grain and gravitas of 
private, bureaucratic-commercial thought, finds a correlate in Baudelaire, Foucault thinks, 
because in the poet-critic modernity was upheld not as an epoch or period but an ethos, an 
attitude (p. 309).  As a way of feeling, thinking, and behaving, ethos presumes a certain 
accustoming to place that “presents itself as a task” (p. 309).  Yet if modernity is routinely 
understood, in Foucault’s phrasing, “in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time”, 
one that “break[s] with tradition” via “a feeling of novelty [or…] vertigo” (p. 310), what 
accustoming is possible?  In Baudelaire contingency and “perpetual movement” occasion 
the heroic task of standing up against the grain of rushing time some mode of eternality – 
even if only ironically, tragically (p. 310).  If the flâneur as idle stroller exemplifies the 
“spectator’s posture”, Baudelaire, as Foucault read him, crafts a “man of modernity” who 
not only looks and recalls, but who transfigures the real, “who respects this reality and 
violates it” (p. 311) – in other words who plays perversely with it in the precise sense of the 
pervert’s third way.  No doubt an Oedipal overtone (the Oedipus between Thebes and 
Colonus) can be recognized in Baudelaire’s quest to exceed the “fleeting pleasure of 
circumstance”; the solitary is a roamer of “the great desert of men”, for in modernity the city 
has itself become the other of the polis and fashion the harrying atmosphere that worries its 
terrain (2010, p. 16).  Reaching into this transitory, shifting air, the task of the poet is to 
grasp what eludes obviousness in sight – in other words, “to distill the eternal from the 
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transitory” (p. 16).  Like Oedipus remade and exonerated in the desert, for Baudelaire too, at 
stake is an ethos or attitude of self-reform, not founded on uncovering or discovering what 
is secreted within (in Oedipus’ case there was Thebes for that), but more radically, as 
Foucault put it, the task of squaring up to modernity entailed inventing and producing 
oneself otherwise, even if the only feasible place for such reinvention was an extra-societal 
one, a place produced in and by art (p. 312).  
 
Butor found a similar process of reinvention, particularly in relation to Baudelaire’s uptake 
of Poe’s “Man of the Crowd”.  As he put it, “In 1852, the Man of the Crowd, for Baudelaire 
as for Poe, is the man one observes externally and condemns”, but subsequent to 
Baudelaire’s French translation, a transformation is evident: the old man pursued in the 
crowd “has become the narrator himself [with…] the two characters [becoming…] one and 
the same” (1969, p. 23).  Like the translator (Baudelaire) and his idle (Poe), “the second 
follows in the footsteps of the first”, but on condition that the idle knows nothing of the 
follower and the transformation that he exercises over him (p. 23).  The revelatory moment 
in the pursuit of the man of the crowd that occurs at daybreak – the moment that the 
pursuer realizes that no deeper penetration into the mysterious motivations of the pursued is 
possible – is lived differently by Baudelaire the translator: translation offers not equivalence 
but transformation, or more accurately “Vampirization” as Anne Garrait-Bourrier put it 
(2002).  The take-up is life-engendering and erotic, with Baudelaire rendering Poe both 
martyr and passionately remade model, a model capable of being taken in on the basis of a 
certain betrayal.  Citing what Harold Bloom referred to as tesserae – the aim of “bring[ing] 
to perfection” by a second writer what a first has written in a quest to stave off the “‘anxiety 
of influence’” - Garrait-Bourrier imagined in Baudelaire’s case a homoerotic adoption of 
Poe, which filtered through an anxiously defined masculinity,5 required a covert attraction-
repulsion, one that both incarnated Poe as a “Mother figure” and counter-actualised him a 
figure to be dominated (p. 6).  Moreover, if Baudelaire goes looking for a heroic stance 
apposite to modernity via walks labouring within the city’s recalibrated gravity, the images 
he called up – in a reversed masochism - were of a city similarly taken as a ‘female object’ 
precariously avowed and dominated (Buck-Morss 1986, pp 119-120).  Benjamin in an 
astonishing speculation captures the strange intercourse between the recumbent city and 
the commercial stride overtaking it when, in the context of the convolutions of fashion, he 
imagines an evolutionary differentiation between men and women in which the latter, 
holding on to the “advantages” of a “horizontal positioning of the body” (particularly given 
the demands of pregnancy and as testified to by the present-day, female attire of “back-
                                       
5 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, has for instance explored the consequences of an “‘obligatory 
heterosexuality’ […] built into male-dominated kinship systems” and the structural necessity of 
homophobia as necessary consequence of homosocially-defined, nineteenth century work 
practices necessary to industrialization and colonial expansion (1985, p. 3). 
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bracing girdles and trusses”), resolve to “walking erect” later than men and only on the basis 
of a perversion of courting (as departure from the four-footed manner of animals) demanded 
by a (presumably standing) “frontal encounter” in “coitus” (2002, p. 80).  This fantastical 
tale of a temporal misalignment in the upward meeting of bodies as prompt to walking no 
doubt transports a long exercised male privilege that construes itself a virile figure stood up 
(first in this case) in contradistinction to a deferential ground awaiting his traversal and 
disposal.  On the other hand, it signals the acute dependence of such privilege on 
femininity itself made upright, a privilege that can never quite separate itself from that on 
which it leans.  It also suggests, in the context of a recumbent city where figure/ground 
relations are severely challenged by a horizonal velocity (a mercantile-communicational 
‘gravity’ corresponding to Marx’s recognition that “All that is solid melts into air” – a 
volatile, moving air no less shifting of Benjamin’s Angel of History), a reversal whose rising 
up of ground (deterritorializations) engulfs, submerges, and draws back down again 
(reterritorialization).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Paul Klee, 1920. Angelus Novus.  
Source: Wikimedia Commons.	  
	  
 
What Baudelaire makes imaginable is a male psychotopography (to borrow Seltzer’s (1998) 
characterisation from a different context) invoked by an urban seductress throwing 
pedestrian perception into an undecidable posture, a position vacillating between rectitude 
and recumbency.  Dandysme, as reaction to this see-saw between dissolve and self-
distinction, drives towards, as Benton Jay Komins asserted, a “world of narcissistic 
satisfaction” where “no space is opened up for the subjectivity of others” (2001, p. 3; see 
also Garrait-Bourrier 2002, p. 7). 
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In fact, as Holland has explored, the lapse in a masochistoc orientation – one invested in a 
revolutionary urban body deemed capable of repudiating a seemingly tyrannous, paternal 
socio-symbolic – opened towards the psychical disorganisation of “borderline narcissism” 
(2006, p. 26).  Borrowed from psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg, the term describes a psychical 
landscape defined “by lack of integration of the concept of self and significant others” and 
which results in “identity diffusion” whose management requires “primitive defensive 
operations centering around splitting, and a loss of reality testing” (2004, p. 15).  If as 
Holland points out, the “borderline psyche” derives its instability from an inability to sustain 
a “whole mother image” that reconciles and synthesises both good and bad presentations, 
subsequent self-image and ego-identification similarly fail to coalesce and prevent “erotic 
and destructive impulses from merging” coherently in the subject (2006, p. 231).	  	  
Repudiation of the paternal ideal-ego or super-ego similarly prevents the self-observation 
function adequately managing ego-function, self-esteem and the integration of ideal objects 
of attachments (p. 212).  An intense attendance on the world is driven by the need to find 
mirrored in it “versions or parts of himself that have been split off and symbolically 
repudiated”; everything potentially speaks to the need to consolidate a self reactively either 
through aversion or absorption of partial selves (pp. 212-213).  Building on a history of 
criticism that finds in Baudelaire varying configurations of masochism, sadism and 
personality splitting, Holland saw in “Baudelairean modernism”, not a personal 
psychopathology indicative of the poet, but a socio-historical psychical indicator proper to 
nineteenth century market society as Baudelaire came to live it.  In particular, validated and 
denigrated categories like dandy and prostitute – categories synonymous with buying and 
selling and therefore difficult to differentiate in market society – constituted societal poles 
productive of identity diffusion and splitting of assimilative ideals (pp. 26-27).   
 
 
 
8. Narcissism On-Mass  
 
 
In Holland’s account, the importance of Poe to Baudelaire is his charting of a cultural 
economy rich in “defunct ideals” and indicative of a “bankrupt reality” (273).  Nevertheless, 
his ability to detach himself from the tragic atmosphere of the market and the subject 
positions of the “prostitute and the dandy”, offered an ego ideal seemingly risen above 
selling and buying.  Concomitant with the pervert, what the borderline narcissist achieves is 
a psychotic disassociation still capable of reality testing.  For Kernberg this meant the 
belated production of a differentiated self despite a lived field defined by identity diffusion 
(2004, pp. 16, 19).  It is this that Poe provides Baudelaire, the kernel of a grandiose self 
capable of mediating the constantly decoding subject positions of the market.  Kept in play 
was both repetitive “self-invention” consistent with the “decoding of experience” and the 
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semblance of a stable self (if “an-Oedipal” one) set up to cynically judge, “from a safe 
distance”, these very same “partial selves” (Holland 2006 pp. 250, 274).  
	  
Moreover, Holland recognised in this overseeing role what Jacques Attali has termed “the 
‘programmer’”, or what is rendered “the moulder” in the English translation of his cultural 
history of music (p. 251).  In the context of a capitalist “economy of repetition” dedicated to 
mass production, the problem of maintaining the convertability of money to profit via 
commodification means furnishing the commodity with “semiotic surplus value” in excess 
of its sheer reproduction – in other words, submitting it to marketing and advertising (p. 
251).  For Holland, Baudelairean modernity, anticipates, and in many ways prepares, the 
contemporary advertising mentality that cynically seeks to script the disenfranchising 
circuits of surplus semiotic while remaining aloof from them (2006, 27).  The narrator in the 
prose poems performs this double action of narcissistically assimilating identity while 
fantasising about his own unassimilable essence.  For instance in “Les Foules” (“Crowds”, 
collected in Le spleen de Paris), Baudelaire writes: 
 
The poet enjoys this incomparable privilege, that he can be, just as he likes, either 
himself or someone else. Like those wandering souls in search of a body, he 
enters, whenever he likes, into the characters of everyone. For him alone, 
everything is unoccupied, and if certain places appear to him to be shut, it is only 
because in his view they aren’t worth the trouble of visiting. 
 
The solitary, pensive walker finds a singular intoxication in this universal 
communion. The one who weds himself to the crowd enjoys feverish pleasures 
denied to the egoist, who is locked up like a safe, and also denied to the lazy one, as 
self-confined as a mollusk. He adopts as his own all the professions, all the joys and 
all the miseries that circumstances present to him.  (1970, p. 22) 
 
Here simultaneous self-dispersal and self-aggrandisement aptly mirror borderline narcissism. 
The subject of enunciation is imagined to effortlessly converge on the subject of the 
statement subsuming it as if action and contemplation images where one and the same 
thing.  Where Descartes refuted the walking self as test positive for being (“I walk therefore I 
am”), for Baudelaire the “pensive walker” finds its very being in a vamparitic slide into the 
everyperson as occupiable tenancy.  In a reversal of the formal narcissism of Neoplatonism 
- that passage through the materiality of the world in pursuit of an inner infinity – the 
subjectivism of Baudelairean modernity passes into the mirror of the other in a grandiose 
and infinite gathering up of scapegoats on-mass! 
 
All this enacts to the nth degree the passional rupture with despotic signification.  Born of 
an exclusionary mechanism generative of betrayal, expulsion and exile, Cain heads a 
disenfranchised, scapegoated populace.  If the key protagonists in the drama that 
precipitated the state of exile constitute God, Abel and Cain, Gunther Wittenberg, in his 
consideration of Genesis 4, has emphasised the importance of a fourth, little acknowledged 
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character in the tale - the figure of the earth.  To read the story through this innovation is to 
recognise that the double betrayal of man and God transports a second perfidy in which 
Cain and the earth no less turn away from each other.  The seeds of this lapse where 
already in place with Adam and Eve’s expulsion from Eden where God places them beyond 
the bounteous of the garden on cursed ground whose barrenness necessitates “toil and 
sweat” (Wittenberg 2000, p. 107).  Cain’s murder of Abel leads to the subsequent 
confrontation between Cain and Yahweh, but a third voice is also raised, that of “adamah”, 
or the fertile soil, and in a pointed prosopopoeia that gives face to the Earth itself, the throat 
of the ground is said to have swallowed Abel’s blood and in turn voiced its outrage (p. 109).  
Further emphasising the characterological nature of the Earth, Yahweh’s curse results in 
Cain being sent out into the land of Nod (or wandering) whose location “east of Eden”, as 
Wittenberg points out, extends the prior curse over the soil’s fertility so that “whereas Adam 
and Eve were banished from the garden to an arid adamah, Cain is banished from the soil 
itself” (p. 110).  Without even an impoverished adamah, it is to the creation of the city and 
that Cain turns with his son Enoch to provide a means of survival in the absence of a God-
given bounteousness.  Yet rendered “autonomous and emancipated from the Earth”, 
sustenance becomes possible only through the mechanism of exchange, or alternatively as 
Wittenberg describes, through the violence of “extortion, exploitation and oppression of 
peasant populations” (p. 112).  Caught between a bounteous earth and a withholding one, 
the urban dweller in the Judeo-Christian tradition lives a deeply fraught relation in that the 
city itself assumes the maternal mantel of provider but only through the relay of wounding 
and/or solicitation. 
 
At stake is a malfunction in the “whole mother image” consistent with Oedipus’, eschewing 
of telluric forces in favour of an intellectual mediation that in turn institutes a psychical 
fracturing centred on an irresolution of the monstrous and beneficent maternal.  Siding with 
the “Race of Cain” over the “Race of Abel”, Baudelaire in “Abel et Caïn” monomaniacally 
reverses the pastoral privilege of the latter, figuring this race complacent, profligate, 
crawling and rooting in satiation at time’s end.  Conversely, the Race of Cain, is pictured as 
finding its own ground (if an impoverished one) and its own temporality as an overturning 
of divine ordinance and privilege over the earth:  
 
Race of Cain, assault the skies 
And drag him earthwards – bring down God! (1998, p. 267-279) 
	  
In this aggressive assailment of ‘elevation’, two components are evident: firstly, against an 
earth-divine axis and the hierarchical ordering it implies, there is a pointed siding with a 
deterritorialized gravity - the mercantile-communicational vortices indicated above - one 
that nevertheless risks, in the context of constant decoding, ego splintering of a “borderline” 
type; secondly, to the extent that the former tends to split off incompatible “facets of the 
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personality” (in opposition to their integration via a normative installation of the super-ego) 
as Holland says, an ego ideal as de facto identificatory anchor is narcissistically substituted 
instead (2006, p. 219).  For Holland, this double response mirrors the 
production/consumption cycle of market society whereby selling oneself on the job market 
entails specialisations that serve to decant the self into a cluster of fractured personas, while 
consumption entails something like an anticipatory and compensatory recovery of an 
integral self.  The intimate pairing of “commoditised leisure time and exploited time”, as 
Holland said, results in “individuals whose primitive and mostly unsublimated ideal egos 
fuse an-Oedipally with the ego ideals summonsed up by advertising and its muse” – in other 
words, they ride a pre-Oedipal libidinousness (2006, p. 247).  More specifically, the mother 
figure in this case equates to the city itself whose longstanding renunciation of 
adamah|earth advents a volatile mix of good and bad states invoked by degrees of satiation 
and withholding.  
 
Given the amplification by market society of the problematized urban ground arising with 
Cain, what innovation is available to the narcissistic ego?  For Barthes, Baudelaire is 
amongst a cluster of nineteenth century writers who found in writing a kind of heroism that 
leant towards mythology in its construal of a world in parallel with, yet opposed to, the 
given (2010, p. 281).  Moreover, this heroism has three defining facets: the writing that 
arises with it exhibited a “monomania”, an obsessive focus whose “transcendence […] 
proffers literature as the full expression of an alternative to the world”; secondly, this literary 
heroism aimed at an autonomy of practice and solitude relative to the world at large; and 
thirdly, the solitude implicate to a literary apprenticeship was lived as if a state of exile 
forced on the writer cursedly from the social world itself (2010, p. 281).  Seeding this 
division, as Barthes asserted, was the sense that the writer participates in a milieu at odds 
with the labours and motivations of the creative work itself.  Where and how is one’s 
sensibility to be situated? “In which History? […] In which Society?” (p. 282).  In answer, 
the writer stages a “grandiose, impassioned obstinacy [by…] claiming not to be present”, or 
rather, of being “both in the present and not in the present”, caught at the juncture between 
a “new world” and an absent world of the past”, and that the task is precisely to write that 
juncture as a thing (p. 284). 
	  
Where Oedipus dreams of restoring wholeness through the smoothing out of surfaces, 
surfaces traversable without break, Baudelaire’s literary heroism sought to enter the 
disjuncture motivating the Oedipal drama itself, perversely re-programming it as a 
masterable domain set aside as dirtied mirror on the world.  Faced with a persistent 
mercantile caesura inserted into the very fabric of the everyday, a narcissistically construed 
subject sets itself up as equal to the betrayal of experience to better unify - an-Oedipally - a 
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picture of urban place.  Yet language itself undercuts the exiled self-sufficiency of the 
literary hero.  If the movement of the phallus is to rectify and gather the partial objects and 
intensities underwriting it, writing itself is also the bearer of an incising, cutting, tearing 
action as Blanchot has noted (1993, p. 28), one that breaks the bond between the word and 
the self that claims utility, even mastery, over it (1989, p. 28).  Writing levies its own cost 
and what Blanchot called the “Tyrannical Prehension” describes a compulsion to write 
carried out by a hand failing to know any end to its labours.  Writing, carried to infinity by 
this “sick hand” seeking to capture the departing objects of its attention, can be relieved 
only by the other hand, the hand that doesn’t write, but that intervenes to prevent a descent 
into absolute passivity and loss of self (1989, p. 25).  In fact this interplay of hands – one 
scribing its way to death and the other opening a pause for renewing or claiming back life – 
offers a precarious balance with, on one side, a return to a self actively synthesising, and on 
the other, a tipping over into what Blanchot described as a “third person substituting for the 
‘I’” altogether (p. 28): 
 
The third person is myself become no one, my interlocutor turned alien; it is my 
no longer being able, where I am, to address myself and the inability of whoever 
addresses me to say ‘I’; it is his not being himself. (p. 28) 
 
Deleuze, in a different context, called this third person, “the man without name”, seeing in 
it a castrating of the Phallus itself, castrating in the sense of a desexualisation that asks what 
thinking might amount to in the context of the dissolved cogito (1994 p. 194).  If this raises 
questions such as “‘what is writing?’”, “what is it to sense?”, “what does it mean to think?”, 
it points in fact to the existential, indeed the “ontological scope” of a “question-problem 
complex” arising with Oedipus, for it is Oedipus who first showed “the power of the 
question to put the questioner in play as much as that which is questioned” (p. 195).  For 
Blanchot it was Arthur Rimbaud, the Bohemian, peripatetic poet who abruptly ceased 
writing in his twenties, who demonstrated the potency of an incessant will to write via a 
sick hand that only a tyrannical prehension could interrupt (p. 25, 53).  For Barthes, this 
doubleness shows up as a defining split in the “linguistic subject” who is left negotiating an 
increasingly defective present (2011, p. 153). It is this doubleness - a duplication without 
narcissistic programming - that the following chapter addresses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
‘Angleterre’ |Terra Incognito	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
You will go everywhere, since you have come 
from all times. 
 
Arthur Rimbaud, 1872-1874 
 
 
Rimbaud experienced his great crisis when he 
was eighteen, at which moment in his life he had 
reached the edge of madness; from this point on 
his life is an unending desert. 
 
Henry Miller, 1946 
	  
	  
 
1. Maximising the Surface of the Self 
	  
	  
For Blanchot the work of writing demands of the writer an exit from the self.  In Rimbaud’s 
case it was necessary to make the world itself a “shelter […] of protective forgetfulness” 
from the demands of his own writing (1989, p. 53).  If he was forced to disavow this 
passage to the limit, it is equally certain, as Blanchot remarked, that no writer can remain 
“face to face with the work” for it departs its author, and siding with the fate of life itself, 
slides “into the distress of the infinite” (1989, p. 26).  Nevertheless, Rimbaud, while 
famously ceasing to write, continued to side with the diminishing draw of the infinite, a 
draw he answered by means other than writing.  For Baudelaire, literary heroism is 
anchored by obsessional writing; for Rimbaud it was maniacal travel.  Indeed, it preceded 
the writing as indicated by a letter to the Paul Demeny in 1871 at the age of seventeen: 
“You see: I’m a pedestrian, nothing more than that”, and hoping to find work enough to 
survive in a move to Paris, he added, “tell me of work not too absorbing because thought 
demands large blocks of time” (cited in Fowlie & Whidden 2005, p. 387).  Joined up, 
peripatetic and thought offer an antidote to deadening work time.  A long distance walker 
throughout his life - eventually travelling much of Europe and considerable stretches of the 
Sudan on foot - he was noted as having an especially purposeful stride.  French essayist, 
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Ernst Delahaye, in a letter possibly to Rimbaud’s brother-in-law Paterne Berrichon1, 
similarly underscored Rimbaud’s compulsive pedestrianism by emphasising both his 
physiological and psychological predispositions for walking: 
 
His long legs calmly took formidable strides; his long, swinging arms marked the 
very regular movements; his back was straight, his head erect, his eyes stared into 
the distance.  His face wore an expression of resigned defiance, anticipating 
everything, without anger or trepidation. (cited in Robb 2000, p. 278)    
 
In a letter to Paul Verlaine dated April 1876 Delahaye illustrated just these facets when he 
showed Rimbaud marching across the border between France and Austria after his 
expulsion from Vienna for vagrancy (Figure 20).  Barthes was similarly struck: “It’s literally 
mad; already in his adolescence, incredible journeys on foot: walking, walking, without a 
penny” (2010, p. 152).  For Barthes, writing in Rimbaud’s case amounted to “a Desire, a 
Passion”; yet the cessation of that passion – what he called a “Counter-Writing, a “Not-
Writng”, a “Para-graphy [or…] A-Graphy” – didn’t end “Desire itself”, just the siting of its 
mania: instead, scappering, travel, exploration, geographic mapping, gun-running, business, 
colonisation, etc. (p. 150).  Constantly evidencing a “Desire for the Other” of what subsists 
statically, it was only the cruel and ironic onset of cancer in the right leg that curtailed this 
will and his life in 1891. 
 
   
   
 
Figure 20. Ernest Delahaye, 1876. “Le nouveau Juif errant”. Bibliothèque   
littéraire Jacques Doucet. 
 
                                       
1	  Jeremy Harding and John Sturrock (2004) attribute the passage to a letter to Berrichon dated 21 
August 1896, though Robb (2000) suggests any attribution remains uncertain.	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Nevertheless, for Rimbaud his poetic vocation started with city streets and their potential for 
perturbation. Writing to Ernest Delahaye from the Rimbaud family home in provincial 
Roche after an eight-month sojourn in London, he exclaimed: 
 
I am absolutely thwarted.  Not a book, not a bar within reach, not an incident in the 
street.  How horrible the French countryside is! My fate depends on this book, for 
which I still have to invent a half-dozen atrocious stories.  How can I invent atrocities 
here? (Letter of May 1873, in Fowlie & Whidden 2005, p. 393) 
 
His return to London and cohabitation with Verlaine in June of the same year did not fail to 
produce the city-centred atrocities necessary for his first poetic project – Une saison en 
enfer (A Season in Hell, 1873) – along with the infamous unravelling of their relationship, 
the drunken shooting of Rimbaud in Belgium, and Verlaine’s subsequent imprisonment 
there. Motivating the production of atrocities was the demand to have something to retell.  
As Kristin Ross noted with reference to Blanchot, the aim was a récit or restaging of an 
“exceptional event” located elsewhere in time (1987, p. 62).  More generally, the récit can 
be thought to make up a “transhistorical antigenre”, one that contests prevailing literary 
conventions, particularly the nineteenth century novel’s concern with everyday mores and 
verisimilitude.  As Ross summarised Blanchot’s reading of Une saison en enfer, the use of 
the récit can be thought to contest both the dominant English “novel of education or 
acculturation” and its French equivalent, the roman de formation, which each in their way 
pursued the genesis of bourgeois personality (1987, p. 62).  Countering the bourgeois self , 
no less than Romanticism’s lyric subject, Rimbaud rendered poetry an explicitly political 
vehicle, one that eschewed the typical assumption that prose portrays “a social production 
of reality” whereas verse produces “a desiring production that is mere fantasy or wish 
fulfilment” (p. 63).  Instead, as Blanchot asserted, Rimbaud in fact sought to “help man go 
somewhere, to be more than himself, to see more than he can see, to know what he cannot 
know – in a word, to make literature an experience that concerns the whole of life and the 
whole of being” (1995, p. 155).  Yet this grasp of an existential whole differed from 
Baudelaire’s.  Against the theory of correspondences with its counter-nature, and 
supernaturalism that potentially finds a link in every divergent thing, Rimbaud sought a 
version of totality revelled through extreme exhaustion in a sampling running all the way to 
expiration (pp. 139, 158-159). 
 
In another contrast with Baudelaire, Jeremy Harding and John Sturrock in the Penguin 
collection of Rimbaud’s poems and letters, noted a difference between Baudelaire’s 
flaneurism and what they call the “Rimbaudian self”.  The later, they held, amounts to a 
“harsh experiment” designed to distend and distress subjectivity to better achieve a 
“maximum surface area to which unusual information (the ‘unknown’) [might] adhere” 
(2004, xxiv).  Walking was in Rimbaud’s case not incidental to a project to expand the 
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surface-area of the self and it was one of the critical vectors by which encounter and 
capitalisation on the unknown was engineered.  For instance in “Ma Bohème (fantaisie)” 
(“My Bohemian Life (Fantasy)”, 1870), the experiential dividend of an eight day walking 
expedition through Belgian found form in a bawdy, wandering cosmicity celebrated in a 
crossing of road surfaces with the night sky: “I walked under the sky, Muse! And I was your 
vassal; | Oh! oh! what brilliant loves I dreamed of! | My only pair of trousers had a big hole. 
| - Tom Thumb in a gaze, I sowed rhymes | As I went along […]” (2005, pp. 65-67). 
Renovating the poetical travelogue, Rimbaud sought in this and similar early works to 
troublingly shift the ground beneath the romantic road poem by threading through its 
pleasing and predictable format the ignoble instincts and innuendo of the schoolboy ditty, 
much as Baudelaire before him had done (Robb 2000, p. 60). 
 
If in an Oedipal solution surfaces are contrived to better manage a metaphysics of 
separation and the divided world underwriting bourgeois-mercantile politics, with 
Baudelaire such surface-making was eschewed in favour of an an-Oedipal orientation – a 
desexualisation calling on the displacement of the super-ego/ego-ideal with the desiring 
liberty of the ideal-ego aiming to bring down paternalism.  Conversely, the reinstitution of a 
surface orientation in Rimbaudian poetics suggests a pseudo-Oedipal posture indexed less 
to amelioration than spoiling.  Key in this sense is a spoiling of the subject itself, which like 
Hölderlin’s recognition of a breaking-through implicate in the Oedipal positing of a 
caesura, reserves the capacity for the ‘atrocity’ (staged or incidental) to remake all that 
precedes it.  Breaking-through, or what amounts to the pure event for Deleuze, causes 
something new to appear in the vacancy of the present, something “produced without a 
producer” and free of the predicates conditioning it (Faulkner 2006, p. 135).  It is this 
pseudo-Oedipal orientation that this chapter explores relative to Rimbaudian poetics and its 
encounter with Victorian London. 
	  
	  
2. A Vigorous Indolence 
	  
	  
A poet born of the Paris Commune of 1871, Rimbaud rode a politic that then contemporary 
writer, Maxime du Camp (1822-1894), linked to the “time of Genesis” and Cain’s crime: “It 
is envy that lies behind all those demands stuttered by the indolent whose tools make them 
ashamed, and who in hatred of work prefer the chances of combat to the security of daily 
work” (cited in Ross 1987, p. 62).  The Bohemian polemic damning work in Baudelaire 
(selling oneself on the market), is in Rimbaud a howl against development of trades, 
professions, vocations – in other words, against an industrious subject.  In the “Mauvais 
sang” (“Bad Blood”) section of Une saison en enfer he wrote: “I loathe all trades. All of 
them, foreman and workmen, are base peasants.  A writer’s hand is no better than a 
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ploughman’s. What a century of hands! I will never possess my hand” (pp. 265-267).  In 
contrast with an ode to wounded shoes and an extended surface intimacy with the world as 
travelled in “Ma bohème (fantaisie)”, Rimbaud pitches motility against immobility in “Les 
Assis” (“The Seated Men” 1871), where resentful and reactive, sedentary watchers of the 
world shamelessly conjugate with supporting furniture: “In seizures of passion, they have 
fused | Their own fantastic skeletons to the back | Bone structure of their chairs, day upon 
day | Their feet now grafted to the creaking leg-rests […]” (2005, p. 127-129). 
Personification in this case invokes an entirely different conjuncture of the erotic and the 
oneiric than that offered by “Ma bohème (fantaisie)”.  Where the later construes the world 
in terms of multiple and marvellous conjugations on the move, “Les Assis” parodies a 
pedagogical (and in some interpretations pederast2) replication of routine sameness 
pointedly apprenticed to the bureaucratic domain of paperwork and officialdom.  Ross read 
in the lament of hands in the “Mauvais sang” a critique of dependence and co-option: only 
beyond the regimes of work is a celibate engenderment (to be one’s own work) possible 
(1987, p. 65).  Yet to bring about one’s own birth is far from the borderline narcissism of 
Baudelaire; in Rimbaud it meant mobilising collectives – particularly anti-bourgeois 
populations.  As Ross put it: “In Rimbaud the minimal real unity is not the word, nor the 
individual subject, nor the concept, but rather the arrangement, the process of arranging or 
configuring elements” (p. 66).  Again in “Mauvais sang”, the advancing European world of 
work is countered briefly as a narrator identifying with a soon to be colonised, “inferior 
race” defined by corporeal intensity: “Yells, drum, dance, dance, dance, dance! I can’t even 
see the time when the whites will land and I will fall into the void. Hunger, thirst, yells, 
dance, dance, dance, dance!” (2005, p. 271).  Antithetical to the poet as an outsider/genius, 
socially withdrawn from his or her world, Rimbaud samples and absorbs what the 
nineteenth century mobilised en mass – dissident populations and identities.  His own flight 
from home at sixteen (actually repeated departures and returns) was far from exceptional, 
for amongst those convicted for vagabondage (a rapidly rising figure across most of the 
nineteenth century in France), children of education age was particularly high, as Ross 
noted, and amounted to a “ritualization of the entry into work” played out as rupture or 
convulsion (p. 69).  No doubt, unmoored from fixed placement, the vagabond was held up 
as a virtual criminal, one whose sheer mobility invites the mobilisation of atrocity and 
misdeed (p. 70). 
 
If in “Les Assis” the satiric fusing of immobile bodies with chairs is plainly intended to 
disparage fixed placement and the privileging of intellectual labour, it is consistent with the 
specific critical preoccupations of the Parisian Commune that Rimbaud is believed to have 
                                       
2	  See Robb (2000, p. 100).	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participated in from late April 1871.3  Commune participant, Marxist Paul Lafargue (Marx’s 
son-in-law, whom Rimbaud likely met in Soho, London subsequently while attending the 
“Cercle d’Études Sociales”4 with Verlaine), similarly criticised the bourgeoisie for their 
“absolute laziness”, parodying them with comparable images of physiological incapacity. 
Satiated and squatting immobile in their places of privilege (intent on exclusively pocketing 
for themselves, as Kristin Ross noted, the rights to “leisure, pleasure, intellectual life”), 
Lafargue linked bourgeois excess with the decaying and collapsing organism (see Ross 
1989, p. 61).  Paralleling individual physiological decrepitude with that of the larger social 
body, his critique mirrored anxieties arising with Second Empire French urban life that fused 
excessive production with an insatiable commodification running in the shadow of 
Napoleon III’s authoritarian return.  If in turn, as Ross argued, much French revolutionary 
impetus then turned on an oppositional rhetoric pitting those who were perceived to work 
and produce against those considered parasites on ‘honest’ labour, Lafargue and Rimbaud 
are both noteworthy for intuiting a third way in the search for “revolutionary praxis”.  
Specifically coded in Lafargue’s The Right to Laziness (1883), but no doubt operative in 
Rimbaud’s poetic motivations well before that date, was a call to overturn the monopoly of 
the capitalist class on leisure thereby leaving open to workers and producers an opportunity 
to recoup their “taste for abstinence and to develop indefinitely [their] consuming 
capacities” (Lafargue 2000, Chapter 4).  Framing the revolutionary “Rights of Man” in terms 
of a mandatory ‘right to work’ courted, by Lafargue’s account, only misery, when 
contradictorily, the right to something akin to a virile laziness was needed instead: 
 
If, uprooting from its heart the vice which dominates it and degrades its nature, 
the working class were to arise in its terrible strength, not to demand the Rights of 
Man, which are but the rights of capitalist exploitation, not to demand the Right to 
Work which is but the right to misery, but to forge a brazen law forbidding any 
man to work more than three hours a day, the earth, the old earth, trembling with 
joy would feel a new universe leaping within her […]. (2000, Chapter II) 
 
At stake - contrary to Maxime du Camp’s fears - was something like a reconciliation of the 
two earths divisively afforded Abel and Cain: in fact this reconciliation (minus a 
melancholic backwardness, solitariness and non-urban polemic) was decidedly 
Rousseaueian in its virtual virility.  Certainly the interdiction against excessive work was 
rich in renovative societal potential.  In as much as laziness was “the mother of noble arts 
and noble virtues”, as Lafargue claimed, the masses must necessarily “take the hygienic and 
calisthenic exercises requisite to re-establish their health and improve their race” (Chapter 
4).  In the colourful caricature of this Communard Marxist only bodies in healthy motion 
                                       
3	  Despite disagreements among biographers, Robb points to strong evidence that Rimbaud 
witnessed the Paris Commune, perhaps even being amongst its reserves briefly (Robb 2000, pp. 78-
79).	  
4	  A group publishing information about the Commune intended to counter “Versaillais anti-
Commune propaganda”. See Ross, note 28, pp. 72-73. 
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might rouse and restore the languid, flabby torso of France commandeered by capitalism.  
Hence the “old earth”, not the estranged, couch-bound version doctored to by an “ape-like” 
industrialism, might yet be brought into happy animation. As Lafargue parodied: 
 
Capitalist France, an enormous female, hairy-faced and bald-headed, fat, flabby, 
puffy and pale, with sunken eyes, sleepy and yawning, is stretching herself out on 
a velvet couch. At her feet Industrial Capitalism, a gigantic organism of iron, with 
an ape-like mask, is mechanically devouring men, women and children, whose 
thrilling and heart-rending cries fill the air; the bank with a marten’s muzzle; a 
hyena’s body and harpy-hands, is nimbly flipping coins out of his pocket. Hordes 
of miserable, emaciated proletarians in rags, escorted by gendarmes with drawn 
sabers, pursued by furies lashing them with whips of hunger, are bringing to the 
feet of capitalist France heaps of merchandise, casks of wine, sacks of gold and 
wheat. (2000, Chapter IV) 
 
Consistent with a work model that striates horizontally and vertically - horizontally in the 
sense of the earth “stretching herself out”, languidly awaiting consummation/adulteration, 
and vertically in the sense of the carousing capitalist, amassing and concentrating wealth at 
will - this caricature binding landscape and socio-types, can be thought to respond to a 
broader surface demarcation and characterisation of national territory.  As Ross identified, at 
work was a “massive, synchronic expansion” seeking to coordinate the nineteenth century 
European national and colonial enterprise (1989, p. 86).  Pivotal to that synchronisation was 
academic geography, or what was proclaimed in France in the 1870s the “science of 
landscape” (in fact a “bastard offspring of history”) that sought a regional partitioning of 
space and its coding on the basis of physiognomies, “‘individualities,’ personalities’” (1989, 
p. 86).  Championed by founding geographer Vidal de la Blache, the new geography was 
concerned to capture the qualities of place, specifically according to visual criteria that 
apprehended territory as ‘landscape’.  Purportedly defined by the detail of “‘what the eye 
embraces with a look’” (Vidal cited in Ross 1989, p. 86) - an approach metaphorically 
redolent of sexual penetration, as Ross noted - in fact what the geographer achieved was, 
less a mastering of the seen, than an imposition and tabulating of landscapes according to 
what wasn’t seen, precisely because what was given in these descriptions were limited to 
“the typical landscape […] construct[ed] from abstract and derivative cliché formulations” 
(pp. 86-87).  Nevertheless, in line with the physiognomic impulse (whether exercised 
sociologically or geographically), at stake in this “landscapism” was the quest for a 
correspondence between image/surface/exterior and an inner truth or verisimilitude.  Sought 
in fact was a predictively productive demarcation of fixed, dependable character. 
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3. Observational Fields  
	  
	  
Vagabondage as virtual miscreancy, like adolescence as a vestibule of ‘anti-social’ subject 
positions in need of rectification, played into a larger demand to tabulate and identify the 
proliferating subjectivities spawned by market society.  No less pressing in cities than it was 
for landscapism in national territory, a concern with identifying physiologies quickly slide 
towards a physiognomic project seeking to uncover ‘natures’ and ‘tendencies’ otherwise 
signalled by obtuse visual cues.  Equally it constituted an observational field rich in the 
possibilities of overlooking and misrecognition.  Such a ‘seeing past’ is particularly evident 
in a sketch of Paul Verlaine and Arthur Rimbaud walking in London (Fig. 21).  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 21. Félix Régamey, 1872. “Verlaine et Rimbaud a 
londres”. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
	  
 
Drawn by French painter and ex-Communard Félix Régamey (1844-1907), it shows the pair 
shortly after their arrival in the city for the first time in September 1872.  Intent on capturing 
the perambulation of two urban walkers, the sketch leans toward a “representation of 
contingency” (Ebner 2008, p. 187), or what amounts to a chance view akin to what the 
“snapshot” would eventually come to avail.  To the extent that Régamey’s sketch hovers 
between impromptu street scene and portraiture, it does so by starkly stripping the setting of 
surrounding urban and social particularity – save for the iconic London ‘Bobby’ wearily 
scrutinising the passing Frenchmen.  In this its curious combination of arrest, observation 
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and occlusion aptly diagram a physiognomic viewpoint.  ‘Contingency’ here 
serendipitously catches a perquisite junction of persons and place that will, firstly, 
inaugurate a literary break sufficient to catalyse ‘modern poetry’, and secondly, ‘a new 
love’.   Régamey presents the perambulations of two poet-lovers precisely in the decade it 
became possible to ascribe to that love ‘that dare not speak its name’, the new name, 
“homosexual”.5  Citing Carl Westphal’s article on “contrary sexual sensations”, Foucault 
offered the date of 1870 as the point at which incidental, sodomitical relations became 
ascribable to a new species of man - the homosexual (1990, p. 43).  In the shadow of the 
event that made of diverse sexual acts or practices definitive identities, and with it 
recognition of a definitive range of internal perturbations of gender sensibilities and 
attractions, Régamey, knowingly or not, was likely the first to set down on paper such 
newly imaginable walkers. 	  
	  
Not coincidently, the stretch presents a gaze between Verlaine and Rimbaud that precisely 
mimics the prevailing representational code for erotically involved couples promenading in 
public.  Stephen Kern has called this convention, particularly prevalent amongst English and 
French artists in the second half of the nineteenth century, the “proposal composition” - a 
moment of indecision between a male and his female companion in which she appears to 
turn from his gaze to consider a weighty proposition and thereby leaving the viewer to 
ponder a decisive, “Will she or won’t she?” (1996, p. 7; emphasis in original).  Moreover the 
romantic interregnum reinforced divergent gender expectations as Kern wrote: 
 
The man’s single profiled eye implies the limited depth perspective of monocular 
vision and single-mindedness of purpose; the woman’s two frontal eyes imply the 
greater depth perception of binocular vision as well as a wider horizon of visual 
interests, a broader range of purposes, and more profound, if not more intense, 
emotions. (1996, p. 07) 
 
Correspondingly, Verlaine’s somewhat awkward, profiled stare is suggestively penetrating, 
while Rimbaud’s frontal gaze lies somewhere on the hesitant-resolute range of the feminine.  
This composition in fact mirrors the circumstances and prejudices of the situation: on one 
hand Verlaine, the married man fleeing his wife and child for London; on the other, “Mlle 
Rimbaut”, as the French National newspaper Le Peuple souverain satirised the juvenile 
poète maudit on 16 November 1871, a “charming young lady” purported to have been 
seen “arm-in-arm” with Verlaine in Paris (cited in Robb 2000, p. 139).  In fact, what the 
drawing more likely sets up is a physiognomic parody, both of the erotic promenade and of 
the solitary figure of the flâneur.  In the spirit of Rimbaud’s first London poem, “L’enfant qui 
ramassa les balles…” (“The Child who picked up the balls…”) scribbled and illustrated in 
                                       
5	  Karl-Maria Kertbeny first used the term in an anonymously authored pamphlet published in 1869.  
The term was subsequently adopted by others including Gustav Jager in Discovery of the Soul 
(1880) and Richard von Krafft-Ebing in Psychopathia Sexualis (1886).	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Régamey’s album,6 the sketch sets in play a knowing innuendo that undermines appetent 
surface certainties.  In contrast to the regional physiognomies of landscapism or its poetic 
equivalent, Parnassianism - a poetic form named after Greece’s Mount Parnassus (site of 
Delphi and the Sanctuary of Apollo) and with which Verlaine was associated – that was 
overly concerned with “mimesis” and a poetically faithful rendering of what is seen, 
Rimbaud wanted nothing to do with those “O very-peaceful photographers!”, seeking 
instead a perturbance refiguring the seen (Rimbaud 2005, p. 111; also Ross 1989, pp. 83-
83).  
 
In contrast to the street stripped bare of detail in Régamey’s sketch, to walk London’s streets 
in the nineteenth century, was not only to encounter foreign others drawn to the Empire’s 
capital – Verlaine and Rimbaud in their passage from Charring Cross Station, through 
Trafalgar Square and up Regent Street on first arriving were astonished enough to write, “it 
seems to be snowing negroes” (Robb 2000, p. 190) – it was to encounter an alien remaking 
of city space itself.  In fact to walk through Victorian London was to discover the “first city 
of the world”, a locale where the most far-flung geopolitical machinations were troublingly 
brought ‘home’ (Walkowitz 1992, p. 197).  While colonial expansion had presumed as 
unremarkable the centrifugation of the British (and European others) around the globe, the 
return of a sea of new social actors, racial and foreign others along with commercial, 
criminal and moral ‘undesirables’ to its shores had unexpectedly created what was 
construed to be a “terra incognita”, an unknown land, at the heart of Empire (p. 33).  Where 
John Nash’s reorganisation of Trafalgar Square in the 1820’s sought to bring into clearer 
relation the political actors in the country’s capital and the Empire’s centre (a gesture 
subsequently reinforced by the addition of representative colonial ‘houses’ at the square’s 
perimeter), the far less consciously and convincingly ordered East End and Docklands 
provided a much disparaged source of unpredictable colonial ‘leakage’ into the West End, 
thus miming an older east-west tension at London’s heart, bifurcated as it has long been 
between the City and Westminster.  Rich in imperialistic overtones, the resulting 
proliferation of discourses proclaiming an “East/West opposition”, as Judith Walkowitz has 
argued, sought to reorder the “social and epistemological disorientation” found up close in 
the Capital, yet not without revelling in the pleasures of an enriched urban spectatorship 
this potentiated (p. 19 & 197).  Here, any observer was but a drop in the ocean, set afloat 
on an unfathomable social field expanded, seemingly, without, limit as Friedrich Engels 
suggested in 1844 and Henry James, somewhat differently, in his essay “London” (1888).  A 
“thematics of fluidity” (to borrow David Wills’ phrase from a different context, 2008, p. 115) 
found in these accounts of London sought stability in the east-west arc organising the 
                                       
6	  The poem effected a smutty identification with 16 year-old Imperial Prince Louis, then exiled in 
Chislehurst in Kent, who is portrayed as an incessant masturbator - a then widely recognised code 
for homosexuality (Robb 2000, p. 185).	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imperial capital’s imaginary.  The Victorian city was remarkable not just for the civil 
engineering reforms prompted by the hygienist movement; urban ‘sanitation’ was 
inseparable from a parade of inspectors and administrative observers whose supposedly 
‘impartial’ and well-meaning attendance on the technical machinations of water supply, 
drainage, street lighting etc., drew on social concerns awash in moral indignation and 
revulsion at modes of deprived city living (Joyce 2003, p. 68).  No less in this period, a 
cadre of male urban walkers of varying professions and privileged station set out to observe 
and tabulate the sensory excesses, social depravations and immoderate circumstances of 
London’s newly assembled internal orient.  In so far as Verlaine and Rimbaud must be 
counted amongst those commentators at once demonstratively repelled, yet also whetted by 
an incremental airing of the pleats of the Victorian urban behemoth, as foreign adventurers 
themselves, they were caught as Régamey’s sketch makes plain, in a slide between observer 
and the observed.  Washed up on the paved shores of the English Capital fresh from the 
disquietude of the Paris Commune and in retreat from societal and domestic scandal of their 
own making, they had reason to attract scrutiny.     
 
In this regard, the uniformed presence of the constable in Régamey’s sketch can be read as 
more than a touristic addition by its amused French artist; the then relatively new 
technology of beat policing introduced with the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 
1829 in London (and subsequently across other British metropolitan centres) ambitioned a 
highly visible and repetitious presence of law enforcement on city streets.  Where 
previously city policing had operated according to stationary watchmen whose principal 
aim was the protection of property, particularly at night, police beats entailed a new and 
mobile surveillance of city space based on an older “military Shorncliffe system of 
communicating scout patrols” (Metropolitan Police 2013). Its aim was the traversal of 
predefined beats uniformly measured by “beat wheels” and repeatedly walked every 15 
minutes, day and night.  Citywide, the everyday walking of streets unavoidably entailed 
movement through a cellular patchwork of militarised scrutiny spatially and temporally 
circumscribed by these beat rhythms.  While the explicate intention of the new patrols was 
the detection of criminal activity and the apprehension of perpetuators, the unavoidable 
disciplinary effect, given the constant sense of police oversight, was an amplified 
circumspection and self-surveillance amongst the citizenry themselves (Joyce 2003, p. 111).  
As Patrick Joyce has written, given the previous, longstanding collective monitoring and 
shared policing of relatively autonomous communities by themselves, save for the 
occasional intervention by State militia, this arrangement helped set in train a much starker, 
and far from popular, distinction between public and private spaces.  Imposed over what 
was previously an informally ordered social terrain, what the new, municipally centralised 
policing effected was a bifurcation between, on one hand, places of collective access 
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regulated by police passage and oversight, and on the other, places of individual 
proprietorship and restricted access.  Not surprisingly, these newly defined public spaces 
took on the characteristics of a “neutral medium”, primarily dedicated to impediment-free 
circulation but over which an edict against loitering and gatherings were regularly enforced 
with the commonplace imperative to ‘move along’ (p. 111).7 
 
Something of this circulatory clearing is evident in the Régamey sketch, stripped as it is of 
the press of impediments and extraneous others.  The imperative to separate and partition 
persons, one from the other as part of a broader “hygienisation of the city” (p. 73) was a 
long standing goal of social reform and sensory diminution from the eighteenth century.  
The “crowding together of bodies”, as was widely believed at the time, facilitated the 
accumulations of “morbid emanations” or miasmal contamination and new standards of 
personal cleanliness, while slow to take hold, progressively raised sensitivity to proximal 
smell of others and a corresponding veneration of something approaching ‘personal space’ 
(Corbin 1988, p. 101).  Taking its lead from earlier military techniques of distancing and 
individuating bodies in mass manoeuvres and parading, the pocketing of persons in singular 
spatial enclosures ranging from single beds to individual graves, served to counter concerns 
over unregulated and immoderate mixing (whether social, familial or material) and the 
detrimental consequence of a fall into states of inertia and stagnation. In ideal conditions, 
all persons were to be maintained, much as Claude-Nicolas Ledoux argued for a 
paradigmatic Neoclassical architecture in the century before, as “‘islands in the air’”, 
independent of all extraneous adherence to better battle, by way of ventilation, the effects 
of bad air (cited in Corbin 1988, p. 101), but also to suture the utilitarian with the utopian. 
The diagrammatic economy of Régamey’s sketch similarly revels in an air of separation, 
though a qualified one.  Baudelaire’s championing in the preceding decade of an 
observational rendering of modern life according to a bare “physiognomy” or outline “bony 
structure” of things is evident too (2010, p. 21).  Favouring caricatures, rapid sketches and 
comic renderings against the prevailing taste for laboured heroic subjects, Baudelaire was at 
pains to recommend against the observer’s “will to see all and forget nothing”, a frugality of 
line that would resist being “trampled under foot” by “a riot of detail” all anarchically 
calling for inclusion on the canvas (p. 16).  In this sense, Régamey’s rendering of the street 
can be seen to raise a sparse visual depiction from a setting more commonly celebrated for 
its mobbing spectacle.  The pictorial economy here entails a seeing-through that uniquely 
befits modernity, a looking for “the salient or luminous points of an object” as Baudelaire 
called for (p. 21). 
 
                                       
7	  Certainly the British Police Acts of 1839 and 1835 empowered constables, as Joyce has observed, 
to intervene in “non-criminal street activities for the first time” and in particular, the “1867 Traffic 
Acts increased police powers over the regulation of traffic” itself (2003, p. 217).	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Diverging from the images by Constantin Guys that Baudelaire had in mind is the framing of 
the strolling poets by a police officer.  The iconic, if apparition-like, figure of a London 
Bobby in the scene starkly invokes legal force and portends the explicitly erotic and 
turbulent relationship between Rimbaud and Verlaine that infamously concluded in the 
following year with Rimbaud’s shooting and the imprisonment of Verlaine in Belgium for 
sodomy.  If the police presence suggests a general atmosphere of suspicion, as Robb had 
indicated, it was not unwarranted, for as subsequently became known, “spies who reported 
to Ministers on both sides of the Channel” monitored the visiting French poets, as they did 
for many of the political exiles and immigrants thought to compose, with varying degrees of 
commitment, an “international socialist underground” in London’s Soho (2000, p.189).  If 
that observation comprised a covert operation, the manifest police observer in Régamey’s 
image, foregrounds, with its array of sideways glances and avoided face-to-face recognition, 
a reflexive field consistent, not with a despotic, paranoiac/interpretive register, but a post-
signifying mix of self-surveillance, passional determination and social counter-expression.  It 
pictures in fact an elemental unit of social space redolent with the pastoral machinations 
and disciplinary technologies Foucault associated with the emergence of the nineteenth 
century “subject of desire”.  Régamey unerringly stages the complex observational field that 
the walker as a subject of desire and bearer of (potential) sexual perturbation (for which 
Verlaine and Rimbaud were taken as actual markers) comprises – or what amounted to a 
field of post-romantic decipherment and visual referencing that was entirely antithetical to 
the romantic notion, as Celeste Langan asserted, of walking as a “transcendental surplus” 
that emphasised universality and equivalence over “the contingent details” of gesture, gait, 
apparel, or societal relation (1995, p. 05).  Emphasising this relational field is Régamey’s 
composition itself which has both the constable and Rimbaud symmetrically turned inward 
toward the taller figure of Verlaine who centralises the composition, but who in turn adds a 
certain imbalance or tension by looking back across his shoulder toward Rimbaud.  The 
incongruity of his diverted attention serves to displace any sense of forward momentum and 
with both feet essentially planted flatly, and legs minimally bent while widely spread, 
suggests he has momentarily paused or is shuffling to a halt.  In contrast, Rimbaud, body 
and head inclined forward, one leg planted, another rising and with clear room all about 
him is clearly advancing at pace suggestively compressing the space between them.  In the 
background the more spectrally rendered constable, wide-legged and with knees locked, is 
resolutely stationary.  While Verlaine’s sideways glance was linked to the proposal 
composition above, in fact its slightly more rearward trajectory accords with a less openly 
rendered or even acknowledged propositional gesture, “the rearward glance”, itself a telling 
icon of sexual interest whose exercise in public between males, was increasingly 
understood in the nineteenth century to signal homosexual recognition as Mark Turner has 
explored.  The propositional glance (belonging to the “cruiser”, as Turner assigns ‘him’) as 
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decoding of the proposal composition takes up the small hiatus in the teleology of the 
romantic interregnum – or what Lee Edelman calls a “temporality of desire” indexed to “the 
reproductive Couple” and a futurity resting on familial closure and Oedipality (2004, p. 87 
& 2011, p. 148) - extending it indefinitely, not in the sense of consummating, casual sexual 
acts, but in the perpetuating dynamic of “walking, gazing and engaging another (or others)” 
outside all completion8 (Turner 2003, p. 60).  It entails, in other words, surrendering to the 
“omnipresent, diffuse sexualisation” of the city itself as a mobile domain of attraction and 
indifference, a domain coloured by the neutrality of a ‘maybe’ and the search for a double 
or companion through recognition (Henning Bech cited in Turner 2003, p. 60).  Integral to 
this attraction is a language naming and delimiting companions tout court (the homosexual, 
the heterosexual) and yet language itself orchestrates that naming’s undoing – radically so.  
Language, like the city at large, is never other than an anonymous companion, an 
impersonal personation that never satisfies, in the nexus of observation it extends, either 
definitive recognition or satiation.  
 
	  
4. Orchestrating Language  
 
 
The vacillation between the propositional composition and the propositional glace in 
Régamey’s sketch, speaks to the broader problem of eliciting from male bodies specifically 
signification capable of telling, within a presumed gender solidarity, a defining difference – 
the homosexual difference.  For Edelman, the historical circumstances making possible the 
naming of the homosexual leaves no sexual position untouched and in fact set in play a 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” adhering to all male bodies (1994, p. 7).  Like Cain the betrayer 
marked indelibly for his crime, the ‘homosexual body’ is in turn conceived of as a 
discursive entity, an entity required to manifest its difference visually, and therefore 
‘textually’ as a ‘truth’ capable of being read - a gait, an affectation, an indiscrete look. In 
doing so it frees its other – the heterosexual body - from any specific, signifying demand, 
thereby affording it a purported nature and naturalness exempt from representation (pp. 5, 
9).  Homographesis is the term Edelman coined to describe in fact the play of difference and 
sameness determining sexuality and the discursive performance extended to all bodies in 
modernity.  Centring moreover the victimage mechanism of homophobia, is the capacity to 
identify (deviant) cues metaphorically expressive of an essence – specifically in the Anglo-
European context an essential passivity equated with femininity.  Following Lacan, Edelman 
argued - against metaphor, and any essentialness in sexuality - for the primacy of metonymy 
                                       
8	  Edelman makes the point that irony in the manner Paul De Man defined it, causes narrative to be 
“suspended, interrupted, disrupted”, and in the context of a serial chronology implicate in the 
“reproductive Couple”, Régamey’s ironising of the proposition composition implies a lapse of 
futurism for which the ‘crusier’, indeed the homosexual couple, are exemplars (2004, p. 87).	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as desire’s indicative mechanism and the decoded ground upon which all metaphor 
troublingly plies its trade in equivalence: 
 
Metaphor, that is, binds the arbitrary slippages characteristic of metonymy into 
units of ‘meaning’ that register as identities or representational presences. Thus the 
historical investiture of sexuality with a metaphoric rather than a metonymic 
significance made it possible to search for sexual signifiers that would testify to 
the presence of this newly posited sexual identity or ‘essence’. (p. 9) 
 
If, as indicated previously, excessive semiosis in capitalist market relations operates 
metonymically, the imposition of metaphoric signification amounts to one means of 
imposing an identificatory stricture against the former’s erosive passivity.  As such, the 
‘queerness’ of Rimbaudian poetics (a queering, that is, of the narcissistic counter-
actualisation of borderline states pursued by Baudelaire) lies less in rendering visible a new 
sexuality than in ‘exploding’ all metaphoric determinacy.  At stake is a poetic driven not by 
resentment at the lapse of promise portended by bourgeois culture; Rimbaud rails instead 
against the hegemony of that culture by mobilising, amplifying and redistributing the 
dissimilitude underwriting it (Ross 1989, p. 125).  That this took the form of a tropic 
malfunction is widely noted in the literature on Rimbaud.  Ross exampled Hugo Friedrich’s 
highlighting of “absolute metaphor” in Rimbaud’s poetry where identification with 
substitute figures, rather than implying similitude, is total (p. 79).  For example, the self 
taken as a boat on a drunken course in “Le bateau ivre”: “As I was going down impassive 
Rivers, […]”;2005, p. 129).  Similarly, Jean Paul Sartre, as Ross noted, found in Rimbaud a 
“‘leftist’ turn of the imagination” that deployed “‘centrifugal’, ‘generous’, and ‘explosive’ 
metaphor” (p. 125).   Evident in Rimbaud, as Sartre found, was one particular strand of 
modern poetic which unifies through expansive gathering, “compel[ling] natural diversity to 
symbolize an explosive unity” by forging in the disassembly and motion of things ever-
greater circuits of connection (Sartre 2012 pp. 463-464; Ross 1989, pp. 125-126). 
 
In Rimbaud then is this double valence: the body made a site of speech (a demand to speak 
its ‘secret truth’ as spoiler of bourgeois masculinity) and a subject of enunciation (the “‘I 
speak’”) that lets itself go by entering into what Foucault, in another context, described as 
an endless, spreading forth of language (1987, p. 11).  Contrary to a bourgeois origination in 
the Cartesian cogito and its linking of interior states with truth-finding, what Foucault called 
the “I speak” knows no certainty against doubt and draws the thinking subject into an 
“outside” relieved of all fixed features or orientating markers (p.11).  Foucault sought in the 
essay “The Thought of the Outside” to consider beyond experience as internally predicated, 
thinking instead into the being of language where he found a paradoxical place – a kind of 
non-place - between silence and actual speech.  Not unlike Rimbaud’s absolute metaphor, 
he imagines a sheer equivalence between speech and the self, but one shorn of any 
transitivity or object-reference (the thing I am “speaking about or of”; Lawlor 2011, p. 93).  
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As Lawlor described this thought operation, “when I suspend the transitivity of speech, I 
find myself located with an indefinite or even infinite supporting discourse, a discourse that 
becomes definite and limited only with the speaking of or about one thing” (2011, p. 93).  
Suturing the ‘I’ to speech prior to any particular articulation renders it absolutely exposed to 
the abyssal multiplex state that is language’s anonymous, networked being - its “informal 
murmur” (p. 94).  Doubled with a foundation that founds nothing but the loss of foothold, 
the speaking self, as opposed to the thinking one, experiences immanence as grafted to a 
beyond that no actual speaking will overcome.  To think this outside is to enter into a realm 
of anonymity where forgetting and diffusion prevail and where “waiting for nothing in 
particular” (for no particular thing avails itself) induces both interminable boredom and an 
over-zealous grasping of the ungraspable – qualities in fact consistent with Blanchot’s 
double characterisation of Rimbaud in his pursuit of an exhausted and exhausting unity.  
More broadly, this “attraction-withdrawal” couplet is indicative of literature itself, which 
must be understood to invariably open a passage to the “neutral space” or ‘outside’ 
underwriting language (Foucault 1987, p. 13; Lawlor 2012, p. 179).  For this reason, 
Foucault asserts, “it is now so necessary to think through fiction”, to find thought not as an 
“entire tradition wider than philosophy” has, in “deepest interiority”, but in the “being of 
language” that knows no interior (1987, pp. 12-13).  The “‘subject’ of literature (what 
speaks in it and what it speaks about)” does not belong to the “dynasty of representation” 
(1987, p. 12) - that remaining vestige of despotism – but to the beyond of what can be 
stated in positivity or certainty.  The space of fiction no doubt extends a problematic around 
truth.  Much as Socrates’ confrontation with political parrhēsia shattered “the foundations of 
Greek truth” with the possibility that “‘I lie, I speak’” (Foucault 1987, p. 09), it set up a 
confrontation with immanence – a grappling with the immediate contingency of one’s own 
truth – opening the way for metaphysics to overarch it with a superior world exceeding 
manifest appearances (Lawlor 2012, pp. 03-04).  With a reassertion of an Oedipal trajectory 
in Cartesian thought there is also a reassertion of immanence, or at least, as Lawlor said, 
that version of it first understood “as internal, subjective experience” (p. 200).  Yet, if the 
thrust of post-Cartesian, Continental philosophy has been an overcoming of Platonism 
specifically, and metaphysics generally, subjective experience itself has increasingly lost its 
claim to certitude or truth while immanence has come to mean “ungrounded experience” - 
something which insistently ‘companions’ the subject and to which it only precariously 
rises above (p. 200).	  	  
 
While Certeau critiqued the grounding of the scriptural or literate subject in the island of the 
page, an island mimetic of a mercantile-capitalist remaking of the world, Foucault saw in 
the scriptural operation, firstly a fortressing of the self (its disjunction from the world that 
can be named), and secondly, the exile to a “surrounding desert” subsisting with every 
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reach towards transitivity in speech. The subject so mired in a hiatus, “inserts distances” 
into its quest for self-presence (Lawlor 2011, p. 98).  If Descartes provided the model for 
modern auto-affection and immanence “‘I am thinking, I am thinking about…, I am thinking 
about my own ideas”’ (cited in Lawlor 2011, p. 98), for Lawlor, thinking as an inner 
monologue (consistent with Plato’s overcoming of a dialogical alterno pede) implies 
“‘hearing oneself think’” seemingly simultaneously, yet to hear - even inner speech - is to 
have invoked, however small, a temporal span and mediation (p. 98).  This miniscule split, 
like the division Merleau-Ponty ascribes to the auto-affection invoked by vision which 
makes the subject always a seer and the seen, divides the present in which thought occurs.  
Rimbaud for his part set out to similarly undermine the surety of thought, “degrading” 
himself, deranging “all the senses, to better convert himself, via poetic vision, into a “Seer” 
(letter to Georges Izambard 13 May 1871; 2005, p. 371).  In a follow up to the famous “I is 
another”, Rimbaud, calling on a certain disassociation arising with waking moments, wrote, 
as indicated previously, of watching internally his thoughts coming into being (2005, p. 
375).  The self, no less than the thoughts that emanates from it are far from sui generis; an 
orchestral tempo and temporality course through them. Concomitantly, for Lawlor auto-
affection means finding in oneself: 
 
[…] the sounds of others […] other voices, which come from the past [so that…] it 
is impossible for me to hear myself speak all alone. There is a multivocality, a sort 
of murmur or clamour coming from the past. Others’ voices contaminate the 
hearing of myself speaking. Just as my present moment is never immediate, my 
interior monologue is never simply my own. (2011, p. 99) 
 
Not that thought is incapable of forming unique or singular expression, but it answers to 
what Lawlor called a double structure: a spacing that repeats or brings into play repetitious 
traits, traits of the past; and a singularization that combines them as novel events (p. 99).  
Together these two ‘structural elements’ operate by failing to unify, by ensuring an end-
heterogeneity or out of jointedness that in fact render thought a “hetero-affection” whose 
“immanence dissolves into multiplicity and that taints any cognitive interior with an outside 
that murmurs ‘we’ (p. 99). 
	  
	  
5. Legal Force & Un-Seaming 
	  
For Régamey’s poet-walkers, mired in something akin to neutral space, an absence of 
encircling city or even a viscerally substantive ground - commonplace in eighteenth century 
accounts of pedestrian passage where impeded or contaminated street surfaces abound – 
points to a certain abstraction of place – in fact an eidetic reduction of sorts.  The redaction 
of city detail leaves only an anonymising, socio-legal triangulation, where desire lines travel 
without converging or completing their promise.  Following Foucault, ‘attraction’ in the 
sense that Blanchot deployed it, courses through the composition – which is to say that it 
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presents an open whole without “positive presence” or real intimacy (1987, pp. 27-28).  
And if there is attraction in this image, there is negligence – the flipside indicator of 
Blanchotean attraction as Foucault saw it – too: neglect of the city proper, neglect of the 
familial and circumstantial background of the exiled poets, and, despite an askance glance, 
neglect of the intimate attraction that drove them to neglect bourgeois prudence and 
reasonableness to the point of a devastating intersection with the law.  Ultimately there is 
negligence of writing.  On the other hand, zeal - drunken and desperate (desperate to 
harvest an unremitting boredom) – takes solicitude too far, and as Foucault held, strides 
towards “distraction and error” multiplied by steps that “dizzy with stubbornness” (p. 29). 
So Régamey, perhaps with a prehension of where the poets’ zeal and negligence will carry 
them, personifies the law via a ‘Bobby’, or perhaps he just wanted a marker of the 
foreignness of the city he left undelineated. In either case, the figure of the law doubles with 
the couple no less than the city spaces it comes to define.  Foucault referring to this 
companioning function, saw in it an insistent sovereignly force haunting “cities, institutions, 
conduct, and gestures”, one that keeps them in order without ever manifesting itself 
completely (p. 33).  As such, the law, as something only ever approached but never 
grasped, operates as an “outside that envelops conduct” much as language envelops the ‘I 
speak’ without any speech being equal to it (1987, pp. 34-35).  Moreover, as Foucault 
claimed, “The law is the shadow toward which every gesture necessarily advances; it is the 
shadow of the advancing gesture” and as such is its own diabolical attractor (1987, p. 35). 
That Rimbaud could not imagine a poetic output without atrocities, and achieved poetic 
notoriety precisely on the basis of making ‘atrocity’ his companion, something of the law’s 
potency as progenitor is evident.  Correspondingly, in the essentially groundless portrayal of 
the walking poets, what grounding credence Régamey’s sketch does invokes takes the sole 
form of shadows (belonging to Verlaine and Rimbaud), shadows that fall towards, and 
tightly frame, the shadowless figure of the law.  And if, as Foucault said, it is in the nature of 
“The law [to] avert[…] its face and return[…] to the shadows the instant one looks at it” 
(1987, p. 41) - or what amounts to the same thing, a place without shadow – what can be 
recognised in the legal force Foucault described is the double betrayal characterising what 
Deleuze and Guattari’s called the passional or a-signifying regime.  That the law, like the 
being of language, finds its essence in withdrawal to an outside with no substantive or 
positive manifestation, it is because, unlike the despotic reign that links decrees and 
interdictions to a “an external model, a referent, face”, the postsignifying semiotic institutes 
a discourse vacillating between finitude and the infinite as vast impersonal power that 
betrays all referents.  Rimbaud from “Villes” (“Cities”): “But the law must be so unusual that 
I give up imaging what adventures are like” (2005, p. 333).  
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Such is the mark of Cain impressed on its exiled peoples as an infinitely postponed 
sentence, one born of an interdiction proceeding all interdiction (the first murder).  As 
Steven Connor noted: “Cain kills Abel, but what law does he break? The law that his own 
act institutes as prior to it; thus Cain is marked with the primal mark. Cain is marked with 
the sign of the deserter; but […] he is marked in order that he can never desert, that he will 
always be at home in his wanderings” (2001).  If it is the body that links, as Connor phrased 
it, the “law and letters” within what he calls the “law of marks” (or what amounts to a 
passional regime in extreme compaction), the mark of Cain calls up a disturbed siglum 
indeterminately implicating wandering bodies.  The biblical word for mark is the Hebrew 
“ot”, something that itself “came to have the meaning of a ‘character’ or ‘sign’” (2001), and 
therefore suggests a circular or undecideable logic further carried over into Latin translations 
where, as Ruth Mellinkoff confirmed, an ambiguity over whether God “placed a sign on 
Cain” or “made Cain (as) a sign” has tended to be resolved in favour of the former, causing 
much speculation over the precise nature of the sign, speculation well in excess of any 
scriptural specification (1981, p. 02).  The drive to make the mark, any mark, manifest, 
again in Connor’s characterisation, means that the “law takes him [the subject under law] 
out of his own time, and submits him to its durance [hence it is…] a system for making the 
past and the present commensurate, [of keeping] the past and the future in balance” (2001). 
But Oedipus the Greek Cain, is the one in whom no balancing of past and future can be 
achieved in the present.  The mark events but does not signify.  Similarly with Cain, as the 
bearer of a monomaniacal passion, there is no equivalence between mark and law, no mark 
of equivalence and therefore no closure of the law.  God holds him in reserve, protected 
from revenge by way of an “apotropic” sign, a sign attracting exception but also repudiation 
(Connor 2001).  Certainly, Rimbaud’s own assumption of Cain as a narrative hero in 
“Mauvais sang”, completed in the aftermath of the London sojourn with Verlaine and during 
Verlaine’s imprisonment emphasises, as Carrie Jaurès Noland has explored, a “kind of holy 
loneliness, an immunity, but also a permanent isolation from his fellow men” (1997, p. 
567).  
	  
In Régamey’s sketch, Rimbaud and Verlaine stand before and, in a certain sense, knowingly 
against the law.  No doubt, behind the cold intimacy of the image is the persistence of the 
Romantic idealisation of the artist as outsider, marked out in isolation from context and 
surrounding social convention, but something new presses through too: the possibility of 
passing unrecognised, despite a physiognomic-inclined observing field seeking deeper 
truths via the surface of things, and despite a law seeking to signify, in all positivity, the 
difference, the divergence, the deviant within a law of equivalency.  These two walkers, as 
newly minted ‘homosexuals’, suggest the difficulty of bodies to testifying in the 
physiognomic sense, but also to the possibility of difference being inscribed within 
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sameness consistent with Edelman’s homographesis.  For Edelman, the emergence of a 
nineteenth century hetro-homo demarcation overturning an earlier “socially diffused 
homosexuality” without metaphoric valence (a term borrowed from Alan Bray; 1995), far 
from stabilising ‘essential’ (and asymmetrically valued) differences in sexuality by making 
them “available to signification”, instead come to “signify the instability of the signifying 
function per se” (1994, p. 6).  Perturbing of three key signifying arenas - the theological 
(where it is coded as sodomical and heretic), the political (where it is coded as treasonous), 
the social (as misplaced “gender roles and stereotypes”) – homosexuality in fact fails its 
metaphorical task by calling all desiring subjects into suspicion via a “metonymic dispersal” 
readable everywhere.  Further, “homosexuality comes to signify the potential permeability 
of every sexual signifier – and by extension, of every signifier as such – by an ‘alien’ 
signification” (pp. 6-7).  On the other hand, if the production of the “gay body as text” 
amounts to the grasping of a homosexual essence supposedly “always already inscribed” in 
certain bodies, the impossibility of securing a visible token of that difference in any male 
body (a morphological difference) points to the uncertain initiation of any body into the law 
of desire and into textuality.  It speaks in fact to a lapse in the whole physiognomic project 
that would converge the “two into One” in a metaphoric essentialism that puts words to 
bodies and fixes them in statements (Edelman 2004, p. 87).  Instead, a doubling persists, 
and like the being of language and the law’s ever-distant retreat, this queer companioning 
opens up all and any interiority accorded the subject of desire.  Further, it calls time on that 
subject’s claim to an enduring futurity or what amounts to the realisation, and coping with 
that realisation, that out front and beyond there is nothing but a lapse of finitude – in other 
words an absolute outside (1987, p. p.47).   
 
For Edelman what defines this coping is a “fantasmatics of futurity” in which social reality 
receives its status as reality by virtue of its exceeding individual mortality and thereby 
providing a structure “to identify ourselves with what’s to come by way of haven or defense 
against the ego’s certain end” (p. 34).  Indeed desiring subjects can only dwell in and 
through the “sheltering office of fantasy”, that itself instils an “imaginary suture in the face of 
death” by dissolving such subjects into the very scene and setting of social space (2003, p. 
230; emphasis in original).  To be in the scene is to always be invested in its longevity, and 
by borrowed reference, our own; it is to be invested in a reproductive agency seeking to 
exceed the Real as a figure of impossible enduring – in other worlds, as figure of the death 
drive itself (p. 231).  Adolescence, richly verging on societal reproduction – both socio-
economic and sexual – is also a placeholder for desiring ambiguity no less than virtual 
miscreancy and in Régamey’s picturing of a parodic, propositional composition, and the 
bridging of adolescence into infamy, the scene of social absorption is one severely shorn of 
manifest futurity.  Its going-nowhere (in the sense its non-place traversal) resonates with 
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Edelman’s identification of a queer refusal of the fantasmatics of futurity.  Building on 
Lacan’s depiction of the sinthome, (“an old way of writing what was subsequently written as 
symptom”; 2013, I-19) or what he understood, not as a signifier opening the unconscious to 
interpretation, but a nonsensical indicator and interpretive blockage uniquely inducing 
subject coherence via a jouissance bringing together the real, the imaginary and the 
symbolic, Edelman proposed the Sinthom-osexuality instead to specify an interminable 
blockage operative in “a heterosexually elaborated symbolic order” (p. 232). Specifically: 
 
[…] sinthom-osexuality specifies the ‘sin’ with which the ‘homosexual’ continues 
to be charged as that of figuring a threat to the subject’s faith that its proper home 
is in meaning, a threat made real by the homosexual’s construction in the image 
of a radically despiritualized ‘home’. (p. 232) 
 
If fantasy provides “an unbroken continuity to the meaningless circulation and repetitions of 
the drive”, sinthom-osexuality is its antithesis on the basis that it potentiates the erosion of 
all limits to pleasure (p. 232).  Moreover, it characterises the flipside of an ameliorating 
Oedipal surface: 
 
Sinthom-osexuality […] – denied and denying the seductive appeal to fantasy thus 
exerts, refusing the pledge of futurity that mends all tears, however mean, in 
reality’s dress with threads of meaning) attached as they are to the eye-catching 
sequins of sequence, and thus of consequence) – presents us with fantasy turned 
inside out, the seams of its costume exposing reality’s seamlessness as mere 
seeming, the fraying knots each sequin in place now usurping that place. (p. 231; 
emphasis in original) 
 
While for Lacan the sinthome amounted to a fourth knot or binding holding together the 
symbolic, imaginary and real circuits composing a topology of the subject and thus 
preventing the whole structure sliding into a psychotic state, it nevertheless operates to 
show up and enjoy the unruly collision between bodies and language, the symbolic and the 
real (Thurston 2004, p. 166).  Like Barthes punctum that dwells up close in details and has 
the power, contrary to “hide-and-seek”, interpretive desire, to expand metonymically, 
Edelman’s picturing of sinthom-osexuality is all stitching, and messy knotted construction 
that singularly undoes, via the eye-catching incongruity of its patchwork, the seamlessness 
of the big picture (or what Barthes called the averaging reality of the stadium image) (2000, 
pp. 26, 43-45).  On this basis the lapse of futurity the homosexual body is made to 
phobically embody covers over a move severe desexualisation than sublimation’s way 
forward.  Edelman’s arresting, no future, coalescing about the sinthom-osexual undoing of 
all signifying certainty, if given a Deleuzian inflection, translates as something like a 
metaphysical surface where castration propels, not a fantasy overbridging in its 
preoccupation with the restoration of couples, but an altogether different leap past what 
Deleuze saw as its “deadly furrow” – the trace of castration brings to the fore “the crack 
constitutive of thought, or between sexuality and thought as such” (1990, pp. 218-219).  
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Not unlike Lacan’s eschewing of a representational basis for fantasy, what inhabits the 
rupture that constitutes thought for Deleuze is the phantasy, a non-representational, non-
personal, event whose infinitive nature transcends localisation in a person, a time, or a 
place (Faulkner 2006, pp. 28-29).  Passing from figurative expression to abstract symbolism, 
the phantasm amounts to an incorporeal take-over of bodies that dissolves subjects in 
action in excess of personal representation (1990, p. 220).  In short, the phantasm draws all 
bodies (no less than the homosexual one) towards an unstable, textual imbrication as 
suggested previously with regard to Klossowski’s tripartite soul.  
 
Thus does writing as phantom repetition shuttle between the “corporeal surface of sexuality 
and the metaphysical surface of thought” (1990, 222).  On the other hand, the reverse 
surface of fantasy, the unseemly inside of every solidly and dependably enduring reality – 
Edelman’s Sinthom-osexuality in fact – accords with that body perpetually making itself 
foreign to any corporeal organisation – what Deleuze and Guattari called the “body without 
organs”.  As the model of “non-productive stasis”, in fact “the model of death”, the body 
without organs is an attraction-repulsion mechanism that both gathers desiring machines 
and shuttles them off (2000, pp. 9, 329).  In its repelling mode it models death by closing 
down and resisting all organisation or appropriation (catatonia as figure of zero intensity); in 
its attracting mode it binds together and distributes operational parts of a desiring nexus.  If 
desire only works on the basis of both attracting and repelling operations, as Deleuze and 
Guattari argued, there must be both a model of death and an immanent experience of death 
at the heart of any desiring nexus.  Further, it must be a matter of converting the death 
model into the experience of death – in other words, “Converting the death that rises from 
within (in the body without organs) into the death that comes from without (on the body 
without organs)” (p. 330).  More plainly, there is no feeling that does not entail a divergent 
becoming, one whose passing into actuality necessarily traverse a point of zero affective 
intensity as datum marking the point at which the feeling is felt (p. 330).  More radical still, 
every new affective departure potentiates an ‘I’ who is another without necessarily 
invalidating the other constituent attractions and repulsions that may have rightfully called 
themselves a One’ in prior affective state (p. 331).  Not coincidently did Deleuze and 
Guattari cite Rimbaud in this context, emphasising the contingent making and remaking of 
perceptual horizons in excess of the single experiencer: “Let him die in his leaping through 
unheard-of and unnameable things: other horrible workers will come: they will begin on 
the horizons where the others collapsed!” (p. 331).9 
 
 
 
 
                                       
9	  The citation comes from Rimbaud’s letter to Paul Demeny dated 15 May 1871 (2005, p. 373-377). 
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5. An Alchemy of the Foot 
	  
	  
All this suggests that for Rimbaud and Verlaine, London was a type of attraction-repulsion 
machine for shattering the limits of the lyrical self but also the urban given as such.  For 
instance, in two city prose poems in Illuminations - “Villes” (“Cities”) - both take London as 
referent and yet craft a non-mimetic relationship with the city, vastly distending and 
amplifying it. From “Villes II”: 
 
The official acropolis surpasses the most colossal conceptions of modern barbarism. 
Impossible to express the flat daylight produced by this unchanging gray sky, the 
imperial glitter of the buildings, and the eternal snow on the ground. In a singular 
taste for the gigantic they reproduced all the classical architectural marvels, and I visit 
exhibitions of paintings in rooms twenty times larger than Hampton Court. (2005, p. 
331) 
 
Like much poetry nineteenth century city poetry, Rimbaud gives a descriptive account of 
urban place in the throes of industrialisation and urbanisation, yet going beyond such 
accounts, his narrator is given, less to aghast distance, than wonder. From “Villes I”: 
 
Swiss chalets of crystal and wood move along invisible rails and pulleys. Old craters 
girdled by colossi and copper palm trees roar tunefully in the midst of fires. The 
sounds of love feasts ring over the canals suspended behind the chalets. The pack of 
chimes clamour in the gorges. Guilds of gigantic singers come together in cloths and 
banners as shinning as the light on mountain tops. On platforms, within precipices, 
Rolands blare forth their valor. On foot bridges spanning the abyss and on the roofs 
of inns, the burning sky decks out masts. (p. 329) 
 
An alchemistic and ecstatic remaking of city specificity is at work in these depictions, one 
eschewing the degraded palette Baudelaire was compelled to sample in pursuit of an 
ontotheological coordination of wholes out of parts (Ross 1989, p. 126).  Rimbaud’s 
incendiary metaphors – “metaphor that “explodes and scatters in all directions” – instead 
achieve a “dynamic unity” through sheer combustion alone, as Ross noted (p. 126).  Fusing 
the historical with contemporaneity, nature with the urban, and festivals and love with 
work, a transmorgrification consistent with the mystical origins of guides and the old pre-
industrial economies crafting value from putrefaction can be thought to be involved, 
particularly in “Villes I” (Ahearn 1983, p. 294).  Yet the merging with nature in Villes II 
portends a more troubling futurity, a deurbanising conglomeration of infinite reach, one 
giving rise to savage, neo-Rousseauian, social actors: 
 
The suburb melts strangely into the country, the ‘Country’ filling the eternal west with 
forests and gigantic plantations, where savage nobles hunt their news columns in the 
light which they invented. (2005, 333)  
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In a tradition “stretching from Blake to Yeats”, as Ahearn noted, apocalyptic gravitas is 
coupled with ecstatic visionary experience (death as model and experience perhaps?) and if 
Rimbaud gathers up these themes, both repelling and attracting, he no less exacerbates 
them, drawing them into fantastical configurations as if illuminating a re-seamed flipside to 
concrete urban perturbation.  In fact Villes II might be imagined to concretise a critique of 
urban centrifugation for if the last paragraph charts a melting into suburbs and savagery (for 
which no first person reference attests), the preceding two paragraphs, rich in observer 
reference (”I went down”, “I trembled at the sight”, “I thought I could estimate” etc.), imply 
an immediately explicate facing of urban specificity.  Here an incendiary metaphorics 
expands into the eye-witnessed fabric of things, though not without remaking what is 
habitually known.  
 
 
 
Figure 22. Illustrated London News, 1865. Embankment Construction of the Thames. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons.  
 
In fact the given-ness of the city was itself in great flux at this time with the London City 
Corporation undertaking widespread street paving and cleaning programmes, in addition to 
numerous road-straightening and realignment projects between 1850-1870 - works likely to 
have remade much of the surface terrain walked by Verlaine and Rimbaud between 1872-
73.  Following Nash’s Trafalgar Square/Regent Street formation in 1814-1825, the Thames 
Embankment riverbank reconstruction designed by Joseph Bazalgette and undertaken by the 
Metropolitan Board of Works between 1862-70 followed - a civic initiative seen as answer 
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to “the brilliant achievements of M. Haussmann”.10  Proposals for a single unified bank-edge 
for the Thames had been advanced as early as 1666 by Sir Christopher Wren after the Great 
Fire, but the 1860s version - entailing a new traffic artery providing east-west diversion for 
congested Strand and Fleet Street nearby - was extended along the length of the swampy, 
north bank of the Thames and was unprecedented in the vertical extent of its carriageway 
development (Fig. 22).  Below ground, behind extensive retaining walls, it accommodated a 
railway tube (the Circle Line), multi-level sewers and interceptors of London’s lost and 
undergrounded rivers, along with gas lines; above it provided a tree-lined, granite paved 
promenade complete with cast-iron benches and gas lamps, monuments and, if its earlier 
planned version had been completed, jets of ornamental water (Winter 1993, pp.26-27).   
 
What this Regency merging of the “healthful and the beautiful” (pp. 27, 30) – if also 
concentrating idlers and “ragged youth”11 - underscores is the dramatisation and 
specialisation of street terrain in the nineteenth century, particularly a sense of an unseen 
but pervasive ‘beneath’ integral with its traversal.  In a unique shift, walking was made to 
play out across a surface of unprecedented technical complexity, a surface not merely 
rolled out across variable terrain, but one whose form harboured a routinely indecipherable 
sentience or rationality of its own.  While the experience of large-scale infrastructural 
systems are commonplace, even banally experienced in this century, their spread into every 
aspect of daily life in the nineteenth was no doubt deeply confounding.  The developmental 
continuity of the Embankment’s riverside walk no less offered an synthesis that brought into 
abrupt contact not only the depth of the river and its tidal surge held back by an urban 
underworld, it offered a new measure of the city’s temporal draft bringing into a single 
viewable sweep, as the Daily New contemplated in 1869, the vast interior of St Paul’s at 
one end and the gothic towers and chambers of Westminster at the other.  In between, the 
“Titanic grandeur of the [then newly constructed] Charing Cross Railway-bridge” had trains 
and engines wondrously “rolling to and fro high up in the air”.12  Consequently, the Daily 
News was moved to further announce:  
 
If this is not the age of the Graces, it is the age of the Cyclops; and the Cyclops 
have a grace of their own.  Harmonious and connecting all, the fluent softness, 
reflects the lights, and manifold activity of the river, contrasts charmingly with the 
objects on shore. 
 
Sons of Mother Earth, the one-eyed Cyclops (builders of “gigantic walls and master-smiths” 
all three; Graves 1992, 3b) were so named for being “ring-eyed” – in other words, having 
had concentric circles inscribed on their foreheads to signify their use of compasses for 
                                       
10 Daily News, “On the Thames Embankment”, Wednesday October 13, 1869, Issue 7317, page 5.  
Source, British Library. 
11	  Refer the Daily News, “On the Thames Embankment”. 
12 Refer the Daily News, “On the Thames Embankment”. 
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marking metal.  Metal-smiths in turn assumed a cyclopean association on the basis of the 
patch allowing them to stare, protected, one-eyed at fire.  This inhuman urban association 
no doubt points to the challenges of seeing a world made anew in the furnaces of 
modernity. 
 
For his part, Rimbaud, who lived briefly from March 1874 with Germain Nouveau at 178 
Stamford Street, Lambeth, close to Waterloo Station and across the river from the 
Embankment, had regular cause to contemplate its submerged gigantism in his daily 
traversal of the river.13  Again, the topographical vision of “Villes II” describes a river-edge, 
constructed terrain of perplexing depth and scale that pointedly evokes the Thames 
Embankment: 
 
The upper part of the city has inexplicable parts: a river from the  
sea, without boats, unfolds its blue slate water between wharves supporting 
tremendous candelabra.  A short bridge leads to a postern right under the dome of 
the Sainte-Chapelle.  This dome is an artistic framework of steel, about fifteen 
thousand feet in diameter. From a few points of the copper foot-bridges, and 
platforms and stairways surrounding the market and pillars, I thought I could 
estimate the depth of the city: this is the miracle I was not able to judge: what are 
the levels of the other parts above or below the acropolis?  For the foreigner of our 
day, reconnoitring is impossible. (2005, 331-333) 
 
Commentators have seen in the “tremendous candelabra” explicate reference to the 
Embankment and its ornamental gas lighting (Cohn 1973, p. 318) – similarly referred to at 
the time by the press as candelabra.14  Robert Greer Cohn links Rimbaud’s city vision here 
with English painter and engineer John Martin (1789-1854) whose fantasy architectural and 
landscape depictions include Belshazzar’s Feast (1821) and The Seventh Plague of Egypt 
(1823).  
 
Like Martin’s panoramas and their quest to recreate lost urban worlds where “the great 
becomes gigantic, [and] the wonderful swells into the sublime” (cited in Ray 1992, p. 44), 
what “Villes II” likewise offers is attendance to a semi-submerged gigantism.  Yet as 
suggested above, Rimbaud’s facing up to urban facticity meant more than a subjective 
accounting of it.  For as “a decentred man […] a man of the hiatus and not one of lived 
duration”, as Jacques Plessen put it (cited in Whidden, p. 136), Rimbaud’s narrator effects a 
magnification of the disparities between object reality and the visions subtending it.  The 
narrative strategy of poems like Villes II depends, not on a distancing spectatorship, but 
                                       
13 Robb notes Rimbaud and Germain’s likely daily walk at that time across the Blackfriars Bridge to 
temporary work in a box factory at Holborn.  He similarly notes Germain’s complaint of the long 
hours they spent walking and crossing “no end [of] bridges” throughout the city (2000, pp. 243-
244). 
14	  See, The Graphic, on Saturday May 21, 1870, in an article titled “A Grumble About the Thames 
Embankment”. Source, British Library. 
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looking and describing bringing forward a new scenographic real.  Beyond habitual 
perception, what Rimbaud’s narrative technique flagrantly emphasizes is the autonomous, 
revealing power of pure imagination and vision freed of real object-fields.  As Ahearn put it, 
the results are visions “seemingly unmotivated by reality, indeed superior to reality” (1983, 
p. 326).  Breaking with lived experience because its pattern and rhythm are beyond grasp, a 
hiatus within the seen forces thought to reconceive the whole that it confronts.  Yet no 
cumulative perspectivism can master or encircle the scene; instead, as Deleuze describes 
the task of modern literature, “To every perspective or point of view there must correspond 
an autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense”, a perspective that breaks open not 
just the object but the subject that beholds it in accordance with the lapse of Kant’s object = 
x (1994, p. 69; Faulkner 2006, p. 142).  Both one-eyed like the Cyclops, and monstrous 
because, one-eyed, the subject cannot coordinate the circumnavigation it is required to 
repetitiously make of the world, and is carried into the “decentred circles” persisting 
beneath lived duration – in other words, into “the lived reality of a sub-representative 
domain” (Deleuze 1994, p. 69).  Consistent with the foot and foot work as a “dark 
precursor” limpingly breaking the urban given into divergent series confounding the here-
now of the what and who of experience, Rimbaud levers against the brute quotidian an 
unmoored temporality calling up under the guise of ‘London’ qualities at once too big and 
too small, too old and yet futuristically new, too close while infinity dispersed.  Borrowing 
from Machiavelli, Barthes said of Rimbaud: “there were two different beings inside him, 
‘joined by an inconceivable jointure’” – in short a traveller and a poet  (p. 153).  
Constituting “two discontinuous languages” as companions paralleling each other, they run 
one-eyed to a horizon which, unlike the orientating terrain crafted by the Homo pictor of 
myth, can never be reconciled (p. 153).   
	  
	  
6. An Oceanic Ebb 
	  
 
Born by foot, a word-body problem inaugurated by the Christian logos hangs over 
Rimbaud’s horizonal flight.  As the Gospel of John puts it: “In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God [then…] The Word became flesh and made his dwelling 
amongst us” (1, 1-15).  For Jacques Rancière, in nineteenth century literature is found the 
persistence of an old Christian tradition in which “body and spirit go together and stand in 
opposition to the ‘dead letter’” (2009b, p. 56).  Freed from a despotic linguistic monopoly, 
the result, as he put it, is that “a vast egalitarian surface of free words” – or what amounts to 
a “limitless, indifferent chatter of the world” – both confounds the “old expressive 
conventions” and sets in play a drive to forge a “direct relationship between the potential of 
words and the potential of bodies” (p. 57).  Foucault credited Hölderlin with first 
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recognizing that “the gods had wandered off through a rift in language” leaving behind an 
ungrounded speech and bodies waiting for a relation to satisfy that rupture (1987, p. 17).  
As Rancière notes of such “speech on the march”, it “takes possession of souls, leads bodies 
and gives rhythm to their walk” (2004, p. 04).  The problem of releasing a “new harmony” 
that reconciles the wait with action and causes a “new man [to] rise up and march” is not 
only what Rimbaud sought; it is “the cardinal directions of his century” (pp. 4, 49).  Yet this 
new man is not a solitary being, it/he is the people, the last remnants of that tribe (of Israel) 
seeking union with its gods and in doing so immuring itself in the “whole of language” in 
pursuit of a utopian reconciliation (p. 65).  From the desert of words is promised the New 
City and its peopling.  Ross gives a similar prognosis on Rimbaud by way of Louis Gauny: 
the emancipatory vector is born of both the desert (or the sea as its surrogate15) and the city: 
“it is in the desert that seditious thought ferments, but it is in the city that such thought 
erupts [for…] Liberty likes extreme crowds or absolute solitude” (cited in Ross 1989, p. 21).  
If Rimbaud stands in the interstices between the old lyric project singing “the song of the 
people [with…] the salvation of bodies” and the strident assertions of “the poetical and 
political avant-gardes”, as Rancière held, he also sought that middle place Barthes called 
idiorrhythmy.  The task of his anachoritism (withdrawal) was to draw from the interminable 
heterorhythmy of the wait a reconciled communality.  Hence the acute sociability of his 
poetics (as Ross said, an “asocial” tendency toward free coalescence) that attracts, much 
like a treacherous shore, a veritable “scrapyard of a civilization” (Ross 2000, pp. 20, 233). 
 
It is useful to think of this space of all possible connection as the ocean, something David 
Wills did in his essay, “A Line Drawn in the Ocean” (2008).  There, amongst meditations on 
lines and sea, Wills endeavored to think through - both in terms of figurative ‘content’ and 
figuration as a gap or opening - Rimbaud’s “Le bateau ivre” (“The Drunken Boat”).  If 
standing on firm ground is exemplarily undone by the sea (inducing “nothing but the 
supine” as Wills noted), technologies like boats and poems about boats can be thought of as 
mechanisms for managing fluidity (2008, p. 105).  Yet oceanic life, well before a bipedal 
motility that might put bodies upright on decks, bestowed what Leroi-Gouhan coined an 
anterior existential field, and with it, a bi-symmetrical “articulation”, or the lever-action of 
fins/limbs.  Animation and motility is, as Wills emphasised, technologization from the get 
go:  
 
[…] there is technology as soon as there is limbs, as soon as there is bending of 
those limbs, as soon as there is any articulation at all.  As soon as there is 
articulation, the human has rounded the technological bend, the technological 
                                       
15	  Rimbaud himself says of the sea in “Délires” (“Delerium”): “I had to travel, to divert the 
enchantments assembled over my head. Over the sea, which I loved as if it were washing me of a 
stain” (2005, p. 295) – that stain likely being the economy of sin that so motivated Baudelaire 
(Rancière 2004, p. 55). 	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turn has occurred, and there is no more simple human. Which, for all intents and 
purposes, means there never was any simple human. (p. 03) 
 
It means too, as Wills continued: 
 
[…] the ocean will here surge in the back – and not so background as the paradox 
of a natural technology, a pretechnological technology, or technological différence 
[making…] Limitless oceanic water […] the energetic force of an essence of 
technology […]. (p. 105; emphasis in original) 
 
Otherwise “floating in technology”, as Wills put it, Oedipus, as the mediator and engineer 
of surfaces, is also a lever-arm and law wielded against an “oceanic [psychical] force” in 
the quest, as Freud had it, for an exclusive ground for civilisation (p. 105).  Yet Oedipus as 
complex, like the anterior field at large, is directional; it rests on a front-back, before-after 
trajectory, both forward-facing and fronting a blind field or behind seemingly done with.  
Yet Deleuze and Guattari’s passional regime, with its double betrayal (God and man’s) 
condenses both a flight from despotism into exile and an askance longing for return to 
despotic origins.  Along these lines, Wills attributes to Oedipus, with his “podiatrically 
challenged” gait, a problematized forwardness, one, as he says, that seems to be both 
simultaneously “limping back home and away from home from the beginning” (p. 67).  
Having “one foot caught in the earth”, as Oedipus’ dragging limb does, invokes this tension 
of a past and a soil that can’t be got free of despite an implantation of logos into the soil of 
myth.  The literal immediacy of the limp no less stands in as figure for the subsuming 
persistence of telluric forces and the lapse, as Wills says, of any “terra firma of the literal”, 
any possibility, that is, “of an operative distinction between literal and rhetorical” (p. 107).  
Oedipus’ chronically contrived hold on any kind of ground (its blatant artificiality – a limp 
consequent to a paternal riveting of ankles no less!) is nothing if not a hypostatising of the 
problems of return and forward motion as they seek a footing; he concretises in fact the 
threat of a mode of being that aspires to rise above the ground, to free itself into absolute 
knowledge – a knowledge that is self-engendered, not other-dependant – and in this bears 
the mark of what Patočka calls the “fascinosum, mysterium, tremendum”, an unspeakable 
or unrepresentable mode of being (2002, p. 55).  As such Oedipus represents a 
thaumaturgy, a miraculous work that should not have arisen, for as the Oracle had decreed, 
he would be the bearer of a “loss of humanness”, which means to say he aspires to 
encroach on, and appropriate for himself, the clarity afforded the divinities (p. 55).  So does 
Europe extend this desiring ‘anomaly’ in Patočka’s view. 
 
Wills similarly sees the European project as taking its cue from forcing wandering into 
clarity, a vector that he links to the Book of Exodus, and in the context of Moses and his 
followers fleeing the Egyptians, is defined by the capacity of a fleeing peoples to take to the 
ocean as if “walking on the dry land” (2008, p. 112).  The resulting instituting of religion as 
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a territorializing drive not only pre-empts Europe as “sectarian inheritors” of Judeo-Christian 
tradition, but it consolidates “the nonconformist walker” as an exceptionality that is the 
norm.  If this exceptionality is given concrete expression in God’s drowning of the Pharaoh 
and his army by the returning sea, it is further consolidated at Mount Sinai where the 
delivery of the law as clarity from on high stands over the domain of wandering and 
ultimately seeks to forget the tumultuous sea – for on high, even the ocean can be rendered 
a surface and pathway, one imaginable without mystery or thaumaturgy (pp. 111-113).  
Nevertheless, like temporality’s return in Oedipus, the ocean always reasserts itself for it is 
Europe’s unconscious (p. 107).  It is this that “Le bateau ivre” taps in Will’s view (p. 119), 
with its ”loosened peninsulas” giving way to a bathing in “the Poem Of the Sea” beyond 
“the stupid eye of the lighthouses” (Rimbaud 2005, pp. 129-131). And even the return at the 
poem’s conclusion to Europe – that “black Cold puddle” - doesn’t quite add up to a 
restoration of solid ground, but instead refutes the territorialisation of the seas themselves 
(held under the “pride of flags and flames” and “the terrible eyes of prison boats”; p. 135) by 
European imperialism.  The business of keeping at sea or at least staying afloat despite the 
wretched shallows, oddly enough can also be thought to show up in Régamey’s stripping, 
in the London sketch, of all territorial orientation and reference.  In the lee of “Le bateau 
ivre” – the poem that Rimbaud used to seduce Verlaine and launch his European 
derangement – the keel is well and truly broken while the Oedipal Zephyrs run flat.  Adrift 
in the observational field of the law, no less than the annonymising voice of language, 
wandering sinthom-osexuality ensures that there is no tropic distinction between the literal 
and the figurative.  Or rather, as Wills put it, “the literal has to be understood as one 
figurative position among others” (p. 126).  In other words it events simulacra all the way 
down (Deleuze 1994, p. 68).  As such, the long Occidental voyage from aspective, through 
perspective and on to psychical transpective can be thought to resolve in an inversion.  The 
incorporation triggered by Oedipus of an oceanic unknown in the form of the ‘personal’ 
unconsciousness at last ebbs and then churns out through the headlands of the self (subject 
of enunciation and the subject of the statement).  Desire channels worldward.  On the 
flipside of reality where the psyche and corporeality are merely two modes (not substances) 
of one ontological force, ‘life’ is horizonally driven to totalise through the lever action of 
motility what is perpetually untotalizable (Barbaras 2006, p 117, 127). 
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CONCLUSION 
	  
Turning Over the Times  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Man flees. First he flees something, then he flees 
all things through the unmeasured force of flight 
that transforms everything into flight. Then when 
flight has taken hold of everything [it…] makes 
the whole, by a repulsion that attracts, slip away 
in the panic reality of flight […] it is the very 
category of the whole – the one borne by the 
general question – that is unseated and made to 
falter.  
 
Maurice Blanchot, (1969) 
 
	  
	  
	  
1. What Labour in Questioning? 
	  
	  
In this work I have aimed to develop a method for thinking about how cities, motility and 
senses of self intersect historically – a method I’ve termed onto-peripatetics.  Tracing the 
genealogy of a tradition of self-conscious walking by what I’ve termed observing walkers – 
specifically writers who foreground pedestrian experience – I have sought to identify the 
origins of, or at least a deeper temporal substratum to, the relatively well-canvased 
association of walking and writing in romanticism and nineteenth century urban accounts. 
Both are progenitors to an aesthetic regime that by the twentieth century takes the urban 
itself as an aesthetic ‘object’ graspable through walking practices – inclusive of Duchamp’s 
city as readymade, the Surrealists linking ambulation with “psychic automatism”, and the 
dérives of the Lettrists and the Situationist International (Careri 2004, p.75-106).  If these 
‘movements’ evidence both a drive to uncover and possess the perturbing sensory 
distribution arising with cities – indeed a tentative grasping tuned to affective, atmospheres 
and spectacle - the initiating motivation for this inquiry was that at least as far back as 
Descartes a particular disjunction between self and world occasioned a synthesising drive 
tuned to travel, observation and written reflection.  If in this synthesis a particular cognitive 
bias prevailed over bodies, what I wanted to do was less suture thinking and extended 
substances (in fact a project Descartes himself broached in The Passions of the Soul, 1649) 
than think into that hiatus itself, to unearth the genealogy and the productivity - politically, 
aesthetically, philosophically – sustaining it.  Despite the historical nature of this study, the 
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gambit has been that thinking about and asking after walking engages with and questions 
our own time – to rework a phrase from Blanchot (1993, p. 11) – a time marked by the 
becoming-urban of the world starkly enacted at the cost of world-creation and freedom in 
Nancy’s sense.  In a beautiful meditation on the act of questioning itself, Blanchot wrote: 
“To question is to seek, and to seek is to search radically, to go to the bottom, to sound, to 
work at the bottom, and finally to uproot”, and adding that “This uprooting that holds to the 
root is the work of the question” (p. 11).  Further, uprooting means turning over the times, 
making it a site of work, and ultimately, to “turn oneself back into question” (p. 11).  It is a 
temporal work of this order that has been undertaken here, one that has found it necessary 
to go deeper than the originating edge (as complex as that is) of modernity.  It has meant 
sounding both historically and philosophically the equally complex crossover between 
mythos and logos in the context of the Greek polis. 
 
If Descartes, emblematically for modernity, asked after the ‘I’ that thinks, looking where to 
place and placate doubt, his questioning came up short because, as Goux and Negri have 
demonstrated in different ways, he failed to drive the question deeper than an 
anthropocentric surface designed to shut out the temporal perturbance coursing through his 
time.  Crafting an ontology apposite to fledgling bourgeois interests, he crossed out via a 
metaphysics of separation partisan theological dependence in favour of a proliferation of 
surface ‘bodies’ suspended partes extra partes and therefore answerable to human cognitive 
and organizational agency – an agency characterised by having or possessing, rather than 
inducing of human transformation.  Blanchot linked this type of elision, as Goux himself 
did, with Oedipus who, in answering “man” to the Sphinx’s riddle, causes a more profound 
question to disappear, to disappear in fact “into the man who bears it and into the word – 
man” (p. 18).  If this way of answering meant understanding “man as a general question” – 
a generality given by the Sphinx in terms of a normative walking progressing from infancy, 
through adulthood and into old age (four, two and three legs) – Oedipus remains ignorant of 
the “profound question” transmitted via his own disfigured walk (p. 18).  Hence he 
achieved “on the one hand, abstract clarity, that of the mind, but on the other hand, he 
plunges concretely into the abominable ignorance of his depth” (p. 18).  My response in this 
project has been to think both against the grain of a Cartesian metaphysics of separation – 
in other words to think depth-intensively – and against the vertical thrust of metaphysical 
transcendence, or what I’ve termed a metaphysical walk.  Falling-up, as Wallace termed the 
tendency for peripatetic to write out the specificity of excursion in favour of an excursus 
indicative of wholeness, consciousness and stability has been countered here (after Serres) 
by a noisy, “metaphysics of the foot” sounding out questionable instances of ground.  
Moreover, I have pursued a twofold presumption: firstly that this Greek way of questioning 
(where “the most profound question and the general question mutually seize and obscure 
one another”; p. 17) has bequeathed to the West a persistent hiatus structuring its existential 
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rhythm or gait; and secondly, that both this hiatus and its namesake are integrally tied with 
Occidental urban life.   
 
Bolstering the first of these presumptions was Serres’ claim that all cultures derive their 
existential specificity from the particular intersection they make of divergent spatial types: in 
the case of the West, he thought, Oedipus exemplified a propensity for that culture to test its 
existential placedness historically against a backdrop of wandering and journeying, and in 
doing so, to define itself according to “spatial accidents” - crossroads, deviations, swerves, 
and loops.  At its mythological origin, Oedipus then can be thought to stand as figure for the 
shadow of wounding in every discovery, or as Blanchot put it, the return of the “perfidious 
depths” at crossroad seemingly leading towards “tranquil human reign” (p. 18).  To the 
extent that the crossroad (or what amounts to nodal intersections in today’s ubiquitous 
networks) emblematises the potential to reach anywhere and everywhere, the Occident 
instils in the question – any question – “the question of everything”: hence for Blanchot, 
“where we see men, it is the question of the whole that stares at us – this is what we are 
handling and what is handling us”  (p. 16).  Yet, the question of everything (which in the 
first is instance eminently Oedipal), cannot free itself from “the panic question” that “draws 
‘everything’ into play” (no less eminently Oedipal), collapsing the draw of the whole and its 
claim to hold onto same and “singular identity” (p. 19).  To be driven by the shadow of a 
profound or panic question in every encounter, is to be caught up in a leap and flight 
whose renouncing of foothold risks falling back into what for Blanchot “is other than 
everything” – in other words what is “Entirely Other” (p. 19) - and which Deleuze (1990) 
termed first the “otherwise-Other”, or “the great Health”, and later with Guattari (2000) the 
body without organs.   
 
In a not dissimilar way, Lacoue-Labarthe has pointed to the pivotal nature of Oedipus for 
the West – a centrality whose significance he thought remains to be fully explored.  If 
Oedipus can be assumed to be the very “name for the West”, as he hypothesised, it is a 
name split between desire and work, or, on one hand, a certain libidinous eroding of 
determinate ground, and on the other, a restorative labour pursuing knowledge, truth-
seeking, and bridging amelioration.  Because Oedipus does not name one thing, but rather 
is the name for a problem in knowing what naming speaks, the West would be, by this 
account, a series of shifting relationships between these seemingly divergent terms, effected 
on the basis that they have forgotten to each recognise in the other an integral companion.  
I have sought to account for this blind companioning in a series of city settings historically, 
noting in various ways how standout figures parry with a figural that endlessly dissolves 
perambulation into an everyday that escapes record.  Time no less corrosively companions 
the name Oedipus.  Divided ‘internally’ by opposing locales on the body – foot and head – 
a nominal indetermination occasions both forgetting and a sense that there is something to 
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recover from its vacancy.  Compacted in this bifurcation is a mode of self-consciousness 
riven by both passive and active determinations – the uncertain mechanics of which drive a 
complex psychical and philosophical field, a portion of which has been canvased here.   
 
The second presumption motivating this research – that Oedipus is a figure integral to urban 
understanding – to the best of my knowledge has received lesser critical attention.  A 
pervasive tying of Oedipus to the psyche, following a still persistent mind-body partition 
introduced by the Cartesian cogito, a phenomenological demarcation arising with the 
Kantian cogito, and Freud’s ego-development, has favoured an inner, temporally subjective 
anchoring of the Oedipal implications.  In Serres’ correction of this tendency - one that 
favoured a topological reading of the Oedipal phenomenon - there is an invitation to 
pursue, specifically, spatial and motile considerations, or rather, what amounts to 
recognition of various spatio-temporal complexes confounding object-subject demarcation.  
More specifically, Oedipus’ urban association shows up in Greek tragedy as the very 
embodiment of the polis – specifically Athens as Knox identified.  In the Greek context a 
polis tyrannos was one effecting an imperial over-assertion and whose centrifugation was 
ruinous of isonomia and autarkic ideals.  Moreover, the tyrannos was figure for excesses 
running ahead of constraint and self-knowledge, and found expression in chrematistics 
where self-interest and the profit motive rode an erratic temporality that knows neither 
cyclic renewal nor eternality, but only infinite linear accumulation.  Profit-time, became 
linked with the democratic polis where political parrhēsia (with its sophistic inflation of 
opinion and immoderate persuasion) catalysed a call for the new ethical parrhēsia or 
internal accounting.  Oedipus-Athens, as bearer of a runaway temporality undermining the 
Apollonian edict to “know thyself”, and bearer of a horizontal immanence eschewing 
transcendence and temporal measure, reversed the pharmakon or scapegoat mechanism 
through self-exile and wandering.  Rendered apolis, Oedipus between Thebes and Colonus, 
it has been argued, analogously pictures an excessively porous and extended urbanity – an 
urbanism of the bad infinitive as Nancy diagnosed its eventual contemporary form.  At 
Colonus though, a reconciliation with the Athenians sees Oedipus achieve a centre and 
(foreign) ground via a secret burial whose whereabouts must be passed on, via Theseus in 
the first instance, as an occluded urban inheritance running in perpetuity.  The Oedipal 
aftereffect not only founds the democratic polis, it instances a secret or mystery on which 
urban wellbeing is said to depend.  As a phantasm ghosting the urban given, this mystery, 
indicative of pre-Classical magico-religious determinants, instituted alētheia, or unveiling as 
a key urban response, yet one shorn of its prior collective initiatory stricture.  Intersected 
with the deterritorialised social terrain fostered by apatē, the polis was made a site for 
uncovering and hunting out falsehoods via a perspectivist self-consciousness.  It was in this 
context that philosophy was instituted, substituting blind wandering for clarity and a 
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decisive motion in thought.  Metaphysics then arises as a contemporaneous, urban adjunct 
set up to account for and ameliorate an existential break with what Bakhtin referred to as 
“adventure time” in the “abstract-alien world” circumscribed by mythos.  In short, Oedipus 
is the vehicle that crosses from the “oikoumenē” or cosmologically figured household 
condensing an unequal community of mortals and immortals, into the everyday polemos or 
battleground of unconcealment characterising urban place. 
 
 
2. Dark Origination  
	  
	  
If Oedipus can be considered another name for the West, no less than it is integrally tied to 
walking, cities and the emergence of philosophy, the potential and difficulty of this research 
has rested on how to account for its persistence without imbuing it with representational 
fixity, and in turn, imparting to the historiography pursed here a dialectical inevitability or 
telos – precisely the thing Blanchot’s profound or panic question cuts away from generality.  
My answer has been to propose an Oedipal vector traversing myth, tragedy, aesthetics, 
psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis, a vector or part mechanism that operates by repeatedly 
folding the arcane into the contemporary consistent with what Deleuze and Guattari (1990) 
termed a disjunctive synthesis.  To the extent that the disjunctive synthesis is concerned 
with the problem of prolonging a plethora of passive syntheses (narcissistic egos or larval 
selves subsisting solely through habit in the present) sufficiently to invoke experiential 
duration, and with it, memory, it pits the present against a past in general that is not 
equivalent to it and which demands some form of reconciliation.  If as Deleuze claimed 
habit (Eros) and memory (Mnemosyne) constitute the two legs on which the self is 
ultimately bourn – green and red legs respectively – their divergent rhythm (one surging 
forward, the other conditioning, limiting the difference the first draws off) imparts to this self 
a limp or impaired grasp of the given.  At its most general level I have referred to this halting 
gait as an alienation-possession couplet – in other words a problem of recognition and the 
‘style’ of that problem’s resolution.  At stake is the recovery of an active understanding from 
out of sensory indeterminacy, but always with Oedipus it is a matter of how recognition is 
maintained across a hiatus.  The Oedipal vector then is that conditioning mechanism that 
resolves in varying stylistic generalities – tragedy, anthropocentric cognition, caesura, 
sublimation. 
  
With this in mind I commenced this study thinking about the Oedipal vector in topological 
terms as something inducing potentially endless empirical figures while never exhausting its 
particular figural persistence – no doubt there are Oedipus’ everywhere and of everything as 
Deleuze and Guattari claimed (2000, p. 217).  Picking up on topology’s first instancing in 
Königsberg as a walking problem in which Euler sought to predict how a single linear path 
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might traverse the plethora of paths making up the city, I saw in the notion of a linear 
trajectory simplifying urban complexity (the one way or royal road) and the constant 
parrying of that transiting line with an unmasterable complication, a broadly Oedipal 
problem.  The Oedipal vector, I said, was what variously implicated Eulerian and non-
Eulerian series and motivations historically.  Plainly the Eulerian route in modernity has run 
- in accordance with the generality of transport, the circulation of equivalence, and 
maintenance of certain operational sameness - all the way to the planetary scale, though 
not without inducing a similarly scaled non-Eulerian complex – or what can be thought of 
as compounding immanence.  
 
If metaphysics sought, in varying ways, to run a Eulerian line at a transcendent level, it was 
Kant who, closing off that avenue, instead imported a transcendental function into the 
subject.  The self divided between noumenal and empirical versions replicated the 
Cartesian demarcation but internally where a “mind-body dualism” within the cogito 
harbours an a-temporal, active agent and a passive one that “is nothing more than time” 
(Faulker 2006, p 23).  In turn I have followed Deleuze in his revision of this split subject 
and his vesting of sensation and passive syntheses in pre-conscious determinations prior to 
any a priori understanding.  Phantasms, or what Deleuze called dark precursors, shape 
“obscure impressions” into pre-representational figures that only contingently arise as 
objects breaking into conscious awareness - not through the unified action of that 
consciousness (pp. 26-28).  Kant’s “object = x” - the formula defining how noumenal, and 
therefore unknowable, objects run a line into phenomenal awareness where they are picked 
up and unified by the ‘I think’ – and Deleuze’s renovation of that notion which replaced 
infinite understanding on the theologically inflected transcendental side with an unthought 
and ultimately unthinkable unconscious (p. 74), I have further extemporised with the notion 
of the walker = x.  The urban object, itself a thing exemplarily rich in contradictory 
intensities, attributes and perspectives, has long been held up as model for forms of 
theological and reasoned unity, while the observer-walker, a receptive agent set on reading 
into and through the multiplex dimensions of the urban thing, has variously attempted 
transcendental abridgments.  This project commenced by charting precisely such an 
abridgement found in the inaugural, textual intersecting of philosophy and the polis where a 
walking commentary is made to span, via split footwork, mythos and logos.  Plato’s 
metaphysical walk in the Republic, pitched against Oedipal tyranny and yet Oedipal in its 
own takeover of cognitive agency from myth, configured a Eulerian walk running up and 
down between Ideas and appearance, in an attempt to bypass the non-Eulerian mise-en-
abyme through the a-temporal mechanism of double-seeing.  In a trajectory that broadly 
runs from Platonism to naturalism, and in turn, from the metaphysical walk to modernity’s 
promenade métaphysique, various instances of split footwork have been tracked: Descartes’ 
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bourgeois-Arcadian span, Defoe’s colonial-other abridgment, Rousseau’s stepping between 
history and a-temporal, originary man, Baudelaire’s parrying with the borderline splitting of 
market society and a programming narcissism, and Rimbaud’s surfacing of the submerged 
perceptual phantoms companioning London’s terra incognito.  
 
 
 
3. “An-Ethics”  
 
 
The walker = x, extended as discourse, is inseparable from superlinearity and the 
overcoding of gestural repertoires by written language – a linearisation underwriting the 
signifying regime and its despotic totalisation of the semiotic field.  Yet the Oedipal West, 
itself the bearer of a unique mode of historiography and temporal relation no less than a 
societal and mercantile immanence gnawing away at the despotic body wherever it 
coalesces, imparts a passional tincture to the resonance of language with monopolistic 
power.  Defined by the capacity to depart, betray or turn a back on settled states (and 
States), this passional impulse, as Patočka (1996) has suggested, is the source of history-
making and a freedom arising with a break with models of perenniality.  Nancy (2007) 
similarly recognises this freedom as resulting in a “denaturalization of history” or rather an 
overcoming of natural, cyclical ‘history’.  This has required living in the mode of “radical 
questioning” and with the consequences of a slide into a needing-to-be-sounded 
immanence.  That is the legacy modernity takes up and deepens and it is what both makes 
“internal, subjective experience” pivotal and what drives it towards “ungrounded 
experience” or the questioning of presence, origins and determinate purpose (Lawlor 2011, 
p. 92).  Phenomenology pursues this freedom by leaping free of a natural attitude and ontic 
states into transcendental pre-conditions of experience, though not without reifying 
consciousness (Lawlor 2013, p 185).  The scriptural economy, as a place of islanding and 
mediation with immanence – a place for sorting out one’s place and for turning a world 
about that place – runs a precarious course out of despotism and into the capitalist shoals.  
Neither solid ground, nor the sandy shore, nor even wade-able shallows, the scriptural-self 
runs across the acute deterritorialisation of language itself whose drop-off is unfathomable.  
Deeper than the impersonal semblance of apatē and crowding, anonymous opinion 
rumouring and running streets and media-ways, this language speaking through the subject 
makes the self itself a detour.  Oedipus, the Greek Cain, is a creature of flight, and what gets 
pulled into flight is the whole of things, the whole signifying arrangement preceding it; 
stealing away makes, as Blanchot asserted, reality appear as a whole, and a whole that is 
lost (p. 21) – or what Deleuze rethinking the phallus, identified as a perishing good.  
Contrary to an anachoritism seeking refuge simply in solitariness, the flight of the whole 
gives up a crowd: 
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[…] belonging to flight makes of being a crowd, an impersonal multiplicity, a non-
presence without subject: the unique self that I am gives way to an indefiniteness that 
is paradoxically always growing, that sweeps me along and dissolves me in flight.  At 
the same time, the empty self that is undone in the crowd in flight remains solitary, 
without support, without contour, fleeing itself in everyone who flees: an immense 
solitude of flight where no one accompanies anyone else. (Blanchot 1993, p. 22) 
 
This doubling of the crowd and the unattended mimes Deleuze and Guattari’s a-signifying 
regime where the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation, like the Kantian 
subject scythed into temporal and a-temporal selves, turns one through the other in a 
haltering progression (see figure 7), or better, a stationary flight as Blanchot preferred, one 
where “a given people” caught in a “simultaneity without constancy” front “a fleeting 
reality” (p. 22).  Keeping this all on the level is Oedipal amelioration and a surfacing that 
circles the globe striving for a becoming-equal to the petit and not so petit ruptures of 
decoding.  Half turned towards a long-lost (and belatedly longed-for) despotism, and half 
turned towards new beginnings, the whole a-signifying rig is powered by as a comic-tragic 
torque finding its measure and perpetuation in exchange value where nothing can remain 
outside the reign of monetary equivalence.   
 
Nevertheless, I have aimed to show that while the passional inflects accounts of city-
walking from the start, and that these accounts condense a reality or world-making of a 
different measure; in varying ways, they speculate on and therefore event the urban – much 
as Oedipus events by implanting a vacancy into the present.  From Plato to Rimbaud, the 
seen passes through the seer, a beyond-seeing pried open by the object = x (whether 
transcendent or immanent).  Beyond the mass circulation of generalities, the walker stands 
out as a key if anachronistic lever whose becoming-equal potentiates going beyond tragic-
comic repetition of the agora-market at full extension in a speculation running past 
speculative gain.  These accounts variously call up violence, for speaking (writing in fact) 
about cities as if they had been walked plays a betrayer’s game with the seen.  Writing isn’t 
the speech of the seen because it cuts, incises a line that runs deeper than the psychological 
subject and the ontic appearing of things (Lawlor 2013, p. 181).  If beneath the auto-
affection of reflective force, there is only hetero-affection, as I’ve examined in relation to 
Rimbaud, the outside of language floods the I think, marking it speak in a multitude of 
voices and through a plethora of disjunctive perspectives.  Auto-affection, in its constituting 
of one who thinks, finds itself beside, touched by, doubled with other(s) in a distancing 
analogous to a bipedal reach that cuts all place-presence into a here-there, then-now 
spanning (p. 183).  If the cognitive pole of Oedipus signals a will to overpower the 
disjunction and voluntarily get to the bottom of divergent appearances, paradoxically, via 
dianoia, the corporeal pole contributes an involuntary momentum and blindness rich in 
indiscernible mixtures always ready to overcome the rise of thought towards its end.  The 
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walk, despite all best intention – in Plato’s case a delivery of the Good – remains in the 
middle on a line without origin or end carried on a heterogeneous gait rich in loose ends 
and unsynthesised threads.  Encouragingly, as Blanchot held, walking’s advance is always a 
“crab’s progress”, a seeking that sidles and turns (1993, p. 32).  Adapting Lawlor’s reading 
of Deleuze, walking could be said to reverse Platonism from the start, turning the 
metaphysical imposition of arché and telos, and therefore a world without loose ends, 
towards a less violent resolution where remainders abound.  Yet in the run from Platonism 
to immanence the cost is a counter-effectuation that dissolves the self in its reach for the 
future.  At stake is a becoming-equal to a world-encircling given to ever more rapid thanatic 
repetitions exercised for the sheer pleasure of it.  Beyond this bad-infinity, the city ought not 
to be a thing to be unveiled or restored, nor net-worked to infinity, but manifested anew, ex 
nihilo, meaning, as Nancy suggested, made according to a world-becoming falling short of 
the world formation and totalisation ambitioned by metaphysics, onto-theologies and 
univocal value systems (2007, p. 51).   
 
Uprooting and “detheologising”, if there is an enduring promise in the Oedipal vector it 
rests on the eventing of a present that calls out for an ethos or attitude that looks to extant 
limits and an experimental “going beyond” (Foucault 1997, p. 319).  Against the Platonic 
quest for a city of justice, at stake may be an injustice of a very specific type, a counter-
ethics, or what Eleanor Kaufman has called, in the context of Tournier’s Robinson Crusoe 
and the surrender to the perverse or otherwise-Other structure of Speranza, “an-ethics” - an 
ethics that allows for the (urban) world to be left open to the upstand of time (2012, p. 114).  
It is this that returns Oedipus as cliché or as stereotype back towards the phantasms and 
intensities that ground its alternative corporeal semiotics, and where a care of the soul might 
meet its Klossowskian other.  Against a “logic of dispossession and […] concealment”, the 
three-part constituents of the (Platonic) soul may be understood to resolve into a contrary 
third-ness unable to be possessed by anyone (Rancière 2011, p. 15).  Whereas Rancière 
understood this third-ness to be a mode of translation always already driven by an inherent 
distance mediating and undoing any neat partition between observation and action, the 
potential I hope this work has opened up is recognition of the inherent temporality of this 
third-ness.  Cities, neither yielding to a Eulerian logic of “straight, uniform transmission” (p. 
14) (and pursuit of a paternal simultaneity – ‘now!’), nor offering a riotous terrain waiting to 
give, from the street up, a new fraternal community (out of the “crushed and mechanized 
man of the great metropolises” as Deleuze described; 1998, p. 74), might be understood 
instead as so many paths given to difficult passage.  These impasses, contrary to an Oedipal 
urbanism attracted to every (city) wall as a site of breeching and burst-through in the name 
of a universal, mobile subject and a general economy of nomadism (Rancière 2004, p. 162), 
show up as places of political traction, frictional sites whose immobility demands a squaring 
The Gait of the City: Oedipus and Impressions of Modernity  Conclusion 
  
Page 235 
up to what is perpetually without equal – an indeterminate motility in time itself.  It is this 
that seems key in walking’s transition to an aesthetic practice in the twentieth century and 
to which an onto-peripatetic broached here may yet avail itself.     
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